you mean such as the person, to whom they are proposed, understands sufficiently to be truths revealed by God. But how then can he possibly choose but believe them? Or how is it not an apparent contradiction, that a man should disbelieve what himself understands to be a truth; or any Christian what he understands or but believes to be testified by God? D. Potter might well think it superfluous to tell you this is damnable; because indeed it is impossible. And yet one may very well think, by your saying, as you do hereafter, that “the impiety of heresy consists in calling God's truth in question," that this should be your meaning. Or do you esteem all those things sufficiently presented to his understanding as Divine truths, which by you, or any other man, or any company of men whatsoever, are declared to him to be so? I hope you will not say so; for this were to oblige a man to believe all the churches, and all the men in the world, whensoever they pretend to propose Divine revelations. D. Potter, I assure you from him, would never have told you this neither. Or do you mean by sufficiently propounded as Divine truths, all that your church propounds for such? That you may not neither; for the question between us is this: whether your church's proposition be a sufficient proposition? And therefore, to suppose this, is to suppose the question; which you know in reasoning is always á fault. Or, lastly, do you mean (for I know not else what possibly you can mean) by sufficiently presented to his understanding, as revealed by God, that which, all things considered, is so proposed to him, that he might, and should, and would believe it to be true and revealed by God, were it

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not for some voluntary and avoidable fault of his own that interposeth itself between his under standing and the truth presented to it: this is the best construction that I can make of your words; and, if you speak of truths thus proposed and rejected, let it be as damnable as you please to deny or disbelieve them. But then I cannot but be amazed to hear you say, that D. Potter never tells you whether there be any other points of faith, besides those which we are bound to believe explicitly, which a man may deny or disbelieve, though they be sufficiently presented to his understanding as truths revealed or testified by Almighty God; seeing the light itself is not more clear than D. Potter's declaration of himself for the negative in this question, p. 245-250, of his book where he treats at large of this very argument, beginning his discourse thus: "It seems fundamental to the faith, and for the salvation of every member of the church, that he acknowledge and believe all such points of faith, as whereof he may be convinced that they belong to the doctrine of Jesus Christ. To this conviction he requires three things: clear revelation, sufficient proposition, and capacity and understanding in the hearer. For want of clear revelation, he frees the church before Christ, and the disciples of Christ, from any damnable error, though they believed not these things, which he that should now deny were no Christian. To sufficient proposition he requires two things: 1. That the points be perspicuously laid open in themselves. 2. So forcibly, as may serve to remove reasonable doubts to the contrary, and satisfy a teachable mind concerning it, against the

principles in which he hath been bred to the con. trary. This proposition (he says) is not limited to the pope or church, but extended to all means whatsoever, by which a man may be convinced in conscience, that the matter proposed is Divine revelation; which he professes to be done sufficiently, not only when his conscience doth expressly bear witness to the truth; but when it would do so, if it were not choked and blinded by some unruly and unmortified lust in the will: the difference being not great between him that is wilfully blind, and him that knowingly gainsayeth the truth. The third thing he requires, is capacity and ability to apprehend the proposal, and the reasons of it: the want whereof excuseth fools and madmen, &c. But where there is no such impediment, and the will of God is sufficiently pro pounded, there (saith he) he that opposeth is convinced of error; and he who is thus convinced, is an heretic; and heresy is a work of the flesh, which excludeth from salvation (he means without repentance). And hence it followeth, that it is fundamental to a Christian's faith, and necessary for his salvation, that he believes all revealed truths of God, whereof he may be convinced that they are from God." This is the conclusion of D. Potter's discourse; many passages whereof you take notice of in your subsequent disputations, and make your advantage of them. And therefore I cannot but say again, that it amazeth me to hear you say, that he declines this question, and never tells you whether or no there be any other points of faith, which being sufficiently propounded as Divine revelations, may be denied and disbelieved. He tells you plainly, there are none such; and

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therefore you cannot say that he tells you not whether there be any such. Again, it is almost as strange to me, why you should say, this was the only thing in question, whether a man may deny or disbelieve any point of faith, sufficiently presented to his understanding as a truth revealed by God. For to say, that any thing is a thing in question, methinks, at the first hearing of the words, imports, that it is by some affirmed, and denied by others. Now you affirm, I grant; but what protestant ever denied, that it was a sin to give God the lie? which is the first and most obvious sense of these words. Or, which of them ever doubted, that to disbelieve is then a fault, when the matter is so proposed to a man, that he might and should, and were it not for his own fault, would believe it? Certainly, he that questions either of these, justly deserves to have his wits called in question. Produce any one protestant that ever did so, and I will give you leave to say, it is the only thing in question. But then I must tell you, that your ensuing argument, viz. To deny a truth witnessed by God is damnable, but of two that disagree, one must of necessity deny some such truth, therefore one only can be saved-is built upon a ground clean different from this postulate. For though it be always a fault to deny what either I do know, or should know, to be testified by God; yet that, which by a cleanly conveyance you put in the place hereof, to deny a truth witnessed by God simply, without the circumstance of being known or suffici¬ ently proposed, is so far from being certainly damnable, that it may be many times done without any the least fault at all. As if God should

testify something to a man in the Indies, I that had no assurance of this testification should not be For in such cases the rule Idem est non esse et non ap all, and not to appear to "If I had not come and

obliged to believe it. of the law hath place, parere; not to be at me, is to me all one. spoken unto you (saith our Saviour) you had had no sin."

10. As little necessity is there for that which follows: that" of two disagreeing in a matter of faith, one must deny some such truth." Whether by [such] you understand, testified at all by God or, testified or sufficiently propounded. For it is very possible, the matter in controversy may be such a thing where God hath not at all declared himself, or not so fully and clearly, as to oblige all men to hold one way; and yet be so overvalued by the parties in variance, as to be esteemed a matter of faith, and one of those things, of which our Saviour says," He that believeth not shall be damned," Who sees not that it is possible two churches may excommunicate and damn each other for keeping Christmas ten days sooner or later; as well as Victor excommunicated the churches of Asia, for differing from him about Easter-day? and yet I believe you will confess, that God had not then declared himself about Easter, nor hath now about Christmas. And ciently some good catholic bishops excommuni cated and damned others for holding there were antipodes; and in this question I would fain know on which side was the sufficient proposal.The contra-remonstrants differ from the remonstrants about the point of predetermination as a matter of faith; I would know in this thing also, which way