to see that if the offender in the duel with Marshall, had been a political editor opposed to Governor Seward, the enforcing of the conviction under such circumstances, would have been regarded as an act of personal and political retaliation. No one can suppose he would have enforced it under such circumstances. But Colonel Webb, the offender in this case, was a personal and political friend of Governor Seward's, and his editorial controversies had made many relentless enemies. Colonel Webb having, like many others, made himself liable to the penalties of this law, probably without being aware of its existence, those enemies, unconscious, without doubt, of the motives which influenced them, demanded the rigorous application of the obsolete statute. The governor showed, in this instance, that he was not afraid to do in the case of a friend, what all men who knew his impartiality and magnanimity, would have expected him to do toward an adversary. He pardoned Colonel Webb. In the case of Rathbun, he would not pardon, because, among other principal reasons, the offender had moved in high circles and had powerful friends. In the case of Webb, he pardoned notwithstanding he occupied an elevated position and was surrounded by influential friends. In both instances he showed his coolness and courage in resisting popular clamor, when satisfied that justice demanded such resistance.

Governor Seward's principles in the exercise of the veto power, may be learned by reference to his messages* delivered on the several occasions when he assumed its exercise. The D'Hauteville case will serve as an illustration.

A lady of large wealth, a resident of Boston, while travelling in Europe, had married a French gentleman, by the name of D'Hauteville, of greater respectability than of fortune. One child was the fruit of this connection. She separated from her husband, and returned to America, in 1840, bringing her child with her. D'Hauteville appeared in Bos

*See Vol. II., pp. 374, 379, 426, &c.

ton, and demanded her return to Europe, insisting, in case of refusal, on the custody of his child. The friends of the lady, designing that she should take refuge in the state of New York, procured a hurried passage of an act by the legislature of this state, then in session, providing that where an American woman should be married to a foreigner who should propose to require her, with his children, to remove to Europe, the court of chancery should have the power to interpose and take charge of the children and their fortune. A veto from Governor Seward arrested the passage of this bill,* upon the ground that no nation could wisely or justly make a discrimination in its laws regulating parental or other domestic relations, on the ground of the alienage of either of the parties—a decision the wisdom and soundness of which few can doubt.

With the return of an opposition to the legislature, came, of course, a desire for the benefits to be derived from the enjoyment of the state printing. An act was passed removing Thurlow Weed from the office of state printer, which he held, under a contract authorized by law. Governor Seward interposed his veto† promptly, on the ground of the inhibition, in the constitution of the United States, of the passage of laws by the states impairing the obligation of contracts.

But while he thus exercised the veto-power to arrest inconsiderate and unconstitutional legislation, he declined interfering in cases of pure legislative discretion, as has been seen in his action on the New York registry bill, and in his consent, against his own opinions, to the act of 1842, suspending the public works. In such cases, however, he insisted on the right of stating the grounds of his qualified approval of bills, in the message communicating the executive assent. It must be left to impartial public opinion, free from the bias of temporary excitement, to decide between him and the legislature, on their refusal to receive such messages and enter them on their journal.‡

* See Vol. II., p. 374. † See Vol. II., p. 426.

See Vol. II., p. 411.

CHAPTER XIII.

GOVERNOR, CONTINUED

-SLAVERY-
-FUGITIVES-

JURY-TRIAL

-VIRGINIA CONTROVERSY· - COLORED VOTERS KIDNAP

PING

- NORTHRUP CASE-ELECTION OF 1840-HENRY CLAY

- POLITICAL AFFAIRS- RENOMINATION DECLINED.

IN his administration of the state government, Governor Seward took a firm and dignified attitude against the institution of slavery. He labored to clear the statute-books of every provision which authorized holding a man in slavery, in any form, or on any pretext. His devotion to the principles of freedom at length accomplished the work which had been so nobly commenced by the admirable statesman John Jay, in 1795. The law, which permitted a master, travelling through the state with his slaves, to retain them for the space of nine months, was repealed through his influence. It was this repeal by which the slaves in the recent Lemon case, who had been brought from Virginia to the city of New York, in order to be shipped to Texas, were saved from perpetual bondage.

Governor Seward also procured the passage of an act by the legislature, allowing the benefit of a jury-trial to persons claimed as fugitive slaves. He defended this right with his usual fervid eloquence, and it was mainly through his efforts that it was incorporated in the policy of the state. At a subsequent period, when the fugitive-slave bill was debated in the United States senate, he labored to have a similar provision engrafted in its details.

An act was also passed, at his instance, prohibiting state officers from participating in actions for the recovery of fugitive slaves, and denying the use of the public jails for

their detention. He held that these were actions under the constitution and laws of the United States, and should, therefore, be executed only by the United States marshals and judges in United States courts, and that imprisonments they might order should be in United States prisons, if such could be found. Although the supreme court of the United States pronounced these laws to be unconstitutional, they were clearly founded on the eternal principles of right and justice. They will form an enduring memorial of the wise humanity of Governor Seward, and of his heartfelt devotion to the spirit of freedom, as embodied in the Declaration of Independence.

It was through his agency, moreover, that a law was enacted, in 1840, for the recovery of free colored citizens of New York who should be kidnapped into slavery. This law authorized the governor to employ an agent for the aid of such persons, securing their restoration to liberty. It was under the provisions of this act, that H. B. Northrup, Esq., of Washington county, New York, in January, 1853, procured the liberty of Solomon, a colored man, long a member of his family, who twelve years ago had been inveigled to the city of Washington, and there kidnapped and sold into slavery.

Among Governor Seward's last official recommendations to the legislature, was an amendment of the constitution of the state, by which the freehold qualification required of citizens of the African race, as a condition of exercising the right of suffrage, should be abolished. He based this recommendation on the principles of natural justice. And he urged the necessity of granting the right of suffrage to every class of persons subject to the laws of the state, and the safety with which it could be thus extended where a system of universal education had already been established. It is to be regretted that on the revision of the constitution, in 1846, this recommendation was found to have anticipated public sentiment for an indefinite period of time. But that

Governor Seward's recommendation on this point will yet be adopted and incorporated into the constitution of the state, there can not be a doubt.

The course of Governor Seward in regard to these measures was an agreeable surprise to the abolitionists, who had failed to obtain any pledge from him during the preliminary canvass. His noble position in the "Virginia case" was adapted to win the admiration of every lover of freedom.*

The outlines of this case may be briefly given as follows: In 1839, a vessel from Norfolk, Virginia, on arriving near the port of New York, was found to contain a slave, who had secreted himself in the hold. He was taken and conveyed back to bondage. Three colored seamen belonging to the vessel, who had expressed their sympathy with the fugitive, were charged with having conveyed him out of the state by stealth. Affidavits were made to that effect in Norfolk. A requisition, based on these affidavits, was made by the lieutenant-governor of Virginia upon the governor of New York, for the surrender of the accused, in accordance with the provisions of the constitution of the United States, and the act of Congress of 1793, concerning fugitives from justice. Before the requisition was presented to Governor Seward, the parties had been arrested in the city of New York; but, having been brought before Robert H. Morris, the recorder of the city, on a writ of habeas corpus, were discharged by him on the ground of the insufficiency of the affidavits to justify their detention. The lieutenant-governor of Virginia, however, persisted in the requisition, demanding that the governor of New York should surrender the persons as fugitives from justice. Governor Seward replied that they had been discharged from arrest in due course of law, and that the affidavits in support of the requisition were informal and insufficient. At the same time, he admitted that these affidavits could be replaced by new affidavits, or a formal indictment. Disdaining, however, to stand upon

*See "Virginia Controversy," Vol. II., pp. 449-516.