truded upon

this colony against its.will -men, who, by propagating mistaken doctrines, may expose it to the most imminent peril; who, to effect their evangelical projects, would willingly involve us in ruin, and triumph in the flames! Christianity is not so much their object as to enforce their own vile and narrow distinctions, as contemptible as the tub from which their doctrines are generally delivered. The letter of the committee of the lords of council for foreign trade to his Majesty, on this

66

occasion, states it, as contrary to the principles of toleration established in "this kingdom;" as well might the thiev ish cur complain of intolerance, who was hanged for sucking eggs ar murdering poultry! Toleration, indeed! to look on while these designing knaves were effecting our ruin. We know not upon what honest principle his Majesty's ministers could have advised the suspension of this law, when they well know that the board of controul of the East Indies, that favoured colony, are so entirely of our way of thinking, that they have without animadversion from government, issued the most peremptory orders to send all the missionaries home on the slightest appearance of disturbance. We would ask Lord Castlereagh if this be toleration? but, alas! the West India islands are the foot-balls of ministry.

We know not what their lordships mean by no regular clergymen being provided for, as they cannot be ignorant that one for each parish has a very handsome provision, besides considerable emoluments.

REMARKS BY THE EDITOR.

That the slave-holders of Jamaica who have done every thing in their power to prevent the abolition of the Slave trade, should endeavour to introduce a code of intolerance in our West India islands, is only act ing in character; and that their hirelings should lavish every species of abuse on those whose benevolent efforts have a tendency to promote the comfort of the negroes in this life, and their welfare in the life to come, is nothing more than might be expected. The labours of the

methodists it is well known have tended to promote both of these desirable ends, and, it may be added, without any detriment to the interests of the planters; but no principles however intolerant; no slander however malignant, from Jamaica planters, or the editors of Jamaica Gazettes, need excite surprise. But what must be the surprise, the indignation, and the contempt of every friend to truth, to toleration, to decency, on reading similar lan guage to that we have quoted, in a modern publication, conducted by men of learning and talents, the professed friends of religion and toleration! The following extracts may, however, enable our readers to determine,-who is the most deserving of censure for his intolerant calumnies, the Editor of the Jamaica Gazette, or the Editor of the Edin burgh Review,

"We are a good deal amused indeed with the extreme disrelish which Mr. Styles exhibits to the humour and pleasantry with which he admits the methodists, that nest of consecrated coblers, to have been attacked; that it is not the practice with the but Mr. Styles should remember, destroyers of vermin to allow the little victims a veto upon the wea pons used against them. If this were otherwise, we should have one set of vermin banishing small tooth combs; another protesting against mouse-traps; a third prohibiting the finger and thumb; a fourth exclaiming against the intolerable infamy of using soap and water. It is im possible, however, to listen to such pleas. They must all be caught, killed, and cracked, in the manner, and by the instruments which are found most efficacious to their de struction, and the more they cry out, the greater plainly is the skill used against them,

"When men, whose proper talk is of pullocks, pretend to bave wis

IN THE LATE AND PRESENT WAR.

[From the Edinburgh Review.]

"The missionaries complain of intolerance. A weasel might as well complain when he is throttled for sucking eggs!*

The above extracts may serve for a specimen of the manner in which the body of the methodists, and the missionary societies have been treated by the Edinburgh Reviewers. The whole article is written in a strain of abusive cowardice, and in language only fitting for the critics of Billingsgate. The Reviewer dared not meet the distinguishing principles and conduct of the persons he reprobates, and therefore he most foully slanders them. We are by no means insensible to the weaknesses and follies of methodists or missionaries, but we will at the same time affirm, that a misrepresentation more gross of the principles and conduct of either, was never given to the world than that contained in the article we have quoted; and we may safely add, that if such misrepresentation, is not as wilful as it is gross, not the most illiterate of the nest of consecrated coblers;" or the greatest blockhead" amongst the "preaching ironmongers," could, When" lecturing on theology," disCover greater ignorance on the subject, than those polite scholars, those learned dictators, the Edinburgh Reviewers, have discovered throughout the whole of the article on the subjects of "Methodists and Mission"aries."

Edinburgh Review, No. 47, for April. From a similarity of sentiment and style, one might be led to conclude, that the Editor of the Jamaica Gazette is an ocCasional writer in the Edinburgh Review!

It must be confessed, that the prospect is at present sufficiently gloomy for the in so far as her interests are connectcontinent of Europe and for England ed with the fortunes of her neighbours, France is surrounded either with states who murmur in silence, and vent their indignation at her oppressions in solita ry and impotent curses; or with nations favourably disposed to her, willing to aid her miquities, and well pleased to share things has been brought about by the mutual jealousies of the great continental powers, by their want of principle to wards their weaker neighbours, and by their domestic corruptions-the profligacy of their governments—the obstinate infatuated resistance to those improvements which alone could have opposed an effectual barrier to the conquests of the French revolution. These are the remote causes of the almost universal dominion which has crowned the darings and the crimes of our enemy. But we must look nearer home for his accomcontinent into his hands, when they plices-for those who have betrayed the might have saved it by their prudence from the certain destruction of premature and insulated efforts-united it by the justice and forbearance of their councils-and rendered it powerful as❤ sistance by a disinterested and generous Placed at a distance from the petty quarrels of application of their resources. the different courts; exempted from all suspicion of ambitious views; destined by her situation to derive advantage only from peaceful intercourse with every neighbours forbidden, by the nature of things to reap any benefit from that in good in return; enjoying a high charac tercourse, without conferring an equal ter among all nations for honour and ge nerosity; too weak by land to excite any jealousy; by sea too powerful to have any rival; capable, by her resources, of turning the balance when it hung even though unable to act alone:-England, at the beginning of the last war, stood in the very situation which the fancy of a statesman would have selected, had he been required to choose one for a common umpire of national disputes!—And

in their fruits. This calamitous state of

how does she stand now, when an account of her talent is demanded of her? and by what steps has she fallen from her eminence, and made herself an accessary to the subjugation of Europe? Let us not shrink from this reckoning; for it is only by retracing those steps, that any hope remains of regaining the situation she has lost, and of preserving a rallying point for national independence in better times.

The war began against the French revolution in aid of Austria and Prussia, who had attacked France with the avowed object of dictating a form of government to its inhabitants, and with a design, perfectly well understood, of seizing upon some of its provinces. Admitting that the former purpose was justifiable, every adinixture of the latter should have been scrupulously guarded against; and the only way at once to accomplish the one, and to disavow and banish all thoughts of the other, was to place the exiled family and nobles at the head of the combined operations. England should never have become a party to any invasion of France, which was not accompanied by this pledge of the purity of the principles in which it originated. Nor should she have expected to succeed in the undertaking, by measures which must of necessity unite every class of men in France against her, Accordingly, the allies were soon reduced to act on the defensive; and a coalition, formed upon selfish grounds, was dissolved by the first serious reverses.

But Austria, though deserted by Prussia, and driven out of the Netherlands, was still entire; and England, though she had failed in her attempts to rescue Holland, was possessed of resources which, in the hands of a bold and sagacious leader, might have checked the victories of her enemy, and enabled her ally to retreat with honour from the contest. But then began the reign of contradiction and imbecility. Then came into vogue the doctrine of British objects, and the practice of fighting blindfolded. We no longer dared to hope for a counter revolution in France; we discovered, that the more she was attacked, the stronger she grew: yet we were afraid of allowing Austria to make peace; and, while we pretended that she was continuing the war to regain her lost provinces, and make a barrier for Holland, we avoided every measure which could effectually assist her in the pursuit of these

great objects. The burning of a few ships at Toulon,--the capture of Corsica and Minorca,-a descent to destroy sluices at Ostend,--the easy conquest of some islands in the West Indies,-the seizure of other settlements with the pleasing approbation of their owners,→ the Cape-Ceylon-Pondicherry; or, as if to shew that it was the importance only, and not the difficulty of the enterprize, which deterred us from invading France directly-a long, hopeless, costly and murderous war against climate and pestilence in St. Domingo:-These were the objects on which the whole of our force was squandered; while the enemy was, in a single morning well spent on the Adige or the Rhine, redeeming all, those petty losses as surely as if he had extorted from us the treaty of surrender, and at the same time causing our allies to tremble on their thrones. Hence that character which we began to acquire, among foreign nations, of selfish policy,-of only intermeddling with their concerns when somewhat might be got by it for ourselves,—of looking at the balance of power with eyes rather better accustomed to the scales of a counter,

of always loving to drive a little trade, happen what would to the cause of Europe,-of hankering constantly after some dirty bit of gain-something in the sugar and ship line-and undervaluing, as quite unprofitable, whatever operations of the copartnery only tended to the discomfiture of the enemy, without making a figure in the balance-sheet of our own books. Hence, too, another imputation, equally well founded, (but to the country of Marlborough and Wolfe as galling as it was new), that whatever England might do by sea, on shore she was insignificant; for, in truth, our arms were only successful, where conquest was equally easy and useless: and we had always so many irons in the firesuch an infinity of small jobs going on at once that when, by some unaccountable accident, we, upon one or two occasions, tried to carry a point of real difficulty, we failed, in a manner if possible more disgraceful for ourselves than it was injurious to the common cause.

During the sad period in question, our activity was boundless and incessant. Indolence and parsimony are perhaps the only faults of which we could never be accused. The bustle of our dock yards was dreadful. The pressgang ne ver ceased from troubling. The marches

war.

and counter-marches of troops gave the country every outward appearance of We had recruiting, and drafting, and balloting, in perpetual successionloans and taxes by the dozen. Scarce a 'session passed without some new military system; and we generally invented at the rate of two systems of finance per annum. Nor did all this preparation end in nothing. Our harbours were under an almost weekly embargo. There was as regularly the secret expedition,' as if it were some part of the island. Our little armies were constantly coasting from port to port, and sailing and returning, and whisking about from shore to shore with incredible nimbleness, and crossing one another, and playing at cross purposes, in the most innocent and affecting manner possible;-there was firing of guns, too; and ringing of bells; and one eternal interchange of gratulatory messages-with votes of thanks, and pensions and cabals about appointments, and disputes about islands;-so that any person who had suddenly been transported to this country from some distant region, and saw every thing except our gazettes, would infallibly have concluded, that every nerve of a vast empire was straining for the general attack of an enemy-that our endeavours were to meet the adversary-that we were not making all this bustle to get out of their way- and that our succéss was as important as our efforts deserved. Alas! we were all the while crushing flies with a steam-engine, and puncturing "an elephant with a needle!

The opportunity which a new ally and a second coalition afforded, was rendered still more inviting, by the symptoms of weakness and mismanagement which appeared in the affairs of France. Instead of trusting the fortunes of the league to the cordial co-operation of Russia and Austria, and resting secure in the superiority of the Calmuck to the French generals, because a single good commander had appeared among the Russians, it would have, well become England to have sent a large army, either into Germany or Italy, for the sole object of fighting against the French armies, without regarding the petty squabbles of Vienna and St. Petersburgh.

But we

were busy in Lisbon and Surinam just at that particular time! and, when we sent an army to Holland, we took good care that it should land at the greatest possible distance from the scene of action,

and not until the tide had begun to turn against our allies. The enemy, however, was alarmed--he did not then know us quite so well;-he guessed from our preparations, that we meant something, and was apprehensive we might really intend to operate a diversion. He found we were safe in North Holland !-And, leaving a few troops to watch us, with the assistance of the Dutch army, he quietly pursued the destruction of the second coalition.

Notwithstanding our disasters in Holland, an excellent army was assembled -unrivalled in courage-respectable in point of discipline-most ably commanded-fitted beyond all others for landing at any point of the enemy's coast-capable of being increased in numbers, without inconvenience or delay. The contest in Italy was critical between our allies and the enemy;-and therefore our armament remains quietly at home, until that is decided: and, much about the time when the last struggle is making for Austria within a short march of the Adriatic, away sails our excellent army to Malta and Egypt !-as if our fleet had not sufficiently settled the fate of these. spots two years before, and as if the French army could be better employed than by wasting their strength in fruitless expeditions to the East. The glorious result, indeed, of the campaign in Egypt, has indirectly done inestimable service to us by improving our troops. It has given a new character to our army-a character which, as far as depends on themselves, they have since more than supported. Perhaps it has begun the revival of our fame as a military power; but the remark is not the less obvious, that as much advantage might have been gained in these respects from operations of real importance to the great interests of the nation and its allies-while it us lamentable to reflect, that, so far from turning the military renown and strength thus gained, to a better account in our subsequent schemes, we have been álmost systematic in pursuing the same infatuated course; and gaining, `from each exertion of our force, only some dearbought improvement to our troops

A

squandering their valour upon projects' where success was either hopeless or unavailing.

Towards the latter end of the war, "of which we are surveying the outline, those pretensions of maritime right were advanced, which have since been revived

with such fatal additions, and which laid the foundation of the enmity ever since shown by this country to neutral nations. With respect to the question of strict right, there is very little doubt that we had the best of the argument,-to the extent, at least, to which it was pushed in 1800 and 1801. But so very little could be gained by the fullest exercise of those rights, that it is impossible sufficiently to regret the stirring of the question. Our character and our popularity with the rest of the world has suffered incalculably-every suspicion relative to our narrowness and selfishness has been confirmed. Among ourselves. too, such extravagant notions have been raised up of maritime rights,, and of the importance of asserting them to their full extent, that the prevailing opinion seems to be divided between those who think the maintenance of them essential to our welfare, and those who think our honour requires it, whether useful or not. So that, until the war broke out in Spain, it was difficult to discover any difference between the hatred which was bestowed on neutral nations, and that which was reserved for our enemies. It might even be suspected, at one time, that the former was the stronger feeling of the two. But, in all this, we have been liable to any charge, rather than that of inconsistency. The mistake of what we had a right to do, for what it was expedient to attempt, has prevailed through our whole conduct (with the exception of that disgraceful enterprise in which right and expediency were equally disregarded); and they who could prefer a sugar colony to the interests of one ally--and an island with a good harbour, to the friendship of another were surely acting like themselves, when, in attempting to deprive France of a little hemp and iron, they gave her a permanent influence over all neutral and maritime powers.

After the dependence of the continent had been well nigh secured,-when no chance of a favourable alteration remained but in a change of system,-when it became manifest, that France could only be resisted by such reforms in the neighbouring states, as might enable them to draw forth all their resources against her-that a long interval of repose was absolutely necessary for this purpose and that a renewal of hostilities on the part of one power, without the cordial co-operation of the rest, was only devoting to destruction the little of

national independence that was left;→ England, seduced by the fatal delusion that fighting is expedient as often as just cause of war exists, first broke the peace herself; and soon after drew Russia, and, through her influence, Austria, into the quarrel. The history of the third coalition, as far as we were concerned, differs but little from that of the two first,-ex cept that it was from the beginning much more hopeless. Whatever chance of being useful to the common cause the exigences of our allies held out, we threw away with an improvident selfishness, to all appearance confirmed, and even increased by habit. The march of the Austrian armies into Bavaria, was the signal for a British force making sail to the Cape of Good Hope. The struggle, at first doubtful, between the Archduke and the French in Lombardy, was witnessed by our army at the respectful dis tance of Naples, where a truly British object was to be accomplished, the expulsion of an old ally from his dominions. And another English expedition arrived at the Weser, just in time to learn that peace had been dictated to Austria upon the Danube. An infatuation, hitherto unmatched even in our own history, soon after revived the war in Prussia; and, for once, England had no further share in the ruin of a coalition, than by not having sufficiently exerted herself to prevent its formation. At no one moment of this short but fatal conflict, did any opportunity present itself of taking a part in it with the least prospect of suc cess; and, although the expeditions in the Levant were rather formed upon the old model, the utter impossibility of acting with effect in the North, and the advantage of detaching the Porte from its French connection, might be pleaded in behalf of those schemes, while the prudent reserve of our strength in other quarters for a favourable opening, in de fiance of ignorant and thoughtless clamour, was an earnest of a wiser policy than had for many years been exhibited by the English government.

These prospects, however, were of short duration. A change of men speedily restored the reign of activity, with all its expeditions.. But here a difficulty occurred. There were no more coalitions to be had; so we could not any longer

* The failure of the expeditions in question, is well known to have arisen from the unaccountable mistakes of the officers employed to command them.