ecclesiastical slavery, in which their countrymen had been so long fettered, we should ardently have wished, and prayed for their success, and most cordially approved of suitable measures being pursued in our own country for liberally assisting a people rising in the cause of freedom and independence, and who were proving by their actions, that they were seriously, and resolutely determined to live free or die!

But the proceedings of the juntas, and the general conduct of the people of Spain, too soon convinced us, that the former were only desirous to preserve their old dynasty, and that the latter beheld those proceedings with comparative indifference. The ruling powers were content to resign the government into the hands of a despotic prince; a man destitute of SOUL, the mere changeling of existing circumstances, who assumed, resigned, re-assumed, and re-resigned the government, and who at length weakly and voluntarily abandoned his country, and threw himself into the arms of France. Although this unhappy prince had formally subscribed an abdication of the throne, and has ever since been confined to the estate granted him by NAPOLEON, the Spanish juntas have continued to make use of his name in all their proceedings, whether with the approbation or knowledge of the royal prisoner is still a matter of doubt. Their proceedings however too plainly proved, that they either did not understand, or did not value the blessings of freedom themselves, and had no design to impart them to their countrymen. If in one or two of their proclamations they have uttered the lispings of freedom, its radical principles have been cautiously guarded against. That prime engine of a free constitution the PRESS, the full and complete exercise of which is indispensibly requisite, more especially during a period of revolution in which a brave people are contending for the glorious privilege of forming for themselves a free and independent government, has been during the whole contest entirely suppressed. The people have indeed been amused with intimations of the restoration of their ancient representative body-the Cortez; but the supreme junta of Spain, like many of the professed friends to parliamentary reform iu Britain, appear all along to have entertained the opinion thatThis is not the time; and accordingly, after all the promises of assembling the Cortez, that important work is adjourned-sine die!

The contest between the Emperor of France and the Spanish junta being brought to this simple question-Whether JOSEPH BONAPARTE, or FERDINAND VII. should be placed on the throne? it need not excite surprise if the great body of the Spanish nation have beheld the struggle with apathy, and that when compelled into the field, they have fought with languor, or, as has been, not

unfrequently, the case, avoided fighting altogether, by throwing down their arms, and hurrying from the scene of action.

The disorders attending the various changes of the government of Spain, and the prospect of opposition, however partial or feeble, or on whatever principles conducted, inspired our ministers with renewed hopes of accomplishing that project which had haunted the brains of every administration for these sixteen years past,--" the Deliverance of "Europe;" that is the restoring the old governments on the continent to their former state, and confining the French empire within its former limits. The opportunity afforded for this longed for purpose, bv the Spanish revolution, was embraced with equal eagerness and precipitation, both by ministers, and their opponents in the senate, the leaders of opposition; both parties have been forward in adding fuel to the flames of war, not only in Spain but in Austria; and although their partisans, the ministerial prints on the one side, aud the Morning Chronicle, and the Edinburgh Reviewers on the other, have been squabbling about the conduct of the war, nei- ́ ther of the parties seem to have had leisure or inclination to be-' stow, during the whole contest, much consideration on its justice. Ministers and opposition united on this occasion, and without being properly acquainted with the prevailing inclinations, and real state of the Spanish nation, resolved that the junta should be assisted with British soldiers, British money, and British supplies of all kinds. A large army under an able general, Sir JOHN MOORE, was sent into Spain. All the plans of ministers respecting the assistance to be granted to the Spaniards were voted in the senate, unanimously; and the voice of opposition was not heard from one end of the kingdom to the other. The experiment was fairly made: how it succeeded the history of one of the most melancholy campaigns in which a British army was ever engaged, has too fatally proved. After experiencing not only the apathy, but the ill treatment of the Spaniards, in almost every town and village through which the army was doomed to pass; after being forced to retreat, from a pursuing enemy, under the most disastrous circumstances, loss of artillery, baggage, military chest &c. the roads being strewed with the bodies of men and horses, the army was at length compelled to fight, whilst endeavouring to effect its escape on board the vessels appointed to convey it back to its own country: our soldiers, although so long harrassed, and almost worn out with hardships and fatigue, fought with their usual bravery, and their commander fell gloriously. After suffering the loss of 7, or 8000 men, the remainder effected their embarkation, and their escape to their own › country. The opinion of Sir John Moore, whose experience so well qualified him to give an opinion on this subject, contained in one of his official dispatches, written a short time previous to his decease,

one might have thought would have been sufficient to rectify the ideas even of those who had proved themselves so thoroughly mistaken respecting the affairs of Spain." I conceived it necessary to "risk this army to convince the people of England, as well as the "rest of Europe, that the Spaniards had neither the power, nor the " inclination to make any efforts for themselves.”* But such was the infatuation of the British cabinet, that they resolved on sending additional supplies, and risking a second British army for the sake of those whose apathy in the cause of freedom, could only be equalled by their ingratitude to the people who had shewn so much zeal in their service.

Although it was evident to every one attentive to the dictates of common sense, that the Spaniards, as a nation, were by no means desirous of our assistance, and that they were at least as well affected to Joseph Bonaparte as to Ferdinand, we were gravely informed by certain lords and gentlemen in both houses of parliament, that the "universal Spanish nation," were still determined on the restoration of their beloved sovereign, and that they only wanted some farther assistance from the British nation to enable them " to be ul "timately victorious, and finally to expel their invaders." The war with Austria still farther encouraged our ministers to try another campaign in Spain; and their writers again held out the most sanguine hopes to the nation, that now, when the power of the "Cor"sican Ruffian, and Monster, would be attacked not only by the "whole people of Spain, but by half a million of brave Austrians, "all determined to conquer or die in defence of their beloved sove"reign, there was every reason to hope, that the happy and long "wished for period was at hand, when the liberties, and indepen"dence of Europe," that is the old systems of civil and ecclesiastical despotism, "would be again restored;" and it was predicted in very confident language, that Britain would be covered with glory, and hailed by the rest of Europe, as the power who by her glorious perseverance had principally contributed to accomplish so great and desirable a work!

Sir Arthur Wellesley who had so distinguished himself in his brother's honourable wars in the East Indies, and as one of the Copen hagen heroes; who had likewise equally distinguished himself by his pompous accounts of the victories in Portugal, which were immediately succeeded by the glorious convention of Cintra, was the favourite selected by ministers to accomplish “the deliverance of the "universal and united Spanish nation!" He was accordingly sent out in April last with an army of 30,000 men into Portugal. Shortly after his arrival he met with some trivial successes, which en

*Pol. Reg. Vol. V. p. 256.

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couraged him to proceed with the army into Spain: in his progress he met with but little opposition from the French, whose design appears to have been to draw him into the heart of the country, in order the more effectually to harrass his army, and if possible to cut off his retreat. Sir Arthur on his arrival at Talavera, about sixty miles from Madrid, began to be apprehensive of his hazardous situation, owing to the little assistance afforded him by the “uni, "versal Spanish nation." In his dispatch of July 24th. he says"I have not been enabled to follow the enemy as I could wish on "account of the great deficiency of transport in Spain. I enclose the "copy of a letter which I thought proper to address to Major"Gen. O'Donoghue on this subject, adjutant general of the Spanish "army," [which letter ministers have not thought proper to publish] as soon as I found that this country would furnish no means of "this description. Gen. Cuesta has urged the central junta to adopt vigorous measures to relieve our wants: till I am supplied, "I do not think it proper, and indeed I cannot continue my ope"rations." Thus after having been three months in the country, the British commander at length acknowledges the disappointment of his expectations, and resolves to proceed no farther. Joseph Bonaparte, and the French generals, appear to have been acquain, ted with the situation of the British army, and the intention of its commander. Perceiving that they could not entice him farther up the country, they collected their forces and meditated their attack, Sir Arthur, apprehending their design, in concert with the Spanish general Cuesta, fixed on the different positions for the two armies, and waited the approach of the enemy. Then followed the tremen, dous battles of Talavera on the 27th. and 28th of July, at the close of which both parties claimed the victory. We have yet much to be informed of respecting these sanguinary conflicts, which it is pro. bable have decided the fate of the campaign. That our country. men fought with great bravery, no one can entertain a doubt; but the accounts of Sir Arthur, Cuesta, and the French generals, vary so much in some important particulars, that it is difficult at present to determine to which side belongs the just claim of victory. Sir Arthur states" the great loss his army bad sustained in valuable officers and soldiers in this long and hard fought action, with more "than double their numbers." The British army it appears a-. mounted to about 20,000 men, and the French army to 40,000, But here a question naturally arises-What assistance was afforded by Cuesta's army stated by Sir Arthur in his dispatch of 15th. July as " amounting to 38,000 men, of which 7000 were cavalry?" The united armies were indisputably superior in numbers to the French. To the Britith army is doubtless to be attributed the chief merit of the action; but unless the army of onr ally was composed entirely of

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poltroons, they must have materially assisted the British, in which 'case is it not mere gasconade to represent the former as vanquishing "double their numbers?" Sir Arthur acknowledges certain services performed by the Spaniards: the Spanish general in the order of the day, published on the 2d. instant, thus addressess his army." Sol"diers of the army of Estramadura! On the 27th. and 28th. of July you fought bravely; you repeatedly repulsed the enemy.

This glorious victory is due to your firmness, and union, to your` "incesssant and well supported fire, and to confidence in your offi"cers and chiefs: if you always observe the same, you will always "be invincible. . . . Soldiers, I am satisfied with your valour and “firmness: I congratulate you on your triumph, and I rely on your "union and discipline;" at the same time the general hints that there were some "base cowards who abandoned their regiments "in the day of battle," and whom he threatens "with decimation as soon as they are apprehended." In the official dispatch to the junta he further states-" The Spanish troops, and especially those "which had the greatest share in the action left me nothing to wish "for with respect to their courage and gallantry....The King's "regiment has in particular covered itself with glory, and in con'junction with the English took several pieces of cannon, &c." And although the ridiculous remarks which follow respecting the character of the French armies, viz.-" The French are not men, except "when they find no resistance.-We know that the French soldiers "now refuse to enter into action after seeing their best troops destroyed:"-although such stupid effusions render the statements of Cuesta, like those of most of the Spanish generals, liable to much suspicion, yet comparing them with the accounts of Sir Arthur, it seems that material service was rendered to the British army by the Spaniards; and this we are sure of, that the latter claim their share of the victories. The French as a proof of the justice of their claim assert-"The loss of the English is enormous,: we took 800 infan- * "try prisoners, and a whole regiment of cavalry: this regiment was "taken by one of ours, which opened its ranks to receive the charge, "and then cut off their retreat. The rest of the English column " which constituted the whole force of the enemy, is in full retreat." -War in itself, is seldom any thing but a system of complicated wickedness, and every thing connected with it shares the contamination. We can seldom depend on the veracity of the different parties; misrepresentation, if not falsehood, pervades, in a greater or less degree, almost every detail of military operations, and the only possible way of arriving at the truth, is to compare the different accounts, and to judge of their correctness by subsequent events: thus we argued respecting the tremendous battles of Esling, and Aspern, in which both the French aud the Austrians so confidently