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“ plan of promptly passing the Danube, and cutting off Bonaparte “ from Vienna. The favourable moment was thus suffered to pass “ unimproved; the enemy was permitted to gain his strength; and “ again yielding to the baneful councils of the cabal, the Archduke “ so far humiliated himself, and the brave warriors under his com“ mand as to solicit the uncalled for, and unfortunate armistice " which succeeded the battle of Wagram."
The writer we have thus quoted for the amusement of our readers must surely suppose that the public had entirely forgotten, not only the French but the Austrian accounts of the battle of Aspern, in which latter it is stated that “the Austrian army lamented the death “ of 87 superior officers and 4199 subalterns and privates; and 663 “ officers, and 15,651 men wounded; and 9 officers, and 829 men “ prisoners.” Indeed it is evident to every impartial person, that the Austrian armies, however bravely they inight have fought, were so exhausted that they were utterly unable to pursue the enemy, or in any respect to disturb his future plan of operations.
All ranks of foreigners, whether kings, princes, officers, or people who do not follow the infatuated councils of this country, and embroil themselves in eternal war with France; who will not sacrifice their existence for the sake of carrying on our mad schemes, are insulted and abused by the hirelings of government; and although the objects of this insult and abuse, were but a few days before the objects of the most extravagant panegyric. Such in particular bas been the fate of the Arch Duke of Austria, and tbe Austrian Generals; the former of whom is now described as a weak, timid man, acting under the influence of the latter, “a cabal of cowards or « traitors!”
Notwithstanding the ardent hopes, wishes and expectations of ministers and their dependents for the rupture of the armistice, we think it is scarcely possible that the Austrian Emperor should, after consenting to an armistice wbich gave his opponent so many advantages, again attempt to renew the war. It is after all probable, that there are many important points to be settled, respecting the fate of other empires besides the Austrian, and which may be the reason of the lengthened negociations. If the Austrian Emperor should renew the war, his councils must be seized with the same infatuation as that which has seized the councils of some other couutries: greater infatuation there cannot be! .
Some of the most important proceedings of parliament occurred towards the close of the session, and to which we request the serious attention of our readers : these will be the subject of re- '. mark in a future number. . .
DUCH was the term applied by the British cabinet, and by the public in general, to the expedition lately fitted out for the purpose of capturing the Isle of Walcheren, and for the still more important purposes of affording the Hollanders an opportunity of “ throwing " off the French yoke under which they had so long groaned,” of capturing the forts on the Scheldt, the city of Antwerp, and the French fleet; and by these means to discomfit our grand enemy BONAPARTE, to distract his attention, to encourage our allies to a vigorous resistance, and by animating the continent in general to take up arms, at length to bring about that great event for which all our ministers for these sixteen years past have been vainly striving— The deliverance of the continent," that is the restoration of the old despotisms civil and ecclesiatical, always by them termed the “ regular governments of Europe !"
However the “grand expedition" may finally terminate, for the last act of the tragedy yet remains to be performed, the means iť must be acknowledged were conducted on a larger scale than this country bad witnessed for many years past. One hundred thousand men, with a fleet sufficient to surround the Island of Walcheren, the estimated expence eleven millions sterling, the equipment of which has been the principal employment of ministers during the spring and summer months :--such an armament naturally fixed the attention, and excited the expectations, the hopes, and the wishes of many, and the fears of others of less sanguine expectations; who calmly contemplating past events, 'and judging from circumstances, presaged little good from the plans of the present administration, more especially when they suspecteit the difficulties which might impede the progress, and at length frustrate the execution of such plans, and perceived that the chief command was committed, not to some veteran general of abilities
and experience, but to one, who never appeared to possess the confidence of the army, of whose achievements in the little service he had seen, the public knew nothing; and whose principal qualifications were, that he was the brother of the late. WILLIAM Pitt, had long been in possession of a valuable place, –a ministerial, and a court favourite !
The first of the proposed objects, the possession of the Isle of Walcheren was obtained with little difficulty, and with as · little honour. The vast superiority of the British forces over those
of the enemy ensured success : the resistance shewn'at Flushing although brave, was ineffectual. The Hollanders gave no indicacations of discontent with their own government, or of desire for our assistance to enable them to effect a revolution to restore the old, favourite government of the English -- the STADTHOLDERIAN; and the manner in which we conquered Flushing ; bom. barding and firing the town, reducing it to a heap of ruins; and burying thousands of the inhabitants, men, women, and children under the ashes of their own houses, has, we may rest assured, served to increase the hostile disposition of a people who, as our ministerial writers vainly Aattered the nation, were anxious to receive the British forces with open arms. · The introductory object being thus obtained, it was generally and naturally expected that our fleet and army would proceed to accomplish those ulterior and most important objects, the possession of the forts up the Scheldt, the city of Antwerp; aud the French fleet in that port; and of consequence, to gain the complete command of a river by which the enemy would have been materially... injured, and Britain as materially benefited: but the delays which were too soon apparent, gave rise to suspicions that there was something defective, either in the arrangement, the progress, or the execution of the grand plan; which suspicions were confirmed by various letters from our officers naval, and military ; but the ministerial prints endeavoured to keep up the spirits of the people by strong assurances that our commanders “ were pro“ ceeding without loss of time to the accomplishment of the “ ulterior and most important objects of the expedition.” The following instance of the delusion endeavoured to be practiced on the people on this occasion, even to the last moment, by one of our ministerial prints, is well worth preserving: it may serve as a specimen of the gross impositions so frequently practised on their credulity; and of the miserable condition to which the writers are reduced, when the clear and strong light of truth breaks forih, dissipating the gross and thick mists of delusion.
[From the Morning Post, Friday Sept. 7.] INTELLIGENCE FROM THE EXPEDITION.--We have been favoured with a letter from an officer on board his Majesty's ship L'Aigley, which in the
absence of official advices, must be deemed of considerable importance ; inasmuch as it serves to contradict the MANUFACTURED communications from the Scheldt, which occasionally appear in some of the papers, and which would give us to understand that all idea of approaching Antwerp has been given up, and the ulterior objects of the expedition abandoned.. So far from this being the cuse; it will be seen that a part of our force was off Antwerp on the 22d, and that the landing of our army was expected to take place in a few days after, with every prospect of being joined by SEVERAL THOUSAND DUTCH TROOPS. For these important FACTS we have the authority of an officer belonging to one of his Majesty's ships engaged in the enterprize, and of whose letter the following is an extract :
• His Majesty's ship L'Aigle, off Antwerp, Aug. 22. On the 13th we sailed up the River Scheldt, with nine other frigates, and arrived off Antwerp on the 16th, where we still remain. Our troops ! will land in a few days, to take possession of the forts on the main lund, ' which protect the enemy's ships of war. There are eleyen sail of the line French, and three Dutch ; but the information we have received is, that only three sail of the line have their guns and men on board, the rest being nearly in a dismantled state. The enemy are said to have 30,000 men, most of which, however, are Dutch undisciplined troops; and whó, "for the greater part, have been forced to take up arms by the French. 'It is said that about 10,000 of these will join our army.on its effecting a landing; and there is no doubt of the Dutch, like every other people subjected to the domination of France, being heartily tired of the galling yoke they are made to bear. The inhabitants of Antwerp are anxious that the ships of war should be entirely removed from that port, as the meditated attack would not fail most materially to injure the town,'
[From the MORNING Post, Saturday, Sept. 8.) ABANDONMENT OF THE ENTERPRIZE AGAINST ANTWERP. 4 Contrary to our expectations, and predictions, founded upon the wisdom of the project, and the extensive means employed to affect its success, as well as the information we were in the habit of occasionally receiving from intelligent officers attached to the expedition, it is with infinite grief we understand that advices were yesterday received from Lord Chatham, stating, that from the information he had received of the numbers which the enemy had been able to collect for the defence of Antwerp, and the extensive inundations they had effected, his lordship, in concurrence with the opinion of the lieutenant generals, had decided not to advance from South Beveland against that city; so that the medituted attack upon its arsenal, and the French fleet is altogether abandoned. -Never certainly was an enterprize more wisely or judiciously planned ; and we cannot dissemble that it rends our heart to contemplate its failure in any particular, satisfied as we are that the most ample means were provided to ensure its complete success. The most formidable and best equipped armament that ever sailed from the shores of Britain was upwards of a month in the Scheldt, and instead of its projected operations being simultaneously carried into execution, the greatest part of our force remained inactive during the whole of that time in sight of the enemy, who, from the unfortunate delay, were enabled, nat only to collect numerous corps from various quarters, but effectually to inundate
the country to prevent our approach. The contemplation of so unex pected a result grieves our very soul; nor can our grief be alleviated otherwise than by our commanders being able to give a satisfactory exs planation upon the subject;--this explanation, we trust, they will be able to afford ; and resting upon that hope we shall not attempt to prejudge the question.”
That there will be much crimination and recrimination on the part of ministers and commanders, those who so eagerly contrived this famous plan of operations, and those who so voluntarily ! engaged to carry it into execution, may naturally be expected as the result of that discontent felt by the whole nation. Some sort of inquiry will certainly be instituted; but the evidence already before the public is sufficient to convince 'impartial persons, that the plan itself was of a piece with that system which has consisted of little else thap blundering attempts to obtain objects in themselves of comparative indifference, and by no means answerable to the vast expenditure of blood and treasure lavished on such occasions. Is it possible that men possessed of common sense should imagine, that to treat the inhabitants of Flushing as the British cabinet have done, could have even the remotest tendency to conciliate the Hollanders, or induce them to overturn their present govern. ment; to place themselves under the protection of Britain, or convert them from enemies, to friends and allies. What rational ground was there for presuming, that when all the different objects of the expedition were publicly known for months before its departure, that the French government would not be active in their preparations for defence, more especially at the forts up the Scheldt, and at Antwerp, on the possession of which depended the security of a considerable part of the French navy. The official dispatches fully demonstrate the lamentable ignorance of: both ministers and commanders of the nature of that resistance they had to encounter. “Most happy should I have been” (says Lord Chatham in bis letter to Lord Castlereagb) “ to have announced to “ your lordship, the farther progress of this army. Unfortunately, “ however, it becomes my duty to state to your lordship, that s from the concurrent testimony from so many quarters, as to leave s6 no doubt of the truth of the information, the enemy appears to o have collected sq formidable a force, as to convince me that the o period was arrived, at which my instructions would have directed r me to withdraw the army under my, command, even if engaged “ in actual operation, I had certainly early understood on my “ arrival at Walcheren, that the enemy were assembling in copsi“ derable force at all points; but I was unwilling to give too
" much credit to these reports, and I was determined to persevere, · " until I was satisfied, upon the fullest information, that all fur