revenue as may be necessary to an economical expenditure by the government, without regard to the protection or encouragement of any branch of domestic industry whatever." The enforcing and tariff acts were carried through together. This was the famous " 'compromise" tariff, and was followed by a repeal on the part of South Carolina of the nullification law. "This tariff," says Sumner, in his " History of American Currency," was deceptive and complicated. It had no principle of economic science at its root-neither protection, nor free trade. It was patched up as a concession, although it really made very little, and its provisions were so intricate and contradictory that it produced little revenue. Specific duties were unaffected by it, and these included books, paper, glass and sugar. It did not run its course without important modifications in favor of protection, for it could not bind future congresses, and the doctrine of the horizontal rate of 20 per cent.—a doctrine which had no scientific basisproduced an increase on many articles." Elsewhere the same writer speaks of it as a 'pure political makeshift," in which the public and private interests had no consideration.' (Mr. Benton, in his " Thirty Years in the United States Senate," has several chapters on this measure, which should be consulted.) - The four years after 1833 were marked by great speculation, which was chiefly directed toward schemes of internal improvement, and culminated in the crisis of 1837. The depression that naturally followed was made use of by protectionists, and hard times, produced by low duties and insufficient protection, was again a prominent cry. In spite of the fact that in 1836 the government was in a position to distribute a large surplus revenue among the states, in 1838 it stood in need of a larger income. The compromise bill had guaranteed that after 1842 the highest duty levied should not exceed 20 per cent. except in case of war, and in order to maintain this guarantee a 20 per cent. duty was levied upon many new commodities, but without producing the requisite increase of revenue. In 1841 a home league was formed, the purpose of which was to agitate for high duties, and the president's message gave an opportunity for a general discussion of the subject in congress. A provisional tariff bill, by which the operations of the existing tariff were to be continued until August, 1842, passed the house, but in the senate was amended by a proviso postponing the distribution of the proceeds of the public lands until the same date. The president vetoed it, on the ground that it abrogated the provisions of the "compromise act," and for other reasons. Congress did not pass the measure over the president's veto, but incorporated the same proviso respecting distribution into a general tariff law, which suffered the same fate. The president objected to it, first, on the ground that the bill united two subjects which, so far from having any affinity to one another, were wholly incongruous in their character, as it was both a rev enue and an appropriation bill; secondly, the treasury being in a state of extreme embarrassment, the bill proposed to give away a fruitful source of revenue, a proceeding which he regarded as being highly impolitic, if not uncon stitutional; and thirdly, because it was also in violation of what was intended to be inviolable as a compromise in relation to the tariff system. A general tariff act was passed without the obnoxious clause, and was a return to protection. The average rate of duty levied upon dutiable imports was about 33 per cent., and the principle of 'home valuations," which had been adopted in the compromise tariff, was dropped. In 1844 Mr. Polk became president, and, as a southern man, it was expected that he would advocate a policy other than protective as a basis for tariff revision. It will now be convenient to note some of the changes in circumstances that had occurred since 1825. Up to that time, as I have already said, the main object of the tariff was to countervail the restrictive commercial policy of other nations. It was an instrument for retaliation, by which it was hoped that concessions could be wrung from those countries with which we might have commercial relations. "To all the powers that wish 'free trade,' we say, Let free trade be; to all that will restrict us, we say, Let restriction be." So wrote that ardent protectionist, Niles, in 1826. Now, however, when England was preparing to mitigate the many limitations and restrictions that she had imposed upon her foreign commerce, it was claimed that her action would prove of injury to American interests, industrial and commercial, and that we must increase our restrictions in order that these interests might not suffer, but be amply protected. When Great Britain reduced the tariff on wools, a commodity that congress had more highly taxed in 1824, Mr. Everett said, "Unless the American people think it just and fair that the laws passed by the American congress for the protection of American industry should be repealed by the British parliament, and that for the purpose of securing the supply of our market to the British manufacturer to the end of time, it was the duty of congress to counteract this movement," and again, "Believing, of course, that there is no wish to single it out (the manufacture of woolens) for unfriendly legislation at home, I can not sit still, and see the gigantic arm of the British government stretched out across the Atlantic, avowedly to crush it." In 1832 the doctrine that a high tariff meant low prices was prominently advanced, and somewhat later the balance of trade theory, the excess of imports over exports, causing a drain of specie to the manifest impoverishment of the country, was harped upon. But all through this period the expediency and necessity of protecting "infant industries" were constantly depended upon by the defenders of the American policy," and as a corollary to this a home market for the agricultural productions of the country, now excluded from foreign markets, was to be created and maintained. In 1839 the agitation | from 100 per cent. (distilled spirits and brandy), against the corn laws was begun in England, and resulted in their repeal in 1846. In 1849 another important step was taken, in the repeal of the navigation laws. Meanwhile a change was occurring in the complexion of the tariff debates in this country. "In the presidential campaign of 1840, protection was advocated, I believe for the first time, on the ground that American labor should be protected from the competition of less highly paid foreign labor. The pauper-labor argu- | ment appeared full-fledged in the tariff debates of 1842; and since that time it has remained the chief consideration impressed on the popular mind in connection with the tariff." (Taussig.)—Mr. Polk, in his inaugural address, was conservative. "I have heretofore declared to my fellow-citizens, that in my judgment it is the duty of the government to extend, as far as may be practicable to do so, by its revenue laws, and all other means within its power, fair and just protection to all the great interests of the whole Union, embracing agriculture, manufactures, the mechanic arts, commerce and navigation. I have also declared my opinion to be in favor of a tariff for revenue; and that, in adjusting the details of such a tariff, I have sanctioned such moderate discriminating duties as would produce the amount of revenue needed, and, at the same time, afford reasonable incidental protection to our home industry; and that I was opposed to a tariff for protection merely, and not for revenue." While Mr. Polk thus confined himself to general phrases, his secretary of the treasury, Mr. Robert J. Walker, prepared a report in which his treatment of the tariff question deserves to be ranked with Hamilton's famous report on manufactures. It stamped Mr. Walker as an economist and practical financier of the highest order, and his utterances mark an important stage of tariff legislation in this country. He laid down the following general principles as a basis for revising the revenue laws: 1, that no more money should be collected than is necessary for the wants of the government, economically administered; 2, that no duty be imposed on any article above the lowest rate which will yield the largest amount of revenue; 3, that below such rate discrimination may be made, descending in the scale of duties, or, for imperative reasons, the article may be placed in the list of those free from all duty; 4, that the maximum revenue duty should be imposed on luxuries; 5, that all minimums and all specific duties should be abolished, and ad valorem duties substituted in their place, care being taken to guard against fraudulent invoices and undervaluation, and to assess the duty upon the actual market value; 6, that the duty should be so imposed as to operate as equally as possible throughout the Union, discriminating neither for nor against any class or section. In accordance with Mr. Walker's views, the tariff of 1846 was framed. He divided his classification into nine schedules, each of which had its own rate of duty (comprising many articles), running down to 5 per cent. (the raw materials of manu- was made to pass a protective tariff, but it was defeated. The secretary of the treasury had recommended that raw materials should be made free of duty, and also salt, as a necessity for the western packer. The eastern manufacturers favored this measure, and wool was the most difficult commodity to rate, as the west wished it made dutiable and protected. The tariff of 1857 was denounced as the result of a "fraudulent combination of those who favored the protection of hemp, sugar, iron and the woolen manufactures of Massachusetts. It was a blow at the wool grower." By this act the average duty was lowered to about 20 per cent. ad valorem. The crisis of 1857 was followed by deficits in the government finances, and it became necessary to revise the tariff. In 1861 a measure known as the "Morrill tariff" was passed, which was a decided step toward a protective measure, but it remained in force only a few months. The war created necessities which compelled the government to seek every possible source of revenue, and while the dilatory and tentative tax methods applied in the first years of the war only complicated matters, and forced the government to have recourse to that most dangerous of financial expedients, an irredeemable paper currency, the tax privilege was exercised as far as it could be before the end of the war. In these years the tariff was carried from a low and revenue rate of duty to one of extreme protection-not for the sake of protection, but in order to obtain revenue. An internal revenue system that was all-pervading was imposed, and it was to counteract the high taxes levied under this system that many of the tariff duties were carried to such an excessive point. Measure after measure raising duties was adopted between the years 1861 and 1866, and it was inevitable that protective duties should creep in. Settled policy there was none, and while revenue was always the plea for action, the duties imposed often defeated that plea, by becoming prohibitive. Everything was taxed, and, under customs and excise laws, commodities might be taxed many times. On the return of peace the important changes made applied chiefly to the internal revenue system, and the perpetual tinkering of the tariff had served to bring out in bold relief the many protective features it contained. With the termination of the war," writes Mr. David A. Wells when special commissioner of the revenues, “and with accruing receipts from the tariff in excess of the actual requirements of the treasury, the popular tendency, as expressed by legislation, accomplished or projected, has been to reverse the order of importance of these two principles, and to make the idea of revenue subordinate to protection rather than protection subordinate to revenue. And in carrying out, furthermore, the idea of protection, but one rule for guidance would appear to have been adopted for legislation, viz., the assumption that whatever rate of duty could be shown to be for the advantage of any private interest, the same would prove equally advantageous to the interests 174 VOL. III. 55 * * of the whole country. The result has been a tariff based upon small issues rather than upon any great national principle; a tariff which is unjust and unequal; which needlessly enhances prices; which takes far more indirectly from the people than is received into the treasury; which renders an exchange of domestic for foreign commodities nearly impossible; which necessitates the continual exportation of obligations of national indebtedness and of the precious metals; and which, while professing to protect American industry, really, in many cases, discriminates against it. One of the first things that an analysis [of the existing tariff] will show is, that every interest that has been strong enough or sufficiently persistent to secure efficient representation at Washington, has received a full measure of attention, while every other interest that has not had sufficient strength behind it to prompt to action has been imperfectly treated, or entirely neglected."-The effect of the commissioner's recommendations was to lead up to a general debate on taxation in 1870. A bill which originally proposed to touch only internal duties, was gradually enlarged until it covered not only excise, but also customs duties. Protection had now become a cardinal principle of the republican party, the party in power, and most of the protective features of the tariff were retained under the new measure, which became a law July 14, 1870, and whatever reductions were made applied to commodities in common use, like tea, coffee, sugar, etc., or luxuries, like wines, spirits, brandy, etc. The reduction in revenue by these changes was estimated to be about $29,000,000, and at the same time internal taxes to the amount of $55,000,000 were removed. The real burden of the tariff was hardly lightened, as the high duties on the necessaries of life remained. In 1871 an attempt was made to repeal the duty on coal, but it failed. The question of protection, however, came up, and to prevent further discussion the duties were removed from tea and coffee (1872), and in the same year a general tariff was passed, which still left the protective duties almost unchanged; admitting large classes of manufactures to a reduction of 10 per cent. without designating specifically the articles to which the reduction should apply. Between March 1, 1861, and March 4, 1873, fourteen principal statutes relating to classification and rates, besides twenty other acts or resolutions modifying tariff acts, had been passed, and parts of each were in force. To this must be added the laws passed prior to 1861, and under which customs were still collected. This created great doubt as to what was the law, and the uncertainty gave much trouble to the government, and involved the importers in costly litigation and imposed upon them vexatious delays. these various enactments, questions relating to the proper assessment of duties constantly arise. There is often a direct conflict between different statutes, and occasionally between two or more provisions of the same statute, while single provisions are frequently held to embrace different meanings. "Under These differences can be settled only by arbitrary | their lowest point in 1878, when they were only interpretations or by adjudications in court. * * The number of statutory appeals to the secretary of the treasury on tariff questions during the last fiscal year (1873) was 4,731, exclusive of miscellaneous cases or applications for relief, numbering 5,065."-The financial crisis of 1873 naturally had some influence upon the revenues of the government, and in 1874 the cry was raised that the government finances were embarrassed through too large reduction in taxes. This allowed the protectionists an opportunity to carry a measure through congress restoring the 10 per cent. duties upon commodities which had been taken off in 1872, and also to increase by one-fourth the duties on sugar. While these movements precluded all idea of revising the tariff so as to return to a revenue standard of duties, yet great dissatisfaction was expressed with the operation of the law. I have just noted one of the difficulties connected with its administration, that of being needlessly complex. Other objections to it consisted in the great stimulus it gave to smuggling and undervaluation of imports, practices which even the honest importer was forced, in self-defense, to adopt. Moreover, the law became each year more and more complicated. It consisted, first, of the act of congress; second, of the decisions of the treasury officials interpreting the law, and these decisions had the force of law and were unchangeable; and, finally, of the decisions of the courts. The expediency, and even the necessity, of a revision, now became more and more urgent. "The revised tariff," writes the secretary in 1875, "contains thirteen schedules, embracing upward of 1,500 dutiable articles which are either distinctly specified or included in general or special classifications. To these must be added nearly 1,000 articles not enumerated, but which under the general provisions of two sections of the law, would be assigned a place as dutiable either by virtue of similitude to some enumerated article, or as articles, manufactured or unmanufactured, not otherwise provided for, making over 2,500 in all. The free list contains an enumeration of over 600 articles, thus constituting a total aggregate of more than 3,000 articles embraced by the tariff either as dutiable or free. Of the articles subject to duty, and either named in, or subject to, specific classification by schedule, 823 pay ad valorem rates varying from 10 to 75 per cent.; 541 pay specific duties, according to quantity or weight; and 160 pay compound, or both specific and ad valorem, rates." Not only was a sentiment against the tariff being created on account of its many unreasonable and exorbitant features, but a like feeling was engendered by a desire to reduce war taxation to the limits that an economical administration of the government required. The largest sum collected from customs in any one year was in 1872, when it had attained the amount of $216,370,286. During the years of depression that followed the crisis of 1873 the receipts from this source steadily dwindled, reaching $130,170,680. An improvement then became submit to such a reduction. The presidential | sulting hybrid measure became a law one day before the session closed, no time being given for an examination of the recommendations of the conference committee. The law, however, satisfied no one, and there is every likelihood that the whole tariff will be again revised at no late day. - Meagre as this outline is, it is enough to show that the United States has never had a tariff that was at all suited to its industrial and commercial interests since the first revenue tariff imposed before 1826. And as the average rate of the tariff has increased it has become more and more injuri. ous to the interests involved, as no high tariff can be applied to such various conditions as are to be found in this country without doing as much mischief to one part as good to another. - AUTHORIProf. Wm. G. Sumner's Lectures on the History of Protection, Life of Andrew Jackson and History of American Currency. The writings of Henry C. Carey and H. C. Baird. There is no good history of the finances of the country in the English language. The pretentious work of A. S. Bolles is unsatisfactory, and the facts are much distorted. Niles' Weekly Register contains much valuable material, and the writings of Condy Raquet, now quite scarce, should be carefully read. The public documents contain many ex TIES. campaign of 1880 had been fought on the issue of the tariff, but in that blind and unreasonable way that settled nothing, though awakening a spirit of inquiry. This had given strength to many movements in favor of revenue reform, especially in the western states, and it was in answer to this feeling, which was developing into a political force, that the commission measure was adopted, because it was believed that such a plan would produce the best and speediest results. The president, who had the appointment of the members of the commission, nullified whatever of benefit might be expected of it, for he took men who were directly interested in the maintenance of high protection. Of the nine men chosen there was not one who could pretend to be a student of economic principles, not one who could have explained the incidence of a tax. The influence of the lobby in framing tariff legislation had become notorious, but in this commission the lobby influence was maintained, and allowed even better opportunities for carrying its point than it enjoyed | before. The commission traveled over a part❘ of the country taking testimony, and made its report to congress. It was afterward developed that the schedules of duties presented with the report had been prepared by men who were them-ceedingly valuable reports on the tariff, and the selves manufacturers and therefore interested in keeping intact protection. The report, while promising a reduction in duties, contained some of the most barefaced attempts to double and triple duties; while making a pretense to revise and reform the tariff, it was but a juggle and a sham. The members of the commission (with one honorable exception, Mr. McMahon, whose technical knowledge of the operation of the then existing tariff was of great service) were wholly unfitted for the work intrusted to them, and as a consequence the results of their labors were of little value. One year had thus been wasted. Nor were the events that followed the presentation of this report calculated to increase the expectation that the subject of revenue reform would be adequately handled by congress. The senate, rejecting the commission schedules, prepared a bill of its own; and the house also framed a new bill for its own consideration. The whole session of 1882-3 was given over to a discussion of these various measures, schedule by schedule, and line by line. Every possible difference of opinion was developed in these debates; but, as the high tariff party was in the majority, little toward a reduction of duties could be accomplished. A large number of ad valorem duties were made specific, though no change in the actual amount of tax was thus brought about. Owing to its being a short session, the house was unable to complete the consideration of its own bill, and took up that of the senate. Some differences being developed, they were referred to a conference committee, in which the high protectionists had a large majority. Here many changes were made, some of which had been voted down in both houses, and the re proceedings of some early conventions (1819, 1831, etc.) throw much light upon the effects of tariff legislation. Mr. David A. Wells has contributed much to a proper understanding of the last war tariff, and stands well to the front in the great number of writers who have given attention to this subject. A special Report on Customs-Tariff Legislation was prepared by the Bureau of Statistics in 1873, and the provisions of the laws are fully given, as also in Heyl's and Williams' two Manuals. WORTHINGTON C. FORD. TARTAR, TARTARY. The Chinese Tâ-tâ, or Tâ-tar, was originally a generic term for tributary or vassal peoples, especially of those hordes inhabiting the plateaus of northern Asia beyond the great wall which was built to repel them. One sinologue finds the derivation of the word in one of the forms of obeisance in vogue among the tribes of Mongolia, in which the foot is struck on the ground, and a prominent article of dress, usually worn in front, is at the same moment thrown behind. The leaders of most of the uprisings of population in the grassy plateaus of central Asia that have emerged into history, spurning the epithet of Tâ-tars, have taken to themselves various dynastic names, such as Hun, Turk, Liao, Kitan, Kin, Mongol, Manchiu, etc. Genghis Khan, for instance, gave to his people the name Mongols (Mungku-jin), "braves," in order to show that they were no longer Tâ-tars, or tributaries, but conquerors. When the Mongols invaded Asia, and even Europe, overrunning Russia, and covering it with ashes and blood, the Christian_monks, struck with the resemblance of the word Tâ-tar to Tartarus, and ready to associate these centaurs |