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Methodists and Baptists, had split into two sectional parts; and the Presbyterians were evidently close to the point of division. Political bonds were also stretched almost to breaking, and their preservation depended on the willingness of the northern states to satisfy the south by not excluding slavery from the territories. "If you," says Calhoun, who represent the stronger portion, can not agree to settle the great questions at issue on the broad principle of justice and duty, say so; and let the states we both represent agree to separate and depart in peace. If you are unwilling we should part in peace, tell us so, and we shall know what to do." The last sentence shows the remarkable underlying consciousness in every advocate of secession, of the truth so forcibly stated by Webster three days afterward: "Secession! Peaceable secession! Sir, your eyes and mine are never destined to see that miracle. The dismemberment of this vast country without convulsion! The breaking up of the fountains of the great deep without ruffling the surface! Peaceable secession is an utter impossibility.' (See, in general, UNITED States, II., 5.)— This underlying consciousness, that secession meant war, was for some time sufficient to make any attempt at open secession hopeless ab initio, and no such attempt was made. Indeed, the south had been very well satisfied with the compromise of 1850; and the impediments to the execution of the fugitive slave law (see FUGITIVE SLAVE LAWS, PERSONAL LIBERTY LAWS), while they excited great discontent in the south, were not commonly looked upon as reasonable cause for secession. Those final causes were three in number, with a supplementary cause, 'coercion," which will be stated in the next section. 1. Nothing is more noteworthy in the extreme southern states than the sudden development of large estates, the freezing out of small planters, and their emigration after the absorption of their property. “In a few years large estates are accumulated as if by magic." In large sections of each state the population consisted almost wholly of negroes, with the few whites owning or managing them. But in all these states representation was on the basis of the "federal population": that is, three-fifths of the negroes were represented, while the voting and office-holding pertained to the few whites. Thus, apart from the natural influence belonging to the wealthy class of the population, the counties in the "black belt " were practically the pocket boroughs of the slave-owners therein. These thus held far more than their fair share of power in state legislatures and conventions, and in some states absolutely controlled them. With every year, from 1850 to 1860, the power of this class was growing stronger, and their desire for secession for the protection of their property in slaves was not weakened. (See SLAVERY, IV.) 2. But there was still another and much larger class in the south, owning few or no slaves, not wedded to the protection or extension of slavery, but high-spirited, and determined not to submit to

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oppression, or, above all, to the evasion of a fair compromise. The results of the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska bill (see that title) served to bring these into the secession programme. They had never asked for the abrogation of the Missouri compromise; but, when it had been abrogated by fair agreement, it seemed to them an unworthy evasion to turn Kansas and Nebraska into free states by organized, not voluntary and natural, emigration from the north. This was the class to which was addressed the argument which A. H. Stephens says carried Georgia, the key-stone of a successful secession, out of the Union: " We can make better terms out of the Union than in it." 3. The Harper's Ferry insurrection (see BROWN, JOHN) had a silent influence everywhere. Those who desired secession were active, persevering, and in earnest; those who did not, were at the best negative; for they saw one great chance of good, even in a successful secession, a release from national association with future John Browns, and the ability to protect themselves from such invasions by open and national warfare. With so many influences at work in its favor, it is matter for wonder that secession in 1860-61 was only forced through by the influence of the first two classes over the delegates to the state conventions, and that the popular demand for secession was so conspicuous by its absence that the conventions, except in Texas, did not venture to submit their ordinances to popular vote. For, in a popular vote, be it remembered, the "federal representation" disappeared; only the votes of the whites went for anything; and the total vote of the state might very easily show that their nominal representatives did not really represent them. There must have been an enormous mass of Union feeling in the south, blind, leaderless, and rendered powerless first by the belief that their primary allegiance was due to the state, and then by the organization of the new national government at Montgomery, but still genuine and hearty. - III. The threat that secession would have followed Fremont's election, in 1856, was probably only an electioneering device. When his election seemed probable, Gov. Wise, of Virginia, called a meeting of southern governors at Raleigh, for Oct. 13; but only three governors appeared, those of Virginia, North Carolina and South Carolina, and these did nothing. The meeting was of some influence, however, upon the northern vote. (See REPUBLICAN PARTY, I.) Practical secession was hardly as yet possible. The alienation between the sections was not yet sufficient; and the power of the secessionist class over the state conventions was not yet great enough. Four years made a great difference in both respects. In December, 1860, Senator Iverson, of Georgia, pictured the situation in the senate thus: "There are the republican northern senators on that side. Here are the southern senators on this side. How much social intercourse is there between us? You sit on that side, sullen and gloomy; we sit on ours with portentous scowls. Yesterday I observed there was

not a solitary man on that side of the chamber came over here, even to extend the civilities and courtesies of life; nor did any of us go over there. Here are two hostile bodies on this floor, and it is but a type of the feeling that exists in the two sections. We are enemies as much as if we were hostile states. I believe the northern people hate the south worse than ever the English people hated France; and I can tell my brethren over there that there is no love lost on the part of the south." From this picture, the fact is carefully eliminated that the southern senators represented, not the southern people, but its slaveholding class; but, even barring this defect, the picture is well worthy of study. With such a tightly strained tension of international relations between the governments of the two sections, the real feeling of the people was a matter of but secondary importance, and there was but little need of open threats of secession in case of Lincoln's election. Such threats were undoubtedly made, but unofficially; and the question of secession played no formal part in the campaign of 1860. The whole congress of 1859-61 was inundated by threats of secession in the event of the election of Seward as president in 1860, the object seeming to be to commit the southern people to that policy beyond the possibility of an honorable withdrawal. It has been asserted that the disruption of the democratic party, in 1860, was contrived by the secessionist class for the purpose of insuring Lincoln's election, and thus obtaining an excuse for secession; but such a design is very doubtful. (See DEMOCRATIC PARTY, V.) The more natural explanation of their course is in their hope that the electoral vote would be so divided up as to give no candidate a majority; that the choice of the president would thus go to the house of representatives; and that they would there be able to obtain the election of either Breckinridge or Bell. That their hopes had some foundation, may be seen from the facts that the opposition to Lincoln, after his election, still controlled both houses of congress; and that the republicans, throughout the whole rebellion, were indebted for their majority in congress to the voluntary absence of the southern delegations. As it resulted, however, Lincoln obtained the electoral votes of all the northern and western states, with the exception of a part of New Jersey's vote, and was elected beyond cavil. What was to be the next step in the political game? Were the southern states to go on debating about co-operation, without taking any practical steps toward secession, until the popular impression caused by Lincoln's election had worn off, and his administration was found to be nothing out of the ordinary? In that case, the idea of secession might as well be laid permanently on the shelf, with other worn-out political stage thunder. The southern politician class felt, that, rather than give up what they had grown accustomed to consider the only life-preserver of their section, or rather of slavery, they would prefer to go over the cataract with it. Nevertheless, there remained that dread of the practical attempt to secede by a

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single state, which was always the surest internal condemnation of the whole theory of secession. Gov. Gist, of South Carolina, had already sent a circular letter to the other southern governors, Oct. 5, 1860, usking their advice and plans. His state, he said, would secede with any other state, if Lincoln should be elected; or she would secede alone, if she should receive assurances that any other state would follow her; "otherwise, it is doubtful." Not one governor answered that his state would secede alone. Florida, Alabama and Mississippi would secede with any other state; North Carolina and Louisiana would probably not secede at all; Georgia would wait for some overt At first sight, these answers seem discouraging; but there was hope in them. If three states were only waiting for a leader, South Carolina would take the plunge, though the gallantry of the act is considerably diminished by this preliminary probing for assurances of support. A movement begun even by four states, would probably swing the other gulf states; any attempt at "coercion" by the federal government would bring the border states; and the confederacy of the slave states would then be complete. - The South Carolina legislature, which chose presidential electors until 1868, was in session to choose them, Nov. 6, 1860, and remained in session until Lincoln's election was assured. It then called a state convention, made appropriations for the purchase of arms, and adjourned. The convention met at Columbia, Dec. 17, adjourned to Charleston, on account of an epidemic in Columbia, and there unanimously passed the following ordinance, Dec. 20: “We, the people of the state of South Carolina, in convention assembled, do declare and ordain, and it is hereby declared and ordained, that the ordinance adopted by us in convention, on the 23d day of May, in the year of our Lord 1788, whereby the constitution of the United States was ratified, and also all acts and parts of acts of the general assembly of this state ratifying amendments of the said constitution, are hereby repealed; and that. the Union now subsisting between South Carolina. and other states, under the name of the United States of America, is hereby dissolved." On the 24th a declaration of causes for secession was adopted. It recapitulated the arguments in favor of state sovereignty and the right of secession, and assigned as a cause for immediate secession the general hostility of the northern states to the south, as shown in their union under a sectional party organization, and in their refusal to execute the fugitive slave laws (see PERSONAL LIBERTY LAws); and it concluded with an imitation of the closing paragraph of the declaration of independence. On the same day the governor by proclamation announced the fact of secession. Having adopted ordinances to enforce the existing laws of the United States for the present under state authority, to transfer to the legislature the powers hitherto exercised by the federal government, to make the state ready for war, and to appoint commissioners to form, if possible, a permanent government for

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all the states which should secede, the convention adjourned, Jan. 5, 1861. The action of the state then ceases to relate to secession, and falls under other heads. (See CONFEDERATE STATES, REBELLION.)-The action of Georgia comes second in importance politically, if not chronologically; for the rank, wealth and position of the state would have made its persistent refusal to secede a most annoying brake on the secession programme. The legislature called a state convention, Nov. 18, 1860, and the whole struggle took place on the election of delegates. There was hardly any denial of the right of secession; but a strong state party, under the lead of Alexander H. Stephens, warmly denied the advisability of secession. The convention met at Milledgeville, Jan. 17, 1861, and on the following day, by a vote of 165 to 130, declared it to be the right and the duty of the state to secede. This really settled the question. Jan. 19, the formal ordinance of secession was adopted by a vote of 208 to 89. In order to maintain the position of the state, every delegate but six signed the ordinance; and these six yielded so far as to pledge themselves to the defense of the state. After passing the other necessary ordinances for a transfer of powers from the federal government to the legislature, the convention adjourned, but re-assembled in Savannah, March 7, and on the 16th ratified the confederate constitution. In Mississippi the convention was called for Jan. 7, at Jackson, and passed an ordinance of secession on the 9th by a vote of 84 to 15. March 30, the confederate constitution was ratified by a vote of 78 to 7. In Florida the legislature passed the bill calling a convention, Dec. 1, 1860, and the. convention met at Tallahassee, Jan. 3, 1861. Jan 10, an ordinance of secession was passed by a vote of 62 to 7.-In Alabama the election for delegates was ordered by the governor (see ALABAMA), and the convention met at Montgomery, Jan. 7, 1861. Jan. 11, an ordinance of secession was adopted by a vote of 61 to 39. March 13, the confederate constitution was ratified. - In Louisiana the legislature, Dec. 11, 1860, passed the bill calling a convention, and it met at Baton Rouge, Jan. 23, 1861. Jan. 26, an ordinance of secession was adopted by a vote of 113 to 17, and on March 21 the confederate constitution was ratified. Louisiana was the only original seceding state in which the popular vote for delegates was a close one. It is stated at 20,448 for, and 17,296 against, immediate secession. - In Texas, secession was forced through with great difficulty, and altogether as a revolution. The governor refused to call an extra session of the legislature until, early in January, 1861, he found that steps were being taken to call it together without his authority. He then summoned it for Jan. 22. But this gave very little time for the passage of a convention bill, the election of delegates, and the meeting of the convention. An entirely unofficial call was therefore issued, delegates were elected, and the convention met at Austin, Jan. 28. Feb. 1, an ordinance of secession was passed by a vote of 166 to 7; but, as the conven

tion itself was entirely without any basis of law, the ordinance was to be submitted to popular vote, Feb. 23. The legislature, Feb. 4, validated the convention, apparently with a view to overriding a possibly adverse popular majority. The popular vote was reported to the convention as 34,794 for the ordinance, and 11,235 against it. But even before the popular ratification, the convention had appointed delegates to the confederate congress, Feb. 11, and the federal troops in the state had been captured and paroled. The confederate constitution was ratified March 23. One week before that day the convention had declared vacant the office of Gov. Sam Houston, who had shown no inclination to favor the convention or its purposes. - These seven states, South Carolina, Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana and Texas, were the original seceding states; and the details of their action seem to show that the first three named were the only ones in which convention action represented the majority of the white voters. In Georgia and Louisiana the result was due to the lack of any abiding principle in the unionist representatives for resistance to the earnest body of secessionists; in Alabama, to the control of the convention by the southern portion, or "black belt"; and in Texas, to the revolutionary action of the secessionist politicians. These considerations, however, are not of much practical importance, for in all the states unionists and secessionists alike acknowledged the abstract right of secession, the citizen's paramount allegiance to his state, and the unconstitutionality of "coercion" by the federal government. The secession of even a single state, and an attempt to coerce it, would therefore have brought about the secession of the other states named, as it afterward did in the cases of Arkansas, Tennessee, North Carolina and Virginia. COERCION. It is noteworthy that originally the most extreme particularists had the least objection to the coercion of a state by the federal government. In writing to Monroe, Aug. 11, 1786, Jefferson says: "There never will be money in the treasury till the confederacy shows its teeth. The states must see the rod: perhaps it must be felt by some one of them. * Every rational citizen must wish to see an effective instrument of coercion, and should fear to see it on any other element than the water." And still more fully, Aug. 4, 1787: "It has been so often said as to be generally believed, that congress have no power by the confederation to enforce anything, for example, contributions of money. It was not necessary to give them that power expressly; they have it by the law of nature. When two parties make a compact, there results to each a power of compelling the other to execute it." This was the general ground on which the democratic members of congress, in 1861-5, while still holding the constitution to be a 'compact," voted for the prosecution of the war. It may also explain the reason why both the Virginia and New Jersey plans in 1787 (see CONVENTION OF 1787) included a power to coerce disobedient states; and why Madison and

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others in the convention wished to give the fed- | that would not be all. The jailor and judges eral government an absolute veto on the legisla- and governor of Vermont, and all persons guilty tion of state governments, to remove the necessity with them of rebellion against the faithful execu for any forcible "coercion." Either of these tion of the laws of the United States, would have plans would have been hazardous. Madison him- to be arrested and tried according to law, or, if self said that 'the use of force against a state their resistance was serious enough to require it, would look more like a declaration of war than an to be slain in battle of rebellion against the laws infliction of punishment, and would probably be of the Union. And I am sure, that, if civil war considered by the party attacked as a dissolution should thus be brought on to battle and carnage, of all previous compacts by which it might be every patriot and lover of the laws would march bound." This expression, justified as it is by com- to the order of coercing a state, to compel her aumon sense, has often been quoted as a condemna- thorities and her people to obey the supreme laws, tion of "coercion." But it must be noted that no to lay down their weapons, and to renounce the such " use of force against a state" was ever author- state laws and ordinances commanding their rebellized by the constitution. That instrument gave ion."- Voluntary secession had really spent its. an indirect and far safer power of coercion, 1, in force in carrying Georgia, Alabama, Louisiana. the case of states, by extending the power of the and Texas with it; but it relied on carrying the federal judiciary to state laws involving the con- other slave states with it on the plea of resistancestruction of the constitution (see JUDICIARY, I.); to coercion, when President Lincoln should call and 2, by giving the power to compel individuals for troops to enforce the laws. In two of them it to obey the federal government in any conflict succeeded fairly: Arkansas passed an ordinance of with the state. Nevertheless the opinion was secession May 6, and North Carolina May 20. (Seestrangely prevalent in 1860-61, that, because con- those states.) In Virginia and Tennessee, another gress had no power to coerce" a state, secession | plan had to be adopted. The convention, while could not be interfered with. The simplest argu- nominally submitting the ordinance of secession ment for this view can be found in President to popular vote, first formed "military leagues" Buchanan's message of Dec. 3, 1860. with the confederate states; confederate troops at the main encouragement to secession by a single once swarmed over their territory; and under their state; it was announced again and again by the auspices the popular vote became a farce. In this border states during the winter of 1860-61; and way Virginia's ordinance was ratified May 23, and the consciousness of its general existence threw Tennessee's June 18. Here the current stopped: the Lincoln administration at first altogether up- in Maryland, Kentucky and Missouri much the on the defensive. (See BORDER STATES, and the same plan was tried as in Texas, but it was a failnames of their states in detail.) It was not un- ure. (See those states.) In Delaware alone of the til the popular uprising in the north had taught slave states, secession seems to have had no advothe administration what states it could rely up- cates. The United States supreme court has. on, that the federal government was encouraged finally decided that the ordinances of secession to begin the work of coercion by exercising its were entirely void, and that a state government. power to execute the laws and suppress insurrec- steps out of its sphere when it undertakes to ortion by means of the armed militia. From that ganize armed resistance to the federal government. time coercion took the form of repression of indi- Reconstruction by congress does not seem to havevidual resistance, the federal government ignoring been founded on the notion that the ordinances of the action of the state as entirely ultra vires. secession had so far taken the states out of the This is the form which coercion took in its first Union as to require their readmission, but on the operation in our history, the "force bill" of 1833 theory that the state governments had either been (see NULLIFICATION), and which it must always vacated by the fault of the individual citizens of take. If a state should see fit to form a treaty the state, or had been seized upon by usurpers; with a foreign power, the federal government that in either case the reconstruction must be un-would ignore such action, and would compel indi- der the authority of the federal government; and viduals to ignore it also, by the use of the courts in that individuals who had been guilty of treason cases of mild resistance, and of the army and navy were estopped from objecting to the methods. in case of resistance by force. This process of which congress might see fit to employ. (See "coercion" could hardly be better stated than in RECONSTRUCTION, I.)-Finally, the suppression a pamphlet cited below, by Gov. H. A. Wise, of of the doctrine of secession by force has estabVirginia, published in 1859, though aimed at a lished the political existence of the nation, as disvery different object. He supposes the state of tinguished even from all the states. It has done Vermont gradually coming to forcible resistance so, not by the facts that all the seceding states, in against the execution of the fugitive slave laws, their new constitutions, expressly disavowed any her state convention making the arrest of a slave right of secession, and declared the primary allefelony, and her magistrates and officers resisting giance of the individual citizen to be due to the the federal writs of habeas corpus by force. "The United States; but by the higher fact that the napresident must then command a sufficient force tion has plainly expressed and successfully enof the army or navy or militia of the United forced its will in the matter. For the future, all States to overcome the rebellion and treason; and men are bound to take notice that it is the nation

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that wills that there should be state governments, and not states which will that there should be a

national government. The ultimate results of secession in this way no man can foresee. (See NATION, III.)-The theory of the right of secession will be found in Centz's Republic of Republics; Fowler's Sectional Controversy; 1 Calhoun's Works, 300; 1 Tucker's Blackstone, Appendix, 187; 1 Stephens' War Between the States, 495; Rawle's Commentaries on the Constitution, 302; Appleton's Annual Cyclopædia, 1861, 614 (Davis' Message of April 29). The study of Mr. Fisher's theory of "constitutional secession," by amicable agreement between the federal government and a seceding state, will also be found interesting and profitable: see Fisher's Trial of the Constitution, 160, 167. (See STATE SOVEREIGNTY, III.) See also (I.) authorities under NEW ENGLAND UNION, and ALBANY PLAN OF UNION; 5 Elliot's Debates, 276, 278; 1 Benton's Debates of Congress, 172; 4 Jefferson's Works, edit. 1853, 111; 1 von Holst's United States, 196; authorities under KENTUCKY RESOLUTIONS; 3 Jefferson's Works, edit. 1830, 394; 2 Schouler's United States, 192; Quincy's Life of Quincy, 206, 210; Adams' Documents Relating to New England Federalism (see, under index, "Northern Confederacy"); 4 Upham's Life of Pickering, 53; 3 Sparks' Writings of Gouverneur Morris, 319; 1 Story's Life of Story, 182; 8 Niles' Weekly Register, 262; Carey's Olive Branch, 7th edit., 416, 449; Hunt's Life of Livingston, 346; authorities under CONVENTION, HARTFORD, and NULLIFICATION; (II.) 1 Greeley's American Conflict, 359; May's Anti-Slavery Conflict, 320; 2 Benton's Thirty Years' View, 613, 698, 733; Cox's Eight Years in Congress, 188; 16 Benton's Debates of Congress, 403, 415 (Calhoun's and Webster's speeches, March 4 and 7, 1850); 2 Olmsted's Cotton Kingdom, 158; (III.) Nicolay's Outbreak of Rebellion; 1 Draper's Civil War, 438, and 2 ibid.; Buchanan's Administration, 108; Greeley's Political Text Book of 1860, 170; McPherson's Political History of the Rebellion, 2; 2 Stephens' War Between The States, 312; ibid., 671 (South Carolina declaration of 1861); 2 Jefferson's Works, edit. 1830, 43, 203; H. A. Wise's Territorial Government, 103; Botts' Great Rebellion, 205, 209; Brownson's American Republic, 277; Story's Commentaries on the Constitution, edit. 1833, § 359; Mulford's The Nation, 334; Goodwin's Natural History of Secession; Hurd's Theory of Our National Existence.

ALEXANDER JOHNSTON.

of the confederation there was but one house, and
each state had an equal vote in it. (See CONFED-
ERATION, ARTICLES OF.) There was some effort
in the convention of 1787 to continue the arrange-
ment of a single house, but it found no influential
support, except from Franklin and the "Jersey
plan," and was abandoned. The greatest difficul-
ty, which seems very slight now, but was almost
insuperable in the beginning of the convention's
work, was to find a different basis of existence for
the two houses. It was comparatively easy to fix
the membership of the house of representatives
by fair proportions of the whole population of the
country. (See APPORTIONMENT.) But it was
then very difficult to hit on any radically different
basis for the senate, which should be satisfactory
to all concerned. There was no different class, as
in Great Britain, from which to select a house of
lords (see that title); and the formation of a smaller
house, on the same basis as the other, would have
ended in the establishment of two houses, both
controlled by precisely the same ideas, and the
loss of all the advantages of two houses. - The
same difficulty has attended the formation of state
senates, and has been met there by the division of
the state into different territorial units for the two
houses. (See ASSEMBLY.) The convention of 1787
hit upon a simple and natural basis for the senate,
and formed a body as efficient in practice as it is
apt to strike the imagination of an observer fa-
vorably. The senate is certainly the most digni-
fied and impressive part of the American consti-
tutional system, unless we except the supreme
court. But this brilliant success of the conven-
tion must not blind us to the fact that the conven-
tion itself gained it blindly, or was forced into it;
that it was the product of no single clear design
or desire; and that it was due to the gradual and
unwilling compromise of conflicting purposes.
(See CONVENTION OF 1787; COMPROMISES, I.) If
the scheme of the senate, as we admire it in its
final form, had been offered to the convention in
the first place, it would almost certainly not have
received a single vote. - The Virginia plan, when .
first introduced, provided that the senate, without
as yet giving it a name or defining its powers or
term of office, should be chosen by the house of
representatives out of a proper number of persons
nominated by the state legislatures. Pinckney's
plan proposed that it should be chosen by the
house from residents of the various states to
serve for three years; that the senators from
New England, the middle and the southern states,

SEDITION LAWS. (See ALIEN AND SEDI- should constitute three classes, to go out of office TION LAWS.)

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SEMINOLE WAR. (See SLAVERY, II.)

SENATE (IN U. S. HISTORY). This name is given to the smaller of the two branches of the state legislatures, but, when used without distinctive description, usually refers to the smaller of the two houses of congress. (See CONGRESS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.) - In the congress

on successive years; and that the senate should have sole power to declare war, make treaties, appoint foreign ministers and judges of the supreme court, and decide territorial disputes between the states. Hamilton's plan proposed that senators should be chosen by electors chosen by the people of each state in election districts; that they should serve during good behavior; and that the senate should have the power to declare war and approve treaties and appointments. The New Jersey plan

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