| not disproportionately but proportionately. A majority of the electors would always have a majority of the representatives, but a minority of the electors would always have a minority of the representatives. Unless this be so, there is no equal government, but a government of inequality and privilege. One part of the people ruleover the rest. There is a part whose fair and equal share of influence in representation is withheld from them, contrary to all just government,. but above all, contrary to the principle of democracy, which professes equality as its very root and foundation." Incidentally be it mentioned that this plan would secure to a capable man a career in political life as secure as in any profession, as he would not be dependent on the accidental majority of his district, but could always rely upon obtaining a quota vote. - The cowardice of mod-ern political parties is best indicated by the fact. that no party in the United States dares, in moderm days, ever present its strongest man for the presidency, because, having been long in the public: eye, he is sure to have offended a great number of: voters whose adhesion is necessary to make a majority. Availability, therefore, takes the place of true ability. The adoption of minority representation also solves, in advance, all the objections to the extension of the suffrage, and would! secure to the tax payer by combination, what it: is impossible for him to secure now in relation to municipal administration—a strong contingent of representatives of the tax payer in the city councils, to act as a check and brake on extravagant expenditures. If the scheme of minority representation is extended, by making large districts and numerous representatives from such districts,. it would also give within party lines such independent action as to create a balance-of-power party within the party, and would thus forever destroy the supremacy of halls and juntas, who hold their power simply because the alternative presented to the voter is to accept their candidate or the candidate of a hall or organization equally bad but belonging to the opposing political organTo the objection that may be urged, that minority representation would secure to the sinister elements of a community a representation. if they saw fit to combine, the answer is, that it. is better that the representative of the sinister elements should be known as such, than that a private arrangement be made with the sinister elements of a community by which they secure surreptitiously and secretly several representatives on condition of their support, and thus obtain by bargain a very much larger share than they could obtain by right.— The one formidable objection to the whole scheme of minority representation, and which is really the price that the community must pay for the total representation of the community, is, that it has a tendency to prevent the spirit of compromise and mutual forbearance, which party has a tendency to create. The community would possibly split up into too many segments. Opportunity of representation being afforded to small up of the existing political machinery, the tyranny . erence to governmental machinery, that it, like all machinery devised by men, must be progressively improved to adapt it to the varying needs of society. The devices to prevent tyranny and oppression which answered the purposes of the people against the kingly power of a John, a Charles or a George are as little adapted to modern society as is the crude machinery of those periods to the necessities of man in civilized life at the present day. For the satisfaction of all physical wants immense progress has been made in every direction. The art of government, however, has not been so progressive. The safe maker has kept pace with, and is a little in advance of, the skill of the burglar. The art of government has not kept pace with the skil. and ingenuity of those who require its restraining influences. The oppression which in former periods exhibited itself on the banks of the Rhine, by a robber baron sweeping down upon a rich neighboring community and depleting it of its movable property, or by his kin in spirit, locking up in his dungeon keep some rich Jew, and drawing his teeth until he disgorged his wealth, now manifests itself in corporate management in stock waterings, and in con fiscation under the guise of taxation, in river and harbor bills, in protective tariffs, and thousands of other forms which are tyranny and exaction disguised under specious names to hide their nature, and clothed with the machinery of government itself to make the imposture complete. To destroy these malignant abuses of governmental machinery, effort must be made to give the gov ernment back to the people, freed from the organization which assumes to act for the people, but which misrepresents and abuses them. There is, therefore, no art or science to which the human intellect can devote itself of a more practical and immediately beneficial nature than reforms in rep. resentation, which lie at the bottom and root of modern government, so as to make representative bodies the true exponents of popular interests instead of fraudulent representatives of the popular will. "Representation should effect for the nation," says Mirabeau, "what a chart does for the physical configuration of the soil-producing not only a reduced picture of the whole of the people, but also representing their classes, their aspirations, wishes and opinions." The body of representatives should produce on the mind of the student of a nation's social constituencies an effect similar to that produced on its territory, in repre quotas, the Catholic, the Jew, the infidel, might | agement. - Finally, we must recognize, with refsecure separate representation, and thus intensify religious feeling. Workingmen and capitalists might secure separate representation; and thus the same reason which would make minority representation act as a solvent of political parties, might result in its acting as a solvent on constituencies which ought to be held together in the bands of party, thereby cultivating mutual good will, which probably would not exist were their parts to be exclusively committed to their own class for political action. The only answer to this position is the universal experience of mankind, that the instant men are clothed with the responsibility of government, acerbity is lessened, and the intoler. ance which characterizes them as sectaries or partisans without political power is diminished. To give to minorities, therefore, who now have no chance of representation, an opportunity to have their voices heard, coupled with the responsibility that their recommendations must be put in practicable shape for legislation, and that the responsibility of such legislation rests upon their | shoulders if adopted by the majority, has in itself a very sobering influence on all viclent and extreme | opinions, and subjects them to the severest tests to which opinions can be subjected, that of discussion with well-trained adverse opinions, and that of practicability to frame statutes to enforce such opinions. Admitting Catholics and Jews to parliament was opposed, on the ground that, in the one case, a superior allegiance was considered due from the Catholic to the pope, and in the other case, that the Jew regarded every country in which he lived as but a mere resting place, that his true home was in Palestine, and that these convictions made both sects unpatriotic. Their admission, however, has proved how utterly groundless was this objection; that there are no more patriotic members of parliament than the Catholics and the Jews, is now past controversy. Indeed, in all matters of legislation the religious conviction scarcely ever comes to the surface, except where it is necessary for the purpose of preventing some act of intolerance to formulate itself into law. In boards of direction of corporations the adoption of a minority scheme of representation would be the most absolute security to insure continuity of direction and purpose in a less objectionable form than the adoption of a classification scheme, by which only a few of the directors go out each year, and would also prevent the possibility of a capture of a corporation through the instrumentality of proxies representing fic-senting its mountains and dales, its rivers and titious holdings, borrowings of stock, etc., by which great corporations have been depleted and the interests of the stockholders wholly disregarded. Even if the majority of the board of direction would truly represent the majority of the stockholding interest, a watchful and alert minority would prevent the diverting of the property and management of the road to sinister purposes, and be a check more efficacious than are courts or laws to prevent corporate misman lakes, forests and plains, cities and towns. The REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY. (See DEMOCRACY, REPRESENTATIVE.) REPUBLIC. This form of government is no more independent than the monarchical of the historical, geographical, ethnographical, and, above all, moral conditions, which seem to predestine a people to one or the other, by not leaving it the liberty of choice between them except within rather restricted limits. From this point of view, all abstract comparison of the intrinsic merits of monarchies and republics might seem superfluous, and there would be occasion to ask one's self whether the platonic love of a monarchy in countries with republican manners and customs, or of the republican enthusiasm which possesses some young minds or some generous imaginations in countries called by their inmost nature and their past to hereditary monarchy, are not chimeras which should be dispelled, and dangers which we should endeavor to avert. Without contesting whatever truth there may be in such a conclusion, we think that the forms of government may and should be compared with each other and considered in themselves, and that it is the task of the publicist, all due reservation being made in consideration of what is possible in time and place, to investigate their value, and to point out that which constitutes their merits and their defects. Thus the publicist, the least likely to be misled by deceptive appearances, and the most determined to settle, in the choice of his political opinions, upon what he judges to be actually practicable, will not scorn the enthusiasm which a republic awakens in noble minds, and he will examine whether it does not partake of an ideal beauty for which he should have some regard both as one of the elements of the judgment which he passes on the republic, and of the influence which it exercises. He will thus discover that elevated thought, lofty and powerful sentiments, are connected with the idea of a republic. In monarchies the devotion of man to man occupies a large place, and far be it from us to deny what it presents of the touching, and sometimes of the heroic, or to question what it has in it compatible with a love of the public | welfare; but it is less pure and less sublime than that devotion which is directed to something superior to man himself, that is, to the fatherland, to the law, to the state. All selfish prejudice, all personal calculation, every fancy foreign to the general interest, seems to disappear in this generous sacrifice of each to all, and of the littleness of the individual to the greatness of justice. To the idea of devotedness, to that of an entirely stoical disin- | terestedness, is added another idea not less severe, and more attractive because it is more natural, that of equality united to liberty. Equality is to such an extent the passion of republican minds that the most aristocratic republics are no exception to it; only the practice and the worship of equality are concentrated within a limited circle, instead of extending to all the citizens. It is to equality that all, in a republican aristocracy, sacrifice themselves; it is to it that they do not hesitate to sacrifice the most illustrious heads; it is cquality which impels, in spite of himself, in a manner, a | This Brutus to arm himself against a Cæsar. shows us the nature and the end of the republic; it is a government founded upon general interest and equality, the motive power of which are disinterestedness, devotedness, and, let us add, popularity, with the honors which it confers. If all think they find their advantage in this form of government, it is on the supreme condition of defending, at the cost of the greatest struggles, a good, precious from the double point of view of individual dignity and of utility. This is why the most generous dreamers as well as the most rigorous logicians come, by some sort of instinct, to the idea of a republic. This is why it has produced so many virtues, of the sublimest kind, offered by history to the admiration of future generations. But what constitutes the greatness of this form of government is also the source of its difficulties and dangers, which no clearsighted republican can deny. Equality, which is the soul of republics, encounters two formidable enemies: ambition, which conspires against it, and envy, which exaggerates it. The former can not be resigned to accept the yoke of a law, the same for all; the latter rebels against the superiority of fortune and of merit; it tries to level the one, and devotes itself to railing at the other. Taxation directed against the rich, schemes of agrarian law, privileges in favor of the poor, suspicions of the well-to-do and enlightened part of the population all these spring up in republics. "For," says the old publicist, Jean Bodin, with a severity which is not exaggerated if applied to the past, "the real natural disposition of a people is to have full liberty without any restraint or curb whatever, to have all equal in goods, in honors, in punishments, in rewards, without any regard to rank, or knowledge, or virtue." Who does not know that, up to the present time, great citizens in republics have always had to defend themselves (and sometimes without success) against calumny? If favor has its vicissitudes in a monarchy, how few reputations in republics withstand the exercise of power for however short a time. To what contumely in the most irreproachable of republics, the United States, so often cited as a model, were their Washingtons, Hamiltons and Madisons not exposed? What accusations against their generals in the ancient republics of Greece! What terrible changes of popularity and what bloody sacrifices to that capricious power, in the short and stormy attempt at a republic made by France in 1793! The moderate republic of 1848 did not sully herself with blood; she spilt it only in the arena of civil war, when that of the best citizens flowed voluntarily in the service of public order. But did any one's popularity last longer than three months? Was this the fault solely of the men who governed? Be that as it may, there is not a historian, not an enlightened publicist, who has not declared that jealousy, suspicion, and the spirit of change, are the especial dangers of republics, as favoritism and intrigue are those of monarchies. But the first-named vices are those of the majority; the second belong to only a small tablishment. That establishment has no interest. to threaten liberty; it has, on the contrary, every interest to take care of it. This care is the price of the force of public opinion which sustains it. In republics, liberty, recognized as sovereign in principle, runs serious risks. The power, under the form which best represents order in the eyesof the nation, is temporary. Hence the necessity of arming it in an exceptional way, or of arming one's self against its possible encroachments, or by precautions which are embarrassing to all. The majority oppresses the minority, or else the minority governs through terror. If we can not see in this a fatal and inevitable law, it has at least been, up to the present time, the history of the greater number of republics. Another cause threatens liberty: its own excesses. Too frequently have we seen republics knowing no alternative but excessive or suspended liberty. Happy were they when this suspension of liberty did not end in its suppression, and when temporary dictatorships were not changed into a lasting tyranny!—The error of the greater part of the republican schools has until now consisted in believing that a republic had not to solve the problem of equilibrium; that it is a government of absolute simplicity, and has no need of being tempered. This thought has led some to the idea of a direct government of the people, excluding even a representative government; an idea which caused the author of L'Esprit des lois to say: "There was one great defect in most of the ancient republics: that in them the people believed they had the right to make active resolutions requiring some sort of execution, a thing of which the people is utterly incapable. The people should not enter into the government except to choose their representatives, which is quite within their power. For, if there are but few people who know the precise degree of men's capacity, each one is nevertheless capable of knowing in general if the one whom he chooses is more enlightened than most others." The same opinion as to absolute simplicity has led other politicians to the idea of a civic assembly. Experience, as well as reason, teaches that republics can not, save at the risk of death, abandon themselves to the descending plane or declivity of a civic principle or element. There is no society which does not contain natural aristocracies of experience, learning, age, etc., within it. And, on the other hand, there is no society, however strongly organized its privileges may be, in which the masses are not important, and do not count for something in the state. Notwithstanding their inclination to exaggerate simplicity and to crush out whatever obstructed the full expansion of their principle, the constitutions of antiquity felt this. Aristocratic as was the Roman republic, it modified the power of the senate by means of the tribunes and popular suffrage. Democratic as was Athens, it had the Areopagus. It is true that the wise precautions taken by Solon did not prevent the country of Aristides and Socrates from succumbing to the propensities which hurried it on. The more and more exclusive predominance of the popular element produced disorders there, the undying remembrance of which is preserved by history, as a lesson to democracies, present or future, which choose not to recognize any restraint.-The United States itself has endeavored to combine the different powers in such a manner as to secure respect for the law against the changeable will of the multitude. The president possesses extensive powers, and, in spite of pure ultra-republican theory, there is a moderating senate side by side with the popular assembly, or house of representatives. Any constitution, monarchical, republi-viduals to contribute money and military service can, aristocratic or democratic, which does not distrust its own principle, at the same time that it does all it can to establish it on a solid basis, is a bad constitution. The excessively unitarian and centralizing propensities which govern in some countries, make this observation especially opportune. A republic which should have only a very centralized power, with no independent powers to act as a counterpoise, would run the risk of becoming more oppressive than a monarchy. If to this cause of oppression should be added the necessity of being on the defensive in order to resist either hostile parties within, or menaces from without, it is clear that liberty would be exposed to painful lisappointment. Every liberal republic involves a certain amount of administration. What were the republics of Greece and the Italian republics of the middle ages? Brilliant municipalities. American federalism is not necessarily the form of a free republic, but a certain amount of decen- | tralization seems to us to be an indispensable condition for such a republic. A free republic can be understood only where much is left to individuals and to associations. Otherwise, what result would have been obtained by so many revolutions? A change of name! But of what consequence is it to the world whether an omnipotent government call itself a monarchy or a republic? | LIBERTY Laws), their essential characteristic was that belief in the political existence of the nation which has controlled their whole party history, and given them their claim to the name republican. (See NATION.) From 1854 until 1861 the party was engaged in opposing the extension of slavery to the territories. Since 1861 it has controlled the national government, and has been successful in maintaining the power of the nation to suppress resistance to the laws, even when marshaled under state authority; to establish and control a system of national banks; to compel indi HENRI BAUDRILLART. REPUBLICAN PARTY (IN U. S. HISTORY), the name, 1, of the original democratic party (see DEMOCRATIC PARTY, I.), and, 2, of the most powerful opponent of the democratic party, 1854–82. In the latter case, it seems to have been assumed, in great measure, for the purpose of making use of the still lingering reverence for the name in the northern states; and yet it seems far more appropriate to its modern than to its original claimant. The original republicans looked upon the Union as a democracy, whose constituent units were not persons, but states; and, hence, the name democratic party, which they finally accepted almost to the exclusion of the name republican, was their proper title. The modern republicans looked upon the Union as a republic of itself, apart from all the states, and able to assert the integrity of its territory against any of the states; and though, like every other American minority, they were ready upon occasion to assert the sovereignty of the states (see STATE SOVEREIGNTY, PERSONAL to national defense in time of war, the former by the issue of legal-tender paper money, the latter by drafts; to abolish slavery; to reconstruct the governments of seceding states; to maintain and defend the security of the emancipated race against state laws; to regulate those state elections which directly influence the national government; and to suppress polygamy in the territories. No other political party has, therefore, exerted so enormous an influence upon the essential nature of the government in so short a time. — I.:1854-61. But one party, the democratic, emerged unbroken, and even increased, from the storm which was settled by the compromise of 1850. For the next five years there were only feeble and discordant efforts to oppose it, by the free-soilers on the slavery question, by the whigs on economic issues, and by the know-nothings on the question of suffrage. The dominant party itself struck the sudden and sharp blow which, in 1854, crystallized the jarring elements of opposition into a single party. The passage of the Kansas-Nebraska bill (see that title), not imperatively demanded by the southern democracy, a quixotic adherence to party dogma by the northern democracy, only served to rouse a general alarm throughout the north. The summer and autumn of 1854 became an era of coalitions in most of the northern states; and the result of the congressional elections of that year was that the "anti-Nebraska men," as the coalitionists were called, obtained a plurality in the house over the democrats and the distinct know-nothings, and elected the speaker. A few members, elected as anti-Nebraska men, turned out to be consistent know-nothings; the remainder, however, still controlled the house. The elements which went to make up the new party were very various and numerous. 1. Its immediate ancestor was the free-soil party, which joined it bodily. Of its first leaders, Hale, Julian, Chase, C. F. Adams, Sumner, Wilmot, F. P. Blair, and Preston King of New York, were of this class. Many of these, like Chase, were naturally democrats, but had been forced into opposition to their party by its unnecessary deference to the feelings of its southern wing. 2. But these alone could not have formed the basis of a new party. This was supplied by former whigs, either originally antislavery, or forced into that attitude by the compromise of 1850. Of this class, Lincoln, Seward, Greeley, Fessenden, Thaddeus Stevens, Sherman, |