French concessions it was still further reduced on French articles of export. But what distinguished this treaty from preceding ones was the fact that these reductions were not bargained for as special and exclusive privileges. This treaty was intended to become part of a system; it was contemplated that both England and France would make similar treaties with other nations, and in view of this it was provided, that in case either of the contracting powers should subsequently grant to a third power conditions more favorable in any respect, the other should have the benefit of such conditions. This provision constitutes what is known as the most favored nations clause; it was incorporated in subsequent treaties, as had occasionally been done in previous treaties, and soon became the important element in them; for by it a.special concession made in favor of any one nation at once inured to the benefit of all who had similar treaties. It is this provision that distinguishes the modern European reciprocity system, and has caused that system to work so strongly in favor of free trade. -The gain to the commerce of France and England was so great that other nations hastened to secure the same advantages. Similar treaties with France or England were made by Belgium in 1861, Prussia in 1862, Italy and Spain in 1863, Switzerland in 1864, and by most of the other European states in 1865 and 1866. Even Russia ultimately secured at the hands of some of the powers the benefit of the most favored nations clause, though without much reciprocity on her part. Within ten years the system seemed to be firmly established all over Europe, and to insure steady progress in the direction of free trade. (For certain special statistics, see Leone Levi in Journ. of Stat. Soc., 40, 1; for discussion of principles, a work entitled "Letters on Commercial Treaties," etc., "by a disciple of Richard Cobden.")—But several circumstances combined to stop this progress, and to a certain extent unsettle the system. The first of these was the downfall of Napoleon III He had not only started the system, but had by his strong influence done more to extend it than most people were aware of. It had never been really popular in the sense of calling forth general enthusiasm. It savored too much of bargaining, too little of principle. And it was rendered less popular than ever by wars like that of 1870, which intensified the opposition of national feeling, and substituted a spirit of embittered rivalry for one of mutual help. This acted against the reciprocity system in a variety of ways. Increased military expenditure demanded larger revenue; and nations chafed under treaty restrictions which hampered them in raising this revenue. The commercial treaties looked toward free trade; but national pride and the constant possibility of war led men to demand a protective system. While men's minds were in this state came the crisis of 1873; and public feeling was only too ready to attribute the hard times which followed to the one tangible grievance of foreign competition, and to seek to be rid of

this grievance in all possible ways. -The diplomatists were mainly free traders; and it was some time before they understood the strength of the feelings they had to contend against. The failure of the English negotiators in 1876 to obtain some expected concessions from France, began to reveal the true state of the case. The termination in the same year, by the action of Italy, of the French-Italian treaty, and the rejection by France. of a proposed compromise treaty in 1877, were equally significant. Of still greater importance was Bismarck's change of attitude in 1878. Ever since the year 1818 the Prussian government leaned toward a free trade policy, much more so than any other great power except England. In 1862 their steps in support of the reciprocity system had been bold in the extreme. Now, such a change on the part of Prussia, as well as France and Italy, rendered the future of the system extremely doubtful.-To understand the negotiations which followed, we must observe that in the application of these treaties of commerce, two different courses had been pursued by different states. One group of states, headed by England and Prussia, had no sooner made a concession to a single nation, than they modified their whole tariff in accordance with it, so that all nations, even those outside of the system, at once had the benefit of the change. Another group, represented by France, left their general tariff unchanged, but in the collection made a deduction of that amount in favor of nations having the benefit of a treaty. Spain went so far in this direction as to have two tariffs, the lower for "most favored nations," the higher for all others. — As long as the statesmen on both sides were animated by common aims, this distinction made very little difference. But when it became a matter of international bickering, the nations of the first group found themselves at a great disadvantage. What special privileges are you offering us under the treaty? French negotiators constantly asked of the representatives of those nations which had reduced their general tariff. To this question there was no thoroughly available reply; and it was this diplomatic helplessness that led to the "fair trade" agitation in England, and to a full discussion of certain points in the theory of reciprocity into which we can not here enter. (Westminster Rev., 112, 1; Contemp., 35, 269; Nineteenth Cent., 5, 638, 992; 6, 179; Fawcett, "Free Trade and Protection," last chapter.)- In the year 1881 a number of French treaties were about to expire; and it was felt that a critical point had come in the history of the system. After some difficulties, particularly in connection with the Italian and Swiss treaties, they were nearly all renewed on the basis of increased duties on either side. The treaty with England was not renewed, but a special act was passed placing England on the footing of the most favored nations. On the whole, it may be said that the continuance of the system has been secured, but its efficiency in the direction of free trade destroyed. - The United States has never

been in any way connected with the system. At the time of its adoption and growth, American tendencies were all in the direction of increased duties. Our reciprocity treaties have all belonged to the earlier type of special arrangements. By far the most important of them was the one with Canada, proclaimed Sept. 11, 1854, and terminated March 17, 1866, on notice given by the United States one year previous. By the terms of this treaty food products of all kinds, nearly all raw materials, and some half-manufactured articles, were allowed to pass free from one country to the other. The dissatisfaction with the treaty arose from the owners of mines, timber, etc., in the United States, who found the price of their products kept down by Canadian competition. A memorial in favor of its renewal was presented to the United States government by the national board of trade in 1873, but without calling forth vigorous general support. — A similar treaty was concluded with Hawaii in the summer of 1876, for the benefit of certain business interests of the Pacific states, particularly the sugar refiners. It was severely criticised by Secretary Sherman, after having been in operation about two years; but it now seems to have accomplished what was expected of it. The position of the United States government on the subject of commercial treaties is illustrated by the fact, that, when the Hawaiian authorities attempted to negotiate a similar treaty with Germany in 1879, they were checked by an intimation from the United States that the value of those privileges lay largely in their exclusiveness, and that the treaty must guarantee the United States exclusive rights. In the years succeeding the exhibition of 1876, strong efforts were made by French exporters to secure reciprocity privileges from the United States. It was hoped that if France would place America on the basis of the most favored nations, America would lower its duties on French wines and silks. In spite of the repeated efforts of the French manufacturers' agent to secure public sentiment in its favor, the subject was never officially taken up.

ARTHUR T. HADLEY.

RECOGNITION. It is customary for princes to notify the states with which they hold relations of their accession to the throne. The same is the case with all new governments. As a rule, especially in the case of a prince who succeeds regularly and peaceably, this announcement is met by congratulations and sometimes by sending ambassadors, more or less extraordinary. At other times only an official certificate of the notification is given, and the receipt of it acknowledged. There are even cases in which, at the time of a change, no formality is employed; relations with the new government are entered upon, and it is thus recognized de facto. - International recognition was formerly of much greater import than in our day. The dogma of national sovereignty had as yet been accepted by but a few daring innovators; and right, justice and law were summed up

in the will of the prince. This was the period im which a haughty king could say: l'état, c'est moi.

It is now admitted that a people is independent by its own right, exclusive of any recognition. Let an island arise in the Atlantic to-morrow; let people land and settle there; let them form themselves into an independent political society and choose a government; and that island would form a state as lawful and regular as any other. International recognition is at bottom only the authentication of a fact, an anthentication which requires no formality. In entering into relations with Japan, with Burmah, or with any country, the remoteness of which preserves it from European enterprise, it never occurs to any one to begin by recognizing the government with which they are about to treat. It is sufficient that it exists, and in treating with it recognition is implied. — In such cases as these, there could never be any doubt; but doubt has arisen sometimes, when, in consequence of internal revolution, one government has been replaced by another. The independence of the state is not called in question, but it is hoped to authenticate or legitimatize the new government by recognizing it, though often again family motives or interested motives may prevent this being done. The principle of national sovereignty, better understood, has silenced all these scruples. Recognition no longer implies approbation, and foreign countries are not obliged to distinguish between the government de jure and the government de facto. If the government appear established, if the nation accept it, and, above all, if it has appointed it, it has all the legitimacy necessary in order to be recognized. be recognized. Thus recognition adds nothing to the right of existence of a state; it is only a means of facilitating international relations. A state which is not recognized is regarded as not existing for those which deem it expedient to remain a stranger to it; but if any inconvenience result from this lack of intercourse,. both the states suffer. The injury is greater, however, to the state which refuses recognition than to the one which is deprived of it. Spain lost nothing from the fact that the emperor of Russia would not recognize Isabella II., while Nicholas I. made it impossible to exercise an influence over Spain. Besides, it was Russia which was destined to yield in the end, and, in such a case, the longer the sulkiness has lasted, the more it costs to effect a reconciliation. We have just been speaking of governments established in consequence of a profound change, violent or peaceful, in the constitution of a state. But before the new public powers are well established, several cases may occur, and we must review them. In the first place, there may be a "provisional government." A diplomatic official agent, ambassador or minister is never accredited to a provisional government; but power may be given to an agent more or less official to enter into relations with it, and to treat with it on all pressing måtters. In reality, such an agent is an ambassador deprived of the honorary immunities customarily enjoyed by the repre

sentatives of foreign powers. However, many shades of difference are possible here. Then, two parties may be contending for power. As long as there is a doubt as to the definitive success, foreign governments recognize only the one to which its agents have been accredited. The new government does not as yet exist; there is, consequently, no occasion for recognizing it. Besides, if relations are prematurely entered into with the chiefs of an insurrection, the government still established would have a right to consider itself offended. When there is too much haste to recognize, it is often in order to aid or intervene. The third case to consider is, when a part of the territory, a province, or colony, wishes to detach itself from the state of which it has hitherto formed a part. If this territory be victorious in the contest, to the extent that its independence is recognized even by the state from which it has separated, foreign powers can have no doubt what to do: recognition is then a simple authentication of a patent fact. If peace have not been formally concluded, each foreign state will be able to estimate, at a given moment, if the territory which claims to be independent has acquired sufficient political stability to offer a guarantee for the future. But we must not lose sight of the fact that a state threatened with the loss of a province will always see with displeasure that the separation is looked upon as accomplished, and, according to circumstances, it will protest or declare itself offended. A powerful country will pay no attention to these complaints, but a weak country will act with prudence. - We do not need to say that to recognize the independence of a country at the moment when the insurrection begins, constitutes a real casus belli. War will not be recoiled from, unless the insult come from too powerful a .state. - In 1861 a new situation was introduced into international law, the recognition of belligerents. We have had as yet but one example of this, that which recognized as belligerents the confederate states fighting to separate themselves from the United States. It will be understood that to recognize the southern states of the American Union as belligerents, was to close the English ports to war vessels from the northern states, which was an act of indirect hostility. Sympathy was extended to the confederates, not because their cause was considered just, but because their cotton was needed. We can not foresee what use may be made one day of this semi-recognition, the only example of which we have just cited, but we instinctively regard the precedent as a thing to be regretted. It may more than once encourage malcontents to revolt, without its being deemed expedient to come to their assistance otherwise than by this indirect aid, which we can not help regarding as a sort of intervention, perhaps without danger, but more generally without honor or profit. When one state does not recognize a change in the constitution of another, diplomatic relations cease, as in war, and the subjects of the disaffected states are commended to the good

offices of an allied state; they are thus officiously (officieusement), using the term in a good sense, instead of officially, protected. MAURICE BLOCK.

RECONSTRUCTION (IN U. S. HISTORY), the political problem of the restoration of the seceding states to their normal relations with the Union after the suppression of armed resistance therein to the constitution and the laws. Such a problem would have been easy of solution under a simple and direct acting government; in a highly complicated system like that of the United States, in which the parts and their action are so delicately adjusted, any derangement shows its effects everywhere; and a derangement so great as was introduced by secession, since it can not check the national force, is almost certain to throw all the wheels out of gear, convert the national machine into a blind and guideless power, and make a bad master out of a good servant. In the matter of reconstruction the difficulty was increased, 1. By the length and bitterness of the war. The terms of reconstruction which were possible in 1862, 1863, 1864, or 1866, were each of them impossible within a year thereafter. Every battle lost and won, every vessel sunk, every house burned, every case of mistreatment of prisoners, was in its way a factor not only in anti-slavery action, but in final reconstruction. 2. By the status of the freedmen. It was impossible that the successful party should feel no interest whatever in the fate of the beings who had been converted by its success from chattels into persons. It was natural that the disposition of the conquered toward the freedmen should be keenly and suspiciously scrutinized; and thus every act of individual violence, every appearance of organized repression, which came to light before the work of reconstruction was completed, became a silent factor in the work. 3. By the existence of a written constitution which provided for no such state of affairs. An omnipotent British parliament would have soon hit on a formal settlement, though its success in solving the Irish problem has not been so swift or sure as to make us wish for a change of régime. The American government could only engage in a series of experiments, more or less successful, and finally rest content with that solution which seemed to offer the least difficulty and the greatest advantages to the nation. Happily for the nation," says Brownson, "few blunders are committed that with our young life and elasticity are irreparable, and that are greater than are ordinarily committed by older and more experienced nations. They are not of the most fatal character, and need excite no serious alarm for the future." In considering the question, it is proposed, 1, to give, as briefly as possible, the successive theories of reconstruction; 2, to detail the work as it was finally done; and 3, 4, to consider its failures and its successes. In so doing, there are certain prece dents which are often referred to by all of them, and these may as well be given now, for reference.

mitting illegal acts, for which they are liable to punishment; the states have never left the Union, but so soon as their officers shall perform their duties, or other officers shall assume their places, will again perform the duties imposed, and enjoy the privileges conferred, by the federal compact, and this, not by virtue of a new ratification of the constitution, nor a new admission by the federal government, but by virtue of the original ratification, and the constant, uninterrupted maintenance of position in the federal Union since that date. Acts of secession are not invalid to destroy the Union, and yet valid to destroy the state governments and the political privileges of their citizens.” This ground was held thereafter by the democratic conventions of all the states, and by the national convention of 1868, but it was unsuccessful. Indeed, it was worse. Nothing is more curious in the congressional votes on this question than the manner in which democratic consistency and persistency thwarted all propositions for mild terms to the insurrectionary states. The names of democrats and "radical" republicans, of Fernando Wood and Thaddeus Stevens, appear side by side in voting down the successive and increasingly severe propositions for reconstruction, until, after 1865, the "radical" republicans, falling back a step, united with the moderate republicans and swamped the democrats. - Kindred to this general principle were the constant demands of the democrats for a national convention of states. They began July 15, 1861, when Benjamin Wood, of New York, offered a resolution recommending such a convention, which was tabled by a party vote of 92 to 51; and they continued until the democratic national convention of 1864 demanded "a cessation of hostilities with a view to an ultimate convention of all the states." Toward the end of the war, and particularly just before the presidential election of 1864, many southern authorities inclined to accept this scheme, if offered to the seceding states; but they still insisted that the states were not to be bound by the action of the convention. — Another kindred proposition, offered in December, 1861, and several times thereafter, was to appoint ex-Presidents Fillmore and Pierce, Chief Justice Taney, Edward Everett, and seven other commissioners, to confer with a like number from the seceding states for the preservation of the Union. It was either left unconsidered or tabled. — In the conference at Hampton Roads, Feb. 2, 1865, between Alex. H. Stephens, R. M. T. Hunter, John A. Campbell, President Lincoln, and Secretary Seward, Mr. Stephens says that he asked "what position the confederate states would occupy toward the others, if they were then to abandon the war? Would they be admitted to congress? Mr. Lincoln very promptly replied that his own individual opinion was that they ought to be. He also thought they would be, but he could not enter into any stipulations upon the subject. His own opinion was, that, when the resistance ceased and the national authority was recognized, the states would be immediately restored

to their practical relations to the Union." This statement, however, is opposed to the known fact that the president was then fairly committed to the presidential theory of reconstruction. - The last attempt at "restoration" was the memorandum of April 18, 1865, between Generals W. T. Sherman and Joseph E. Johnston. It provided for the disbandment of the confederate forces at their state capitals, the re-establishment of the federal courts, and the recognition by the execu tive of the United States of the several state governments on their officers and legislatures taking the oath prescribed by the constitution of the United States; and, where conflicting state governments have resulted from the war, the legitimacy of all shall be submitted to the supreme court of the United States." The agreement was repudiated by President Johnson, and an unconditional surrender took its place, April 26.-2. The Presidential Theory. President Lincoln seems to have held from the beginning, that while, as commander-in-chief, he was bound to carry the war into the heart of the seceding states, he was also bound, as civil executive, to endeavor to restore civil relations with the states themselves. His theory is detailed in his proclamation of Dec. 8, 1863, and his defense of it in his annual message of the same date. The proclamation, 1, offered amnesty to all but specified classes of leading men; 2, declared, that a state government might be reconstructed as soon as onetenth of the voters of 1860, qualified by state laws, "excluding all others," should take the prescribed oath (see its form under AMNESTY, I.); 3, declared that, if such state government were republican in form, it should "receive the benefits" of the guarantee clause; 4, excepted states where loyal governments had always been maintained; but, 5, added the caution that the admission of senators and representatives was a matter exclusively "resting with the two houses, and not to any extent with the executive." The proclamation further remarked, that “any provision which may be adopted by such state government in relation to the freed people of such state, which shall recognize and declare their permanent freedom, provide for their education, and which may yet be consistent, as a temporary arrangement, with their present condition as a laboring, landless, homeless class, will not be objected to by the national executive." The message says: "There must be a test by which to separate the opposing elements, so as to build only from the sound, and that test is a sufficiently liberal one which accepts as sound whoever will make a sworn recantation of his for

mer unsoundness." The presidential programme thus included but four points: cessation of resistance, the appointment of a provisional governor, the taking of the oath of amnesty by at least onetenth of the white voters, and the formation of a republican government; there was no negro suffrage or supervision by congress in it, and the only action of congress was to be the separate decision of the two houses on the admission of members.