* * * * is plain enough, therefore, that the provisions, in principle if not in detail, which punish cheating, falsehood and violence at the final election, should be extended to the primary elections also. A committee of the legislature of New York reported, last winter, that the fraudulent practices at the primary elections now unpunished can be prevented from soon extending to the official elections, only by legal prohibitions. More stringent legislation on it is essential. The two Pennsylvania laws enacted upon this subject in 1881, go far beyond the New York statutes of the same year, and are examples of legislation which well illustrate the better spirit which is becoming potential in both states.-2. Recognizing the pos trusted to the republican primaries, and that their rolls contain fictitious names," declares that "when the delegates to the general committee of 1871 were elected, a very large portion of the true republicans in every district declined to take part in such election, on account of the frauds and violence and the facts herein before set forth"; and that "many of the presidents of the republican associations were in the direct employment of the city officials. * Members of the general committee have since acknowledged that they were paid large sums of money to vote in accordance with the dictates of the Tammany officials. As might be expected, the elections of delegates to conventions in nearly all of the districts were mere farces."-There has been but very inadequate im-sibility that a disciplined band of politicians may provement since. George Bliss, district attorney under President Grant, in a letter to President Arthur, dated November, 1879, says: 'The rolls are deceptive; in one district half the names of those on the rolls are not known in the district. These bogus names afford a convenient means for fraudulent voting. The rolls of many of the districts are full of the names of men not republicans, and are used by the managers to perpetuate their control of the associations. On the other hand, desirable members, good republicans, who have an absolute right to become members, are excluded. Sometimes this is done by a direct rejection, but oftener by a refusal to vote upon the names presented. * At elections they are or are not members, according as they are or are not prepared to vote a ticket satisfactory to the controlling powers. So notorious is it that elections in the associations are not fairly conducted, that contests are of rare occurrence." He says, reform of the primary system must be made," or the republican party of the state "must and will be swept out of existence." There has hardly been any change in New York for the better since 1879, if indeed her primaries have not become more mercenary and proscriptive. Such are the reasons which have made the question of primary elections in the leading states, and must, not long hence, make them in other states, a subject of great peril and difficulty. - As the fate of elections and the general welfare is plainly involved in this primary action, there can be no more question of the sound policy of extending the laws over it than there is as to the expediency of registering voters or educating the poor. The real question is, how to do it effectively. 1. It is plain, that, in the voting for members of the primaries, in their proceedings as organized bodies, in the methods of selecting delegates, and in the discharge of duties of the delegates, there is every opportunity for injustice, fraud and corruption that there is in the formal elections of officers, or in the discharge of their duties. The New York state convention, for example, has just been disgraced by flagrant cases of forgery which have affected, if they have not decided, the nomination of a governor. No New York statute covers such cases, though that of Ohio probably would. It a gain too much power in the primaries, whatever legal safeguards may be thrown around them, other bills offered on the subject, and especially in New York, have gone further than mere penal provisions, by providing for a direct vote of the people in the primaries for the candidates for election, instead of for delegates to make nominations. The primary elections are thus practically converted into a first vote for officers; the second vote being the elections themselves, at which, however, only those can be voted for who have received the highest vote of the party at the first election. On this theory, strictly applied, delegates and conventions are made unnecessary, but, in some forms of its proposed application, delegates for specific purposes are to be voted for at the time of the first vote. There are also provisions in some of the bills allowing a given number of citizens to put forward a candidate, at the first election, they being in the sense of the law "a party," though not in the popular sense of the word. Their candidate, having the majority of their votes, could therefore be among the highest eligible to be voted for at the second or final election. Much as that device might at first curtail the present power of the primary despots, it is plain that their vicious nominating machinery could be put in force to forestall the first election by making nominations therefor. Without adequate provisions for making a fictitious legal party as aforesaid, it is plain that the rule of confining the final vote to the party candidates having the most votes, would greatly increase partisan tyranny and monopoly. It would make partisan tests more mischievous and controlling than they now are in municipal elections. As both clections, on this theory, are made legal and public proceedings, the expenses of both alike are to be paid from the public treasury. It can not, therefore, be doubted that the legitimate expenses of elections would be considerably increased; though, if the sums gained by assessments and the sale of nominations are added, it is very likely the expenses of the new methods would be less. This experiment of double voting appears to have been tried with some benefit in Richmond, Virginia. The need of bringing the action of the primaries under legal provisions is so plain like good citizens, on the basis of principle and duty, and the feverish, mercenary activity of those leaders will cease. The most intelligent and patriotic classes will be not only the most active but the most potential in our politics. —5. The abuses. of the primary system are as intimately connected with the sums which candidates pay, if not direct son of its having been made, as they are with the moneys extorted through political assessments. A citizen of New York has, in the pending canvass, publicly refused to be a candidate, because the nomination was tendered on the condition of a money payment. The funds secretly gained by either means are secretly expended without legal responsibility, and often in ways utterly corrupt, In England, the laws have for some years required a public statement and official audit of election expenses; and these safeguards, together with her office-brokerage laws, have been a con and imperative, the subject is so complicated, | gain by extortion and the patronage they dispense difficult and new to legislation, that the expedi- | by favor; force them thus to organize and to vote, ency of attaching to it new and doubtful methods of elections is at least very questionable. It may cause great delay.-3. Other legislation and further remedial measures are needed for the purification of the primary system. We must by penal statutes suppress the raising of money by assessments and the sale of nominations. So long as partisan managers are allowed to gain by such means abundantly as a bribe for a nomination, yet indirectly by rea-. money for filling their own pockets and those of their camp followers, for bribing the press, and for compensating demagogue oratory, they will be stimulated to a pernicious and almost irresistible activity. The unnatural spectacle will continue, of the lowest class of partisans, having the least stake in the welfare of the country, being the most active in politics and the most influential in the elections. Why should we expect any other result as long as that corruption fund can be divided among them by their own vote or the order of their chieftains? What is it but partisan despotism awarding the prizes for political corruption and servil-siderable check upon the corrupt use of money ity? -4. We must also, as an essential condition of honest primary elections, take from the great politicians and the elected officers their corrupt patronage, by reason of which, through threats of removal, they make the public officials their servants, and through actual removals they make places and spoils for their followers, who do the basest work of the elections. (See PATRONAGE.) The reform of the primaries is largely dependent upon the reform of the civil service. So long as we allow such opportunities of prostitu- | tion and corruption to be the prizes of elections, we have no right to expect them to be pure, and no reason for surprise that honest voters are discouraged and the baser elements so often triumph. If the better classes would elect their candidates, they must use their own money to pay expenses, and must forego the use of places for rewarding their mercenary supporters. The existing system allows the public treasury to be indirectly plundered, and the public service to be directly prostituted, by the politician class for their own ends; and when that system is arraigned, those who live upon its spoils declare that the abuses at the primary are caused by the neglect of the honest and independent voters to attend. In the very outset of their resistance, such voters must take money from their own pockets to match the tens of thousands which machine politicians plunder from the public servants, for campaign expenses. Let both classes alike be compelled to appeal to the voluntary contributions of the voters. When corrupt patronage shall be suppressed by filling the subordinate places through competitive examinations, and assessments and the sale of nominations shall be made penal, so that all classes alike must tax themselves for the election of their candidates, we shall no longer see the most mercenary and▾ patriotic citizen the most active at the elections. Take from the vulgar lords of the primaries in New York or any other great city, the money they for influencing elections. These statutes are worthy our study. It might also be found an improvement if the voting papers were furnished, and portions, at least, of the legitimate expenses of the elections were, after proper audit, paid from the public treasury. Such payments would remove various excuses for assessment extortion and the sale of nominations; and, while taking an unjust advantage from candidates who can com mand money, would make it easier for worthy and scrupulous citizens of limited means, to stand as candidates. It would be altogether reasonable, and it would not be difficult, to compel every. candidate for an elective office to file a statement, for public inspection, which should clearly set forth all money he had paid or become responsible for, directly or indirectly, by reason of his nomination or toward the expenses of his election; and he might also be made subject to a properlyguarded examination before a judge upon the whole subject. The British government gave this theory of opening official doings to public inspec tion a very radical application nearly a century ago. (See 24 George III., chap. 25, sec. 55, and Eaton on "Civil Service in Great Britain," p. 140.), And an application somewhat analogous has been made in the laws applicable to the city of NewYork. (Laws of New York, 1873, chap. 335, sec. 109.)-The purification of the primaries in great cities would be much facilitated by increasing the. length of terms and by reducing the number of elective officers. The great number of candidates for election confuses and disgusts the voters in much the same degree that it makes the business of caucus management intricate, active and profitable. The election of such officers as constables, county clerks, secretaries, justices and judges, whose functions are in no sense representative, and who were appointed until the spoils system had become established, is indefensible upon any sound principles. The changes that made them. 350 PRIORITY OF DEBTS DUE TO THE UNITED STATES, ETC. elective were naturally desired by all those inter- | ested in the patronage of party chieftains or gains of primary elections. The honest voters, alarmed at the abuses of the appointing power, too readily consented to the change, in the hope that it would | be an improvement. But for the abuse of that power, such officers would never have been made elective. With a true reform they will again be made appointive. (See REMOVALS.) Here, again, we see the close connection between the reform of the civil service and the reform of the primary system. To make the reappointment of such officers safe and satisfactory, we must reform the civil service. To relieve the primary system of the demoralizing duty of selecting officers in no sense representative, and only ministerial and administrative, we must make such officers again appointive. DORMAN B. EATON. PRIORITY OF DEBTS DUE TO THE UNITED STATES AND TO THE STATES. In the first decade of its existence under the constitution, congress passed several laws giving priority to debts due to the United States. As early as July 31, 1789, it was enacted, that the claims of the national government upon bonds given by importers for the payment of duties should have precedence over all other obligations. (U. S. Statutes, 1789, chap. 5, § 21.) Subsequent revenue acts contained similar provisions. (U. S. Statutes, 1790, chap. 35, § 45; Ib., 1792, chap. 27, § 18; and Ib., 1799, chap. 22, § 65.) On May 3, 1797, a bill became law which regulated in detail the settlement of accounts between the government and revenue officers. (U. S. Statutes, 1797, chap. 20.) It contained a section (§ 5) which gave preference to debts due to the United States in all cases whatsoever, whether a revenue officer or other person was the debtor, and however he might have become indebted, if only the debtor became insolvent, or if his estate after his death was insufficient to pay his creditors. This sweeping clause, curiously inserted in a bill of limited scope, still remains in force; and in all cases of insolvency or insufficient assets in the hands of executors or administrators, debts due to the United States are first satisfied. It is easy to ascertain why congress gave priority to the claims of the government. These statutes were framed for the purpose of building up our system of customs, and preference was given the debts of the government simply to increase the revenue and make it more certain. The heavy national debt which the confederation had left behind it made such a course especially desirable. The section which extended this preference to all debts passed as a part of the revenue laws. These statutes neither recognize nor adopt any traditional prerogative. They rest the right of priority, not on the diguity, but on the need, of the government. In 1805 the supreme court at Washington held that the constitutional right of congress "to pay the debts of the United States," (Constitution, art. 1, § 8), and "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers," (Ib.), included the right to make laws preferring debts due to the government. (Fisher vs. Blight, 2 Cranch, 358.) Our highest tribunal thus bases this priority on the power of congress to use whatever means it considers eligible to raise revenue for the purpose of paying the debts of the nation. No legal objection to the preference of debts due to the national government could be made on the ground that it interferes with the rights of individual states, because the constitution, and the laws of the United States made under it, are the supreme law of the land. (Constitution, art. 6.) The insolvency of the debtor which gives preference to the United States under the act of 1797, must be legal insolvency, manifested by some notorious act. Mere inability on the part of the debtor to pay his debts is not enough, unless it is accompanied by a voluntary assignment of all his property for the benefit of creditors. The courts usually construe the act strictly, and do not allow the right of priority unless it is clearly established. Would this right of preference have existed independent of statute? Our national and state governments are the successors of the British crown, and, as such, they acquired those prerogatives of the crown which are adapted to the changed condition of things in this country. This right of preference is a royal prerogative in England. Where the king's right and that of a subject meet at one and the same time, the king's is preferred. (8 Bacon's Abridgment, Prerogative E. 4, p. 91.) In a case which was several times argued in the court of common pleas during the reign of Elizabeth (Skrogs vs. Gresham, Anderson, 129, case 176), Lord Chief Justice Anderson decided that the queen should be preferred in the payment of debts before any subject, partly because of the requirements of magna charta, and for various other "self-evident reasons," (et per divers auters reasons queur jeo omit pur cco que sont evidents). These reasons are not as evident to-day as they were then, and it is a pity that the learned chief justice did not give them at length. - Did the United States and the states themselves inherit the right of priority from the crown? Our courts have divided on this question. As the state and nation are equally sovereign in their own spheres, the arguments which apply to one apply also to the other. The supreme court of the United States has distinctly held that the national government had no right to prior payment before the acts were passed. (1815, United States vs. Bryan, 9 Cranch, 387.) In South Carolina the state has no right of priority. The court there holds that the state has not succeeded to all the prerogatives of the crown. A monarchy is a government for the benefit of the king, while a republic is a government for the protection of the citizens. The state, therefore, has no privileges but such as are granted by its constitution, or by act of the legislature, or such as are necessary to the proper administration of the govern ment. (State vs. Harris, 2 Bailey, 599.) In Maryland, on the other hand, preference is given to debts due to the state. Its court recognizes the right as a common law prerogative of the government. (State vs. Bank of Maryland, 6 Gill and Johnson, 205.) In most of the states the question has never been settled. This is the case in New York, but at one time the court of appeals seemed to favor the right of priority. One of the judges, in an opinion of the court, said that there was great force in the suggestion that the people of the state have succeeded to all the prerogatives of the crown in so far as they are necessary to the effectual exercise of the essential powers of civil government, and that consequently taxes should here be paid first, as they are in England. (In re Columbian Insurance Company, 3 Abbott's Court of Appeals Cases, 239.)-The statutes of the states have declared and altered the law in many cases. Taxes are usually preferred by express enactment, but in some cases this preference only applies to insolvents, and in others only to bank. rupt estates in the hands of executors or administrators. The reader must examine the statutes of each state to ascertain the law. It is to be noted that the right of priority existed under the Roman law, and that it usually prevails now wherever the civil law is followed. See on the general subject, 1 Kent's Commentaries, Lecture 12; see also U. S. Revised Statutes, § 3466 et seq. ERNEST HOWARD CROSBY. PRISONERS OF WAR. Persons coming under any of the following heads can not be regarded as prisoners of war, namely: those who are connected with the service of the army, but who do not form part of the combatants; innocent subjects of the enemy who have not taken part in the hostilities; soldiers who have committed acts of violence without orders from their commanders; those who have spontaneously, without order from the state, armed themselves against the enemy; spies, deserters and fugitives. These classes do not include surgeons, chaplains and sutlers, quartermasters, drummers and fifers; they form part of the combatants, and are considered as belonging to the active army; they are likened to soldiers, and classified as prisoners of war. (In pursuance of the convention agreed upon Aug. 22, 1864, between nearly all the countries of Europe, and completed in 1868 by additional articles, all medical persons, and even the wounded in ambulances, as well as chaplains and nurses, are considered as non-combatants. In the war of 1870-71 complaints were made on both sides of infractions of these treaties, but we do not believe that these infractions were voluntary, even supposing that the complaints were well founded. M. B.) "Even in the best days of pagan antiquity, the laws of war, from which the law of conquest was derived, said, with inflexible severity: For the possessions of the enemy, confiscation and pillage; for the person of the enemy, slavery or death.' But, under the influence of Christian principles, customs have become modified. The laws which our fathers, after having conquered the Roman empire, made in fire, in action, in impetuosity, in the pride of victory, they softened; these laws were harsh, they made them impartial. The Burgundians, the Goths and the Lombards always desired that the Romans should remain a conquered people; the laws of Euric, of Gondebaud and of Rotharis made the Romans and barbarians fellow-citizens." (Montesquieu, Esprit des lois, book x., chap. 3.)-To slay an enemy after the battle, or to reduce him to slavery, is no longer permitted by international law; to make him lay down his arms, and to hold him as prisoner of war until the re-establishment of peace (unless a free retreat be granted him, either at once or at a stated time), are what the laws of modern warfare prescribe. The effects of captivity date from the moment of surrender. The prisoners are then placed in the interior of the country under the surveillance and authority of the conqueror, and restored to liberty either unconditionally or on bail, or for a ransom, or in exchange. The decree of May 25, 1793, breathing the spirit of human dignity, declares that no person taken from the enemy shall be forced to serve in the army of the state which has taken him. — The law of June 20, 1792, places prisoners of war, in France, under the safeguard of the nation, and orders that they shall be protected, the same as French citizens, against all insult or outrage. This law contains also other orders full of humanity. A decree of April 4, 1811, says: Any prisoner of war, having the rank of an officer, and any hostage, who, after having given his parol, violates it, shall, if recaptured, be regarded and treated like a soldier, as to pay and rations, and confined in a citadel, fort or castle. The rules relating to the exchange of prisoners have been established by several legislative provisions. Until very recently, it was customary to agree as to the exchange and the pecuniary ransom according to rank, at the same time, in order to settle the account in case of an inequality in the number or rank of the prisoners. We find an example of this in the cartel of March 12, 1780, between France and England. But France set aside all ransom during the war of the revolution, by decreeing, May 25, 1793, that only an exchange of man for man and rank for rank should be allowed. (See ExCHANGE OF PRISONERS.) - We see that legislation with regard to prisoners of war in Europe is founded upon generous sentiments. If the fatal laws of war permit a belligerent power to make prisoners and to hold them, whether to prevent them from again bearing arms or to weaken the enemy, or even to lead them to accept equitable conditions of peace, they do not permit violence or ill-treatment toward them so long as they do not disturb the quiet of the state. It is also customary to allow a greater degree of liberty to higher officers than to non-commissioned officers and soldiers. They are, as a general rule, placed upon honor (parol) in a certain town, and it is not to us that there should be no question as to declaring women and children and non-combatants prisoners of war, even in the case of queens and princesses. Nevertheless, if a queen regnant should command an army, she would be justly considered a combatant. M. B.)-On the principle that war alone can make prisoners, as cause produces effect, it follows that any act by which the subject of a nation should be declared prisoner of war, even though he had not taken an active part in the hostilities, can be regarded only as a violent measure, in opposition to all the principles of civilization. Such is the provision of the decree of Berlin (Nov. 21, 1806), stating that any English individual in the countries occupied by France or its allies, is declared a prisoner of war. Such a principle, poorly veiled under the pretense of reprisal, demonstrates how far contempt of international law may carry a conqueror irritated by secing limits put to his ambition. This sad example is happily the only one presented to us by modern history. (It is proper to say, that since the war of 1870 the Germans have been driven unusual to see them sent back to their own country upon the promise of paying a ransom, and virtually under engagement not to bear arms | against the government which has restored them to liberty. The victorious state can not, however, be disarmed against prisoners of war and their breach of parol. Thus, besides the penalty which we have cited above in the decree of April 4, 1811, to punish violations of sworn faith, it was necessary to provide for cases in which prisoners of war, taking advantage of their number, might organize a resistance against lawful authority. This was done by the decree of the 17th of frimaire, year XIV., which orders as follows: "All mutiny, resistance to the police or the national guard, all plots of which prisoners of war may be guilty, shall be punished by death." - Outside of this, the life of a prisoner of war is sacred, inviolable, according to law. | The distinction is easily understood. In the latter case, there is no longer any question of the application of the laws of war, but of the defense of society and the repression of a crime under the principles of common law. Publicists, how-away, even when a long time settled, and that any ever, have propounded this question : Are there of them found upon the territory would have been cases in which the care of one's own safety, and made prisoners.) PAIGNON. the danger to be incurred, will not permit us either to make prisoners or to retain those whom we have already made?" This question recalls a frightful episode of the French-Egyptian campaign. The French army had just taken Jaffa and sacked | it during thirty hours of pillage and massacre. There remained several thousand prisoners who could not be kept for want of food, nor yet sent back to swell the ranks of the enemy. The unfortunate wretches stood on the shore with their hands tied behind them, waiting for their doom to be pronounced. "Bonaparte," says M. Thiers (Histoire de la Révolution, vol. viii., p. 401), "determined on a terrible measure, the only cruel act of his life. Transported to a barbarous country, he had involuntarily adopted the customs (morals?) of it; he caused the remaining prisoners to be put to death. The army, appalled but obedient, completed the execution with which it had been charged." "Who shall answer to posterity for so horrible an act? Those who commanded it," adds M. Dalley ("Natural and International Law," No. 123), "unless they tried every means, even in face of the enemy, to prevent it. For the principle is self-evident, that war, even the most just, can legalize only such injury to the enemy as is absolutely necessary." - Can a monarch and his family be made prisoners of war? International law has decided in the affirmative. Nevertheless, it has long been customary among the civilized powers of Europe, first, to consider it as contrary to the laws of war to take aim at a hostile sovereign or prince of the blood royal; secondly, to treat his family with distinction by exempting them from detention; thirdly, to alleviate for the hostile sovereign personally, or for his family, the evils of war, in all respects which would not affect the result of military operations. (It seems PRISONS AND PRISON DISCIPLINE. The extirpation of crime is the highest aim possible in a penal code. Since to extirpate crime is practically impossible, all existing penal systems content themselves with an effort to repress crime. Crimes are committed by men: therefore they can be repressed or prevented only by the exercise of some restraining influence or power upon the men who commit them. Men are influenced by motives. Their action is the outgrowth of their personal character and experience, which produce in them a greater or less susceptibility to hope, fear, and the sense of moral obligation, and lead them to say, as the case may be, I ought, I must, or, I will. The efficiency of every actual or proposed system for the repression of crime may, therefore, be measured by the knowledge of human nature and the harmony with its fundamental laws displayed in the elaboration of the code. In every good code there is a distinct purpose, and the means employed are wisely adapted to secure the end sought. Crime may be repressed in either of two ways, namely, by physical or by moral agencies. - The highest form of forcible repression is execution, or the death penalty, called capital punishment, because it stands at the head of the list of possible punishments, so that all other punishments are said to be secondary. Capital punishment has been inflicted in many ways, by different nations, and at different stages of their development, among which may be named decapitation, strangulation, burning, breaking upon the wheel, stoning, crucifixion, burying alive, drowning, poison, starvation, shooting, driving a stake through the body, disembow. eling and quartering. Most of these punishments are obsolete. The more usual modes of execu |