lumbia. May 18 the committee reported as instructed, with an additional resolution that thereafter all petitions relating in any way to slavery or its abolition should be laid on the table without action, and without being printed or referred. May 25 the previous question, cutting off debate, was ordered by a vote of 109 to 89, and the second of Pinckney's resolutions, above mentioned, was adopted by a vote of 182 to 9. John Quincy Adams offered to prove it false in five minutes, but was silenced. On the following day the third resolution was adopted, 132 to 45, and the committee's new resolution, 117 to 68. Adams refused to vote, denouncing the resolution as a violation of the constitution, of the rules of the house, and of the rights of his constituents. The first of the " gag laws" was thus put in force. It was renewed in substance, Jan. 18, 1837. Adams at once became the champion of the right of petition. In the adoption of the rules at the beginning of each congress, he regularly and unsuccessfully moved to rescind the " gag rule." He became the funnel through which all the antislavery petitions of the country were poured. Within the next four years he records the offering of nearly 2,000 petitions, including petitions for the rescinding of the gag rule itself, for the recognition of Hayti, for expunging the declaration of independence from the journals, and for his own expulsion. Besides those whose number he mentions, there was an unknown number of others presented in batches. The most exciting scene of the series began Feb. 6, 1837. Adams inquired of the speaker whether it would be in order to present a petition from twenty-two slaves. The disorderly house, catching but a hazy notion of the inquiry, at once lost its head. Suggestions to expel Adams for having attempted to offer a petition from slaves, to censure him for contempt of the house, and to take the petition out and burn it, were becoming inextricably entangled, when Adams for the first time reminded the speaker that his inquiry as to the propriety of offering the petition was still pending and unanswered, and stated also that the petition was in favor of slavery. The house saw that it had been outwitted, but it disliked to yield. 'What, sir," said Waddy Thompson, of South Carolina, "is it a mere trifle to hoax, to trifle with, the members from the south in this way and on this subject? Is it a light thing, for the amusement of others, to irritate almost to madness the whole delegation from the slave states? Sir, it is an aggravation." He therefore modified his resolutions into a censure of Adams for having "trifled with the house," 'by creating the impression, and leaving the house under such impression, that the said petition was for the abolition of slavery, when he knew that it was not.' By various amendments this was finally modified into a tame resolution that, since Adams had disclaimed any effort to present the petition, nothing should be done, and even this was rejected. But before the final vote, Feb. 9, Adams secured his coveted oppor tunity for defense, and his savage retaliation upon his opponents in general and in particular, interrupted by explanations and half-hearted denials from them, made up one of the few scenes in congressional history, from 1820 until 1860, when the cowing of an opposition was the result of a northern member's speech. From this time debate with Adams was the most perilous of undertakings. In the senate the objection to the reception of abolition petitions had been almost simultaneous. Jan. 7, 1836, Calhoun objected to the reception of two petitions from Ohio for the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, and four days afterward he renewed it upon a petition of Pennsylvania Quakers to the same effect. But the senate was a dangerous place for such an experiment. No "previous question " could cut off debate; senator after senator drifted off to the perilous questions involved in the institution of slavery itself; and the result was such a portentous debate as had never yet been heard in the senate. Calhoun's point was, that if the petition was couched in disrespectful language it could not be received. But in this there was a cumulative difficulty. To know the language of a petition it was necessary that it should be read, and it would always be difficult for southern senators to listen quietly to petitions in which their constituents and themselves were denounced as pirates, butchers, and dealers in human flesh. King, of Georgia, read Calhoun a bitter and well-deserved lecture on this unstatesmanlike policy of provoking debate on the petitions; and Calhoun could only answer with the reproach that King was destroying southern unity of action. Calhoun's course is one of the few evidences of his lack of sincerity in desiring the preservation of the Union. Ă democratic northern senator likened him to a pugnacious farmer in his state who was so anxious for peace with his neighbors that he was always willing to fight for it. In this instance Calhoun had abundant opportunity to agitate for the suppression of agitation. It was not until March 9 that the reception was agreed to by a vote of 36 to 10; and two days after, the prayer of the petition was rejected" by a vote of 34 to 6. This halting compromise between refusing to receive, and referring to a committee, was thereafter the regular mode of procedure in the senate. It had no effect in checking the petitions, and renewed and constant debate on their reception kept the senate in turmoil. In December, 1837, Clay urged their reception and reference, on the grounds that they were evoked mainly by a feeling in the north, that the right of petition had been assailed, and that it was "better that the country should be quiet than the senate"; but his advice met no more respectful attention than the warning of Buchanan at the beginning, "Let it be once understood that the sacred right of petition and the cause of the abolitionists must rise or must fall together, and the consequences may be fatal.". THE PATTON RESOLUTION. Dec. 21, 1837, in the house, John M. Patton, of Virginia, secured a suspension of "" - first. Adams had his opponents at a disadvantage, for many of them were avowed disunionists, but he used also every other advantage which could be used. The character of the whole debate may be conceived from Adams' reference to Wise, of Virginia, his bitterest opponent, as having come into that hall from the Graves-Cilley duel, of which he was a promoter, "with his hands dripping with human gore, and a blotch of human blood upon his face"; and from Wise's temperate reply that "the charge was as base and black a lie as the traitor was base and black who uttered it." At last Adams, worn out and almost breathless, but triumphant over every assailant, allowed a motion to "lay the whole subject on the table forever," and it was carried by a vote of 106 to 93. - At the special session of 1841 Adams' regular motion to omit the twenty-first rule had actually been carried, by a vote of 112 to 104, on a motion to adopt the rules of the last house for ten days only; but this was afterward reconsidered and lost. Session after session the majority against Adams' motion dwindled. At last, Dec. 3, 1844, the house, by a vote of 104 to 81, refused to lay his motion on the table, and, by a vote of 108 to 80, abolished the twenty-first rule. The ten years' gripe of John Quincy Adams upon the gag system had choked it at last and forever. Thereafter petitions of every nature were quietly relegated to the limbo of such papers, the committee room. the rules and the previous question, and the pas- until Jan. 28. From that day it continued until sage of a resolution to lay on the table, without | Feb. 7, with a virulence surpassing that of the being debated, printed, read or referred, and without further action, all petitions and papers touching the abolition of slavery, or the buying, selling or transferring of slaves in any state, district or territory" of the United States. Adams again protested, and refused to vote, but the resolution was passed by a vote of 122 to 74. - THE ATHERTON RESOLUTIONS. Dec. 11, 1838, in the house, Charles J. Atherton, of New Hampshire, obtained a suspension of the rules, and offered five resolutions. The first four condemned generally any attempts at the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, or in the territories, and any petitions for that object; the fifth resolved that all such petitions should be laid on the table, "without being printed, debated or referred." Again, the previous question cut off debate, and the resolutions were passed on this and the following day, the last or "gag" resolution having in its favor 126 votes to 73. The only apparent result was the immediate appearance of a new line of petitions for the repeal of the Atherton "settlement.' -TWENTY-FIRST RULE. Jan. 21, 1840, by a vote of 114 to 108, the house adopted as its twenty-first rule, that no petition, memorial, resolution, or other paper praying the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia or the terri- | tories, or of the interstate slave trade, should in future be received by the house, or entertained in any manner whatever. The decrease of the majority in favor of the repression principle in this vote was striking, and was in itself an evidence that the system could not endure very much longer. Adams had found the support which he had at first lacked, and his yearly recurring motions to omit the twenty-first from the list of rules were defeated by steadily dwindling majorities. The rule, however, only increased the strength of language of the petitions, and their number as well: 34,000 signatures had been affixed to petitions of this nature in 1835-6; 110,000 in the session after the Pinckney resolutions; over 300,000 after the Patton resolutions; and after the twenty. first rule was adopted the signatures to petitions on all the cognate subjects were practically beyond counting. Jan. 14, 1842, another exciting scene began in the house, Adams being again the centre of it. He offered a petition from citizens of Haverhill, Massachusetts, praying for a dissolution of the Union, and asked for its reference to a committee to set forth reasons for the rejection of the petition. The anger of the southern members flamed out again. Suggestions were again made to expel Adams, to censure him, or to burn the petition. Adams at first only replied by advising his leading opponents to go to a law school, and learn a little of the rights of the citizens and of the members of this house"; but, when the house had voted, 118 to 75, to take into consideration the resolutions of censure offered by Thomas F. Marshall, of Kentucky, the spokesman of the southern caucus, the debate was adjourned | Dec. 12, 1853, the ancient rule requiring the presentation of petitions in the house was rescinded. Since that time petitions have been delivered to the clerk of the house, indorsed with the name of the member presenting them and of the committee to which they are to be referred. The clerk then transfers them to the proper committees, and notes their presentation on the journal. - See 1 Benton's Debates of Congress, 201, 207; 13 ib., 24 (Pinckney resolutions), 13 ib., 266 (Adams' first trial: his speech is at page 283); 12 ib., 705 (Calhoun's motion); 13 ib., 566 (Patton resolutions), 702 (Atherton resolutions); 14 ib., 289 (twenty-first rule); Jay's Miscellaneous Writings, 349; 2 Calhoun's Works, 466; 9 Adams' Memoir of J. Q. Adams, 350; 11 ib., 109; 61 Niles' Register, 350 (Adams' second trial); 14 Democratic Review, 303 (the best argument in favor of the twenty-first rule); 2 Benton's Thirty Years' View, 150; 1 Greeley's American Conflict, 143; Giddings' History of the Rebellion, 108, 158; 2 Wilson's Rise and Fall of the Slave Power, 346; 2 von Holst's United States, 236, 470; Morse's Life of J. Q. Adams, 249, 307; 18, 22, 38 Rules of the House of Representatives. (Compare PETITION, RIght of.) ALEXANDER JOHNSTON. PETITION, Right of. The constitution of the United States, in its first amendment, provides that "Congress shall make no law abridging the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for a redress of griev ances." This provision is not a statement of abstract | right based on theory, but, like almost all other clauses in the great Anglo-Saxon charters, it had its origin in the successful struggle against actual tyranny. It is founded on English history, and to understand it, it is necessary to glance at that history. — The right of petition seems to be recognized in magna charta, which was ratified by King John in 1215. Chapter forty contains these words: "Nulli negabimus rectum aut justitiam," and they are repeated in the charters of Henry III. (1216, chap. 29) and Edward I. (1297, chap. 29). Some petitions of this period are said to be preserved in the tower of London. In the reign of Charles I. petitions became bolder and bolder, notwithstanding the contemptuous treatment which they received from him, and the right of presenting them naturally grew to be obnoxious to the cavaliers. Consequently, soon after the restoration of Charles II., parliament passed a bill against tumultuous petitioning, which forbade the presentation of petitions for the alteration of matters established by law, to the king or either house, by more than ten persons; nor could more than twenty persons sign a petition, unless its contents were previously approved by three justices or a majority of the grand jury in the country, or by the lord mayor, aldermen and common council in London. The transgressor was liable to fine and imprisonment. (13 Car. II., st. 1, c. 5; 8 Statutes at Large, p. 6.) This statute did not have the desired result, and in 1679 so many petitions were presented protesting against the repeated prorogation of parliament, that the king issued a proclamation to put a stop to them, but still they continued to pour in. The advanced royalists presented counter-addresses expressing their abhorrence of these petitions. Hence, the two national parties became known as 'Petitioners and "abhorrers," although soon after they were called whigs' and 'tories" instead. (8 Hume's History of England, chap. 68.) It was from James II., that, nine years later, the right of petition received the severest blow in England. He had made up his mind to restore his fellow Catholics to the full rights of English subjects (and, indeed, to give them the preference), in spite of existing penal laws. To this end he found it necessary to set aside the statutes by means of what was called the "dispensing power.' This prerogative of dispensing with penal laws had been assumed by the crown several centuries before, and was originally copied from the practice of the Roman church. It was an infringement of law, and had met with resistance almost from the beginning. In 1687 the king issued a declaration, under this power, announcing that none of the penal laws against non-conformists should be enforced. This proclamation, which is known as the " declaration of indulgence," produced no effect. Accordingly, in 1688, he published a second similar declaration, which was followed, a week later, by an order in council commanding the clergy to read the declaration on certain Sun days at the usual time of divine service in all the churches of England, and bidding the bishops distribute copies of it for this object throughout their dioceses. The clergy received the order with doubt and dissatisfaction. Not only was it opposed to their wishes, but it was equally repugnant to public opinion and the laws of the realm. Before the day fixed for the first reading a number of prominent divines met at Lambeth and drew up a petition, which was finally reduced to writing by Lancroft, the archbishop of Canterbury himself, and signed by him and six bishops. In their petition they denied the existence of any power in the king to dispense with acts of parliament; they expressed their willingness to obey parliament or convocation; and besought the king not to insist upon the distribution and reading of the declaration. The six suffragan bishops delivered the petition to James on their knees, but he received it in a passion. Although the declaration was not recalled, it was read in only four churches in London on the day appointed, and from these churches the congregations immediately departed in disgust. At the king's order the seven prelates were sent to the tower, and tried before the king's bench for seditious libel. James used every means to secure their conviction, but it was impossible to turn the presentation of'a respectful petition into a criminal offense. The jury returned a verdict. of "not guilty," and the prisoners were released. The whole nation learned the result of the trial with joy, and the king's course in the matter called. down upon him the lasting enmity of the people,. and did much to shake off his tottering crown. (12 Howell's State Trials, 183; 3 Modern Reports, 212.) The prince of Orange referred to the case of the seven bishops in the declaration which he published before coming to England, when he said that the offering of a petition had been held. a high misdemeanor, and that this was one of the wrongs which he would redress. (2 Macaulay's. History of England, 358; Bishop Burnet's History of his own Time, 775-780.) Afterward, when the two houses offered the throne to William and Mary, the offer and acceptance were made subject to the bill of rights. This important document recited the fact that James II. "did endeavor to subject and extirpate the Protestant religion and the laws and liberties of the kingdom," among other things, "by committing and prosecuting divers worthy prelates for humbly petitioning to be excused from concurring to the said assumed [dispensing] power," and it goes on to declare "that it is the right of the subjects to petition the king, and all commitments and prosecutions for such petitioning are illegal." ("An Act for declaring the rights and liberties of the subject and settling the succession of the Crown," 1 William and Mary, sess. 2, chap. 2; 9 Statutes at Large, p. 67, 1688; 5 Cobbett's Parliamentary History, 108 et seq.) The act of 1700 which established the succession of the crown in the house of Hanover confirms all laws which secure the the clause in the English bill of rights. (See BILL OF RIGHTS.) The constitution originally contained no list of popular rights, as the general convention considered such an enumeration unnecessary. In the subsequent state conventions, on the other hand, it became evident that a considerable party desired such a "bill of rights."* Consequently, in the first congress a series of amendments to the constitution were adopted, including the one quoted at the head of this article. The convention of Virginia had submitted a proposed section on the right of petition, which also asserted the right of constituents " to instruct their representatives." rights and liberties of the people (12 and 13 Wm. III., chap. 2; 10 Statutes at Large, 360), and the bill of rights, protecting the right of petition, is to-day a conspicuous part of the English constitution. In the celebrated case of Lord George Gordon (1781,) Lord Mansfield said that the stat ute of 13 Charles II., limiting the number of petitioners, was still in force. The petition in this instance was also directed against the Roman Catholics. Lord George Gordon, president of the protestant association, was displeased with the passage of Sir George Savile's bill removing penalties from Romanists, and presented a petition in the house of commons for its repeal. It In the lower house, while the amendbore thousands of signatures, and he went to the ments were under consideration, Mr. Tucker, of house at the head of a large mob which he had South Carolina, moved that these words be added. collected. His followers attacked several mem- Mr. Madison opposed the motion, and it was lost. bers and attempted to exert intimidation. The (Towle's Analysis of the Constitution, 230, 231.) motion was, however, almost unanimously re- There have been no petitions of very great historjected, and the rabble, after rioting several days, ical interest in this country except those which subsided. (21 Cobbett's Parliamentary History, sought the abolition of slavery. (See, e. g., 2 Ben654, et seq.) The ringleader was tried for high son's Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, 57 treason and acquitted, though the act of 13 et seq., 182 et seq., 209, 436-444; 12 ib., 660-666, Charles II. could undoubtedly have been en- 676-679, 705-711, 713-720, 722-743; 13 ib., 5-14, forced against him. (21 Howell's State Trials, 24-29.) These petitions were very numerous, and 485; 24 Annual Register, 217, 238.) About this always drew forth most bitter debates. Finally, time petitions to parliament became very numer- in 1836, a resolution was adopted in the house of ous. Many of them were directed against the representatives, which directed that all petitions slave trade, and afterward against slavery. At relating in any way to slavery should be laid upon last, in 1839, debate was forbidden on the pre- the table without being printed or referred, and sentation of petitions in the house of commons, that no further action should be taken on them. as they threatened to occupy all the time of the (13 ib., 24). In 1838 another rule of the same tenhouse. The most important English petition of the or was adopted. (13 ib., 702-707; Congressional present century was the one of the chartists in Globe, Dec. 17 and 24, 1838, vol. 7, nos. 2 and 3, 1848. These men, excited by the revolutions on pp. 23-25, 27, 28, 33-38.) The former resolution the continent, sent a petition to the lower house was based, according to its recitals, on the want for annual parliaments, universal suffrage, and of power in congress over the states, the undesirathe other reforms contemplated in their "char- bility of any exercise of power in the District of ter." More than a million names were append- Columbia, and the necessity of stopping agitation ed to the petition, and a mass meeting was called and restoring tranquillity. The latter resolution in London to support it. The house received affirmed that all attempts to abolish slavery in the it with respect, but it was soon discovered that territories or District of Columbia were virtually many of the signatures were fictitious, and that aimed at the southern states, and therefore uncontheir number had been greatly over-estimated. stitutional in their tendencies. Fortunately, such The committee on public petitions, while re- rules are no longer needed. The national conporting these facts, declared its opinion that the stitution has been followed, as far as the right of right of petition was an important privilege. petition is concerned, in almost all of the state (98 Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, 74,283.) constitutions. Only three states ignore the right The agitation soon died out without affecting in their fundamental law: Minnesota, Virginia legislation. (1 McCarthy's History of Our Own and West Virginia. Eleven include the right of Times, chap 18.)- Practice. In olden times peti- petition, address and remonstrance" in their tions were usually presented to the English mon- bills of rights": Alabama, Connecticut, Kenarch, because he was more powerful than parlia tucky, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Delaware, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Texas and Vermont. Four recognize the right to "ap ment. The contrary is now the case; but petitions to the sovereign, though less frequent than those to the legislature, stand upon the same legal footing with them. The sovereign sometimes receives petitions personally, and sometimes through officers of the court. Parliament used to appoint receivers and triers of petitions, but now the house of commons refers public petitions to a committee on public petitions. (May's Law of Parliament, chap 19.) -The amendment to the constitution of the United States referring to petitions was modeled after See, for example, "Address to the People of Maryland," 3 American Museum, 419, giving an account of the Mary land convention, very few members of which, it is true, seemed to wish to have the right of petition mentioned in the constitution; p. 424. + See ib., 273-278, 280-290, 557-562, for the attempt to censure John Quincy Adams for a breach of this resolution; and notice, at p. 278, Mr. Cushing's able argument, showing that the right of petition existed independent of the constitution. ply for the redress of grievances": Illinois, Indiana, North Carolina and Oregon. Two confirm the right of "petition or remonstrance": Maine and Missouri; while all the rest copy the general constitution more closely, and protect the right of "petition" simply. (2 Hough's American Constitutions, 571.) The supreme court of the United States has recently passed upon the right of petition as affected by the constitution of the United States. (United States vs. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. Reports, 542.) Chief Justice Waite, in stating the opinion of the court, says that the right to assemble for lawful purposes existed long before the adoption of the constitution. It is an attribute of free government, springing from laws universally recognized by civilized man. The constitution did not establish it, but found it in existence. Up to that time the individual states were bound to protect it, and as the amendment granted no direct power over it to congress, the right of petition remains subject to the jurisdiction of the states. The amendment recognizes an existing privilege of the people, and guards it against congressional interference only. For their protection in its enjoyment the people must look to the states. The court, however, holds that the right of petition appertains to national citizenship, and that on this account it is guaranteed by the national government. It is implied in the very idea of a republican form of government. (Ib., 551, 552.) As petitions are legal, it follows that a petitioner is not guilty of libel in his petition unless express malice be proved. Therefore a petition to the legislature, requesting that body to direct the attorney general to do his duty, was decided not to be actionable. The court held that a man can petition the legislature for the redress of a grievance which does not exist, if he thinks that it exists. (Reid vs. Delorme, 1806, 2 Brevard's Reports, South Carolina, 76.) So it was held in New York that a petition for the removal of a district attorney on account of malversation in office, directed to the council of removal, and followed by his removal, could not give rise to a cause of action, unless it was presented maliciously, even if it contained false statements. (Thorn vs. Blanchard, 1809, 5 Johnson's Reports, 508, and see cases cited by counsel; see also Gray vs. Pentland, 1815, 2 Sergeant & Rawle's Reports, Pennsylvania, 23, and the very full opinion of the court in Harris vs. Huntington, 1802, 2 Tyler's Reports, Vermont, 129.) — In the United States each legislative body has its own rules, which prescribe the manner of offering petitions and the disposition of them. We will give a short résumé of the rules of the house of representatives on this subject for an example. Members having petitions to present may deliver them to the clerk, after indorsing on them their names and the reference or disposition to be made of them. These petitions, except such as in the speaker's judgment are obscene or insulting, are entered in the journal and published in the congressional record. Petitions excluded by the speaker are returned to the member who presented them. If a petition has been inappropriately referred, it may be properly referred by direction of the committee having possession of it. (Rule 22; see Smith's Rules and Practice of the House of Representatives, latest edition.) No petition can be withdrawn without the leave of the house, but if an act pass for the settlement of a claim, the clerk can send all the papers to the officer charged with the settlement. (Rule 39.) Every petition reported by a committee must be accompanied by a written report, which report is thereupon printed. (Rule 18, § 2.) After the final adjournment of congress the clerks of committees are obliged to deliver all petitions, not reported, and the evidence taken upon them, to the clerk of the house. (Rule 38.) A petition can only be printed by unanimous consent or suspension of the rules. (Smith; supra, 5th ed., 314; this does not refer to printing in the record.) A committee can not receive a petition except through the house. Grey, 412; Jefferson's Manual, & 8; Smith, supra, 105, 234.) All petitions for the satisfaction of private claims against the government of the United States are transmitted to the court of claims, unless the house in which they are introduced otherwise orders. (U. S. Revised Statutes, § 1060.) Petitions must, of course, be presented to the appropriate department of the government. (Paschal's Annotated Constitution, 256, § 248.)* -The right of petition seems to be so just, so harmless, and so unquestionable, that its formal recognition in our constitution may appear needless. Its justice, however, has not always been admitted. In the case of the seven bishops we have seen that James II. attempted to override it. In ancient Persia we learn that petitions were discouraged, for "whosoever, whether man or woman, shall come unto the king into the inner court, who is not called, there is one law of his to put him to death, except such to whom the king shall hold out the golden sceptre that he may live." (Esther, chap. 4, verse 11.) We have the authority of Perry for the statement that Peter the Great made a decree that no petition should be presented to him until it had been offered to his ministers, and by them rejected. If the petition should then be presented to the czar, and fail to secure his approval, the petitioner was to suffer death. The result was, that no more petitions were presented. (Etat de la Grande Russie, 173.) From this account Montesquieu draws the conclusion that "in a monarchy the prince should be accessible." (Esprit des Lois, 12, 26.) It may readily be seen that such instances prove the value of the constitutional recognition of the right of petition, not only in monarchies but also in repub (See also 1 Blackstone's Commentaries, 143; Story on the Constitution, § 1894; Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 349; 1 May's Constitutional History, chap 7, pp. 410-417; Whipple's Report to the Legislature of Rhode Island, and Otis' Letter, published in pamphlet form, by Cassady & March, Boston, 1839; Broom's Constitutional Law, 408 et seq., 493 et seq., 508 et seq.) |