ning, saw the limit which the British channel would put to the conquest of Europe, and the manner in which alone he could pass it, by giving the English fleets employment elsewhere. In 1797, | after the peace of Campo Formis, he wrote: "We must set all our strength upon the sea; we must destroy England; and the continent is at our feet." But the same year had already seen the destruction of the Spanish fleet off St. Vincent, and of the Dutch fleet at Camperdown; and from this time until 1812 Napoleon never ceased the effort, by bluster, by kindness, or by fraud, to make the long and stormy coast of North America his most efficient ally against Great Britain. — A few days before Pinckney's arrival the French minister of foreign relations informed Monroe what formalities were to be observed in taking leave. Dec. 9, 1796, Monroe presented his letter of recall, and Pinckney his letter of credence. Two days after, Monroe received written notice that no American minister would be received until the French grievances should be redressed, and that the French minister to the United States would be recalled; and yet, at the end of the month, he accepted a public reception from the directory, at which the president, Barras, without remonstrance from him, publicly announced that France "would not stoop to calculate the consequences of the condescension of the American government to the wishes of its ancient tyrants.' Pinckney was left in Paris, refused recognition by the directory, and even threatened with police surveillance, until the latter part of January, 1797, when he received written notice to quit France, and retired to Holland to await instructions from home. — Adams was intent upon following up the policy of neutrality, but this news left him little option. He called a special session of congress for May 16, 1797, and stated his intention of sending a new mission to France, to conciliate that country, if possible, but at the same time recommended the prompt formation of a navy and a general permission to private vessels to arm in self-defense. For the mission he named Pinckney, John Marshall, and Francis Dana, chief justice of Massachusetts, and these were confirmed by the senate. Dana declining, Elbridge Gerry was substituted, being specially acceptable to his close personal friend, the president, and, as a democrat, to France also. In October, 1797, the three met at Paris, and undertook to open negotiations with the directory. One leading complaint on the part of France evidently awaited them. The treaty of 1778 had established the principle (between France and the United States) that "free ships made free goods," that enemy's property, excepting contraband of war, was not to be captured in a friendly ship. Jay's treaty, on the contrary, allowed the capture of enemy's property in friendly ships; so that France complained that her ships could not lawfully take English property from American vessels, while British ships were not so restrained as to French property. On this head, the commissioners were empowered to grant to France the same privilege which Jay's treaty granted to Great Britain. They were also directed to demand, but not as a sine qua non, compensation for past injuries to American commerce; and they were forbidden to consent to any loan, under any guise. While the commissioners were engaged in Paris | during the winter, and while little was known of their proceedings, owing to difficulty of winter communication, politics in the United States came to a complete stand-still. The federalists were thoroughly alarmed by the state of affairs in Europe, and the dubious prospects of a single-handed war with France. The French armies had the continent at their feet, and even Great Britain had become anxious for peace. A conflict with France, that is, with continental Europe, was certainly not at any time to be sought wantonly by a backwoods nation of 3,000,000 souls, inhabiting an enormous territory and politically divided among themselves; but the case was infinitely worse if the British navy was to leave the ocean open to the unopposed transport of French troops. Both political parties were afraid to take a step forward, and their uneasiness was increased by the fact, that, though the federalists controlled the senate, there was no party majority in the house of representatives. That body was controlled by a number of members of doubtful political sympathies, without whose support neither party could do anything. Thus, in spite of the president's recommendations to equip a navy, arm private vessels, and fortify the coast, nothing was done throughout the winter. March 5, 1798, the president notified congress that cipher dispatches, dated from November until January, had arrived from the commissioners; and March 19, having deciphered them, he sent another message, in which, without detailing the contents of the dispatches, he summed them up in the information that the commissioners could gain no terms that were "compatible with the safety, the honor or the essential interests of the nation." This first thunder-clap was so effective that the house promptly passed bills to equip three frigates, and to prohibit the exportation of arms; and the senate passed bills to authorize the lease of cannon foundries and the purchase of sixteen additional vessels of war. spite of the long series of aggressions upon American commerce by both Great Britain and France, these were the first belligerent preparations made by the United States under the constitution. To check them, it was at first hoped by the democrats that an adjournment of congress might be secured; but this was impossible without the consent of the senate. As a second choice, resolutions were offered, March 27, that it was not expedient, under existing circumstances, "to resort to war" against France, or to arm merchant vessels. One of the leaders, Giles, during the debate, attacked the president for not communicating the dispatches; whereupon the federalists offered a resolution calling on the president for copies of such dispatches as were proper to be communicated. To prevent an invidious selection from the dispatches, the In democrats insisted on making the call for all the | tial part of the treaty remains to be adjusted: il. dispatches; and in this form the resolution was passed, April 2. The copies were sent the next day, the president being willing to gratify democratic curiosity to the fullest extent. One may imagine the absolute stupefaction of the democratic leaders as the coup de theatre, which they themselves had assisted in preparing, fell upon them as the dispatches were read. — In brief, the commissioners had been kept waiting in Paris for six months without official recognition, had been approached by unofficial go-betweens with proposals for bribes to the directory and the French treasury as indispensable prerequisites to peace, and, on their refusal, had been ordered out of France. On reaching Paris, they had found that Talleyrand, lately a royalist exile, was now the minister of foreign affairs. They had applied to him at once for an interview, but had been informed that he could not grant it until he had finished a report to the directory on American affairs. This answer had hardly been given when Talleyrand's unofficial agents appeared on the scene, and opened communications with the commissioners. In the dispatches, as sent to congress, the names of the agents were honorably kept secret, letters of the alphabet being substituted for them. The principal agents were M. Hottinguer (designated as X), M. Bellamy, a Hamburgh merchant (Y), and M. Hauteval, formerly resident in Boston (Z); and from these the whole transaction took its popular name of the "X Y Z mission." Their appearance had been heralded by information, through Talleyrand's secretary, that the directory were greatly exasperated by some passages in the president's message, that persons would be appointed to conduct the negotiations, and that they would report to him (the secretary). Oct. 18, X called on Pinckney with a message from Talleyrand: it would be necessary, in order to calm the exasperation of the directory, that a bribe of 1,200,000 livres (£50,000) should first be given them. Pinckney refused to discuss the matter without his colleagues, and X the next day laid written propositions before the envoys. The bribe to the directory was now supplemented by the demand of a "loan" to the French republic: if both were agreed to, the directory would restore the treaty of 1778, and submit American claims for damages to arbitration, provided also that the American government would "advance" money to pay any damages awarded against France. Within the next few days, Y and Z appeared, and the proposed form of the loan was explained. France had extorted from her "sister republic" of Holland, and still held, shares of stock amounting to 32,000,000 florins (£2,560,000), worth about half their par value. The United States envoys were to offer to buy these at par; and, as Holland was certain to pay them at par after the war, the whole transaction would really be only a loan. But Y put the whole negotiation into a nutshell thus: "I will not disguise from you that, this satisfaction being made, the essen faut de l'argent, il faut beaucoup d'argent-you must pay money, you must pay a great deal of money." They informed the envoys that nothing could be done in Paris without money; that one of the directory was in the pay of the privateersmen who had been plundering American commerce; that Hamburg and other European states had been compelled to buy a peace; and that the United States must do the same. The envoys nursed the negotiation very skillfully, proposing to send one of their number home for instructions, to suspend French captures in the meantime, and to do various inadmissible things, until they had accumulated a most unsavory mass of "diplomatic" matter. Oct. 27, X became impatient. "Said he: Gentlemen, you do not speak to the point; it is money: it is expected that you will offer money. We said that we had spoken to that point very explicitly: we had given an answer. No, said he: you have not; what is your answer? We replied. It is no; no; no; not a sixpence." This plain, manly and simple answer is probably the one which was distorted into the more bombastic form, much more popular in America: "Millions for defense, but not a cent for tribute." The next day Talleyrand himself had an interview with Gerry, Z acting as interpreter. He informed Gerry that unless the envoys "assumed powers, and made a loan" within a week, the directory would issue a decree demanding an explanation of objectionable passages in Adams' message. On Gerry's report, the envoys. unitedly sent word to Talleyrand that they would assume no such powers, and that he need not delay the decree on their account. On the following day X became still more urgent. He offered to allow the envoys to remain in Paris and communicate with their government as to the "loan," provided the bribe to the directory was paid; but, in default of this condition, threatened the expulsion of the envoys from France, and a declaration of war against the United States. This the envoys answered by flatly declining any further negotiations with unofficial agents, and here their mission really ended. The remainder of their six months in Paris was spent in preparing memorials to Talleyrand, writing dispatches to their own government, and repulsing the continued efforts of X, Y and Z to renew their negotiations. It was not until April 3, 1798, that Talleyrand dismissed Pinckney and Marshall, and then only by a letter to Gerry stating that he supposed they had 'thought it useful and proper," by this time, to quit the territories of the republic. Marshall sailed for home April 16, but Pinckney was detained for several months by the illness of a daughter. The powers given to the envoys had been joint and several, and Talleyrand, ever since the preceding December, had tried to persuade Gerry to use his own power and make a treaty. Now, on dismissing Pinckney and Marshall, he expressed his desire that Gerry should remain so emphatically that Gerry obeyed, fearing a declara tion of war if he should depart unauthorized. | At the same time he informed Talleyrand that he would only confer informally and unaccredited. He remained in Paris until early in August, when he at last received a passport, and obeyed the imperative directions of his government to return at once. Before his departure news arrived of the explosion which the dispatches of the envoys had caused in America, whereupon Talleyrand indig nantly denied all knowledge of the X Y Z negotiations, and called upon Gerry to give him the names of the "wretched intriguers" who had taken advantage of the envoys. This indignation blinded no one; and Y, who had taken refuge in Hamburgh, made a counter-declaration that he had never taken a step in the negotiations without Talleyrand's knowledge and direction. "The effect of the dispatches upon the democrats in congress was increased by the persistence with which both Talleyrand and his agents had returned to the assertion that their friends in America would believe and trust them rather than the federalist commissioners. They had so far mistaken the party, said Jefferson, as to suppose their first passion to be attachment to France and hatred of the federal party, and not love of their country." At any rate, the allegation made the democrats (or republicans) for the time a highly unpopular party. A flame of warlike feeling burst out from the country at large, and war meetings, processions and addresses to the president, volunteering, and private subscriptions of money and war vessels for government use, became the order of the day. The black cockade, the revolutionary badge, was generally worn; two new patriotic songs, "Hail Columbia" and "Adams and Liberty," became highly popular; and the president, careering at the head of the storm, felt for once that he liked the people and that the people liked him. In the only doubtful portion of congress, the house of representatives, all the doubt ful members, and many of the democrats, fell instantly into line with the federalists. The senate bills for increasing the navy and purchasing foundries were passed at once, and the necessary appropriations were made. The navy, hitherto under control of the secretary of war, was made a separate department (April 30). The president was authorized to enlist 10,000 regular troops, and 10,000 volunteers, if any foreign power should invade or declare war against the United States within three years (May 28). American vessels of war were authorized to capture any "armed vessels, sailing under authority or pretense of authority from the republic of France," which should commit depredations on American commerce (May 28). American merchant vessels were authorized to resist capture by French vessels (June 25); and American war vessels and privateers were finally authorized (July 9) to capture armed French vessels of every description. Commercial intercourse between the United States and France and her dependencies was suspended (June 13); and a brief act of July 9 declared the treaties with France no longer binding upon the United States, since France had repeatedly violated them, refused reparation, and " repelled with indignity" all attempts to negotiate. Acts were also passed for the imposition of a direct tax, for a loan upon the credit of the direct tax, and for a general loan of $5,000,000. In strong contrast to the vulgar notion of the belligerency of democracies, the American republic has always aimed at peace. Nevertheless, its people have always been proud of its potential weight in war, and have been fond of looking forward to the day when its irresistible growth in power should reduce to an evident littleness the high-sounding international wars of the continent of their forefathers. In any such point of view the little history of the nation's first defiance to an equal member of the family of nations, of the quasi war of 1798 against France, and of the scattered sea battles in which the little navy acquitted itself so brilliantly, must always be an interesting point of departure. Had the dominant party stopped with the preparations above detailed, even its opponents must have acknowledged the vigor and success of its administration. But the time was one of political passion more intense than can well be conceived now. Each party had inherited many of the practices, and still more of the apprehensions, arising from previous party conflict in the mother country, where parties had not hesitated to assail one another, if not by force, at least by a forcible wrenching of the laws from their proper purposes. To the democrats, the provisional army, officered almost exclusively by federalists, seemed to be not only a means to provide salaries for their opponents, but a possible weapon of offense in party warfare. The step was defended by the federalists on the ground of the danger of an invasion of the southern states by a force of negro soldiers from the French West India islands, who would excite a slave insurrection. For the more flagrant measures, the alien and sedition laws (see that title), little defense could be offered. They were distinctly partisan. Under the operation of the sedition law, Hamilton published with impunity a pamphlet attack on the president, holding up to view his "disgusting egotism, distempered jealousy, and ungovernable indiscretion," and styling him an "arrogant pretender to superior and exclusive merit"; while democratic politicians were arrested and tried for even circulating petitions against the sedition law, or for expressing a wish that the wadding of a cannon might strike the president in the broadest part of his person. Supposing the next congress should prevent the embarrassing feature of a democratic majority in the house of representatives, was the majority to be removed by a series of arrests under the sedition law, supported by the provisional army? The counter-movement of the democratic leaders is elsewhere given. (See KENTUCKY RESOLUTIONS, NULLIFICATION.) Whatever its objects may have been, it need only be said here that the apprehensions which led to it were unfounded, and that the federalists attempted no such use of France, Feb. 18, 1799, and a week afterward the sedition law. -Even before Gerry's depart- added Chief Justice Ellsworth and Patrick Henure, Talleyrand had received news of the stir ry to the commission. Henry declined, and Gov. which the dispatches of the envoys had excited William R. Davis, of North Carolina, was named in the United States, and the effect was instant. in his place. The blow confounded the presThe directory protested their desire for peace, ident's party. Every influence was unsuccessand in August issued several decrees, releasing fully brought to bear on the president and on American prisoners, raising the embargo on Amer- the senate to balk the nominations. The cabinet. ican ships, and cautioning French vessels to do officers lost their heads: instead of either resignno injury to legitimate American vessels. They ing or keeping silence, they protested against the even drew a veil over the language of President step, and thus finally lost the president's confiAdams' messages, for which they had formerly dence. The federal party, which had begun the demanded satisfaction, but which had now grown year in high and united confidence, was now coninto an indictment of the directory's principles, vulsed by sudden feud, the president stigmatizing practices and manners, of a warmth unheard of his federalist opponents as a British faction; and elsewhere at the time; and they semi-officially the latter equally dreading, distrusting and disoffered to receive a new American minister. But liking the president. The new mission to France Adams, in his message of June 21, 1798, an- had not only dissolved the provisional army; it nouncing Marshall's arrival, had declared that he had thrown the whole federal policy into the air. "would never send another minister to France It is in itself a condemnation of the party that its without assurances that he would be received, re- policy should have been reduced by this time to a spected and honored as the representative of a single card-the continuance of the hostile attigreat, free, powerful and independent nation." tude toward France; when this was gone, the fire And in his annual message of Dec. 8, 1798, his of the party was out. At first everything seemed language rose to concert pitch: he declined to to promise quick success to the new mission. send another minister to France without more de- Murray had been informed of his appointment, terminate assurances, left it to France to take the with the reservation that the other two members requisite steps to accommodation, and gave that would not set sail until full assurances had been country deliberate and solemn" warning that, received as to their reception. Talleyrand hastened "whether we negotiate with her or not, vigorous to give such assurances in the amplest terms. preparations for war will be alike indispensable." Before the instructions for the envoys had been Meanwhile Talleyrand had been casting about for completed, the face of affairs in Europe had been a channel through which to convey the assurances so changed as to give the federalists some fresh necessary; and had found it in William Vans courage. Disasters to the French arms had been Murray, the American minister to Holland. Nor steadily growing more serious; Napoleon, the diwas Adams unwilling to receive the assurances, rectory's genius, was blocked up in Egypt or for he had already found that war with France Syria; and in June, 1799, a new revolution disinvolved the elevation of Hamilton, whom he placed all but one of the directory. The governcordially detested. Washington had accepted the ment which had given the assurances of a kindly position of lieutenant general, conferred upon reception of the envoys was no longer in power; him at the previous session, on condition that he and the federalists urged the president to stop should be allowed to name his subordinates. their embarkation until new assurances should be the three next in rank to himself he had named given. It may be that the revived federalist spirit Hamilton, C. C. Pinckney and Knox, who were was also due to the ascertained fact that the new confirmed; but the president insisted on making house of representatives (1799-1801) would be Knox the senior, on the ground of his superior federalist as well as the senate, a southern rerevolutionary rank, and only yielded before Wash- enforcement having established a party majority ington's threat of a resignation of his own com- there. Oct. 16, the president again chilled his mission. Hamilton was thus to be practically party by directing, without consulting his cabinet, commander-in-chief of the provisional army. He the immediate embarkation of Ellsworth and had already become commander-in-chief of the Davis. This step was attributed at the time to the president's cabinet, which had been inherited from president's frantic jealousy of Hamilton, who had Washington; its members maintained a close and inopportunely made his appearance in Trenton confidential intercourse with him, in striking con- (then the temporary seat of government) at the trast to the increasing contempt which their cor- same time with the cabinet and envoys, as if for respondence expressed for their nominal chief. consultation with them. It is now well settled To refuse Talleyrand's overtures in order to put that Adams' motive was mainly the pacific policy Hamilton at the head of an army for the invasion which has been the almost invariable rule with of Florida and Louisiana, perhaps to make him a American presidents (see EXECUTIVE, III.); and conquering hero and a popular candidate for the that his action in this case differed from Washing presidency, was more than could be expected ton's action on Jay's treaty only in the difference from Adams. He could not trust his cabinet; of mode due to the different characters of the and, without giving its members any hint of his two men. Nevertheless, this new reason for disintention, he nominated Murray as minister to trusting the president, together with the impossi As bility of ignoring in the approaching election the representative of New England, the section from which most of the federalist electoral votes were to come, left the party leaders in a quandary. Their only apparent road of escape was in the effort to make C. C. Pinckney president and Adams vice-president, and this road led straight to the overthrow of the party in 1800-1. (See CAUCUS, CONGRESSIONAL, I.; FEDERAL PARTY, I.) — The envoys found, that, by the new revolution of Nov. 9, 1799, Napoleon, who had suddenly returned from Egypt the preceding month, had become first consul. Three commissioners were appointed to treat with them, and a convention was signed Sept. 30, 1800. It secured safety for American commerce for the future, until England and France in turn began to violate international decency in their attacks on neutral commerce (see EMBARGO); but Napoleon was ingenious enough to obtain a mutual abandonment of claims for damages, by reason of the declaration of congress in 1798, that the treaties with France were no longer in force. In this form it was finally ratified by both parties, and declared in force Dec. 21, 1801.. See 1 Tucker's United States, 597 foll.; 2 ibid. (table of contents); 5 Hildreth's United States (table of contents); 1 von Holst's United States, 138 foll.; 1 Schouler's United States, 373; 2 Marshall's Life of Washington, 424; Monroe's View of the Conduct of the Executive, 34; Hamilton's Public Conduct and Character of John Adams, Esq., 12; 2 Benton's Debates of Congress, 225 foll. (see index under FRANCE); 2 Wait's State Papers (2d edit.), 187-499 (complaints of France and of the United States); 3 ibid., 456-499, and 4 ibid., 1-137 (X Y Z dispatches in full); 1 Statesman's Manual, 116, 117 (messages of March 19 and Dec.. 8, 1798); 1 Stat. at Large, 552 foll. (war acts of 1798); 1 Lyman's Diplomacy of the United States, Trescott's Diplomatic History of the Administrations of Washington and Adams, 158 foll.; 8 Stat.. at Large, 178 (convention of 1800.) The democratic version of affairs will be found in 1 Randall's Life of Jefferson, 387 foll.; 3 Jefferson's Works (edit. 1830), 384-422; the Adams version in 8 John Adams' Works, 546-681, 9 ib., 10–307, and the numerous notes and references appended thereto; and the version of the federalists opposed to Adams in 2 Gibbs' Administrations of Washington and Adams, 15 foll. See also authorities under the respective parties, and under articles referred to.. ALEXANDER JOHNSTON. Y AZOO FRAUDS (IN U. S. HISTORY), the | Georgia company, the Georgia Mississippi com a act passed by the Georgia legislature in 1795, and to certain claims arising under it, which were not settled until 1814. Georgia began her existence as a state with doubtful claims to the territory west of her present area. (See TERRITORIES.) The Indian title had been extinguished in but a part of the state, bounded east by the Savannah river up to a considerable distance above Augusta, and west by the Altamaha and Oconee. The rest of the state belonged to the Indians, principally Cherokees and Creeks, but over all of it the state claimed sovereignty and jurisdiction, and the exclusive right to pre-empt lands from the Indians. (See CHEROKEE CASE.) When, therefore, the state sold lands, the sale was really of the right of pre-emption. In this manner a bargain was made in 1789 to transfer about 15,000,000 acres to three land companies for about $200,000; but the companies insisted on paying for the lands in depreciated Georgia paper, whereupon the legislature declared the bargain at an end. This abortive sale furnished a precedent for the increasing land speculations which grew to be a mania during the twenty years, 1780-1800. During the first fifteen years of this mania it had almost exhausted the sale of whatever lands the states had not covered by military land warrants. Georgia's vague and doubtful territorial claims seem to have at last attracted attention as a promising field for speculation. Four land companies were formed, the Tennessee company, commonly called, in general, the Yazoo companies, from the general field of their operations, in the Yazoo district. These joined forces in an attack upon the Georgia legislature, and obtained from it the passage of the act of Jan. 7, 1795, the most extraordinary piece of state legislation in our history. It purported to transfer to the companies named, for a consideration of $500,000, a tract of land then estimated at 20,000,000, but afterward found to contain 35,000,000, acres. The price, about one and twothirds cents per acre, for the richest farm land in the country, was certainly suspicious, but the act itself kindly furnished to the companies the means of corrupting the legislature: one clause contained a provision allowing the companies to take up, on the same terms, 2,000,000 acres additional, for the benefit of whatever "citizens of Georgia' they should admit as their partners. And so little care was taken by the participants to cover their tracks that the United States commissioners in 1802-3 had only to compare the schedule of partners acknowledged by the companies with the legislature's yea and nay votes to show that every member of both senate and house who voted for the act of 1795 had been bribed by a share of the 2,000,000 acres, with a single exception, Robert Watkins, whose name deserves to be recorded. The bribery was effected in the manner now familiar, by assigning a number of acres to the legislator, |