IN glancing at some of the leading features of the present Session, people of common sense might be tempted to address the two Houses of Parliament in the following manner: Your sentiments govern or neutralize those of the empire, and your decisions rule its interests. The vast and perilous power which you thus possess a power which, saying nothing of abuse, may be easily rendered ruinous in the upright use-will well justify the presumption we are about to be guilty of. On divers matters of the first public moment you have in the present Session promulgated, and acted upon, doctrines which we feel ourselves compelled to dissent from; and it is our object to state the grounds of our dissent, and call on you for additional argument and evidence.

We shall restrict ourselves to matters which are of the highest permanent importance, and which, on every principle of national salvation, ought to be stripped of their controversial character. It is as much your interest as your duty to make them the subjects of honest discussion, and seek information respecting them in every quarter. You will not be suffered to proceed much farther on mere assertion and assumption; you must speedily either exchange them for fact and demonstration, or cease to form a legislature.

When the motions respecting the distressed state of the community were brought before you, we shared in the general expectation that you would, like men of business, look at the divisions of the population separately for the purpose of discovering cause and remedy. Different bodies were obviously suffering from different evils, and of course the truth could only be ascertained by detailed examination. In common with the rest of our fellow-subjects, we were disappointed; you resorted to your wild generalities, and threw nearly the whole blame on the change of currency in respect of its effect in reducing prices.

These matters are undeniable. 1. No change of currency had taken place in London, Manchester,

Liverpool, and the whole of Scotland.

2. In the various counties the working classes, farmers, and landowners, were suffering severely from the lack of employment, bad wages, and heavy poor-rates, caused by excess of population. This excess has been for some years increasing, and according to your own reports, it originated in other things than the change of currency.

3. In many districts the farmers were suffering severely from the low price and unsaleable character of wool.

4. Agricultural produce had been greatly depressed in price by large importations.

5. The influx of Irish labourers had operated to reduce wages, and create an excess of labour in agriculture and manufactures.

6. In many trades the working classes were distressed by low wages, caused by the low prices at which foreign goods could be imported.

7. The losses of the farmers from the causes we have mentioned necessarily reduced wages, and the quantity of employment amidst their labourers.

8. The distress of the working classes caused distress in trade, and reduced prices in both agriculture and manufactures.

9. While there was a great decline in the consumption of animal food, the supply of it from Ireland was increased; this of course distressed the grazing districts, and injured the farmers generally.

10. The shipping interest, the silk trade, the mining, and several other interests, were distressed by foreign competition; the ship-builders, ropemakers, sailmakers, &c., were distressed indirectly by the same cause, and directly by the liberty given to shipping to fit in foreign ports.

11. Some of the leading manufactures were bound to low prices by the protecting duties of foreign countries.

12. The distress of so large a part of the population necessarily distressed trade and manufactures generally.

All this we say is undeniable; it has nothing to do with the change of currency. Yet you put it out of sight, and ascribed public suffering almost wholly to such change!

Let us now contrast this with your conduct on other occasions.

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In the discussions which took place in late years on the Corn Laws, you regularly insisted that such laws governed the prices of corn. One part of you maintained that the old ones caused corn to be much dearer than it otherwise would be, and the other part maintained that a change would ruin the farmers by low prices. You asserted that corn was made dear by prohibition, and that it would be made cheap by admitting the foreigner into the market. The variations which had taken place in its value, you charged on variations in the supply; and the same was done by the Press. In the 88th Number of the Edinburgh Review, we find this statement. Owing partly to the unprecedented destruction of agricultural capital that had taken place during the low prices of 1814, 1815, and 1816, (these low prices had not been produced by the suppression of small notes,) partly to deficient harvests, and more than all to the restraints on importation, the prices of 1817, 1818, and 1819, were oppressively high. But mark the effects of this increase of price-fresh capital was applied to the land; and this increase of tillage, conspiring with favourable seasons, again sunk prices to such a degree, that they fell in October 1822 so low as 38s. Id., the average of that year being only 43s. 3d.!" These sentiments were your own, with this exception, that you ascribed the low prices of 1821 and 1822 to the excessive importations which took place before the closing of the ports in 1819.

And what is your conduct at present? When you speak of prices in detail, you virtually deny that they have been in any material degree affected by the change of currency. When you speak of the low prices of wool, do you charge them on this change? No. When you treat on the pauperism and distress of the southern and midland counties, do you make this change responsible for them? No. Do you blame it for bringing the Irish labourers into the

country, who, as you assert, form such a powerful source of general bad wages and pauperism? No. When you look at the distress of the shipping interest, or of the silk trade, or of the lead and copper miners, or of the cotton weavers, or of the producers of kelp, or of any portion of the community, do you say it has been produced by the change in question? No. Do you assert this change to be the cause why the manufacturers are bound to such low prices in foreign markets? No.

Thus, when you framed the present Corn Law, you declared that it, by its effect on supply, would govern the prices of corn; you now declare that it cannot affect prices, and that they are governed by the currency. When you look at prices and public suffering in the aggregate, you ascribe them to one cause; but when you look at them in detail, you deny operation to this cause, and ascribe them to others wholly different!

If this monstrous inconsistency affected your own reputation only, we should be silent respecting it; but it bears vitally on the interests of the empire. It is utterly impossible for you to legislate correctly on the property and bread of the community, if you be ignorant of the things which govern price. The latter is either regulated by the currency, or it is not; we call on you, in the name of the country, to decide the question.

We will now offer a few remarks in reference to your decision. A large part of you, in speaking of the high prices of corn in 1817 and 1818, and the low ones in 1821 and 1822, ascribe them wholly to the currency. Would not the bad crops in the former years, the excessive importations on an abundant crop which they caused, and the very great increase of imports from Ireland in the latter years, affect prices? If they would, what are we to think of those legislators who put them wholly out of the question?

You speak of a metallic standard of value, as though the relative value of commodities to it, could not vary; you assert that with it the prices of commodities must be always low. We have no alternative but to disbelieve you, or history altogether. Is the price of wheat governed by this standard, or by the seasons? Are

wages governed by it, or by the supply of labour, and the quantity of employment? We put the question in regard to every commodity. What is the reply given by history and the nature of things? It is, that it is utterly impossible for the standard of value to govern prices, and that they must vary about as much with a metallic, as with a paper one. In illustration, we give the average price of wheat at Dantzic during four periods of ten years each.

From 1780 to 1789 it was 33s. 10d. 1790 to 1799 43s. 8d. 60s. Od. 55s. 4d.

1800 to 1809

1810 to 1819

You charge the high prices of the war on a depreciation of the currency. The history of the last two years and the present one abundantly proves, that if the supply of foreign corn were as small, and the demand of government, and means of consumption of the working classes, were as great, as they were during the war, corn would be now fully as dear with a metallic currency as it then was with a paper one. Let labour be as much in demand, and as free from foreign competition, as it was during the war, and wages will be as high as they then were. Place imported commodities in the war circumstances, and they will rise to the war prices. This will be the case if the price of gold remain what it is.

What is the outrageous absurdity which you here fall into? You in reality maintain, that, with a gold currency, short crops and inability to procure supplies from abroad cannot make corn dear-an inadequate supply of labour, and freedom from foreign competition, cannot make wages high-and short supply, expensive transit, scarcity, and high wages, cannot make general commodities dear!

The high price of gold during the war was caused, as every intelligent man knows, by other things than the high prices of commodities. It arose partly from the great general demand

for gold created by the war, and partly in respect of this country, from the circumstances produced by the war, which rendered a great export of gold necessary, and an equal import impossible. Yet you practically assert, that the price of gold cannot be affected by a great demand, a constant export, and inability to import; and can only be raised by the high prices of commodities!

If you admit the contrary, you overturn your beautiful currency theory. If you admit that short supply and scarcity can produce high prices independently of the currency, you cannot deny that they produced such prices during the war. If you admit that gold can be made dear by a great demand, necessary export and short supply, independently of the prices of commodities, you cannot deny that its high price during the war flowed from them. If you make these admissions, you own that the paper currency, during the war, was not the cause of high prices, and was not depreciated.

You say that a contraction of the currency must cause not only a momentary, but a permanent fall of prices, because the property of the country must be represented by the currency, and therefore the value of the one must fall with the amount of the other.

In this you virtually maintain, that the quantity of property cannot be affected by variations in the amount of money-that production will be the same in quantity, whether prices be profitable or losing ones-that a diminution of capital cannot diminish production. If you own the contrary, you must own that the currency can be increased or reduced without permanently affecting prices.

Let us suppose that, by small notes, two millions are added to the currency, and that half the sum is lent to the farmers. How will the farmers employ it? Granting that, in the first instance, they use it to keep their produce from market, and thereby raise prices, this, as you declare, must raise their profits, and incite them to force their old land with manure, and take additional land into culture. What must follow? An increase in the quantity of pro

duce fully equal to the increase of currency, and of course, according to your own doctrines, the old prices. Suppose that the other million is advanced to the woollen manufacturers, how will they employ it? They cannot raise the price of woollens without contracting largely the foreign markets, therefore they cannot raise labour and raw produce. They will cause an increase in the quantity of woollens equal to the increase of currency, and, therefore, there can be no permanent rise of prices.

Suppose that, by the suppression of bank-notes, two millions are taken from the capital of the farmers or the woollen manufacturers. This will cause, for a moment, forced sales and low prices; but production must fall in proportion to the loss of capital, and prices must rise to cover the cost of production. The farmers must raise less produce, and therefore, with the same consumption, foreigners must supply the difference, or corn and cattle must be made dear by the suppression of the notes. The woollen manufacturers must produce less woollens; therefore, with the same consumption, foreigners must supply the difference, or the suppression must make woollens dear.

If you, by any suppression of banknotes, take thirty or forty millions from the capital of the country, you must contract general business in a proportionate degree; the farmers must raise less produce, the manufacturers must fabricate fewer goods, and the merchants must have less trade; but prices, except for the moment, must still generally cover the cost of production. By contracting business, it may create a great glut of labour; this may reduce prices, by reducing wages; but, on the other hand, the deficiency of capital will raise them by adding to the cost of production. By doing this, you will greatly narrow your general business, produce a vast portion of distress, and give a large amount of your trade to foreign nations; but you will cause no permanent reduction of prices, unless it flow from the penury of your labouring orders.

It is by operating in this manner, and not by producing any permanent reduction of prices, that your sup

VOL. XXVII. NO. CLXVI.

pression of small notes has been the parent of much public suffering.

If you say, unlimited issues of bank-notes enable the producers to keep goods constantly high by withholding them from market, we reply, it is impossible. The more abundant capital is, the greater must production be; the farmer and manufacturer must, on the average, sell in the year all they produce, and it must be consumed. Such issues, by keeping production at the highest relative point, must keep prices generally low; the glut of capital, which has existed since the war ceased, has been the parent of excessive production and low prices.

If you assert, that abundance of money must make it cheap, we reply, that, in respect of capital, this can only make the profits on it cheap. The wages of capital, like those of labour, must be made low by excess; and this must make goods, not dearer, but cheaper. Abundance of money, as revenue, no doubt, makes it cheap, but bank-notes are not issued as revenue. Such abundance, and the consequent high prices, can only flow from abundance of prosperity. Banknotes can only raise general prices by raising revenue; and it is only by increasing prosperity, that they can do this. It is utterly impossible for them to raise your prices so far as to contract your markets, because a contraction must be an instantaneous fall

of prices.

Suppose that several millions are added to the capital of the country by the issuing of bank-notes. Your farmers and manufacturers produce more goods, and your domestic, colonial, and foreign trades are enlarged; through this, the money obtains employment; but no permanent advance of prices takes place, save what is caused by an increase of prosperity. If you double the capital of the individual, he employs the additional sum, not in raising his prices, but in enlarging his stock and business. The case is the same with the nation. It has been by such operation that an abundance of bank-notes has been so prolific of prosperity and wealth.

Your doctrine really amounts to this. An increase of money will not enlarge production and importation; neither will a decrease reduce them.

3 E

Take away the whole of a farmer's capital, and it will not reduce in the least his production of corn and cat tle; it will only reduce his prices: deprive the manufacturer of capital, and he will still fabricate the same quantity of goods; the only effect will be a reduction of his prices: strip a nation of its capital, and this will not diminish in the least degree its production and trade; the only consequence will be, its goods will be no longer sold, but given away!

When you speak of a paper currency, you vituperate it as a national scourge; you actually assert that the extreme of public misery is preferable to one. Yet when you speak of the history of the empire during the long term of years in which its currency was paper, you declare that it was distinguished by unexampled prosperity! We cannot ascribe such conduct to wicked attempts to impose on the community; therefore, what must we ascribe it to?

A large number of your members declaim against the change, on the ground that it operates most unjustly on the contracts entered into when the currency was paper. The alleged injustice can only exist in the fall of prices. Yet most of those men regularly support every other change which has the reduction of prices for its avowed object. They are worshippers of Free Trade-they would abolish the Corn Law-they would sweep away protecting duties they would buy at the cheapest marketsolely for the sake of obtaining goods and labour at the cheapest rate! With them, to bring down prices by a change of currency is robbery; but to bring them down by other means is perfect equity!

You insist that a paper currency, without limitation, would again produce general high prices. By this you really insist that the production and import of an enormous additional quantity of animal food-the production and import of more corn, to the amount of many millions of quarters annually-the import of a vast additional mass of wool, cotton, sugar, and other articles-the loss of foreign markets for manufactures-and an immense import of most kinds of manufactured goods, could not prevent high prices!!!

We solemnly protest against your

dogmas, because we wish to be thought sane, saying nothing of other matters. Borrowing from the terms which your tutors and leaders bestow so liberally on their opponents, we must humbly observe, that the most finished "empirics" never produced any thing capable of excelling your currency" empiricism."

The low prices, whatever may be their cause, have evidently formed the immediate great source of the suffering. The farmer has been unable to obtain prices for his produce sufficient to cover the demands on him; the inevitable fruits have been loss and insolvency. Other producers have not been able to obtain prices that would yield them adequate profits. The prices of agricultural produce and manufactured goods have been too low to afford sufficient wages to the working classes. These classes have been distressed much less by the want of work, than by inability to earn, when in full employment, a sufficiency of necessaries; and it is manifest that their low wages have been produced by low prices,

Now putting the currency wholly aside, you have intentionally produ ced these low prices by your_new laws. You changed the Corn Laws for the express purpose of reducing prices; you did the same touching wool, seeds, and other articles of agricultural produce; and it was to reduce prices that you changed the whole of your protecting laws. Your legislation has only produced what you intended it to do; you are surrounded by demonstration that the low prices which you intended it to produce have formed the main source of the distress; yet you protest that the distress cannot be ascribed to it in the smallest degree!

What is really your conduct here? You make a law expressly to prohi bit the farmer from obtaining for his produce sufficient to meet his expenses on the one hand, and to take from him a part of his market on the other; in consequence, he sinks into distress and bankruptcy: yet you declare, that although your law has had its intended effects, it cannot possibly have injured him! You make another law to prohibit the shipowner, silk manufacturer, miner, &c. &c., from obtaining remune