borough generally does not contain a single individual able to contest it; therefore its choice is limited to strangers, whom chance may send to it. However anxious it may be to dismiss its old member, it cannot at an election hope for more than one new candidate to oppose him; and perhaps this one will not make his appearance. Were the qualification limited to the parliamentary one, this borough would possess abundance of candidates amidst its own inhabit

ants.

This in many ways has most pernicious operation. It goes far towards prohibiting the electors from having such representatives as they wish, and compelling them to elect those who differ from them in sentiment. It excludes from Parliament those who are the best qualified for entering it. An independent man is deterred from the contest by the heavy purse, not only of an opponent, but perhaps of the Ministry, the Whig Club, or some other corrupt body. A member is a stranger to his constituents, he is an adventurer,-he involves himself in debt or ruin by his election, and he sells himself to the best bidder, as soon as he takes his seat. It operates in the most powerful manner to exclude all from seats in the House, who do not seek them from motives of personal and party gain, and to destroy integrity and independence in the Legislature.

A reform might be made here, which would be no speculative innovation or hazardous experiment, which would be in perfect accordance with the meaning of the laws, and the professions of the whole Legislature, and which would be infinitely more comprehensive in its operation, than the abolition of the rotten boroughs. Why is it not made? Because it would be a public good, and would injure the interests of party and faction.

When two or three thousand burgesses do not give their votes, without causing an expense of twenty or thirty thousand pounds; and when a few thousands of freeholders do not give theirs, without causing one of fifty, one hundred, or two hundred thousand pounds, are we to be told that this cannot be prevented?

It is averred, that it is beneficial for the electors to be assembled in one

place, to hear the candidates speak, and see them "badgered." If we grant this, are not the benefits on the one hand, outweighed by the evils on the other? Is it advisable to purchase the benefits at the heavy cost of prohibiting the appearance of proper candidates, and very often of ren dering the franchise a nullity? It frequently happens, that the possession of the benefits prevents a contest in counties, and thereby prevents the body of the freeholders from seeing the candidates. As to the "badgering" on the hustings, those who advocate it, assert in effect, that a man cannot make a proper member of Parliament, if he be not somewhat of a demagogue. It is sufficient to deter those who are the best qualified for seats, from offering themselves; they are obnoxious to the rabble, and they cannot stoop to the filthy arts which, alas! are necessary for gaining its favour. Let any man read the speeches delivered from the hustings,-lethim overlook the mere nonsense, remark only the misrepresentations and falsehoods, and then say whether the necessity for uttering them is not calculated to make the candidates knaves before they enter the Legislature.

In counties, the candidates might, previously to the time of election, meet the freeholders at different places to explain their principles; and the votes might afterwards be safely collected by the parish officers at no cost.

The votes for the city of London are given in Guildhall, and it seems to work quite as well as the hustings in other places. Public buildings might be used in the same manner in boroughs; in them the candidates might address the electors, and the magistrates might collect the votes.

And now what is canvassing? It is the deluding and demoralizing of the ignorant-the obtaining of votes by falsehood, bribes, and intimidation -the destroying of all purity of election. In the candidates and their friends, it ought to be prohibited. The candidates should merely be permitted to explain fully their principles, and then the parish or other public officers should collect the voters, and take them to the place of election. We do not say that the candidates and their friends could be wholly prevented from soliciting

votes, but we maintain that their committees and canvassing parties, which form such a fruitful source of expense and bribery, could. It is essential that the votes and voters should be collected by disinterested and impartial people.

The out-voters form an enormous source of expense which could be easily destroyed. If a man have a vote, why cannot he be suffered to give it in one place as well as in another? Give every freeman the liberty to vote at the place where he happens to reside, and prohibit him from giving it elsewhere. Various of the Nottingham freemen have cast off their allegiance to this country, and dwell in France; they are no longer his Majesty's subjects. Yet at the last election, they were actually fetched from France to give their votes! It might have been expected that an enormity like this would have been at once put an end to, but no notice has been taken of it by the reformers. Why? Because the foreigners naturally voted on the anti-English and liberal side.

If it were necessary to obtain the votes of four thousand people in a large town on any question, would it not be practicable for the magistrates and parish officers to obtain them almost without expense? Every man will say Yes. It would be as easy for them as to collect the votes at an election. As to liability to corruption, no system could possibly be more corrupt than the present one. We are sure that it is practicable to free elections in a great measure from expense, and yet leave them sufficiently popular in their nature; the loss in this respect would be merely what is vicious and baleful. The gigantic objects to be gained are, the removal of a pernicious scarcity of proper candidates-the destruction of a monopoly which gives what is the most independent part of the House of Commons to a few individuals and families-the abolition of a prohibition which in a great degree renders the franchise a nullity, and restrains the community from possessing representatives of its own sentiments-and the bringing into the field of an abundance of new candidates, far better qualified than those to whom it is now restricted; for such objects something ought to be sacrificed.

After securing a proper variety of candidates, the next point to be gained is the election of the best; to gain this, the franchise in the majority ought to be confined to properly qualified electors. The principle of giving the franchise by birth and servitude, is radically vicious; because it makes the great majority of the electors consist of not only the poor and ignorant, but the corrupt and profligate. Very many individuals amidst the lower orders, are as intelligent and upright as their superiors; but in regard to elections, they form the exception. If the labouring man be perfectly honest in all other respects, he regards his vote as a thing of private gain, and he sells it for the highest price, without any reference to the character of the buyer. If there be no contest, there is no market for votes, and what is the consequence? In open boroughs, the body of the freemen make it a regular rule to return the "Third Man," or new candidate, be he who he may, solely because, by creating a contest, he enables them to extract corrupt profit from the franchise. A place may have two of the best members possible, and still if any reprobate, or traitor, oppose them, he is sure to be sent to Parliament to the expulsion of one of them, merely for the benefit of the stomachs and pockets of the electors.

Let us look more particularly at the operation of this system. A borough contains thirty or forty thousand inhabitants, and three or four thousand of them possess votes. The electors consist principally of labourers, workmen of the lowest grades, and small tradesmen; the chief part of the respectable merchants, tradesmen, professional men, people of independent property, and housekeepers, have no vote. The great majority of the electors give their votes without any reference to the qualifications of the candidates, and solely for the sake of personal benefit. They make it a rule to vote for the brainless traitor, to the rejection of the man of ability and patriotism, if they can draw from it guilty private gain. Thus, in the first place, the vote is denied to the most intelligent, upright, and independent, and given to those who are the most ignorant, and the most liable to be swayed by passion, delusion, and

corruption. In the second place, while the vote in regard to the majority is confined to those who are incapacitated for making a proper use of it, they intentionally make the very worst use of it possible.

This cannot be altogether above the reach of remedy. If, in such a place, the right of voting, at the least, should be extended to the occupiers of houses and warehouses of more than a certain rent, what would be the effect? A few hundreds of new electors would be created, all people of intelligence, property, and character-all possessed of a stake in the public weal, and placed above the reach of bribery. They would to a considerable extent form a balance to the lower orders, and give the majority to the best candidates. While the aristocracy returns the members for counties and close boroughs, the lower classes return those for other places; the middle classes have no vote, or they are in the minority, they can rarely secure the return of a representative. This is the greatest evil of the present sys

tem.

From this and the enormous expense of elections, every interest is very inefficiently represented, and many are in effect not represented. If any measure relating to agriculture be brought forward, scarcely a county member can be found who is capable of making an able speech on it, and of instructing the House touch ing its real character.

London is a place of vast commerce, and yet its merchants think themselves fortunate if they can re turn one of its four members. The rest are generally returned on the vicious politics of the multitude, without reference to qualification. It possesses an enormous mass of shipping, and yet when the Shipping Question is discussed, its members can throw no light on the practical part; they even cannot open their lips on it.

The flower of the empire in rank, opulence, and talent, dwells in Westminster; yet its members are Sir F. Burdett and Mr Hobhouse! They even call themselves only the representatives of its rabble.

The members for a sea-port ought unquestionably to be shipowners or merchants. But if a shipowner or

merchant should offer himself for one, he would have to expend perhaps ten thousand pounds, and then be rejected; should he be so fortunate as to gain his seat at this cost on his first offer, he would be pretty sure to lose it on his second, after expending ten thousand pounds more. It naturally follows, that no such man will offer himself, and that the members are strangers to the place and its interests. The sea-ports do not possess a single member who is capable of discussing the Shipping Question, or supplying any information respecting it; and the same may be said of them touching mercantile matters.

This holds good in regard to various trades and manufactures. The members returned by them do not understand, and very frequently oppose, their interests. These members will present their petitions, but probably they deny their allegations, and vote against them; if they vote differently, they make it known that they do so against conviction.

In its general operation, this tends mightily to exclude the public weal from the House of Commons; to place the interests of the empire at the mercy of ignorant, interested quacks; and to make every thing subservient to party and faction. In truth, it is scarcely possible for any thing to be discussed in the House, save on the interests of party and faction. Every one knows, that it was such interests which refused enquiry to the Shipping Interest, the Silk Trade, &c.

It is one of the great defects of the present system, that the representative casts from him the influence of his constituents in national matters as soon as he is elected. In this respect the close borough members are no worse than the others; on the contrary, they often shew the most deference to public feeling. It makes the House of Commons utterly regardless of the public voice, and clothes it with a dangerous portion of arbitrary power; this will shew the value of the doctrine that the member ought to act as he pleases, because he is not a mere agent,doctrine which strikes at the root of all national privileges and liberties.

Different causes operate to produce it. In the first place, the county

member who wishes to be again elected, must look principally to a few great families; if he oppose them in going with the body of his constituents, he is pretty sure to lose his seat.

In the second place, from the expense, the power of the lower classes, and the principle on which the lat ter vote touching the " Third Man," the member for open boroughs and cities can feel no confidence that he will be elected a second time for the same place. He knows that, whether his conduct be meritorious or the contrary, popular prejudice, or the "Third Man," will almost certainly cause his rejection if he again offer himself. He, therefore, as soon as he is elected, regards his connexion with his constituents to be ended, and pays no farther attention to them touching public affairs. It is his interest to oppose them, and make himself the tool of the Ministry or Opposition, if he wish to get again into Parliament at the least

cost.

In the third place, if a member desire to cultivate the good opinion of his constituents, he must look chiefly to the lower orders, and their favour is not to be gained by the due discharge of duty. Provided he make them presents and use similar means, he may dispose of his vote in the most corrupt manner, without forfeiting such favour.

In the fourth place, no matter how profligately a man may act as the member for one place, it will not prejudice his election for another. While a member can scarcely hope to be again returned for the one he represents, he knows that, in offering himself for a different one, his past votes and conduct will not be looked at by the great body of the electors. In addition to what we have said touching the "Third Man," we may state, that in open boroughs and cities there is a corporation or other interest, and the lower orders generally support any candidate who will oppose it, no matter who, or what, he may be.

Let us now speak of remedy. If members knew that zealous, upright discharge of duty, and attention to the sentiments of their constituents, would ensure their re-election, while opposite conduct would ensure their

exclusion from Parliament, this would form one of great efficacy. How could such a remedy be created? By placing the command of the majority in the hands of intelligent, patriotic electors, and producing a sufficiency of candidates in the way we have mentioned.

A member, on his election, solemnly pledges himself to a particular creed, or to vote in a specified manner on certain vital state questions; and it is of the first importance that he should faithfully adhere to his engagements. If he be suffered to violate them at pleasure, it destroys effective representation, and renders the constitution and public liberties defenceless. At the very least, his abandonment of his pledges ought to deprive him of his seat; he ought not to be suffered to vote in opposition to them without being first sent back to his constituents for their sanction. A member forfeits his seat by accepting office; he must resign it, if in representing a close borough he change his side without the consent of his patron; and similar compulsion to be faithful and consistent ought to be imposed by law on the whole House. If this were done, it would cut off one great source of ministerial corruption, and exclude many profligates from Parliament who obtain seats at every election by hypocrisy and falsehood.

In turning to the close boroughs, we will look first at the independent ones which are free from aristocratic influence. These seats are sold to the best bidder by the electors, without the least reference to creed and character. The sale is practicable, because the electors are so few in number. Where possible, the number of electors ought to be duly enlarged; and where not, the seats ought to be transferred to some other place. We demur to the doctrine, that to transfer seats in this manner, is to take a right from the electors of the place which loses them. The franchise is not a right, but a trust which the State bestows for its own benefit, and has a clear right to recall. We think it erroneous to say, that if the State grant a trust to a certain number of men, on no claim, and solely for its own good, it has no right to take back the trust when its exercise produces public evil.

And now let us glance at the aristocratic boroughs. If at all times they were about equally divided between the Ministry and Opposition, and the two latter followed different creeds, we believe that the opening of them would produce little benefit: we are not sure that it would not prove a source of much evil.

If there were not a single close borough, Parliament would be divided into two great parties, the Ministerial and Opposition ones; and the community would divide itself between them. What the case has been in this respect, it always will be, no matter what scheme of reform may be adopted. This, then, is the question to be considered-is it beneficial to the empire, or the contrary, for each of the great constitutional parties to command a certain number of

seats?

Under the present system, these parties practically elect and govern the close borough members. In many cases the borough-owner suffers his party to nominate his members; in others, he will only elect men who profess its faith, and are of good character; and in all, his members are guided in their conduct and votes by it, and not by himself. In effect, the Whigs, in and out of Parliament, as a party, elect and rule the members for the Whig boroughs, and the case is similar with the Ministerialists. These consequences follow. The most able men that can be met with, are placed in the House of Commons to act as its leaders-each side of the House and the community is provided with the most efficient advocates and champions-both the great parties possess a sufficient number of votes to give due effect to their efforts and the leading part of Parliament is composed of men who are in a large degree independent of the different interests of the empire, and who, therefore, can discuss public affairs with sufficient impartiality, so far as these interests are concerned.

Ta

owners; why, many of those who represent places wholly free from aristocratic influence, vote as servilely with the Ministry, or Opposition, as any of the close borough ones. king for granted that the members, in such a case, would be as much party men as they now are, there would be this difference: Men of talent and knowledge would be in a great measure excluded from Parliament, particularly on the Opposition side-the heads would be of inferior capacity, and would be controlled by the interests they would owe their election to-both the great political parties of Parliament and the country would have inefficient advocates, and public interests would be managed on the ruinous principle of making every thing subservient to trading, cupidity, and popular delusion.

We of course think that a change would yield any thing rather than benefit. The utility of the close boroughs in bringing men of talent and intelligence into Parliament, is so forcibly felt, that the better part of the reformers are willing to spare a certain number of them for the purpose. Any change which should exclude such men would be a public evil of the first magnitude, and we do not know what, beside these boroughs, would ensure their constant return. While it is necessary that they should be sent to Parliament, we hold it to be equally necessary that they should always command a sufficient number of votes to give due effect to their exertions. This number can only be given them by the close boroughs. We do not say that none of the latter ought to be abolished; all we say is, that there ought to be as many as will, not only bring the first men into Parliament, but enable them to be beneficial when

they are in it. All experience proves that individual efforts in it are of no avail; and that in cases of public emergency, nothing but a party can be proof against the seductions of men in power.