هو the involuntary propagator of pes of the unwarranted coninflated boasting of those by were surrounded; and their framed in a strain of blind anticipation, not deducible rged or rational view of the Conditions of the people. Inrepresentations of the numter, and state of efficiency of They were deluded into adoptvagant hyperboles of rash and is men, and contributed what to propagate false and exagions of the military power of nation. They did not venrude on the British Cabinet the le truth, that the national army *ffect, nothing more than a con 4 of money, clothing, and ammoninga, se liberally afforded, became a bone of cantention and of petty jealousy to the rival authorities. In truth, the perinciai governors were actuated by no Serai and enlarged views of the pahür benefz. Supine in danger, and vala-dirimus ià pe perity, at enne untalented and mentigisened, no men could be mire mimet to direct the reserves of a tucie wil v gour and effect. officers sufficiently versed in the of war, to instruct and discipline w levies which constituted the e part of its numerical strength ; urther, that the different leaders prevented, by frivolous jealousies, iscordance of opinion, from cordially g in the execution of any great ope 1, the calamitous events on the Ebro d probably not have come like a lerbolt to crush and stultify the comions of a government, which was at sincerely anxious to co-operate in the of freedom. England h by I isted d Spain with Leven Tom sect. e * junction with the Sudurundion's 's own of Wreunah we tributed a iertan to logon the tw by which his mini wes virgi Meanwhile, intelligere came, fan which Sir John Moore was tiful persons, to have been a political enemy of Moore's fame "And sad Corunna mourns her battle won." On the liberation of Portugal by the Convention of Cintra, it was determined to dispatch an expedition to the north of Spain. It was to consist of a corps of 20,000 men, detached from the forces in Portugal, with two regiments of German light cavalry, and a suitable body of artillery, and 10,000 men, then assembling at Falmouth, under Sir David Baird. Sir John Moore was directed, as commander-in-chief, to proceed immediately with the troops under his more immediate command, and to fix on some place of rendezvous for the whole army, either in Gallicia, or on the borders of Leon. No sooner had he assumed the command, than he found he had great difficulties to overcome. Few effective preparations had been made for the equipment of the troops, by his predecessors in command. Magazines were to be formed, and means of transport to be provided, in an impoverished and exhausted country. All the complicated preliminaries necessary for the forward march of the army, before the rainy season should set in, (for he preferred reaching his destination by land, rather than by sea,) were still to be accomplished; but such was Sir John Moore's energy, that in less than a fortnight, from the period of his assuming the command, the great part of the army was on its march to the frontier. Deceived by erroneous information, as to the state of the roads, he determined to divide his army into three columns,-a dangerous arrangement, our author thinks, and one by which the period of concentration would, of necessity, be retarded. On his arrival at Salamanca, on the 13th of November, 1808, he heard of the defeat and dispersion of the Spanish army, under Belvidere, before Burgos; and next evening he was awakened by an express from General Pignatelli, conveying intelligence, that the enemy had pushed on a body of cavalry to Valladolid, a city not above three marches from Salamanca. He had with him at this time only three brigades of infantry, and not a single gun. The enemy were in his front,-his situation had thus suddenly become one of great peril; and under such circumstances, he assembled the Junta of Salamanca, and declared his resolution, should the French continue their advance on his front, to retire on Portugal. The French, however, withdrew to Palencia; and Moore directed Baird and Hope to close with their divisions on Salamanca. Meanwhile, Blake had been utterly routed at Espinosa; and by this destruction of the left wing of the Spanish army, which had occupied a line reaching from Bilboa to Burgos, the flank of the centre, under Castanos, was laid open to the enemy. The French were completely interposed, at this time, between the Spanish and British armies, and might, at any moment, advance on the latter in overwhelming force. Now, Moore had completed all his arrangements on the assurance, that the assembling of his forces, by three different routes, would be protected by the Spanish armies. But to effect the union of his divisions, had now become an operation of danger and difficulty; for he was placed as a central point between the two wings of his army, and it was impossible to approach the one, without hazarding the safety of the other. "Thus compelled to remain inactive at Salamanca, Sir John Moore endeavoured to stimulate the local authorities into the adoption of such measures of promptitude and vigour as were suited to the exigence of the crisis. In this effort he failed. The Spanish people, though still influenced by fierce and unmitigated hatred towards their invaders, were no longer animated by that uncalculating and convulsive energy, which, in the commencement of the struggle, had goaded them like madness into furious resistance. fierceness of the paroxysm had passed; and though, in the cause of their country, the hand of every Spaniard was prepared to gripe the sword, the blows it dealt were directed with an erring aim, and by a feebler arm. Their detestation of a foreign yoke was undiminished; but it had become a fixed and inert sentiment, rather than a fierce, uncontrollable, and all-pervading impulse. The "Before entering Spain, every thing had contributed to conceal the real state of the Peninsula from the penetrating vision of Sir John Moore. The British government. itself deceived, had become, in its turn, the involuntary propagator of deception. At the commencement of the struggle, it had dispatched military agents to the head-quarters of the different Spanish generals, to act as organs of communication, and transmit authentic intelligence of the progress of events in the seat of war. The persons selected for this service were, generally, officers undistinguished by talent or experience, and therefore little suited to discharge, with benefit, the duties of an office so delicate and important. They seem generally to have become the dupes of the unwarranted confidence and inflated boasting of those by whom they were surrounded; and their reports were framed in a strain of blind and sanguine anticipation, not deducible from any enlarged or rational view of the prospects or conditions of the people. Instead of true representations of the numbers, character, and state of efficiency of the armies, they were deluded into adopting the extravagant hyperboles of rash and vain-glorious men, and contributed what in them lay to propagate false and exaggerated 'notions of the military power of the Spanish nation. They did not venture to obtrude on the British Cabinet the unpalatable truth, that the national army was, in effect, nothing more than a congregation of separate and independent bands, miserably armed, possessing but a scanty and ill-served artillery, and almost destitute of cavalry. Had they done so ; and had they stated likewise, that this army was without magazines of any kind, without generals of talent or experience, without officers sufficiently versed in the details of war, to instruct and discipline the raw levies which constituted the greater part of its numerical strength; and, further, that the different leaders were prevented, by frivolous jealousies, and discordance of opinion, from cordially uniting in the execution of any great operation, the calamitous events on the Ebro would probably not have come like a thunderbolt to crush and stultify the combinations of a government, which was at least sincerely anxious to co-operate in the cause of freedom. "England had furnished Spain with supplies; she had poured arms and munitions into the country with a profuse hand; but she had taken no efficacious measures for their judicious application. She exercised little influence on the counsels of the Spanish government; and even while providing the very thewes and sinews of the war, her voice was seldom listened to with obedience or respect. Arms, placed at the disposal of men swayed by petty views and local interests, were wasted and misapplied; and the supplies of money, clothing, and ammunition, so liberally afforded, became a bone of contention and of petty jealousy to the rival authorities. In truth, the provincial governors were actuated by no liberal and enlarged views of the public benefit. Supine in danger, and vain-glorious in prosperity, at once untalented and unenlightened, no men could be more unfitted to direct the resources of a nation with vigour and effect. His "In such men Sir John Moore could place no trust. His expectations had been deceived. He found supineness where he expected energy; a people not filled with an active spirit-stirring enthusiasm, but reposing in a dull, immovable, and lethargic confidence in their own prowess and resources, even in the immediate neighbourhood of a triumphant enemy. mind became not only perplexed but irritated by the disappointment of his hopes. At Salamanca he knew himself to be placed in a difficult and precarious posi tion, unprotected in front, separated from the wings of his army, with nothing but a barren country to retire upon. To the concentration of his forces, he was aware, indeed, that no present obstacle existed; but how long such a state of things might continue, he had no data on which to form a judgment. The enemy at any moment might interpose a body which would prevent the possibility of a junction, for there existed no Spanish force from which he could anticipate protection. "To the other embarrassments of Sir John Moore must be added, the difficulty of receiving true and faithful intelligence of the events passing around him. On public and official reports no confidence could be placed, and of more authentic sources of intelligence, he was in a great measure deprived. He had been sent forward without a plan of operations, or any data on which to found one. Castanos was the person with whom he had been directed to concert his measures; but that officer had been superseded by Romana; and of the situation of the latter, Sir John Moore only knew that he was engaged in rallying the remains of Blake's army, at a distance of about two hundred miles. Naturally distrustful of the apocryphal intelligence transmitted by the British military residents, he could rely only on the reports of Colonel Graham and Captain Whittingham; and these, in conjunction with the information which his own officers were enabled to procure, contributed still further to deepen the gloom by which his mind was overcast." Meanwhile, intelligence came, for which Sir John Moore was certainly not unprepared, as he had written to Mr Frere, the new minister at Madrid, respecting the probability of such an event. Castanos had been defeated at Tudela with great loss; and the road to Madrid was now open to the French armies. He had written to Frere the very day before the arrival of this intelligence, saying, in that event,-"I must either march upon Madrid, and throw myself into the heart of Spain, and thus run all risks, and share the fortune of the Spanish nation, or I must fall back on Portugal. In the latter case, I fall back upon my resources, upon Lisbon-cover a country where there is a British interest-act as a diversion in favour of Spain, if the French -detach a force against me-and am ready to return to the assistance of the Spaniards, should circumstances again render it eligible." In pursuance of this plan, Sir John Moore, without waiting for Mr Frere's reply, determined on immediate retreat, transmitting orders to Baird at Astorga, and Hope at the Escurial, for the former to retire on Corunna, and the latter to push forward, if possible, to Salamanca. Baird, too, was directed to write instantly to England, that a supply of transports might be sent to the Tagus. They will be wanted," said he; "for when the French have Spain, Portugal cannot be defended,”- -an opinion, by the way, not very consistent with the tenor of his letter, quoted above, to Mr Frere. All the world knows that this resolution astounded Mr Frere, who strongly urged the General to advance on Madrid; or, if he was determined against that step-a pretty bold one, it must be confessed-then he suggested the alternative of taking up a position in the strong country around Astorga. A retreat from that place to Corunna would, he argued, be less difficult than through Portugal to Lisbon; and in that position the army might wait for reinforcements of cavalry, to enable it to act on the flat country, which opens immediately from that point, and extends through the whole of Leon and Old Castile. Two Spanish Generals, dispatched by the Supreme Junta to the head-quarters of the British army, in order to concert with its com mander an united plan of operations, corroborated the exaggerated statements of Mr Frere, with regard to the strength of the Spanish armies. General San Juan was said to be in possession of the pass of Somosierra, which he had fortified so strongly as to render abortive all the enemy's hopes of reaching Madrid. But, lo and behold! Colonel Graham had just arrived with intelligence, that the pass had been forced by the French! Justly disgusted with all this ignorance and weakness, Sir John Moore would not hear of the proposal of these gentlemen to form a junction with Romana, and thereby create a diversion favourable to the defence of the capital. Morla, now at the head of the Junta, and Governor of Madrid, had written to Sir John Moore, informing him that 25,000 men of the army of Castanos were falling back on that city; that 10,000 men from the Somosierra were likewise concentrating, and that nearly 40,000 other troops were prepared to join in the defence of the capital. While Moore was deliberating on this communication from Morla, (whether Morla was then a traitor, or not till a few days afterwards, 'tis not easy to say,) Charmilly, a French emigrant in the British service, arrived with dispatches from Mr Frere. He had been in Madrid on the 1st of December, and had witnessed the strongest and most unequivocal demonstrations of ardour among all the classes of the people. The whole mass of the population was rising in arms; the streets were broken up, houses barricaded, and peasants from all quarters flocking into the city, to bear part in its defence. The Duke del Infantado had commissioned him to make known this state of things to the British General, and to entreat him to make some movement that might operate as a diversion for the capital, which its defenders had determined to hold out to the last extremity. "I have no hesitation," said Mr Frere, "in taking upon myself any degree of responsibility which may attach to this advice, as I consider the state of Spain to depend absolutely, for the present, on the resolution you may adopt. I say for the present, for such is the spirit and character of the country, that, even if abandoned by the British, I should by no means despair of ultimate success." Sir John Moore felt that he could not resist all these official statements -he could not suspect that the Junta would deceive him in a mere matter of fact that a person of Mr Frere's known perspicacity, had become the dupe of a mere flimsy delusionthat the ardour and effervescence of the popular spirit, which Charmilly declared he had seen, was but a dream; and therefore deciding on a change of plan, he sent orders to Baird to stop his retrogressive march, and return to Astorga. These orders reached him at Villa Franca, late on the 7th of December, when in full retreat to Corunna. Hope was already at Alba de Tormes, and thus the position of the army at Salamanca was secure. Meanwhile, Charmilly, ignorant of Sir John Moore's change of plans, delivered to him another letter from Mr Frere, requesting, that in the event of the General continuing his resolution to retreat on Portugal, Charmilly might be examined before a Council of War. This letter Moore tore into pieces, and instantly ordered Charmilly to quit Salamanca. "On a calm review of the circumstances connected with this unpleasant collision, we feel little disposed to attribute blame to either party. Both unquestionably decided on the purest and most conscientious motives. Both were animated by a vehement desire to act as might most contribute to the honour of their country, and the interest of the common cause.The style of Mr Frere, indeed, is somewhat less courteous than might have been expected from so accomplished a diplomatist; and the opinions of Sir John Moore were certainly entitled to greater respect than the minister seemed inclined to afford them; but the question on which they differed, was one on which men, zealous for the same end, might arrive at dissimilar conclusions, without imputation on the motives of either. "In truth, the minds of Mr Frere and Sir John Moore were of different mould and consistency. The one, ardent and enthusiastic, was disposed to rely with too facile a credence on the energy and devotion of the assertors of a noble cause. The other, too strongly disgusted, perhaps, with repeated proofs of ignorance and imbecility in the Spanish leaders, regarded the scene around him with the eye of a general. He felt little disposed to anticipate a fortunate issue to the resistance which popular enthusiasm might oppose to military skill and highly disciplined troops. They beheld the same events through different media." Having now determined to advance, Moore wrote to Romana, expressing a strong wish for the speedy junction of their armies, in order that combined efforts might be made for the support of Madrid. But, alas! what an army! Romana had under him 20,000 men; but they were without haversacks, cartridgeboxes, or shoes, or many even without clothing. Besides, they durst not stir a foot. For a corps of about 10,000 Frenchmen were posted between Sahagun and Almanza, the apparent object of which was to check his movements; and therefore he could not think of abandoning his present position. Farther, any approach with his corps towards the British army, if he chose to run that risk, would leave the French free ingress into Asturias, from which he drew large supplies, and would likewise endanger Gallicia. So much for Romana. The Junta of Toledo now informed Moore, that they intended to reunite the dispersed armies in that quarter, and defend the city to the last extremity. The General instantly sent a British officer to reside at Toledo, and concert measures for its defence. But on the first approach of a column of the enemy, the Junta retired from the city, and it was occupied, without opposition, by the corps of Victor. So much for the Junta and city of Toledo. Two days afterwards, Colonel Graham, who had been dispatched to Madrid, returned with intelligence of its being already in occupation of the enemy. So much for Morla the Deceiver, and for Mr Frere the Deceived! Yet the fall of Madrid did not deter Moore from pursuing his projected operations. The great bulk of the French army, which might have been employed against him, had been carried into Catalonia, or towards Madrid; and Moore considered, that, by a forward movement, and effecting a junction with Baird, he would be able to menace the communication of the enemy; thus creating a diversion in favour of those Spaniards who still |