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founded on knowledge or ignorance of human nature and its most momentous concerns.

That Education we then hold to be comparatively of little worth, which is entirely an Education of Intellect, and not at all of Will. What is all the evil of life but a disordered will? What other ignorance so mischievous-so fatal, as the ignorance of the will disturbed and darkened? From that disturbance and darkness, what dreadful passions rise up, not only to destroy all peace and all virtue in the individual whom they perpetually torment, but in league and union with kindred powers in many other hearts to agitate the whole frame of society, and lay its fairest scenes desolate! Knowledge may and does work directly towards the restoration of the will. But from that to reason generally about the importance of knowledge, is to deceive ourselves, and to expect effects from an inadequate cause. The kind of knowledge that can effectually and permanently clear and enlighten the will is soon circumscribed and defined-moral and religious. You may say, that the will cannot give religion, because religion is doctrine, and facts and truths, out of the acquisition of the faculties, and which must be declared. True-God has done his part, and given us revelation. These truths are couched in few words, and soon conveyed. Where lies the great difficulty of this knowledge but in the will, which is unrecipient-not always by direct purposed opposition, but by earth and desires of earth clinging to it, and in a way it cannot understand; palsying, as it were, the very spirit, when most eager to aspire to heaven? Is there any instance of a soul perfectly spiritual, and withal perfectly meek, that ever found insuperable difficulty in embracing the highest and greatest doctrines? So it is said-" they that will to do the will of my Father shall know of the doctrine;" that is, by the very act of willing, steadily maintained, shall acquire the knowledge. Undoubtedly the best effects of secular instruction are also of a moral kind, but indirectly, and not in the very highest degree. Many of the habits and tempers of such instruction are excellently good. It induces domesticity it is tranquil,

sedate, thoughtful, orderly it mixes with a father's love to his children in divers ways-partly in teaching them, as he will be by his secular instruction better able to be a religious or moral teacher to them. He who studies astronomy or natural history may find in them just grounds of adoration and gratitude. But not necessarily so-for according to the will is the feeding of the soul on its knowledge; it is poison or immortal fruits. The will hallows the knowledge, or makes it wicked. Observe, too, and we ask you to do so from no wish to undervalue Science, that the adoration drawn from speculative knowledge is much weaker than that proceeding from the personal incidents of common life. A poor man, receiving his daily meal, as he believes, from the hand that feeds the young ravens when they cry, has a stronger and more efficient sort of gratitude, than he who derives it from contemplation. Yet it is requisite, too, that the spirit which does put forth the eagle-wings of thought, should, in Intellect and Imagination, still find religion, that its great powers may be good to it, and not its bane. But we are not to begin to seek God above the stars. He is not far from every one of

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Thus, then, there is an effect of secular instruction which works back into the higher order of effects-but not necessarily—although, when it does, most momentous. For, supposing a truly moral people, well taught for the next world, it may easily be conceived that a general diffusion of knowledge, making them an intellectually, as well as morally instructed people, would raise their whole character, as well as their whole power greatly, and be really of prodigious importance. The error, and it is one into which many philanthropists have fallen, is to think of founding on intellect, to build thereon will; the right course being to found in will, and to build thereon intellect-the right course, if there be truth in the words of the Most High.

It is not possible, therefore, for any person, holding the opinion which we have now expressed, to speak in perfect consent with the present zeal for Education. We must suppose it, in this mistaken, that it too often

overlooks, disregards, or misunderstands moral effects. Neither intellect, nor its tuition, are necessarily moral. This many of the most zealous educationists seem not to know. They seem to think that intellect is virtue and happiness. What is the truth? If you try to conceive a human being in his perfection, you, no doubt, conceive him walking in the light of intellect. But there are two kinds of knowledge, objective and subjective. Knowledge objective is knowledge of objects in and among themselves. Knowledge subjective is knowledge of objects in their relation to, and as they affect the mind knowing-the mind or person being called, somewhat perplexingly, perhaps, by logicians, the subject. Now he who is strong in either kind commands reverence, and seems to be achieving the duty of his being; but we would say, that he who knows objectively seems rather to walk in power-he who knows subjectively to walk in light. Galileo and Newton appear to us triumphing spirits. The sovereign and sole power of intellect swallowing up their life, appears to have something consecrating, in our estimation. We do not ask about the will of such men-perhaps we fear to do so, lest we should find a flaw, some evil lurking there that might bring down the starry Galileo from his throne in the skies, and shew him, like ourselves, a child of dust. Here, however, the intellect was purely contemplative, and the subject solemnizes the faculties. Take, then, Lycurgus, Solon, or Numa, who were practical men, and busied themselves with the concerns of this world and this life. Observe, that in them we always suppose great subjective, as well as great objective knowledge, or rather that they have treated subjective knowledge objectively, and that they well knew themselves, and regulated their own minds by noble laws. Besides, they legislated for the public good, and thereby they proved their virtue, and we believe them to have been virtuous. Take, then, knowledge, practical, objective, and limited in its objects, such as that of the illustrious Watt. We know that he was a man of virtue; but we have little or no reason for believing that, from his merely having improved on the steam engine. He might

have been the most scientific man of his age, and yet not a man of great virtue-nor would our minds have been greatly surprised or shocked, had such knowledge and such talents been found disunited from great virtue. They command reverence, by the power, both producing and produced; but surely a moderated and inferior reverence, not one to take place of a moral estimate. Finally, take knowledge, practical, and detached from or opposed to will, as in many great conquerors, and we then feel that knowledge is something altogether different from virtue. Any mental power, at its height, dazzles us, absorbs our contemplating faculty, but may give little light on its general moral effect. The moral effect of knowledge merely objective, which is that of education on common men, seems to be this-that it amends and raises them by drawing force of will from common_passions into a spiritual power. Besides, it raises, and in some degree amends, as it guides them in their actions relative to things external and objective. The injury is, or may be, that it destroys simplicity of faith. The character of the understanding of children and of the common people, is, that feeling their own knowledge to be extremely limited, they readily suppose, and are ever prone to believe, existences and powers out of their own knowledge, and that to any extent. This is a true state of mind, for it is a disposition representing their real power. Instructed men have this not, but the reverse, a persuasion that their present knowledge contains reality, possibility, every thing, which is a state in the utmost degree false. This is the reason of all incredulity-a prevalent temper of the last half century, coming with knowledge, and not yet extinguished. Undoubtedly, by the diffusion of instruction, as it is contemplated, we shall in some produce this temper, perhaps in great numbers. The highest philosophy returns to the pristine humility of ignorance-only an enlightened, instead of a dark humility. It has measured finiteness in the presence of infinitude. No man, if you ask him, “Do you know every thing?" will answer " Yes, I do;" but, nevertheless, that is his virtual belief. For his understanding is shut

against, and denies every thing he does not know.

Now, what is the remedy for this among the people? To have it remedied first among philosophersalso by the predominance of moral over intellectual tuition. This false persuasion does not necessarily come with knowledge, but is induced by the undue excitation of self-esteem in the progress of knowledge, the annexation of the idea of self to the knowledge attained, till all knowledge lying beyond, wholly out of that attained, and especially knowledge contradicting that attained, and that which lies wholly out of it will often seem to contradict it, comes like a contradiction of self, and "is with spattering noise rejected." There is, indeed, a Beyond," to which the knowledge attained visibly leads, but that is very different; and a glimpse of it, instead of repelling, tempts the mind onwards by the lure of light. This disposition often appears as conceit in the young, but it was a terrific vanity in an age. It is the error of the mind new to knowledge, and beginning attainment. The delusion of an age, suddenly inflated, and inflamed with an idea of immense superiority over those that have preceded. It will be the error of minds always, individual, national, secular, which in all their acquisitions, feel themselves more than their subjects. If it has arisen throughout an agethat is, in many nations at once, and has lasted a season-it does not necessarily last. It produces acknowledgment, perhaps humiliation, perhaps regret, perhaps remorse a contrary revulsion of the understanding-a clearer discernment of the truth which has been abandoned or violated-a consciousness of following mischiefs to be blotted out, balanced, or expiated. Let us not speak, then, only of the common people, but of the highest instructed-the leading orders of nations-of this nation, and what is our dependence for their morality? Not precisely and singly the augmentation of knowledge, but, independently of what is given them not human, that which was formerly stated-the constitution of the human soul full of what demands morality, and the constitution of the world teaching morality -teaching it in the experience of

every hour. This is our moral dependence-far more than institutions which have been transmitted to us, more than opinions, than the antique authority at least of opinions, which have been inculcated upon us, and which we are zealous to inculcate, handing down their authority. Institutions and opinions may dissolve; but these are two living sources of good ever springing, which cannot fail. These must be our dependence for the lower classes as for the high er-not ignorance, not, if that be in any countries, the jealous, hereditary guardianship of Ignorance.

The character of the Will of a people is, that the Ideas to which it is attached are few, but embraced with strong feeling, either with passionate affections, or with habits of life revolving round and on them. Some of those ideas are presented by what is every day before them, some by national recollections, some by instruction, some, most and best, by Religion. In earlier states of society, every day presents objects to which passionate feeling cleaves with imaagination, (as in clans, or in simple feudality, their Chief,) or where every man is a warrior for his country, as among the Sabines, the Spartans, the Athenians of old-or nature gives great objects blended with warlike patriotism, as in Switzerland. In common countries where this primitive state has passed, the recollection long remains; as in the ballads and traditionary poetry of a people which turn back generally to those times, and lighten up and tenderly draw the imagination, and perhaps clothe the fields and hills. But a time comes when even this lingering dream of the old existence is swept away, and men remain with the earth, and what it can yield them, and the realities that are not of this earth. For that time it is that we have now to provide. What is there now for their warm elevated will? Certainly, first of all, Religion. Nothing else can be imagined to them very elevating. To us these can—imagination with all her works-human ambition-science. But to the poor man, it is Religion or nothing. Attend next to his domestic affections, which, without this, are strong, clear, yearning instincts-with it, are hopeful, awful, and high. It is the same with his just, wise sympathy with his fel

low-men, and proper love to his country. The great difficulty, then, is to find knowledge that will take hold on the will of the poor man. In the higher classes, we do not regard this. Better with them, no doubt, when the instruction falls in with the character of the mind, of the intellect, of the nature, and that it embraces its knowledge passionately; for such knowledge is more effective; but it is not absolutely necessary. Instructed they must be, for their knowledge gives them their rank—makes them feel it, and for the most part, that is reckoned enough. It gives them something to talk about; a participation in the work of society, and in its discourse; and farther, a reputable occupation of a deal of superfluous time. But with the poor, or inferior man, you wish to see something more solid in his knowledgethat it should bear upon and touch himself, his character, and his trade. You wish to see in him a stronger and more appropriating feeling of his knowledge, which converts it into aliment of his strength, and of his very bodily power.

It will be asked, then, what knowledge should be communicated to the lower orders? If the question regards the subject of knowledge, we answer first and generally, the same as to the higher. If within the subject, it regards the manner of teaching it, there is this essential difference, -that as their opportunity is limited, there must be selected for them, in each subject, what is of primary importance to them as men whose lot it is to live by the sweat of their brow. Also, it is for many reasons very important, that discrimination be made in each, between what is most certainly established, and what is conjectural and doubtful, presenting to them as much as possible the first and not the second. There is this further ground of distinction, that to the lower orders, knowledge is not their business, that is, not to the great lower order, those who render the daily labour of their hands to the use of others. Their business is to render a prescribed and taught, and, for the most part, a very simple, and a uniformly recurring labour. Their calling, then, is in a great measure independent of knowledge, except what is communicated to them in it.

Knowledge to them,-except of the great truths of religion and morality, which are also a business and the same to all men, the moment it goes beyond the humble circle in which their life moves, must be considered, chiefly, as in part recreative and restorative, and in greater part as a moral re-agent. It is otherwise with the higher orders-with whom knowledge is a business in a double sense. In the first place, there are those who devote themselves to speculative knowledge-to any branch or branches of it and with whom and in their hands, is the extension, one might almost sometimes say the conduct, of human knowledge. In the second place, the sphere of their action is high and wide, and often demands, is always much the better of, general knowledge. What knowledge is useless to the theologian, the lawyer, or the statesman, of a highly civilized country? Besides their labour, whatever their calling, is intellectual, and therefore asks that intellectual discipline, that formation or preparation of the powers of the mind, which is to be found only in contest with various high and abstruse studies. The higher classes, too, feel themselves concerned in parts of knowledge which they do not particularly study, looking upon knowledge as a great war which they are all carrying on together, where everything gained tells. To animate, cherish, point this feeling, their knowledge should be more various and extended. They should in some measure know, that they may know how to care for subjects which they will not particularly pursue.

Generally speaking, then, but with the differences now pointed out, the subjects must be the same to both; because the same worlds, the same fields, the same matter are before both-the same faculties are in both -the desires instigating those faculties into action, are naturally the same, though in these considerable difference will be made by condition. History will interest both, and poetry, and nature. No doubt more abstract studies will to a degree also. The same feelings which turn our minds with interest on the consideration of the curious organ of the expression of thought and feeling-Language-will interest theirs also; and

no doubt they will have pleasure in justly acquiring, and in properly understanding and using, language. But here there is a difference,-for the educated to higher labour, should learn the most perfect and artfully constructed languages which men have spoken, were it only for the subtle cultivation of intellectual power that is obtained in the mere acquisition of them. To one of the people it may be quite enough to know his own.

Observe that there is a difference, in the two cases, in the moral effects of knowledge. The highly educated finds in his ardent and powerful pursuit of knowledge a sympathy with all those who are also pursuing it. He feels that he marches in the van of the conquests of human intellect. This feeling, in many ways great, but especially moral, by the manner in which it binds him, first to a certain division of mankind, and then to all the species, is peculiar to him who has leisure to sweep the whole range of his science—and it always has been a very powerful agent of civilization. To the humbler instructed this feeling cannot be; at least it is in a far inferior degree.

But the effects of knowledge on the higher and on the lower orders of society, supposing them both to be well educated, are essentially the same. To know causes, and the laws by which they act, is, if the causes are within human reach, and the particular case within ours, to command the operation and the effects. This takes place in the field of physical nature. The science of the last and present century has shewn this in new and extraordinary splendour. It takes place in the field of moral nature. This has been verified from the beginning of the world in all those, who, publicly or privately, have, by their knowledge of humanity, governed men, personally, or by powerfullyconceived institutions. But moral has never been placed in the same clear evidence with physical science. Its principles have not been certainly found and stated, and doubt removed from them. If stated, they are not communicated as certainly and easily as those of physical truth, because the mind that receives must, notwithstanding, also supply the data from itself, in a manner to which there is

nothing exactly answering in physical science. Nevertheless, the issue is the same, though no such striking and widely-diffused result of science is to be shewn, namely, that the knowledge of the causes and their laws is to man the command of the effects.

Secondly, the reaction of knowledge, and of the pursuit of it, on the faculties which seek it, is most important to all men-the invigorating of intellect, the principles of reasoning acquired, the habit of its exertion, acuteness, subtlety, discrimination, comprehensiveness-these results of study remain; even if the knowledge, in attaining which they were acquired, were afterwards abandoned as useless, or could be obliterated; they remain, and are transferred to every new pursuit.

Thirdly, the affections that accompany knowledge are the same. For instance, the moral emotion with which the recital of great and good deeds is heard or read-the wide, profound, and variously enriched sympathy with which the great history of our species is contemplated

the most solemn feelings, not unmixed, indeed, with those of delight, which accompany the study of the Works and of the Word of God. To the poorest man, if he have a heart and a soul, what a treasure the religious feelings which accompany the study of nature! The moral sensibilities which are set aflow by the contemplation of heroic virtues!the pathetic transports with which a peasant's heart may beat in recollecting the actions of great heroes of old, the high deliverers of their country,

"The Patriot Tell-the Bruce of Bannockburn!"

Finally, there is the feeling of selfrespect which is excited by intellectual attainment, and the hopeful, joyful feeling which runs on with the labour and progress of the acquisition; and effects rather than feelings, the health of mind which waits upon vigorous, well-supported, but not excessive exertion, as the body receives health from its own activity; and, lastly, the blamelessness and perfect innocence of employment.

The greater part of these effects are alike to one Order and to another, except, perhaps, the first; to wit, the power which knowledge gives. However, that also-for though the sphere

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