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So the House decided that the bill should not be read a third time-in other words, that it should be rejected.

Mr. FORSYTH, of Geo. then rose, and said he had voted in the majority against the bill; and was, therefore, at liberty to move a reconsideration of the vote just taken. This motion he did make, with a view to retain the bill still in possession of the House, in order to recommit it; that the House might

not be deprived of an opportunity of passing a bank bill during the present session.

This motion gave rise to considerable sensation in the House, as, indeed, had all the proceedings of this day.

The motion was opposed by Mr. MILLER, of N. Y. and Mr. FISK, of Vt. and advocated by Mr. Fisk, of N. Y. and Mr. FARROW, of S. C. &c. &c.

At length, Mr. FORSYTH withdrew his motion for the present, intimating that he might renew it to-morrow.

Mr. CALHOUN moved to print the Secretary of the Treasury's letter, read this morning; when the House adjourned.

NOVEMBER 29, 1814.

Ordered, That the letter of the Secretary of the Treasury, laid before the House yesterday, by the chairman of the committee, to which was committed the bill to incorporate the subscribers to the Bank of the United States, be referred to the Committee of Ways and Means.

The letter of the Chairman, and the Secretary's reply, are here inserted.

WASHINGTON, November 27, 1814.

SIR: The committee of the House of Representatives, to which the bank bill was recommitted, on Friday last, have directed me to request you to communicate your opinion in relation to the effect which a considerable issue of treasury notes (to which should be attached the quality of being receivable in subscriptions to the bank) might have upon the credit of the Government, and particularly upon the prospects of a loan for 1815.

As the bill, as it was referred to the committee, provides for the subscription of forty-four millions of treasury notes, to form, with six millions of specie, the capital of the bank, any information which you may think proper to give, either in relation to the practicability of getting them into circulation without depreciation, or in regard to their operation on any part of our fiscal system afterwards, will be very acceptable.

DES.

WM. LOWNDES.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, To the Hon. the Secretary of the Treasury.

TREASURY DEPARTMENT, November 27, 1814.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, requesting, for a committee of the House of Representatives, an opinion upon the following inquiries:

1. The effect which a considerable issue of treasury notes, with the quality of being receivable in subscriptions to a national bank, will have upon the credit of the Government; and particularly upon the prospects of a loan for

1815?

2. The practicability of getting forty-four millions of treasury notes (forming, with six millions of specie, the capital for a national bank) into circulation, without depreciation?

The inquiries of the committee cannot be satisfactorily answered, in the abstract; but must be considered in connexion with the state of our finances and the state of the public credit.

When I arrived at Washington, the treasury was suffering under every kind of embarrassment. The demands upon it were great in amount, while the means to satisfy them were comparatively small; precarious in the collection, and difficult in the application. The demands consisted of dividends upon old and new funded debt, of treasury notes, and of legislative appropriations for the army, the navy, and the current service; all urgent and impor

tant. The means consisted, first, Of the the fragment of an authority to borrow money, when nobody was disposed to lend, and to issue treasury notes which none but necessitous creditors, or contractors in distress, or commissaries, quartermasters, and navy agents, acting, as it were, officially, seemed willing to accept. Second, Of the amount of bank credits scattered throughout the United States, and principally in the Southern and Western banks, which had been rendered in a great degree useless, by the stoppage of payments in specie, and the consequent impracticability of transferring the public funds from one place, to meet the public engagements in another place. And third, Of the current supply of money from the imposts, from internal duties, and from the sales of public land, which ceased to be a foundation of any rational estimate, or reserve, to provide even for the dividends on the funded debt, when it was found that the treasury notes (only requiring, indeed, a cash payment at the distance of a year) to whomsoever they were issued at the treasury, and almost as soon as they were issued, reached the hands of the collectors, in payments of debts, duties, and taxes; thus disappointing and defeating the only remaining expectation of productive revenue.

Under these circumstances (which I had the honor to communicate to the Committee of Ways and Means) it became the duty of this department to endeavor to remove the immediate pressure from the treasury; to endeavor to restore the public credit; and to endeavor to provide for the expenses of the ensuing year. The only measures that occurred to my mind, for the accomplishment of such important objects, have been presented to the view of Congress. The act authorizing the receipt of treasury notes, in payment of subscriptions to a public loan, was passed, I fear, too late to answer the purpose for which it was designed. It promises, at this time, little relief, either as an instrument to raise money, or to absorb the claims for treasury notes, which are daily becoming due. From this cause, and from other obvious causes, the dividend on the funded debt has not been punctually paid; a large amount of treasury notes has already been dishonored; and the hope of preventing further injury and reproach, in transacting the business of the treasury, is too visionary to afford a moment's consolation.

The actual condition of the treasury, thus described, will serve to indicate the state of the public credit. Public credit depends essentially upon public opinion. The usual test of public credit is, indeed, the value of the public debt. The faculty of borrowing money is not a test of public credit: for a faithless Government, like a desperate individual, has only to increase the premium, according to the exigency, in order to secure a loan. Thus public opinion, manifested in every form, and in every direction, hardly permits us, at the present juncture, to speak of the existence of public credit; and yet, it is not impossible that the Government, in the resources of its patronage and its pledges, might find the means of tempting the rich and the avaricious to supply its immediate wants. But, when the wants of to-day are supplied, what is the new expedient that shall supply the wants of to-morrow? If it is now a charter of incorporation, it may then be a grant of land; but, after all, the immeasurable tracts of the western wild would be exhausted in successive efforts to obtain pecuniary aids, and still leave the Government necessitous, unless the foundations of public credit were re-established and maintained. In the measures, therefore, which it has been my duty to suggest, I have endeavored to introduce a permanent plan for reviving the public credit; of which the facility of borrowing money in anticipation of settled and productive revenues, is only an incident, although it is an incident as durable as the plan itself. The outline seemed to embrace whatever was requisite; to leave no doubt upon the power and the disposition of the Government, in relation to its pecuniary engagements; to diminish, and not to augment, the amount of the public debt in the hands of individuals; and to create general confidence, rather by the manner of treating the claims of the present class of creditors, than by the manner of conciliating the favor of a new class.

With these explanatory remarks, sir, I proceed to answer, specifically, the questions which you have proposed.

1. I am of opinion that a considerable issue of treasury notes, with the quality of being receivable in subscriptions to a national bank, will have an injurious effect upon the credit of the Government, and also upon the prospects of a loan for 1815.

Because it will confer, gratuitously, an advantage upon a class of new creditors, over the present creditors of the Government, standing on a footing of at least equal merit.

Because it will excite general dissatisfaction among the present holders of the public debt; and general distrust among the capitalists, who are accustomed to advance their money to the Government.

Because a quality of subscribing to the national bank, attached to treasury notes exclusively, will tend to depreciate the value of all public debt, not possessing that quality; and whatever depreciates the value of the public debt in this way, must necessarily impair the public credit.

Because the specie capital of the citizens of the United States, so far as it may be deemed applicable to investments in the public stocks, has already, in a great measure, been so vested; the holders of the present debt will be unable to become subscribers to the bank (if that object should, eventually,prove desirable) without selling their stock at a depreciated rate, in order to procure the whole amount of their subscriptions in treasury notes; and a general depression in the value of the public debt will inevitably ensue.

Because the very proposition of making a considerable issue of treasury notes, even with the quality of being subscribed to a national bank, can only be regarded as an experiment, on which it seems dangerous to rely. The treasury notes must be purchased, at par, with money; a new set of creditors are to be created; it may, or it may not, be deemed an object of speculation by the money holders to subscribe to the bank; the result of the experiment cannot be ascertained, until it will be too late to provide a remedy in the case of failure; while the credit of the Government will be affected by every circumstance which keeps the efficacy of its fiscal operations in suspense or doubt.

Because the prospect of a loan for the year 1815, without the aid of a bank, is faint and unpromising; except, perhaps, so far as the pledge of a specific tax may succeed; and then, it must be recollected that a considerable supply of money will be required for the prosecution of the war, beyond the whole amount of the taxes to be levied.

Because, if the loan for the year 1815 be made to depend upon the issue of treasury notes, subscribable to the national bank, it will probably fail, for the reasons which have already been suggested; and, if the loan be independent of that operation, a considerable issue of treasury notes, for the purpose of creating a bank capital, must, it is believed, deprive the Government of every chance of raising money in any other manner.

2. I am of opinion that it will be extremely difficult, if not impracticable, to get forty-four millions of treasury notes (forming, with six millions of specie, the capital of a national bank) into circulation, with or without depreciation.

Because, if the subscription to the bank becomes an object of speculation, the treasury notes will probably be purchased at the treasury and at the loan offices, and never pass into circulation at all.

Because, whatever portion of the treasury notes might pass into circulation, would be speedily withdrawn, by the speculators, in the subscription to the bank, after arts had been employed to depreciate their value.

Because it is not believed that, in the present state of the public credit, forty-four millions of treasury notes can be sent into circulation. The only difference between the treasury notes now issued and dishonored and those proposed to be issued, consists in the subscribable quality; but reasons have been already assigned for an opinion, that this difference does not afford such confidence in the experiment, as seems requisite to justify a reliance upon it, for accomplishing some of the most interesting objects of the Government. I must beg you, sir, to pardon the haste with which I have written these

general answers to your inquiries. But, knowing the importance of time, and feeling a desire to avoid every appearance of contributing to the loss of a moment, I have chosen rather to rest upon the intelligence and candor of the committee, than to enter upon a more labored investigation of the subject referred to me.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, sir, your most obedient servant, A. J. DALLAS.

WILLIAM LOWNDES, Esquire.

NOVEMBER 29, 1814.

Mr. KILBOURN, of Ohio, said he had ever considered it to be the interest of the United States that a national bank should be established, for the convenient management of its finances. It was with satisfaction he found that to be the opinion of a great majority of the House, by the vote some time ago, on the proposition that it was expedient to establish a national bank. The project before the House having been rejected, he held in his hand a resolution embracing a sketch of a plan, which, if approved, might be put into the shape of a bill. Mr. K. then offered his resolution for consideration.

[The resolution embraced the same plan, with a few variations, as that contained in the bill which was yesterday rejected by the House.]

This motion the SPEAKER pronounced to be out of order, as in substance and matter the same as that already rejected by the House, and which, therefore, could not now be resumed, unless by a vote of reconsideration to-day.

Mr. KILBOURN remarked, that he had not understood that his motion would be considered by the chair out of order, or he would not have proposed it. He the more readily withdrew it, because he understood that it was yet intended to move a reconsideration of the vote of yesterday.

[No reconsideration was moved to-day of the national bank bill, which was, therefore, finally rejected in the House, but revived in the Senate.] Mr. KILBOURN's motion was as follows:

Resolved, That the Committee of Ways and Means be instructed to prepare, in due form, and report to this House, a bill to establish a national bank, of which the following shall be the principal or prominent features, viz: It shall be called the National Bank of the United States. It shall be seated in the city of Philadelphia, but may have branches throughout the Union. The capital stock thereof shall be fifty millions of dollars, divided into five hundred thousand shares, of one hundred dollars each. Thirty millions of the capital may be subscribed by individuals, companies, and corporations; and twenty millions thereof shall be subscribed by the Secretary of the Treasury, on behalf of the United States. The thirty millions, subscribed by individuals, companies, and corporations, shall be paid at proper periods, as follows, vix: Six millions in specie, eighteen millions in stock created since the year 1811, and six millions in treasury notes issued since the commencement of the war; that is to say: on each share twenty dollars in specie, sixty dollars in stock, and twenty dollars in treasury notes. The twenty millions subscribed for the United States, shall be paid in treasury notes, hereafter to be issued, or in stock of the United States, to be hereafter created. For the management of the bank, there shall be fifteen directors, nine of whom shall be elected by the individual stockholders, and six shall be nominated by the Secretary of the Treasury, and appointed by the President of the United States. The board of directors shall appoint the president, and all other officers and servants of the principal bank, and of the branches. The charter to continue twenty years; and no other bank charters to be granted by Congress during that time, except to the banking associations now formed within the District of Columbia. Subscriptions to be opened in one or more places in every State

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