simple, and to seek a confirmation of his general rules less in a series of reasoning than in a reference to well known events in war: which naturally suggested an examination of the career of two of the most remarkable commanders of recent times, Frederick II. and Bonaparte. The operations of the former occupy the first half of the work.

Vol. I. contains a very brief sketch of the early campaigns of Frederick II., viz. from 1741 to 1745; followed by an account of the more memorable operations of 1756 and 1757, including the battles of Prague, Kollin, Rosbach, and Leuthen. Vol. I. Campaign of 1758; battles of Zorndorf and Hohenkirchen; observations on the lines of operation adopted in the different campaigns of the war of 1756, and in the campaigns of the French revolution from 1792 to 1800. Vol. III. Campaign of 1759; battles of Minden and Kunersdorf; campaign of 1760; battles of Liegnitz and Torgau.- Vol. IV. Campaign of 1761 and 1762; continued comparison of the system of Bonaparte with that of Frederick II.; general observations on the art of war.

Of Marshal Daun, the chief commander of the Austrians in this arduous contest, M. DE J. speaks with very qualified encomium; ascribing in a great measure to fortunate casualties his success in the sanguinary conflict of Kollin, in which (Vol. I. p. 95.) the Prussians lost not fewer than 14,000 men; and censuring him strongly (Vol. II. p. 269.) for not following up his signal success in 1758 at Hohenkirchen. With regard to Frederick, M. DE J. is by no means backward in rendering justice to his talents on particular occasions, such as his victories of Hohenfriedberg and Soor in 1745, and still more in his prompt conception of a new plan of operations, after his defeat at Hohenkirchen in 1758. In forming, however, a general estimate (Vol. IV. p. 273.) of the merits of his resistance to a host of foes during the war of 1756, M. DE J. makes a much larger deduction than the admirers of this remarkable sovereign will admit; and he fails, as we shall have occasion presently to observe in the case of other commanders, to make the requisite allowances for the difficulties of his situation. We should have much hesitation in agreeing with him that, in the outset of that war, Frederick ought to have made use of his temporary superiority in marching straight to Vienna, as if the occupation of that capital would have been a decisive blow; or as if the invasion of Saxony had not been an ample effort for the limited means of a kingdom which contained only three millions of inhabitants. In reading the early part of this work, it is well to bear in mind that it was written under the sway of Napoleon;

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and that several passages of eulogy on him, and of censure on others, might have been less highly coloured, had the whole been composed after the former had ceased to reign, and had shewn by the reverses of his latter years that his system was not infallible.

The narrowness of our limits, and the superior interest of the latter volumes, oblige us to be extremely brief with regard to the war of 1756: but the reader who desires to see the advance of columns of infantry attended by more success than at Fontenoy will be gratified by M. DE J.'s description (Vol. III. p. 40.) of the battle of Minden: while in the relation (Vol. III. p. 119.) of the sanguinary and eventually unfortunate battle of Kunersdorf, he will find a very satisfactory supplement to the short and imperfect account given in the Memoirs of Frederick, who was much less distinguished in the narration than in the performance of military exploits. The second division of this work (Vol. V.) opens with a short but interesting account of the military means of France, Austria, and Prussia, on the rupture of peace in 1792. France had not then on foot above 130,000 men in every department of the service: the regiments varied in discipline according to the individual character of the colonels; and the staff was extremely defective: but the engineer and artillery corps were a nursery of intelligent officers. The valuable instructions known by the name of Ordonnance de 1791, the result of the cloquent appeals of Guibert against the defective education of officers, were published at this time; and, though by no means adopted in all their details, they proved highly useful in training the new levies, and accustoming them to the elementary principles of marching, firing, and moving, which are required in action. The Prussian army presented a much more finished model, having been exercised with the greatest care throughout the twenty years of peace which closed the active reign of Frederick II.: no pains had been spared to accustom the infantry, and still more the cavalry, to rapid and difficult manoeuvres: their artillery was numerous; and the total of the military force exceeded that of France. Yet still the veterans of the war of 1756 had almost disappeared, and the bad effects of promotion by seniority were felt even in this brilliant establishment. The Austrian army, more numerous than either the French or the Prussian, consisted of hardy materials, but could boast a very small number of intelligent officers; the recent refinements in the military instructions, particularly those of Marshal Lascy, professing to provide for every contingency by a prescribed rule, and operating as a permanent check on personal exertion and in

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vention. The favourite plan of operation with these followers of system was to divide their troops, and carry on what was termed a Guerre de Cordon; a sure presage of the reverses that awaited the Austrian army, whenever it should be attacked by an enemy possessed of judgment and enterprize.

Passing from these introductory remarks to the narrative part of the work, we find the contents of the latter volumes to be thus arranged: Vol. V. Campaigns of 1792; retreat of the Prussians from Champagne; battle of Jemappes; campaign of 1793; battle of Neerwinden; sieges of Valenciennes and Dunkirk; battle of Hondschoten. Vol. VI. Campaign of 1794; battles of Turcoin and Fleurus; retreat of the allies from Belgium, Holland, and the left bank of the Rhine. Campaign of 1795, on the Rhine; successes of Clairfait.- Vol. VII. Campaign of 1796; successes of Bonaparte in Piedmont and Lombardy; battles of Montenotte, Millesimo, Lodi, and Castiglione; advance of Moreau and Jourdan into Germany; battle of Neresheim; dispersion of Wurmser's army by Bonaparte in September. Vol. VIII. March of the Archduke Charles against Jourdan; battle of Wurtzburg (3d September); retreat of Jourdan; retreat of Moreau; battle of Biberach; siege of Kehl by the Austrians. In Italy, the battles of Arcola and Rivoli; capitulation of Mantua, 1797; march of Bonaparte through the Tyrol and Carinthia; advance of Moreau and Hoche from the Rhine; treaty of Leoben; general principles of the art of war.

On the commencement of hostilities in 1792, the emigration had deprived France of many of her old officers; and the great majority of those who remained had been rendered, by the long peace of the Continent, strangers to active service. The troops, when brought into the field, were necessarily much divided, having to oppose the Austrians in Flanders, the Piedmontese in Savoy, and a formidable body of Prussians in Champagne: it was in the last-mentioned province that Dumouriez commanded, and gave proofs of that activity of mind which, with a cooler judgment, would have ranked him high in the scale of tacticians. We have in this work a satisfactory explanation of that mysterious movement, the retreat of the Prussians from Champagne, in the autumn of 1792; a retreat which took place at the time when, to superficial observers, this advancing force seemed on the point of penetrating to Paris. Never was the surprise of the public greater, or their conjectures more active: some ascribed it to a private order from the unfortunate Louis XVI., at that time a prisoner in the Temple; and others to a deep-laid scheme on the part of

Prussia to bring the French forces on the Austrians in Flanders. M. DE J., however, accounts for it on grounds strictly military; by the deficiency and bad quality of the provisions, and the consequent sickness, particularly dysentery; several of the regiments having 400 nien on the sick-list. He commends highly the conduct of the Duke of Brunswick in arguing against a general engagement, doubtful as was its result, and heavy as would have been the disaster if the Prussians had been obliged to retreat through a hostile and difficult country. The error lay in undertaking the invasion with inadequate means, and in listening to the fallacious reports of the emigrants that the population of France detested the new government, and was ready to come forwards in aid of the allies.

Notwithstanding the successes of the French towards the close of 1792, the campaign of 1793 opened with a very threatening aspect. England and Holland had now joined the alliance, and time had been afforded to the tardy Germans to bring up their numerous reinforcements. It was now also that the battle of Neerwinden (18th March) shewed the inferiority of the French, and proved the cause of a retreat, or rather a rout; which, had it been vigorously followed up by the allies, would have led to the entire dispersion of this illdisciplined and ill-officered army: but the dilatory plan of regular sieges gave time to the French to re-organize their troops, and enabled the Jacobins, then in the plenitude of power, to send to the field a host called forth by the terrors of the Requisition, and supported by successive issues of assignats. That precious interval, the summer of 1793, was thus lost to the allies, and the succeeding spring exhibited their opponents imperfectly disciplined indeed, but full of zeal and powerful in numbers. The collective force of the allies on the Rhine, and throughout the Netherlands, varied from 250 to 300,000 men; and, if the French did not exceed the latter in number in the field, they not only acted with more concert but received more prompt supplies of recruits. M. DE J. describes (Vol. VI. p. 30.) the extensive and ill conducted battle of Turcoin on the 17th and 18th of May, 1794; in which, after conflicts of varied success and in remote positions, the definitive advantage remained with the Republicans. Hence he passes to the bold but disorderly movements of the army of the Sambre and Meuse commanded by Jourdan, but pushed forwards by the orders of the imperious and sanguinary St. Just. Of the battle of Fleurus, (26th June, 1794,) the author gives a circumstantial account; manifesting, what has long been our opinion, that this victory, so much vaunted

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by the Jacobins, would have ended in a repulse, had not the allies learned towards the middle of the day that Charleroi, the town which they were marching to relieve, had actually capitulated. The Prince of Cobourg, at that time commander-in-chief of the Austrians, shewed himself altogether unacquainted with the means of making up for deficient numbers by increased rapidity: retreat accordingly became unavoidable; and the result of the campaign was the acquisition by France of Belgium, of the provinces to the left of the Rhine, and, finally, of Holland.

The campaign of 1795 was not long, but exhibited a very different spectacle; the troops of Austria, alone and unaided, triumphing over the armies of France, though now familiar with war and commanded by officers of experience. M. DE J. admits that he has not yet had access to the best materials for this singular campaign, and, in our opinion, he underrates the merit of Clairfait, who, by the ability of his movements, repulsed Jourdan, raised the blockade of Mentz, and compelled even Pichegru to retreat. The author charges the Austrian commander with a want of boldness and activity in following up his successes: but he is evidently unacquainted with the difficulties experienced by Clairfait from the badness of the season, and the inadequacy of his means in various respects.

We now come to the most interesting part of the work, the campaigns of 1796 and 1797; in which Bonaparte in Italy and the Archduke Charles in Germany occupy the most prominent ground. These memorable operations are described in the last two volumes, and are elucidated, in their principal details, by maps and plans; though the quantity of these useful aids might have been much increased by a recourse to the economical and convenient process of lithography. The début of Bonaparte in April, 1796, evinced how promptly the arrival of a man of talents may change the face of affairs. He brought with him no additional force, and found the army nearly in the same situation in which, in the preceding year, it had struggled through a doubtful and indecisive contest. The country then occupied by the adverse forces is extremely mountainous, the roads are difficult, and the cultivated tracts thinly scattered; circumstances that had suggested to both sides the plan of disseminating their troops in a long line of positions. Bonaparte, on taking the command, perceived that the enemy were likely to direct a superior force against his right, and favoured this intention by pretended movements; while he marched his main body towards the centre of the long line of his opponents, and on

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