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The subjects of the Address are, as we stated in our last number, the necessity, the objects, and the influence of Moral Philosophy, in the most extensive sense of the term.

Moral philosophy in strict propriety is the science of the principles and obligation of duty; but in the observations I may now make, I shall have reference also to all those studies and inquiries, which have for their object the knowledge and improvement of the moral condition of man.' p. 10.

In speaking of the necessity of moral science, the author is employed in answering the objections which may be made to it. These are to be resolved into notions which sometimes are expressly avowed; but which more frequently, perhaps, float loosely in men's minds, without forming themselves into fixed and well defined opinions.

'The doctrine of a moral sense has furnished the first objection to the necessity of moral science. It has often been said, the heart is the best casuist, and its natural promptings the safest guides in duty. But in respect to this objection it must be carefully remembered, that we are not to form our estimate of the value of natural conscience from the prevalent opinions of civilized and christian countries. The moral sense of the most unlearned at the present day is not the sense of nature, but of cultivation; it has been modified by the studies and experience of ages, and, and above all, by the christian religion. It is not denied, that we have froni nature a moral as well as an intellectual capacity; but the former, no less than the latter, is to be improved and enlarged by observation and thought. Many duties arise from relations, which are complicated and remote; these relations must be investigated and brought together, and general principles, which may be settled into rules, deduced from them. The necessity of this is sufficiently shown by the different and contradictory maxims of duty, that have prevailed in different ages and nations. Were, however, the original suggestions of uncultivated conscience far clearer and more decisive than experience will allow us to believe, still the necessity of philosophy would not be superseded. The unremitted labours of the moralist would notwithstanding be required, to relieve the sentiments of mankind, from those associations of prejudice, of fashion, and of false opinion, which have so constant an influence in perverting the judgment and corrupting the heart, and to bring them back to the unbiassed dictates of nature and common sense. Besides, the moral constitution of man, his relations, and duties, are subjects too interesting, and too Vol. VII. No. 2.

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fruitful of remark, to be neglected in the speculations genious and inquiring. Erroneous theories will be formed, nay they will be presented to mankind as the rule of life, and even history and fiction be made vehicles of principles, dangerous alike to virtue and to peace. While indeed these speculations of false philosophy are wrapped in metaphysical subtleties, they may excite little alarm, and serve rather to amuse the learned; they are those eccentrick lightnings, that play harmlessly in the evening cloud; but when they are made the maxims of common life, or, embodied in popular fiction, find their way into the hearts of men, they are these same lightnings concentrated and brought down to earth, blasting and consuming. The safety of society then requires, that such systems be subjected to the jealous scrutiny of a sound philosophy, and that there be men, whose habits and studies will lead them to a rigid superintendence of whatever is proposed ;to give authority to truth, and to detect and expose what is only specious and insinuating. If our moral being could be left, as it came from the hands of its Creator, to the simple and wholesome viands of nature, if it breathed only the pure atmostphere of truth, it might perhaps preserve the soundness of health, and the ingenuous suffusions of virtue; but pampered, as it is, with false philosophy and factitious sentiment, the antidote should grow with the poison. There will always be a Hobbes, a Rousseau, or a Godwin; let us then have also our Cudworths, our Butlers, and our Stewarts. pp. 10-12.

Besides the other obvious beauties of the extract just quoted, we may remark one which is characteristick of the whole discourse-the compression of thought, and the variety of topicks, which, within a very narrow compass, are brought to bear upon the subject without disorder or obscurity.

The other objection remarked upon, is, that the Scriptures furnish us with a perfect rule of right; and that, therefore, it is unnecessary to have recourse to the deductions of human reason. The answer to this is as follows.

The morality of the scriptures is preceptive and not theoretick it enjoins dispositions, without showing their relative subordination, or specifying the actions that flow from them; it commands duties, but does not teach principles; nor was it possible, that its precepts, however numerous, should extend to all the variety of daily occurring cases. It is necessary for the christian to analyse the moral rules of his religion, to trace them to their principles, and again from these principles to deduce new rules, and by a knowledge of the reason of each, understand its ever varying accommodation to varying circumstances. Through a neglect of these

considerations, what enormities have not been perpetrated by men with the bible in their hands, from a wrong application of its precepts and examples ? It is in this, as in the science of law, innumerable as are the provisions of statutes and cases, still that counsellor would be ill prepared to advise his client, who had not learned to distinguish the principle from the facts, and thus to judge how far the former might be affected by the minutest change in the latter. There is a legal mind, a law logick, more important to the professor than a knowledge of all the precedents in all the books without it.' p. 12.

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In conformity with these remarks, we may observe, that it was not the design of revelation to teach a complete system of morality. The fundamental rules of conduct were distinctly stated; and duties, the obligation of which had not been recognized, or the practice of which had been generally disregarded, were strongly inculcated; such, for instance, as the duty of christian charity, in the most extensive, and of christian purity, in the more limited sense of the words. But direct instruction in other duties was rather incidental, than essential to its main purpose. There is so much truth and good sense in the remarks of Dr. Paley upon this subject, that we will venture to give an extract from him of some length. The teaching of morality was not the primary design of the mission of Christ.' If I were to describe in a very few words the scope of Christianity, as a revelation, I should say, that it was to influence the conduct of human life, by establishing the proof of a future state of reward and punishmentto bring life and immortality to light.' The direct object, therefore, of the design is, to supply motives, and not rules ; sanctions, and not precepts. And these were what mankind stood most in need of. The members of civilized society can, in all ordinary cases, judge tolerably well how they ought to act; but without a future state, or, which is the same thing, without credited evidence of that state, they want a motive to their duty; they want, at least, strength of motive, sufficient to bear up against the force of passion, and the temptation of present advantage. Their rules want authority. The most important service that can be rendered to human life, and that, consequently, which, one might expect beforehand, would be the great end and office of a revelation from God, is to convey to the world authorized assurances of the reality of a future existence. And although in doing this, or by the min

istry of the same person by whom this is done, moral precepts or examples, or illustrations of moral precepts, may be occasionally given, and be highly valuable, yet still they do not form the original purpose of the mission.'* To this statement there seems to us little to be objected, except that Dr. Paley has given an imperfect view of the design of revelation as intended to instruct us in religious truth. Not merely the doctrine of a future state was to be made known to men upon certain evidence, but the character of God likewise; and to all men but the Jews, his very existence and moral govern

ment.

After the passage last quoted from his address, Professor Frisbie, that he may not be misunderstood, notices the unspeakable importance of the aids revelation affords to the christian moralist, and the strong light it throws over the region of his inquiries.'

The bible has taught us the being and attributes of God with a clearness and certainty, to which nature had made but the feeblest approaches; while at the same time, particularly in the new testament, it gives many plain rules in almost every branch of duty. From what a maze of paradox and doubt, in which heathen philosophers were continually bewildered and perplexed, are we now extricated by a few simple and sublime truths? Accordingly, we can scarcely read a page of a christian moralist, but we find him limiting, controlling, or supporting principles, by appeals to the acknowledged doctrines of revealed theology; while the practical rules are so many beacons along the road, to mark his course, and light him on his way. To investigate the principle of an admitted rule is much easier, and followed by conclusions far more satisfactory, than when the principle and the rule are both to be discovered. And when we proceed still further, to trace out new principles and deduce new rules, our inquiries are guided, and our conclusions tried, by truths already known. The parts supplied must be suited to those we possess; as our theories involve consequences, that contradict or harmonize with the plain maxims of the gospel, we know them to be false, or may presume them to be

true,

In conformity with these remarks, how different has been the practical application of the same theories, as they have been followed out into their consequences by sceptical or christian moralists. The systems of Godwin and Paley are both founded on the

* Paley's Evidences, P. II. c. 2.

same general principle of utility. This principle led the author of the Political Justice to consequences, that would sever not only the ties of intimate affection, but the very bonds of social order. These consequences, he, who admits the principle, may find it difficult to avoid; yet the Archdeacon of Carlisle, guided and controlled by the doctrines of the bible, connected it with rules of conduct, consistent with the truest reason and purest virtue. Mr. Hume, aware of the cause of such differences, has lamented the unnatural alliance, which in modern times has united theology with morals; but he, who well considers the exact coincidence of the in. structions of Jesus Christ with the deepest principles of our nature and the soundest deductions of philosophy, will find reasons, hardly less impressive than the miracles themselves, for believing that he was a teacher sent from God, and knew what was in man.

pp. 13-15.

The author next remarks upon the characteristick value of revelation, as having furnished the highest motives and sanctions of duty; and then proceeds to speak of the objects of

moral science.

The objects of moral science are implied, in what we have said of its necessity. They are to preserve from neglect or perversion the knowledge we already possess, to enlarge its boundaries, and strengthen its foundations, by new or clearer views of the nature and relations of man, and above all, to give it a practical influence upon the character and prospects of society. p. 15.

• Moral knowledge,' the author observes, cannot yet be supposed to have reached its limits. There are unexplored avenues before us, and gleams of light invite us onward.'He remarks that no theory of morals has yet received a general, much less a universal assent; and notices the uncertainty and difference of opinion, which exist respecting some questions of practical importance in private life. He then proceeds;

In the relations of states, of rulers and subjects, the principles of morality and rules of conduct are still more indefinite and unsettled. That the law of nations is but the extension of those maxims of equity and kindness, which should regulate the intercourse of individuals, till of late seems, in practice at least, hardly to have been conceived. Expediency rather than right has been the great spring of political motion, and diplomacy but another name for intrigue and duplicity. The representative, in his seat, will advo

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