invariably the most numerous, may resort to their physical force to control those who are wealthy, and despoil them of their possessions. Correctly speaking, the struggle is between the plebeian and the patrician, the poor and the rich, and it is therefore that a third power has, by long experience, been considered as necessary (an apex, or head to the pyramid of society), to prevent and check the disorders which may arise from strug-/ gles of ambition among the upper classes.

Wherever this apex has been wanting, there has been a continual attempt to possess it; whenever it has been elective, troubles have invariably ensued; experience has, therefore, shewn that, for the benefit of all classes, and the maintenance of order, the wisest plan was to make it hereditary. It is not to be denied that despotism, when it falls into good hands, has rendered a nation flourishing and happy, that an oligarchy has occasionally, but more rarely, governed with mildness and a regard to justice; but there never yet was a case of a people having seized

upon the power, but the result has been one of rapacity and violence, until a master-spirit has sprung up and controlled them by despotic rule. But, although one despot, or one oligarchy may govern well, they are exceptions to the general rule; and, therefore, in framing a government, the rule by which you must be guided, is on the supposition that each class will encroach, and the laws must be so constituted as to guard against the vices and passions of mankind.

To suppose that a people can govern themselves, that is to say directly, is absurd. History has disproved it. They may govern themselves indirectly, by selecting from the mass the more enlightened and intelligent, binding themselves to adhere to their decisions, and, at the same time, putting that due and necessary check to the power invested in their delegates, which shall prevent their making an improper use of it. The great point to arrive at, is the exact measure and weight of their controlling

influences, so as to arrive at the just equipoise; nor can these proportions be always the same, but must be continually added to or reduced, according to the invariable progressions or recessions which must ever take place in this world, where nothing stands still.

The history of nations will shew, that although the just balance has often been lost, that if either the aristocracy or the ruling power gained any advantage, the evil, if too oppressive, was capable of being corrected; but any advance gained by the democratic party, has never been retraced, and that it has been by the preponderance of power being thrown into its hands that nations have fallen. Of all the attempts at republics, that of the Spartan, perhaps, is the most worthy of examination, as Lycurgus went to work radically, and his laws were such as to obtain that equality so much extolled. How far the term republic was applicable to the Spartan formgov ernment I will not pretend to say, but when Lycurgus was called upon to re-construct its

legislation, his first act was to make the necessary third power, and he appointed a senate.

But Lycurgus was wise enough to perceive that he must amend the morals of his countrymen, and that to preserve an equality of condition he must take away all incentives to ambition, or to the acquisition of wealth. He first divided the lands into equal portions, compelled all classes, from the kings downwards, to eat at the same table, brought up all the children in the same hardy manner, and obliged every citizen after a certain age to carry arms. But more sacrifices were necessary; Lycurgus well knew,

Quid leges sine moribus vanæ proficiunt.

Horace, Ode 24, lib. 3.

To guard against the contagion of corruption, he prohibited navigation and commerce; he permitted no intercourse with foreigners; he abolished the gold and silver coin as current money, that every stimulus to any one individual to exalt himself above his neighbour should be

removed. If ever there was a system calculated to produce equality, it was that planned by the wisdom of Lycurgus; but I doubt if the Americans would like to follow in his footsteps.

What occasioned the breaking up and the downfal of this republic? An increase of power given to the democratic party, by the creation out of their ranks of the magistrates, termed Ephori, which threw an undue weight and preponderance into the hands of the people. By this breach in the constitution, faction and corruption were let in and fomented. Plutarch, indeed, denies this, but both Polybius and Aristotle are of a different opinion; the latter says, that the power of the Ephori was so great as to amount to a perfect tyranny; the kings themselves were necessitated to court their favour by such methods as greatly to hurt the constitution, which from an aristocracy degenerated into an absolute democracy. Solon was called in to re-model the constitution of the Athenian republic. He had a more difficult