when he has studied it. In neither direction does it appear that a book of the character of the one before us will accomplish its design. This one has been carefully prepared, in fact a better abstract of the salient points of the well-known volumes from which it is collated could not be made, but would a student master its text any more readily than he would that of these volumes? Take Stephen on Pleading, for instance. That volume has less than five hundred pages. The abridgment here occupies 118 pages, or about a quarter as much space as the other. It would take less time to read the abridgment, but the reader would by reason of the contracted style find more difficulty in comprehending the ideas designed to be conveyed, and would remember less and with less distinctness than he would if he read the other. This would compensate fully any advantage gained by the ecouomy of time in reading. Besides a resort to the fountain head is more satisfactory. Somehow it seems as if the principles found there are more genuine and rested upon better authority.

Yet we cannot lay down rules to guide others in this respect. If students prefer compilations such as we have referred to we can unhesitatingly recommend the series of volumes of which the book before us is one. The works it extracts from are all of them essential parts of a course of law reading. The volume is well printed and bound, and of a size convenient for

use.

GRINNELL'S POOR DEBTOR LAW OF MASSACHUSETTS. A Study of the Poor Debtor Law of Massachusetts, and some details of its practice, by Charles E. Grinnell, one of the Masters in Chancery for the County of Suffolk. With a chronological list of the statutes of Massachusetts; a table of the statutes of the other States, the Territories, and the United States; and a list of books concerning Poor Debtors. Boston. Little, Brown, and Company. 1883. Pp. XXX and 453.

This is a work of very considerable merit upon a subject of interest, except incidentally, in but a single State. Although Mr. Grinnell has for his material been confined almost entirely to the statute provisions he has produced a logical treatise that may well be taken as a model bythose having occasion to compile works of a like character. The general subject of imprisonment for debt has been examined and a table is given referring to the various State and Federal Statutes relating thereto, also a list of references to articles thereupou in books and periodicals.

THATCHER'S DIGEST OF CIRCUIT COURT PRACTICE. A Digest of Statutes, Equity Rules, and Decisions, upon the Jurisdiction, Pleadings, and Practice of the Circuit Courts of the United States; including decisions relating to Plead. ings and Practice at Common Law, in Equity, Appeals in Admiralty and in Criminal Cases. By Erastus Thatcher, Author of "A Digest of Statutes, Rules, and Decisions relative to the Jurisdiction and Practice of the Supreme Court of the United States." Boston. Little, Brown, and Company. 1883. Pp. xlviii and 976.

This digest contains, we believe, everything in relation to practice in the Federal Circuit Courts appearing in reports of the decisions of these courts and of the Federal Supreme Court, that is of present value. Many decisions, especially early ones, involved questions that have since their announcement been set at rest by statutory enactments and of course such decisions are not here included. Over two hundred volumes of reports have been examined and culled from. The arrangement of sub-heads is partly logical and partly alphabetical, but by the use of the index, which appears to be a good one, one using the book can readily find what he wants if contained therein. We

have heretofore had occasion to speak of a digest of the decisions relating to practice, etc., in the United States Supreme Court, compiled by Mr. Thatcher, and the remarks made in reference to that apply to this work. Each work will of necessity be a vade mecum for the practitioner in the Federal courts. The paper, printing, and binding of the volume before us is all that could be asked.

THE

COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS.

HE following decisions were handed down at Saratoga Springs, Tuesday, June 12, 1883. Judgment affirmed with costs-Cregier v. Mayor, etc., of New York; People ex rel. Evans v. Board of Commissioners of Public Parks; People ex rel. Belton v. Board of Commissioners of Public Parks.—Appeal dismissed without costs-Attorney-General v. Continental Life Ins. Co., claim of Anderson. -Appeal dismissed with costs-Henry v. Randall; In re Cornelia Gilman; Attorney-General v. Continental Life Ins. Co., claim of Dayton.- -Appeal dismissed with cost of one appeal-Henry v. Randall.-Order affirmed with costs-Attorney-General v. Continental Life Ins. Co., claim of Jewetts; Attorney-General v. Continental Life Ins. Co., claim of Dolner, Potter & Co.; Attorney-General v. Atlantic Mutual Life Ins. Co., In re Goldenberg to vacate; Fox v. Erie Preserving Company, In re Clark to vacate; Turner v. Fire Insurance Com pany of Philadelphia, In re French to vacate.Order of General Term affirmed without costs-Attorney-General v. Mutual and three other life insurance companies. Appeals of Mrs. Ingersoll dismissed with costs. Appeal of executor dismissed, except as to the requirement to pay over $70,000, and in that respect affirmed without costs - In re estate of Halsey, Order of General Term reversed, and that of Special Term affirmed with costs - - Lewis v. Stephens.

-Motion to advance granted-Fish v. Hayward.Motion to put on preferred calendar denied without costs-People ex rel. Augusteen v. Keeny. Motion for re-argument denied without costs - Marvin v. Marvin. Motion to dismiss appeals granted with costs-Fellows v. Fellows. Motion to dismiss appeal denied with costs-Hughes v. Sun Mutual Insurance Company.-Motion to dismiss appeal denied Crooke v. County of Kings; Crooke v. Prince. Motion for re-argument denied with ten dollars costs —Attorney-General v. North American Life Insurance Company.

VOTES.

Our esteemed contemporary, the Virginia Law Journal, taking to task certain other law journals for copying a certain article of its own and crediting it to other sources, remarks: "As was said by the clown's wife, it is a little thing, but it is mine own."" We fear that our contemporary not only commits the sin that it rebukes, but makes a misquotation; which is even worse. Perhaps however the correct version would not so well suit our contemporary's purpose and the facts-"an ill-favored thing, but mine own." Touchstone of Audrey,in As you like it. -In the 44th

New Jersey we find a reversal by the Court of Errors and Appeals by a unanimous vote of 15.-In Rabe v. State, 39 Ark. 204, it is decided that no license is required to sell brandied peaches.-In Briffett v. State, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin approved the ruling of the court below that "man must be almost a driveling idiot who does not know what beer is," and that the court would take judicial notice that it is intoxicating.

The Albany Law Journal.

ALBANY, JUNE 23, 1883.

CURRENT TOPICS.

THE acquittal of the star-route gentry is probably a genuine surprise to everybody, including the prisoners, their families, and their counsel. Nobody expected a conviction. The government had rendered that substantially out of the question by setting itself the unnecessary and difficult task of proving a conspiracy. A disagreement was generally expected, and this would at least have not been an outrage on reason and decency. But nobody supposed that the jury would have the effrontery to acquit. And yet they had, and therefore Dorsey hugged Ingersoll, and then Mrs. Dorsey hugged him, and everybody wept, and the crowd outside, unquestionably comprising every rogue and bummer in Washington, cheered him, and he made them a speech, and then Dorsey "set it up" for the crowd as long as his money lasted, and probably juror Vernon had a good time at his expense. Col. Ingersoll was serenaded, and he told his audience that this was the most popular verdict ever rendered in this country. That opinion shows that the Colonel does not know the difference between right and wrong. It is probably the most unpopular verdict ever rendered in this country. It commands as little respect as the acquittal of Dukes. It is impossible to reconcile this acquittal with the conviction on the last trial. Public opinion, which is generally right, is almost unanimous in believing | the defendants guilty of defrauding the government. It is possible that the jury were not satisfied that the charge of conspiracy was made out, but then they must have refused to credit the defendants who turned State's evidence, and we can see no reason why they should have done so. The public believe those witnesses, and the result of the trial ought to be and probably will be as little beneficial to the defendants as Dukes' acquittal was to him.

Now whose fault is it? Primarily that of the government in "biting off more than they could chew." Then the trial was tediously spun out,probably in consequence of the peculiar form of the accusation so that hardly any jury could be expected to carry along any clear idea of the details. Then the jury were not of a high degree of intelligence, to say the least. One of them, it is said, could not read or write. Another drank himself into delirium tremens pending the trial. It may be that they were not corrupt, although to believe that requires a higher estimate of their virtue than their intelligence would naturally warrant. Of course, if they could have been bribed, they were. It is hard to contemplate the verdict with patience or hopefulness, and the easiest way of accounting for it is to suppose that it pretty accurately reflects the average VOL. 27-No. 25.

moral sense of the community where it was pronounced.

Amid a perfect carnival of murders, suicides, and lynchings chronicled during the last week, the most noteworthy "affair" was the murder of Dukes by the son of his victim, Nutt. There never was a cooler murder than this, although to many minds it will

take on a semblance of virtue because committed to avenge a murdered father. Dukes seems to have been a vile wretch, but as the law had acquitted him, he was entitled to live, and he probably would have found that his punishment, like Cain's, was greater than he could bear. The community were indignant at his acquittal, and yet it is perfectly clear that his act was not nearly so deliberate as that by which he lost his own life. It now remains to be seen what view a jury of the same community will take of this crime. The murder closely resembles that of Mansfield Walworth by his son, in this State, a few years ago, where the young man imagined himself the avenger of his injured mother. It would be well to teach young men to keep out of the avenging business. Very likely we shall soon hear of half a dozen other cases of gallant young avengers, and certainly the acquittal of young Nutt would encourage such violence.

The English court in the Belt case have had better luck than Sinbad the sailor, for they have shaken off their burden after sitting restively under it a week or so. They at length summoned up the courage to determine that they would not hear any more reading of the proceedings below. The Law Times says: "A surprise befell the counsel in the Belt case on Tuesday. Sir Hardinge Giffard appears to have assumed, that like meek beasts of burden, the Lord Chief Justice of England and his colleagues would patiently bear the yoke which he imposed upon them, and slumber through the summing-up of Baron Huddleston -the task of reading which was left to the junior counsel. Very early on Tuesday the patience of the court was exhausted, and Lord Coleridge, in terms none too strong, resented the course adopted of leaving a cause 'supposed to convulse society' to the chapter of accidents. He suddenly called upon the plaintiff's counsel to deal with the grounds of the rule. The leader being still absent, the leading junior was required to argue, and the lively time he had of it will be seen from the newspaper report." What the Lord Chief Justice said was this: " My learned brethren and myself, seeing the endless length to which this case is likely to run, are desirous of avoiding what seems very much like a public scandal. The reading of the summing-up now seems to have reached a point at which in my judgment it might properly terminate. Sir Hardinge Giffard told us on the first day, with an air of authority, that it was absolutely necessary to read the whole of the evidence, but on the second day he gave way to our remonstrances. Then in the same short peremptory way he told us that it was absolutely necessary that the whole of the summing

up should be read. That has now occupied the better part of three days, and there is much more of it yet to be read. Well, it is not doing us any good -this reading of the summing-up without any comment. In the absence of the leader, when any question is put to the junior counsel, they very properly say that they cannot take the responsibility of answering it. Speaking for myself, and I believe for my learned brethren, this reading has become a rather serious waste of time," etc. So now, as nothing remains but to hear the lawyers talk, we are warranted in hoping that we shall see his Lordship in the latter part of the summer.

Mr. W. W. Smith, in a recent address before the Arkansas Bar Association, remarked: "The system of special pleading, which prevailed in this State before the war, and for a few years after its close, possesses a fascination for every one who has mastered its details. It constitutes a most refined species of logic. In fact, it is the only logical scheme for developing the issues to be tried which has ever been in use among English-speaking people. But there are better things in this world than logic. Under the old system, the pleaders were intellectual wrestlers, and unless they were equally matched, the weaker was liable to be tripped up on collateral issues and questions of technical accuracy, not much affecting the merits of the controversy. Thus the client was often punished for the mistakes of his attorney. If any one will compare a volume of our recent Reports with those of an earlier date, he cannot fail, I think, to be struck by the fact that causes are now less frequently decided upon points of pleading and practice. The theater of war has been changed from the realm of words to that of things; and the most formidable weapon in a lawyer's hand is no longer dialectical skill, but an intimate ac

quaintance with the rules of evidence. It is only fair, however, to say that these same rules of evidence took root and grew up under the system of pleading as it existed at common law, and it is difficult to understand them, with their exceptions and limitations, without some acquaintance with the science of pleading as it is expounded in Chitty and Stephen." Mr. Smith thought that trial by jury "has in great part survived its usefulness," and he could "scarcely conceive of a civil cause which could not be tried more expeditiously and more satisfactorily by a judge." But he did not "believe that juries are often corrupted."

Many unthinking people suppose that a good character is of less importance to a lawyer than to many other men. On this subject, Judge Valentine, of the Kansas Supreme Court, in a recent address before the law department of the University of Kansas, remarked: "A lawyer possessing a high character for honesty, integrity and sincerity has a great advantage in almost every respect over a lawyer who does not possess such a high character. He

will often win cases where a lawyer of less character would necessarily lose; for in a case pretty evenly balanced the mere weight and force of his high character would turn the scale in his favor. People generally know this, and therefore when they think they have a meritorious case will ordinarily seek to employ only lawyers of known integrity, and such as are known to possess the confidence of courts and juries. Such lawyers, and only such, can command the best cases and the best fees. Lawyers of less character must generally take such cases and such fees only as they can get."

The lawyer in vacation will find some instructive as well as amusing reading in Mr. John D. Lawson's volume comprises only equity and constitutional new volume of "Leading Cases Simplified." This cases, and is designed as a companion to his preceding volume of common-law cases. Here we find a large number of leading cases most clearly and suc

cinctly stated, with excellent brief illustrative notes.

The resumé of the constitutional cases is especially admirable, and has peculiar interest and value for American readers. Occasional flashes of humor en

liven the pages, and bring the book within the vacation category. "Chancellor Bland, of Maryland, could not make a will clear enough to satisfy his heir without going into court to find out their rights under it." "This case is a lesson to people, who, to save expense, try to find out their rights without consulting a lawyer." "Exactly what Mr. Hylton, of Virginia, found to do with one hundred and twenty-five carriages (which the report says he kept 'exclusively for his own separate use, and not to let out to hire or for the conveyance of persons for hire'), is a query which is hard to answer, except on the theory that he was the proprietor of a circus." "Things are often tolerated in a community for years, when all at once the people become suddenly virtuous, and abolish with great indignation something that had not before that appeared to bother anybody." Such statements as these sugar over a great deal of bitter law. We shall read Mr. Lawson's little book through for amusement, and then we shall keep it within reach of our desk for very ready and serious reference.

At the anniversary exercises of the law department of Yale college, which will take place on Tues day the 26th instant, the Hon. Thomas F. Bayard will deliver an oration on "The Responsibilities of the Legal Profession in a Republic." This is a grand subject, and will probably be treated in an adequate manner by the distinguished orator.

In Mr. August Belmont's recent libel suit in New York, counsel seem unwarrantably to have gone outside the issue and wantonly to have hurt that gentleman's feelings by hinting that he had for all these years been living under an assumed name. Mr. Belmont seems unnecessarily to have lost his dignity and patience under the insult. The affair,

however, has furnished the text for some severe reprimands of the lawyers by the daily newspapers. It is rather amusing to read such lectures in newspapers which are everyday intruding on matters of the most sacred privacy, and grossly libelling the character of private individuals and of political opponents, merely to make money or to answer party ends.

The first number of the Medico-Legal Journal to be published quarterly under the auspices of the MedicoLegal Society of New York, is an attractive octavo of 118 pages, with a varied and interesting table of contents, and a good portrait of the late Dr. Beard, Until now there has been no journal in any part of the world, devoted exclusively to this subject. A great deal of matter important to lawyers appears from time to time in the papers read before this and similar societies, and this publication will perform a useful service in pntting it within the convenient reach of the two professions. The publishers may be addressed at No. 55 Broadway, New York.

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when the contract for the exclusive service of a singer in opera provided for "the forfeiture of a week's salary, or the termination of the engagement at the manager's option, without debarring him from enforcing the contract as he might see fit," held, that this clause was not liquidated damages, and that an injunction should issue to restrain a threatened violation of the contract. The court, Brown, J., said: "Contracts for the services of artists or authors of special merit are personal and peculiar; and when they contain negative covenants which are essential parts of the agreement, as in this case, that the artists will not perform elsewhere, and the damages, in case of violation, are incapable of definite measurement, they are such as ought to be observed in good faith and specifically enforced in equity. * In the present case it is however urged that the remedy by injunction should not be allowed on the ground that the plaintiff's damages have been liquidated by the first article of the contract above quoted; namely, that 'for each and every breach of this rule the artist shall forfeit one week's salary;' and the cases of Barnes v. McAllister, 18 How. Pr. 534; Nessle v. Reese, 29 id. 382; Mott v. Mott, 11 Barb. 127, 134; and Trenor v. Jackson, 46 How. Pr. 389, are cited in support of this view. * * * Where the provision of the contract is in the nature of a penalty, and not liquidated damages, it is well settled that such a provision will not prevent the remedy by injunction to enforce the covenant specifically; and the provision will be construed as a penalty, and not as liquidated damages, where its plain object is to secure a perform

ance of the covenant, and not intended as the price or equivalent to be paid for a non-observance of it. Howard v. Hopkyns, 2 Atk. 371; Bird v. Lake, 1 Hem. & M. 111; Fox v. Scard, 33 Beav. 327; Sloman v. Walter, 1 Brown, C. C. 418; Jones v. Heavens, 4 Ch. Div. 636. * * * That the clause providing for the forfeiture of one week's salary for each violation of this contract was in the nature of a penalty, and designed solely to secure the observance of article 1, is manifest both from the general nature of the employment and the requirements of a manager of opera, as well as the express language of this article; because (1) the stipulation is not for the payment of a certain sum as liquidated damages, but only for the forfeiture of a week's salary; (2) it gives an option to the plaintiff, instead of such forfeiture, to annul the engagement; (3) it declares that such forfeiture shall not disbar the plaintiff from enforcing the fulfillment of this contract in such a manner as he shall think fit, i. e., by any available legal or equitable remedy. As the remedy by injunction is one of the remedies available, this language is equivalent to an express declaration that the provision for the forfeiture of a week's salary for each violation shall not affect the right to a remedy by injunction. This last stipulation would not, indeed, influence the court, provided it was clear that the damages were intended to be liquidated at a specific sum, for which the defendant was to have the option of singing at any other theatre. But these several clauses taken together show conthe sole object was to secure the specific observance clusively that no such thing was intended, and that of the contract that the defendant should not sing elsewhere; and the plaintiff is therefore entitled to restrain the violation of it."

In Airy v. Nelson, 39 Ark. 43, it was said, rather obiter, we think, that one who indorses a note that has been paid is not entitled to demand or notice of non-payment. The language used was: "Notwithstanding the note and trust deed were no longer outstanding securities at the date of this agreement, yet they would have been liable on their indorsement; for that was a new contract. Nor was proof of notice and demand necessary to fix such liability. For an indorser of dishonored or past-due paper impliedly warrants that it is what it purports to be, viz., a subsisting, unpaid obligation; just as he warrants that it is genuine, and not a forgery; or as he warrants that it is not tainted by an illegal consideration, such as gaming or usury. Copp v. McDougall, 9 Mass. 1; Turnbull v. Bowyer, 40 N. Y. 456; Mays v. Cullison, 6 Leigh, 230." We think the italicised words do not correctly state the law.

In Archer v. Solor, Hamilton (Ohio) Common Pleas, 9 Cin. L. Bull. 324, the contrary has recently been held, the court observing: "The question raised by the demurrer, was whether an indorser of an overdue note was entitled to demand and notice of non-payment in order to make him liable on the

instrument. It seems to be well settled by the authorities that the indorsement of an overdue note is, as to the indorser, equivalent to making a new note, payable on demand; that the indorsee must make demand, and notify the indorser within a reasonable time, and upon failure to do so, the indorser is released. Also that the petition must aver the fact of demand and notice. The claim of plaintiff, that such indorser becomes a guarantor and not entitled to notice, is not supported by the authorities. The case of Parker v. Riddle, 11 Ohio, 107, is against it and sustains the position taken by defendants, that the indorser after maturity is entitled to notice. The following authorities are in point: Edw. Bills and Notes, §§ 377, 380; Jones v. Middleton, 29 Iowa, 188; Beebe v. Brooks, 12 Cal. 308; Swartz v. Redfield, 13 Kans. 550; Greeley v. Hunt, 21 Me. 455; Colt v. Barnard, 18 Pick. 260; Dwight v. Emerson, 2 N. H. 159; Bishop v. Dexter, 2 Conn. 419; Light v. Kingsbury, 50 Mo. 331; Branch Bank v. Gaffrey, 9 Ala. 153; McKinney v. Crawford, 8 S. & R. 351; Berry v. Robinson, 9 Johns. 120; Course v. Shackleford, 2 Nott. & McCord, 283; Dan. Neg. Inst., § 996."

The defendants were prosecuted for larcency. They had received permission to pick up bricks that were left of a steam-saw-mill, belonging to the firm of Eisler & Sons, which had been destroyed by high water. Under the sand and rubbish they found parts of the saw, of the value 15 fl. and appropriated the same to themselves. The court below found them not guilty, and the public prosecutor appealed. The Court of Cassation rejected the appeal, for the following reasons: It has been found as a matter of fact that the articles mentioned had remained buried under the rubbish for one and a half years after the mill was destroyed, without the knowledge of the firm. The question then is not of articles misplaced, of which the owner knows that they are within a certain locality, to which he has access, but does not know exactly where; nor of articles forgotten, which were left at a strange place, without the owner's losing the fact from his mind that they were so left; we must rather apply to this case the idea of articles lost, which applies whereever the place, in which the articles are, is not, or is no longer, known to the last owner, or has become inaccessible to him in a permanent manner. From this condition of things it follows indeed, that the possibility to exercise an actual control over the articles has been removed, and therefore possession by the firm does not exist, but again from that fact it cannot be concluded that the firm has given up its property in the articles. There is no more question then of larceny, than of lawful occupancy; the offense is the concealment of articles found.Vienna Juristische Blaetter.

The vexed question of a provision for attorney's fees in a note was decided in favor of the negotiability of such a note, in Adams v. Addington, United

States Circuit, Northern District of Texas, January, 1883, 16 Feb. Rep. 89, Pardee, J. "As shown by the note of Mr. Adelbert Hamilton to the case of Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Sevier, 14 Feb. Rep. 662, the weight of authority is in favor of the negotiability of instruments containing stipulations similar to those contained in the one here sued on. And, on principle, why should such instruments not be negotiable? The amount to be paid at maturity is fixed and certain. As to what amount is to be paid in case of dishonor, and after maturity, there may be uncertainty, depending upon contingencies. Is not the same true of every promissory note negotiable by the law-merchant? The simplest one in form will carry with it an obligation to pay protest fees and interest in case of dishonor. The protest fees are contingent upon protest being made, and upon the number of indorsers notified. The interest payable is contingent upon time. Bills of exchange, which, in the matter of certainty of amount, stand upon the precise footing of promissory notes, carry with them an implied contract in case of dishonor to pay notarial expenses and interest (and in case of foreign bills payable abroad), re-exchange and expenses besides. That makers of promissory notes may make stipulations affecting their liability and the remedies to be taken against them in case of dishonor, and after maturity, without destroying the settled. A note in the usual form to which is added, negotiable character of the notes, seems to be well

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Waiving right of appeal and of all valuation and exemption law,' is negotiable. Zimmerman v. Anderson, 57 Penn, St. 421; Woollen v. Ulrich, 64 Ind. 120. So is one with a power of attorney to confess Osborn v. Hawley, 19 Ohio, judgment attached. 130; Cushman v. Welsh, 19 Ohio St. 536; Kirk v. Ins. Co., 39 Wis. 138; S. C., 20 Am. Rep. 39. So is one directing the appropriation of the proceeds of the note. Treat v. Cooper, 22 Me. 203. Likewise a stipulation may be made that no interest shall accrue prior to a certain date. Helmer v. Krolick, 36 Mich. 371. Or, if not paid at maturity, the note shall bear interest at an increased rate. Houghton v. Francis, 29 Ill. 244; Towne v. Rice, 122 Mass. 67; Parker v. Plymell, 23 Kans. 402. * In all the foregoing instances of notes and bills of exchange, the amount to be paid at maturity was certain; the collateral or additionel contract, embodied in the instrument or supplied by the law, relating solely to the amount promised to be paid in the contingency of dishonor, and expenses thereby incurred. Now either as 'ballast' or 'baggage, a collateral contract if negotiable instruments may carry with them, in case of dishonor to pay reduced or increased interest, to waive delays and homestead exemptions, to confess judgment, to appropriate the proceeds, to sell collateral securities, to pay (in cases of bills) re-exchange and expenses, all without losing their negotiable character, there is no principle founded in reason which shall declare a promissory note to be not negotiable because it contains a collateral contract that in case of di honor the maker shall pay the expenses directly resulting from his own