the statute of James 1. expressly provides, that no declaration therein contained shall extend "to any letters patents, and grants of privilege, for the term of fourteen years or under, thereafter to be made, of the sole working or making of any manner of new manufactures within this realm, to the true and first inventor and inventors of such manufactures, which others at the time of making such letters patents, and grants, shall not use, so as also they be not contrary to the law, nor mischievous to the State, by raising prices of commodities at home, or hurt of trade, or generally inconvenient; the said fourteen years to be accounted from the date of the first letters patents, or grant, of such privilege thereafter to be made, but that the same shall be of such force as they should be, if that act had never been made, and of none other." In noticing the law, respecting patents for inventions, we will consider-First, for what inventions patents may be granted; secondly, who is to be considered the inventor; thirdly, the description of the invention in the specification; fourthly, how a patent is obtained; fifthly, the remedies for the infraction of the patent right; and, lastly, how the patent may be vacated. First. It will be observed, that the Act mentions letters patents for the sole working or making of "new manufactures” within this realm. Manufactures are things made by the hands of man, and are reducible to two classes, namely, machinery and substances, In the former case, the machine, in the latter the substance produced, forms the manufacture and is consequently the subject of a patent (a). As observed by C. J. Eyre (b)," the word manufacture is of extensive signification: it applies not only to things made, but to the practice of making; to principles carried into practice. Under things made we may class new compositions of things, such as manufactures in the most ordinary sense of the word; all mechanical inventions, whether made to produce old or new effects, for a new piece of mechanism is certainly a thing made. Under the practice of making, we may class all new artificial manners of operating with the hand, or with instruments in common use, new processes in any art producing effects useful to the public. New methods of manufacturing articles in common use, where the (b) Ibid. 492. (a) 2 H. B. 481, 2. whole whole merit and effect produced are the saving of time and expense, and thereby lowering the price of the article, may be said to be new manufactures, in one of the common acceptations of the word, and agreeable to the spirit and meaning of the Act." To the same effect it was observed by Abbott, C. J. in the King v. Wheeler (a), that "the word manufactures' has been generally understood, to denote either a thing made, which is useful for its own sake, and vendible as such, as a machine, a stove, a telescope, and many others, or to mean an engine or instrument, or some part of an engine or instrument, to be employed either in the making of some previously known article, or in some other useful purpose, as a stocking-frame, or a steam-engine for raising water from mines. Or it may perhaps extend also to a new process to be carried on by known implements or elements, acting upon known substances, and ultimately producing some other known substance, but producing it in a cheaper and more expeditious manner or of a better and more useful kind." And in Edgeberry v. Stephens (b), the words "new devices" are substituted and used as synonymous with the words "new manufactures.” The novelty of the invention for which the patent is obtained is indispensable to its validity; but the patent is good, though, in inventions through the medium of mechanism, the materials used be well known, and have been used before, if the arrangement or combination of them be new, that is, produce a new effect but in such case the patent must be for the compound article, and not for the old materials or ingredients of which it is made (c). So a material and useful addition to, or improvement of, an old article is considered as a new manufacture; consequently, also, the subject of a patent (d). And a patent for an improvement of a thing, or for the thing improved, is in substance the same (e). The patent however must not be more extensive than the invention (f): consequently one for an improvement only, must not extend to the whole of the old article, but be confined solely to the improvement; as the public have a right to purchase the improvement by itself, without being encumbered with other things (a). Therefore where the invention was of a particular movement in a watch, and the patent was taken out for the whole watch, it was held void (b). A mere principle will not support a patent, because it is the first ground or rule for arts and sciences, or in other words the elements and rudiments of them. A patent must be for some new production from those elements which is vendible; for something of a corporeal and substantial nature, that can be made by man from matters subjected to his art and skill; and not for the elements themselves (c). If, however, a new principle, or method of doing any thing; or using old materials; be reduced into practice; and be so far imbodied or connected with corporeal substances, as to be in a condition to act, and to produce a new result, the patent is sustainable (d). There cannot be a patent for a mere philosophical principle, neither organized nor capable of being so; but a patent for a machine improved by a philosophical principle, though the machine existed before, is good. As laid down by C. J. Eyre, in Boulton v. Bull (e). "When the effect produced is no substance or composition of things, the patent can only be for the mechanism, if new mechanism is used, or for the process, if it be a new method of operating, with or without old mechanism, by which the effect is produced. To illustrate this, the effect produced by Mr. David Hartley's invention for securing buildings from fire, is no substance or composition of things: it is a mere negative quality, the absence of fire. This effect is produced, by a new method of disposing iron plates in buildings. In the nature of things the patent could not be for the effect produced. I think it could not be for the making the plates of iron, which, when disposed in a particular manner, produced the effect; for those are things in common use. But the invention consisting in the method of disposing those plates of iron, so as to produce their effect, and that effect being a useful and meritorious one, (a) Mr. Justice Buller in Boulton and Watt v. Bull. 2 Hen. Bla. Rep. 463. (b) Jessop's case, cited by Buller, J. in the same cause. (c) 2 Hen. Bla. 463. 8 T. R. 101. 2 Barnew and Ald. 350. (d) Ibid. the the patent seems to have been very properly granted to him, for his method of securing buildings from fire." Though a patentee denominate his discovery "a method," or a "principle" only, yet if the thing invented be in fact something substantial, or a new and useful effect produced by a new application of means known before, the verbal inaccuracy will not vitiate the grant (a). The statute allows of patents for inventions with this qualification, "that they be not contrary to the law, nor mischievous to the State," in these three respects: first, by " raising the prices of commodities at home;" secondly, by being hurtful to trade; or thirdly, by being generally inconvenient. According to the letter of the statute, the saving goes only to the sole working and making; the sole buying, selling and using remain under the general prohibition: and with apparent good reason for so remaining, for the exclusive privilege of buying, selling and using, could hardly be brought within the qualification of not being contrary to law, and mischievous to the State, in the respects mentioned (b). The rule that the patent must not be more extensive than the invention will be considered in our observations on the specification. Subject to these rules the patent and specification ought, it seems, to be liberally construed: there should be no leaning against it; and the patent generally contains an express clause that it shall be taken and construed in the most beneficial sense in favour of the patentee. In Turner v. Winter (c), Mr. J. Buller said, "when attempts are made to evade a fair patent, I am strongly inclined in favour of the patentee." Though in Hornblower v. Boulton (d), Lord Kenyon remarked, that he was not one of those who greatly favored patents; for though in many instances the public were benefited by them, yet on striking the balance on this subject he thought that great oppression was practised on inferior mechanics by those who were more opulent." Secondly, the statute requires that the patent should be (a) 2 Hen. Bla. 477, per Rooke, J. 2 Barnew and Ald. 350. (c) 1 T. R. 606. (d) 8 Ibid. 98. (b) 2 Hen. Bla. 492. granted granted to the true and first inventor of a manufacture which at the time of the grant has not been used by others. may The decisions on the wording of this part of the statute, prove that it is entitled to a liberal interpretation in favour of new and beneficial discoveries (a). The word inventor ("a finder out of something new (b)") has not been restricted to its literal signification; but has, on fair grounds of political convenience, been construed to mean the first publisher or introducer of the invention: so that a person in this country who is in possession of, and introduces a foreign discovery, obtain a patent (c). And where the patentee was not the first inventor, though he was the first publisher or introducer, of a British invention (the first inventor having confined it to his closet, and the public being unacqainted with it); the patent was considered valid (d). In such case the patentee, though not the inventor, renders a benefit to the public; and it is the part of good policy to encourage the early production of the inventions of genius. But when the discovery has been used by others or publicly sold by the patentee himself, only for a short time, as four months before the time when the patent is granted, the patentee is unable to confer on the public the benefit they are entitled to expect, and the patent is void (e). And it seems that if the patentee were informed of the discovery by another person in this country, the patent would be unfounded (f). Thirdly, Of the description of the invention in the specifi cation. Though there be nothing in the Act of James I. requiring a specification, the patent universally requires, as a condition on which the validity of the grant depends, that the patentee shall "particularly describe and ascertain the nature of the invention, and in what manner the same is to be performed, by an instrument in writing under his hand and seal; and cause the same to be |