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Concluding obser- be invested with the other.

vations.

Imputation shipbuilders questionéd.

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"As between nations she "is," says a modern authority, "the property of the 66 state whose commission she bears. No foreign tri"bunal can inquire into the title of her sovereign, or "demand production of her bill of sale, although she was built in the yards of the country in which that court presides and originally fitted out for illicit war.' But to proceed: the journal from which we have been quoting adds, "that the transactions in question "have been conducted in such a manner as to indicate a consciousness of trespass in some direction or other." "No shipbuilder has openly avowed that he was "building a ship for a belligerent power, but that he "intended to confine himself throughout the transaction "to the limits imposed by the law. The vessels have "been built without any admission of their real desti"nation, and despatched covertly or under pretext." If this were so (though the contrary is the fact, as will presently be shown), would it be extraordinary that the shipbuilder, notwithstanding his conviction of the perfect legality of his proceedings, should be driven to more than ordinary caution when his premises are infested by spies, the lawfulness of his proceedings questioned by unscrupulous adversaries, and retailed to the Government through the resident ministerial agents of a jealous power, with every sophistical argument that a skilful hand, aided by an ex parte case fitted to his purpose, can wield to contravene or evade the liberal application of the dictum of one of our ablest legal advisers of the Crown, that proceedings in this country should be had " on evidence, not on suspicion." Danger of inter- But this is nothing in comparison with the suggestion picion. of those who contend for the arbitrary detention of the

ference on sus

* The Ocean, the River, and the Shore. Part I., p. 187.

vations.

builders.

dour.

ships of the subject, not on actual proof of any wrong Concluding obserdone by him, but on the mere supposition that, after they leave our admiralty jurisdiction, something may be done there which, though it cannot lawfully be done here, may lawfully be done elsewhere by some one else. If an act lawful in itself here, is to be treated as Reasons for timidity of shipunlawful on the mere conjectural anticipation that something more may be done elsewhere, which if done here might constitute that act a crime, could it surprise any one that our shipbuilders should be circumspect to a fault, though they thus incur the charge of suspicion or concealment ? But have they, as before Effects of canalleged, been thus uniformly cautious? The evidence on the late trial of the Alexandra proves that, if the candour contended for be a virtue, Messrs. Miller & Sons are entitled to full praise for the ample exhibition of it. They stated openly that they were building the Alexandra for the agents of the Confederate States, that such was her real destination, and everybody knew it; and what was the result? The seizure and prosecution of the ship! The days and weeks and months of anxiety, trouble and expense entailed by this yet unfinished litigation have been the bitter fruits of candour. If, on the contrary, the shipbuilder does not betray the confidence of his employers by openly declaring that he is building this ship for the Federals, or that for the Confederates, the imputation of concealment imperils his property, and subjects it to seizure on the ground of suspicion. If he frankly confesses that he is engaged in the execution of a lawful contract for the supply of contraband to either of the belligerents, the fate of the Alexandra stares him in the face.

Dilemma arising

from uncer

tainty of law nistration.

and its admi

But, as if the danger of reserve on the one hand and Inquisitorial candour on the other were not enough, with the choice

proceedings un-English.

vations.

Concluding obser- of evils, to perplex the shipbuilder, it is gravely suggested that, in a country where no man can properly be called upon to criminate himself, he must submit to the un-English ordeal of an official inquisition as to the objects and purposes of himself and his employers, with the chances of being impaled on the horns of the dilemma in which he is involved by the equivocal state of the law and the vacillating teachings of time-serving writers as to the administration of it. Ask Messrs. Laird what account they are prepared to give of their proceedings, and they will naturally say-" Messrs. “Miller told the truth, and their ship was seized!" Ask the builders on the Clyde the same question, and they will reply-" Messrs. Laird declined to answer, and "their ships are detained!"

Impolicy of creating new difficulties.

universal rules.

Yet if, consistently with the law of nations, "it is "undoubtedly competent to any British shipbuilder to "build a ship and sell it as another merchant might "sell a battery of field-pieces or a cargo of produce," why do violence to the true spirit of neutrality by endeavouring needlessly to disturb it? Why harass our shipbuilders by tortuous refinement of argument, and seek by overwrought ingenuity to throw vexatious difficulties in the way?

Inflexibility of In order to the honest observance of those broad principles of neutrality which ought to constitute the governing rule of nations, we must neither try them by, nor seek to adapt them to, the special circumstances of a possibly exceptional case. The law must not, either from private or political motives, be strained to meet the convenience of particular states.

The iron-clads.

This proposition may be illustrated by the present case of the iron-clads. Ships as well as arms are contraband of war. To-day the Northern States require

vations.

from us arms, but not ships. The Southern States want Concluding obserships, but not arms. The North urges the interdiction of the sale of ships, whilst the sale of arms is unrestricted.

If the case were reversed to-morrow, should we be prepared to reverse the modus operandi, to deny arms to the South, and permit ships to go to the North? These opposite processes cannot both be consistent with any recognized principle of universal application, but absolute non-interference is; and although tergiversation on the part of one state cannot affect generally accepted rules as between others, any departure from them may, as already shown, be inconveniently quoted against the vacillating state itself should similar complications arise.

There is nothing in the position of the antagonistic powers to warrant even a modification of the settled principles of neutrality. Both belligerents have been. recognized as existing powers; we have declared for strict neutrality; and, to use the appropriate language of a modern authority before quoted, "we must regard all "nations as of equal power, possessing equal rights,

equal intelligence, equal interest in the observance of "the law, and equally prepared and determined to "vindicate their rights, and to repel every inroad upon "them. To assume the contrary would imply that the "strong has a right to impose a law on the weak; "and not only to impose, but to vary it at his "pleasure."*

of the case.

If there be any grave reason why this question should Political aspect be viewed as one of policy, in subservience to which the provisions either of the Law of Nations or of the Foreign Enlistment Act should as far as practicable be interpreted, there is much to be said on both sides.

*The Ocean, the River, and the Shore. Part i., p. 300.

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So long as a plain and obviously unmistakable statute remains unrepealed, it is the duty of the subject to observe, and of the executive to enforce it, without looking to ulterior consequences. If it affects the liberty of the subject, doubts are generally decided in his favour, particularly when the law is penal. If political, should a particular interpretation of a doubtful provision be attended with pernicious results to the community at large, perhaps it is reasonable to expect that an opposite construction might be adopted as most consistent with sound policy and the presumed wisdom and intention of the legislature. A few observations therefore, may not be out of place here as to the policy of imposing restrictions calculated to hamper the commerce of the country in cases where the national interests do not imperatively demand the sacrifice.

When foreign wars occur, particularly between states with which we carry on extensive commercial intercourse, the interests of this country must more or less suffer. In the present instance this is more particularly the case, because not only are our ordinary mercantile transactions between this and the belligerent states diminished by the blockade of a cotton-producing territory, but an important branch of British industry is paralyzed, the flow of a large amount of capital through this country is arrested, and incalculable injury is inflicted. Of this we make no complaint against the belligerents, because it is not the designed but accidental consequence of the war. Nevertheless, the fact exists; and is it not enough that a neutral state should patiently submit to the consequent loss, without being restrained from the exercise of another branch of trade, which, being incidental to a state of war, serves in some

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