ARTICLES IN PERIODICALS STRANGE CASE OF ERVIN POPE, Emmet O'Neal. Am. L. Rev. LVI 552. MODERN HISTORY OF THE DOCTRINE OF CONSIDERATION. W. S. Holdsworth. Bost. U. L. Rev. II 87. TREASON IN MODERN FOREIGN LAW Thomas R. Robinson. Bost. U. L. Rev. II 98. LEGAL ETHICS V. William H. Taft. Bost. U. L. Rev. II 161. MODERN HISTORY OF THE DOCTRINE OF CONSIDERATION (Cont.). W. S. Holdsworth. Bost. U. L. Rev. II 174. PRIMARY SOURCES OF ACQUISITION OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY. Alvin E. Evans. Cal. L. Rev. X 271. THE GOOD JUDGE OF CHATEAU-THIERRY AND HIS AMERICAN COUNTERPART. Max Radin. Cal. L. Rev. X 310. ACCORD IN MARITIME OBLIGATION. J. Whitla Stinson. Cal. L. Rev. X 328. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF EXCEPTIONS FROM THE REFERENDUM. James O. Barnett. Cal. L. Rev. X 371. PRELIMINARY PROJECT FOR AN ITALIAN PENAL CODE. I. M. Kidd. Cal. L. Rev. X 384. ENGLISH TRADE DISPUTES ACT OF 1906. J. J. Posner. Cal. L. Rev. X 395. OWNERSHIP OF WESTERN LANDS. Bram Thompson. Can. L. Times XLII 397. COURTS AND THE COMMONWEALTH. 406. Charles Morse. Can. L. Times XLII CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. M. J. Gorman. Can. L. Times XLII 425. COMPANIES AND DOMINION AND PROVINCIAL LAWS (Art. 1). H. G. Garrett. Can. L. Times XLII 466. JOINT STOCK LIABILITY COMPANIES. Bram Thompson. XLII 525. Can. L. Times COMPANIES AND DOMINIONS AND PROVINCIAL LAWS (Art. 2). H. G. Garrett. Can. L. Times XLII 531. DOMINION'S EXEMPTION FROM PROVINCIAL TAXATION OF C. P. R. Bram Thompson. Can. L. Times XLII 570. COMPANIES AND DOMINION AND PROVINCIAL LAWS (Art. 3). H. G. Garrett. Can. L. Times XLII 583. NOTE ON IMPERIAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. Berriedale Keith. Can. L. Times XLII 594. DEFINITION AND SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW WITH RELATION TO PRIVATE RIGHT. Joseph Whitla Stinson. Can. L. Times XLII 602. ORGANIZATION OF THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE. John Bassett Moore. Col. L. Rev. XXII 497. A THEORY OF LIABILITY OF TRUST ESTATES FOR THE CONTRACTS AND TORTS OF THE TRUSTEE. Harlan F. Stone. Col. L. Rev. XXII 527. TRUST RECEIPT AS SECURITY II. Karl T. Frederick. Col. L. Rev. XXII 547. FARMER'S CO-OPERATIVE ASSOCIATIONS AS LEGAL COMBINATIONS. Miller. Cornell L. Q. VII 293. John D. LEADING DEVELOPMENTS IN PROCEDURAL REFORM. E. F. Albertsworth. Cornell L. Q. VII 310. Cornell L. Q. VII 334. Harv. L. Rev. XXXV 787. THE X-RAY IN COURT. Lyman P. Wilson. CHANGE IN TRUST POLICY-I. Myron W. Watkins. Harv. L. Rev. XXXV 815. FUNCTION OF COMPARATIVE LAW. Pierre Lepaulle. Harv. L. Rev. XXXV 838. EDWARD BRINLEY ADAMS. Arthur D. Hill. Harv. L. Rev. XXXV 895. REVIEW IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE U. S., OF THE DIST. COURT AND CIRC. COURT OF APPEALS. Charles W. Bunn. Harv. L. Rev. XXXV 902. LABOR CO-PARTNERSHIP IN INDUSTRY. Calvert Magruder. Harv. L. Rev. XXXV 910. CHANGE IN TRUST POLICY-II. Myron W. Watkins. Harv. L. Rev. XXXV 926. REPORT ON MORPHINISM TO THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF BOSTON. C. Edouard Sandoz. Jour. Crim L. & Crim. XIII 10. PENAL SETTLEMENT AND COLONIZATION. Crim. XIII 56. Robert Heindl. Jour. Crim. L. & THE SOCIALIZATION OF JUVENILE COURT PROCEDURE. Miriam Van Waters. Jour. Crim. L. & Crim. XIII 61. EXISTING LAWS WHICH AUTHORIZE PSYCHOLOGISTS TO PERFORM PROFESSIONAL SERVICES. Leta S. Hollingworth. Jour. Crim. L. & Crim. XIII 70. STUDY OF THE CASE PRELIMINARY TO TREATMENT. William Healy. Jour. Crim. L. & Crim. XIII 74. THE SAD TALE OF AN INDIAN WIFE. William Renwick Riddell. Jour. Crim. L. & Crim. XIII 82. SOME SOCIETAL ASPECTS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW. Albert Levitt. Jour. Crim. L. and Crim. XIII 90. ON CRIME CONDITIONS IN CHICAGO, Edwin W. Sims. Jour. Crim. L. & HONOR SYSTEM FOR INMATES OF PRISONS AND REFORMATORIES. Sanford THE PROGRESS OF AMERICAN PENOLOGY AS EXEMPLIFIED BY THE EXPERIENCE OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA, 1830-1920. Harry Elmer Barnes. Jour. Crim. L. & Crim. XIII 170. THE CROSS-EXAMINATION OF THE ALIENIST. John E. Lind. Jour. Crim. L. & Crim. XIII 228. THE PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISHMENT. Julian P. Alexander. Jour. Crim. L. & Crim. XIII 235. AIMS AND IDEALS OF THE POLICE. August Vollmer. Jour. Crim. L. & Crim. XIII 251. COMMITMENT AS "DELINQUENT"? Hermione Dealey Dvorak and August Dvorak. Jour. Crim. L. & Crim. XIII 258. THE ADEQUACY OF POLICE FORCES. & Crim. XIII 266. Clarence B. Smith, Jr. Jour. Crim. L. A WORLD BUREAU OF PROSECUTION: NEW METHODS OF IDENTIFICATION. Curt Weiss. Jour. Crim. L. & Crim. XIII 272. JUDICIARY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN THE PROVINCE OF ONTARIO. COURTS OF TOMORROW. William A. Huncke. Jour. of Am. Jud. Soc. VI 22. DISPENSING POWER OF THE CROWN IN ECCLESIASTICAL AFFAIRS I. E. F. THE HAGUE RULES, 1921. Raymond E. Negers. L. Q. Rev. XXXVIII 317. BRITISH AND COLONIAL JUDGMENTS. F. T. Piggott. L. Q. Rev. XXXVIII [Continued on page 566] DIVERSITIES DE LA LEY RELEASE TO ONE JOINT-TORTFEASOR.-Our obnoxious old friend, that constant companion of personal injury cases, viz., the rule that a release to one of several joint-tort feasors is a discharge to all, is receiving numerous hard knocks lately. He is already aged and infirm, being quite anachronistic; and it looks as though he would soon have to retire from active meddling in the affairs of men. The legislatures have begun to deliver blows at him (e. g., the Code of West Virginia, § 5028, c. 136, § 7), and these legislative remedial statutes sometimes become fashionable and spread rapidly. We shall not be sorry to end acquaintance with this old party, for he is merely a surviving relic of the Cokian period of metaphysics. He arrived at maturity, after a period of infantile uncertainty, in Coke's time (Claxton v. Swift 2 Show. 494; Walsh v. Bishop Cro. Car. 39, 243). Crossing to this country at a fairly early date, his right to settlement was vigorously disputed; but he finally established himself pretty generally in the good graces of our supreme courts. Considering that personal injury cases have occupied our courts in large degree for sixty years past, and that in that field his offensiveness was most obvious and constant, it is singular that so long a time has elapsed before the movement to blackball this obnoxious old party has developed. Various technicalities have been covertly employed to show our unfriendly sentiments towards him; e. g., the distinction between an out-and-out release and a covenant not to sue (Chicago & Alton R. Co. v. Averill (1906) 224 Ill. 516, 79 N. E. 654; Judd v. Walker (Mo. App. 1911) 138 S. W. 655). In recent years a few courts have further helped by at least giving to well-informed counsel the opportunity to evade the old gentleman, i. e., they refuse to recognize his authority where the release explicitly reserves all right to pursue other tortfeasors: (1915) Dwy v. Connecticut Co. 89 Conn. 74, 92 Atl. 883; (1912) Walsh v. N. Y. C. & H. R. Co. 204 N. Y. 58, 97 N. E. 408. The latest court to adopt this view is the Supreme Court of Ohio, which in Adams Express Co. v. Beckwith 100 Oh. St. 348, 126 N. E. 300, repudiates a decision of its predecessors that has been law for a century: (1825) Ellis v. Bitzer 2 Oh. 89. The opinion is by Wanamaker, J., whose judicial deliverances in favor of popular rights and against oppressive claims generally are so notably fraught with emotional rhetoric and sentimental appeal. So far as the obnoxious old gentleman is concerned-the Cokian rule giving to a release an unlimited effect-it remains, indeed, to do what the West Virginia legislature has done, viz., limit the implied effect of a release to the liability of the party released. All short of this is merely a parleying evasion of a bad principle. The real juristic vice of the old gentleman consists in his claiming that mere words of release to A must inexorably signify also a release to B and C. Nothing but false logic prevents a complete repudiation of this principle. Some courts have indeed not deemed it necessary to wait for the legislature, and have repudiated the hoary fallacy on common law grounds; e. g., Wisconsin, in Kropidlowski v. Pfister & V. L. Co. (1912) 149 Wis. 421, 135 N. W. 839; and Nebraska, in Fitzgerald v. Union Stockyards Co. (1911) 89 Nebr. 393, 131 N. W. 612.1 J. H. W. HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE FRENCH BAR-[By Archibald Young (1869)].-The most ancient regulations with regard to the bar imposed upon its members the obligation of taking an oath, and of inscription upon a roll, in order to notify the names recommended to the confidence of the public and of the judges. But it is somewhat strange that more than 300 years elapsed after the date of these regulations before a formal and regular roll of the bar was kept. In 1687 there is a roll, containing 366 names, said to have been recorded by the bâtonnier, or president of the bar, in August of that year; but the name of the bâtonnier is given neither in the roll nor in the title, and it was not until 1696 that a regular roll of advocates began to be kept. From a pretty early period in its history, the bar of Paris was accustomed to arrange itself by benches in order that its members might meet and confer more easily. These benches were placed in the great hall of the Palais de Justice or in the adjacent galleries. In 1711 the advocates, formerly divided into eleven benches, were arranged in twelve. The first was composed almost entirely of seniors, and a few seniors were placed at the head of each of the others, after whom came the younger members, according to the date of their admission to the order. This organization, however, was found to be very imperfect, and in 1780 the fifth bench contained 101 advocates, the seventh 9, and the eight 7; while the tenth had 95, and the twelfth 10. In 1781 a reform took place, and the order was divided into ten columns, each containing from fifty to sixty advocates. Each column elected two deputies, whose functions lasted for two years, and who might be re-elected. These deputies from the different columns, along with the former presidents of the bar, constituted the council of the order, elected its presidents, watched over its roll, and maintained its discipline. The advocates were further divided into three classes-listeners (avocats écoutants), pleaders (avocats plaidants), and consulting advocates (avocats consultants). According to the ancient practice the young licentiate from the university was presented to the court by one of the seniors of the bar, and the president administered to 1. Some useful comments will be found in the following case-notes: Harv. L. Rev. XXVI 858; Yale L. J. XXII 62; Va. L. Rev. II 476; Pa. L. Rev. LX 599, LXII 154, LXIII 794, LXIV 96; and in an article by Mr. Robt. B. Tunstall, "Releases, etc., under the Federal Employers' Liability Act" Va. L. Reg. N. S. I 805. him the oath to observe the laws, which he took standing upright, in his gown, with uncovered head, and right hand uplifted; in short, the ceremony of the oath seems to have been very similar to that at present observed at the Scotch bar. A minute of the taking of the oath was then drawn up and signed by the senior, or, as he was termed in the olden times, the godfather of the young jurist. After taking the oath, the advocate might assume the gown, but he had not yet the right of pleading. He entered upon a period of probation, called "le stage," which, by a decree of May, 1751, was extended to four years. Upon the lapse of this period, his name was inscribed in the roll of advocates upon the report of one of the chiefs of his bench or column. The pleaders (avocats plaidants) were highly respected, and had the right not only of appearing in the courts of parliament, but also in all the inferior judicatories. The mutual exchange of papers was considered one of the courtesies of the profession; and, before pleading, the advocates were in the habit of making extracts from their briefs, containing the facts of the case, and communicating them to the opposite counsel. Pleading and consultation for the poor was one of the established rules of the ancient bar, and every week nine advocates met in order to hold gratuitious consultations on the causes of the poor. The advocates, as at present, spoke with their heads covered, except when they pleaded before the King's Council. The consulting advocates-advocati consiliarii, as they are termed in the old ordinances-held the highest rank at the bar. They gave their advice to the pleaders, they regulated the affairs of families, and were intrusted with many matters of the highest moment. They had a bench set apart for them in parliament, and were entitled to a seat on the fleurs-de-lis. The head or president of the French bar was, and still is, termed bâtonnier. This title dates back to the middle of the fourteenth century; but for a long time after that period it was an office of little importance. The name is derived from an ancient usage, according to which the staff (baton) of the banner of St. Nicolas, the patron of the confraternity of advocates, was carried at the head of the order in processions and ceremonies. He who carried it was termed bâtonnier. So late as 1602, however, the dean (doyen) held the first place at the French bar, the bâtonnier only the second. The latter is mentioned for the first time as the head of the order in 1687; and it is only since July, 1693, that he has had a legal title to be considered the head of the bar. Formerly the senior member of the order, by date of inscription on the roll, used to be elected bâtonnier. But as the great age of the advocate thus chosen often unfitted him from efficiently discharging the duties of an office requiring watchfulness and tact in no ordinary degree, the order determined to give up this principle of election. The bâtonnier is chosen for one year only; but since 1830 it has been usual, at the close of his first term of office, to reelect him for a second year. The bâtonnier has the privilege of making his business appointments at his own residence, even with |