existing, but allowed with a clause mentioning the prior patent, and expressly disclaiming any claim to the process therein described. (Griff. 300.)

(i) COOPER AND FORD'S PATENT. [1886]

The applicant described in his specification certain improvements in knitting machinery and certain frictional driving gear, which latter had been already patented by the opponent. The patent was allowed after the insertion of a clause stating that no claim was made to the driving of the shaft, "as friction driving apparatus of this kind has before been used for driving the shafts of knitting machines." (Griff. 275.)

ANDERSON AND MCKINNELL'S APPLICATION.

[1887]

The opponent's machine was materially different from the applicant's. The Solicitor-General said: "Of all ways of protecting pre-existing arrangements in matters of this kind, the one I should be the least willing to adopt would be the mention in one specification of the fact of another patent being in existence." (2 Griff. 23, at p. 25.)

(k) HOOKHAM'S APPLICATION. [1887]

Semble, if there is a distinct reference in the provisional specification to an invention or a device which was within the specification of the opponent, the opponent may be entitled to have a disclaimer inserted. (2 Griff. 32.)

(1) LORRAIN'S APPLICATION. [1888]

Where a patent is opposed on the ground of a prior patent having been granted for the same invention, no harm is done to the owners of the prior patent by allowing the specification in a particular form, but the law officer is bound to protect the public, so that they may not be misled by any specification which, on the face of it, might be held to include a wider kind of invention than that to which the patentee is on the evidence entitled. (5 0. R. 142.)

(m) GUEST AND BARROW'S APPLICATION. [1888]

A prior patentee has not any right to be specially named unless the applicants are willing to name him, and unless it is clear that there is no other publication except the one that is mentioned.

The applicant's provisional specification admittedly covered the opponent's invention, and the applicant, before the ComptrollerGeneral, inserted a disclaimer as to the general state of knowledge: -Held, on appeal, that that was sufficient.

Where a particular patentee or a prior inventor has made a broad general claim, he is not on that account entitled to have limiting words inserted in the applicant's patent, unless he can shew that such words are really necessary to protect him. (5 O. R.

(n) AIREY'S APPLICATION. [1888]

The Solicitor-General settled the disclaimer in the following form: "I am aware of (the opponent's) patent No. 4726 of 1886 for Machine for measuring the height of Human Beings automatically,' and I declare that I do not claim the mechanism therein described and claimed, but what I claim is," &c., &c. (5 O. R. 348, at p. 350.)

(0) GOZNEY'S APPLICATION. [1888]

A disclaiming clause inserted on opposition is intended to guard against the claiming in a new patent something not only described in the old patent, but included in the claim in the old patent as a part of the previous invention. (5 O. R. 597.)

(p) HILL'S APPLICATION. [1888]

If patents overlap, the distinction between the inventions in the earlier and later patents should be made clear for the sake of the public. (5 0. R. 599.)

(9) SIELAFF'S APPLICATION. [1888]

The Attorney-General approved of the remarks made by the Solicitor-General in Anderson and McKinnell's application. (5 0. R.

485.)

(r) LYNDE'S APPLICATION. [1888]

Disclaimer ordered: "I am aware of (the opponent's) patent No. 16,433 of 1884, and do not claim anything claimed and described therein." (5 O. R. 663, at p. 665.)

(8) WALLACY'S APPLICATION. [1889]

The applicant stated in his specification that the operation of the weighing mechanism was substantially the same as that described in his former patent, and in his former patent a referenee was made to the opponent's patent :-Held, that a similar reference must be inserted, and the form used in Lynde's Case was followed. (6 O. R. 134.)

(t) BROWNHILL'S APPLICATION. [1889]

An opponent may appeal in order to get a reference to his specification inserted, although he does not appeal against the allowance of the patent. (6 O. R. 135.)

(u) HOFFMAN'S APPLICATION. [1890]

The disclaiming clause serves two useful purposes, one to protect the former inventor, and the other to protect the new inventor by limiting his claim, thus showing that his patent is not assailable on the ground that it is an infringement on the former patent. (7 O. R. 92.)

Where prior Invention is not the same.

(u) HUTH'S PATENT. [1884]

An application for a patent for improvements in the manufacture of compounds of india-rubber, gutta-percha, and like materials, opposed on the ground that the invention had been already patented, but granted on the ground of a substantial difference in the ingredients used. (Griff. 292.)

(v) CUMMING'S PATENT. [1884]

A patent for an improved fastener for bracelets allowed, although the difference from the invention already patented by the opponent was very slight. (Griff. 277.)

(w) STUBB'S PATENT. [1885]

The law officer will not stop a patent which is opposed on the ground that a prior patent exists unless he is satisfied that the patents are identical. (Griff. 298.)

(x) JONES'S PATENT. [1886.]

It is not sufficient that the invention proposed should be substantially the same as that of the opponent; it must be identical:Held, therefore, that a notice which included the words "substantially the same was wrong, because it raised a question of infringement which the law officer had no power to decide. (2 Griff. 33.)

(y) NEWMAN'S APPLICATION. [1887]

An opponent who owned a similar patent of prior date raised the objection that the applicant's claim went beyond the title and the provisional specification. If the applicant has good subject-matter, and the invention is not identically the same as that of the opponent, the applicant is entitled to have his patent sealed, though an action for infringement may be with success brought by the opponent. The law officer will not stop a patent at the instigation of an opponent because there is some general principle of patent law which is infringed, although it may be reasonable for the law officer to indicate to the applicant that it would be well to consider such a point. (2 Griff. 40; 5 O. R. 271.)

(2) VON BUCH'S APPLICATION. [1887]

The opponents, the Welsbach Incandescent Light Company, had described in their patent the method of making the incandescent envelope which the applicant now sought to patent; but they had not claimed it as part of their invention:-Held, that as only that is patented which the inventor claims, this portion of the invention could not be said to have been patented within the meaning of sect. 11, and that therefore the application must be granted. (2 Griff. 40.)

(a) CHANDLER'S PATENT. [1887]

Where the Comptroller-General found sufficiently indicated on the documents before him what was the particular invention for which a patent was desired, and what was the chief feature in which it differed from those of the opponents-viz., the special form of gas-burner by which the gas issued vertically, and was caused to meet, end on, heated air issuing vertically downwardshe allowed the applicant to amend by confining his claim to such special feature. In such a case the time for appeal to the law officer runs from the time when the amendments are approved by the comptroller. (Griff. 270.)

(b) FLETCHER'S APPLICATION. [1887]

In this case a method of dyeing tissue and other papers by pressing the colouring matter through the same by means of a pair of pressure rollers while supported by an endless felt cloth, and apparatus, were held to be substantially different from a previously patented process of colouring paper by saturating it by passing through a bath and apparatus, and the patent was allowed. (2 Griff. 30.)

(c) WALLIS AND RATCLIFF'S APPLICATION. [1888]

The application was allowed by the Comptroller-General, but was refused on appeal by the Attorney-General on the ground that the apparatus in question did not substantially differ from that already patented by the opponent. (5 0. R. 347.)

(d) LAKE'S APPLICATION. [1889]

There being a strongly controverted question of anticipation by former specifications concerning the manufacture of alpha naphthol disulpho acids for dyes, the Solicitor-General declined to have an expert assessor, on the ground that, even if advised by an expert, he would not think it right to stop the patent where there was such a contest. (6 O. R. 548.)

(e) FAWCETT'S APPLICATION. [1889]

The application being opposed on the ground that "the invention. or material parts thereof had been patented in this country on applications of prior date," the words "or material parts thereof " were objected to and, by leave of the comptroller, were struck out. (Good. Prac. 10.)

(ƒ) HAYTHORNTHWAITE'S APPLICATION. [1889]

In considering what is the invention in the prior patent, the law officer will not consider whether there is a variance between the opponents' provisional and complete specifications. (7 O. R. 70.)

Concurrent Applicants.

(f) Ex parte DYER. [1812]

Where there were concurrent applications for letters patent for the same object, he who obtained the great seal first, by getting quickest through the various stages, had the sole right at law. (Holroyd, 59.)

(9) CORNISH v. KEENE. N. P. [1835]

Tindal, C.J.: “The first who comes to the Crown and takes out a patent is the man who has a right to clothe himself with the authority of the patent, and enjoy its benefits." (1 Web. P. C. 508.)

(h) In re SIMPSON AND ISAACS' PATENT. [1853]

Objections were filed to an application for a patent, and were overruled by the law officer of the Crown; he issued his warrant to seal, to which also objections were filed. On a petition by the patentees, the Court made an order to affix the great seal without sending the case back to the law officer.

The Lord Chancellor said: "I think that Lord Eldon was correct in Dyer's Case. I shall follow the rule which he there laid down. In that case both parties invented the same thing at the same time, and the question was, who was to be preferred, the first who applied for, or the first who obtained, the patent? His lordship decided in favour of the latter. In that case the patentees first applied, and the Act means to put the order for protection granted at the time of the application on the same footing as the patent stood before; you are therefore the first entitled. I am of opinion, too, that you are entitled to have the patent sealed. No doubt, in advising the Crown to seal letters patent, I ran the risk of occasioning great injury to parties, by driving them into litigation; but by the contrary course I run the risk of doing irreparable injury. In my opinion, the question is the same as if, under the old law, application were being made to me for letters patent to be granted at the time when the application for this patent was made. This application is rested on two grounds: first, that these patentees are not the true inventors; secondly, that the invention is not new. I am quite ready to say that I think there is strong evidence that it was not; but I shall not take upon myself so to decide. . . . . I think I am bound to decide myself, not whether they have made out that they are the true inventors, and that the invention is new, but whether such a prima facie case has been made that I ought to put them into a position to litigate the question with the public." (21 L. T. Rep. 81.)

....

(i) HEATH v. SMITH. [1854]

Campbell, C.J.: "When I was Attorney-General, and it appeared that there were two contemporaneous discoveries, I used to give a patent to the two jointly." Sir A. E. Cockburn, AttorneyGeneral: "I have adopted the same practice, but I have found