of the exception which a correct statement of that rule must always include, viz., that long and uninterrupted possession shall be considered such prima facie evidence of title as to justify the Court in protecting the patent right by an injunction until its invalidity, if it be invalid, shall have been established by an action at law.” (2 Ph. 335; 2 Web. P. C. 177.)

(z) CROSSKILL v. EVORY. [1848]

Though a patentee had enjoyed his patent for a considerable time, and had succeeded in several actions for an infringement thereof in upholding his patent, yet there being a new infringement by a different party, an injunction to restrain him was refused until after a trial at law. (10 L. T. Rep. 459.)

(a) BRIDSON v. BENECKE. [1849]

The plaintiff having been put to establish his legal right, succeeded on the trial, but the defendants tendered a bill of exceptions. An injunction was granted, under the circumstances, before the bill of exceptions had been disposed of. (12 Beav. 1.)

(b) CALDWELL v. VANVLISSENGEN. [1851]

Injunction granted against subjects of the kingdom of Holland, to restrain them from using on board their ships within the dominions of England, without the licence of the plaintiffs, an invention, to the benefit of which the plaintiffs were exclusively entitled under the Queen's patent, the title of which had been maintained at law against several attempts to impeach it. Where a legal right exists, the Court cannot refuse to interfere for its protection, upon grounds which depend exclusively on considerations of national policy. (9 Hare, 415; 21 L. J. Ch. 97; 16 Jur. 115.)

Turner, V.-C.: "Where there has been long enjoyment under the patent (the enjoyment of course including use), the public have had the opportunity of contesting the patent; and the fact of their not having done so successfully affords, at least primá facie, evidence that the title of the patentee is good; and the Court therefore interferes before the right is established at law." (9 Hare, 424.)

(c) BAXTER v. COMBE. Ir. Ch. [1851]

On a motion for an injunction to restrain the infringement of a patent, an order was made that the motion should stand until the plaintiff brought an action at law. There was a verdict for the plaintiff, and the defendant tendered a bill of exceptions, pending which the motion was renewed; the Court granted an injunction, the plaintiff undertaking to abide any order which the Court might make, by directing an issue, or otherwise, to asce: tain the damage, if any, which the defendant should sustain by obeying the order, in case the defendant should obtain judgment in the action at law. (3 Ir. Ch. R. 245.)

(d) BROWN v. KIDSTONE. [1852]

The patent was not obtained for Scotland till soine months after it had been obtained for England. In the interval a description of the invention had appeared in a magazine circulated in Scotland-Held, that this publication created such a prima facie objection to the patentee's title, that he could not interdict parties in Scotland alleged to be using the invention without a licence. (1 S. M. & P. 769.)

(e) NEWALL v. WILSON. [1852]

Where a patent had been in force for twelve years, and had been the subject of four suits against different persons, all of which terminated favourably to the patentee, and in two of which verdicts had been given in favour of the validity of the patent:-Held, that in a fifth case, the patentee was entitled to an injunction pending the trial of the legal right, although a fresh fact was brought forward, tending to impeach the novelty of the invention. (2 De G., M. & G. 282.)

(f) HANCOCK v. MOULTON. [1852]

Length of time and uninterrupted enjoyment of a patent give a colour of right even where there has not been a trial at law. The Court ought not to grant an injunction to restrain an infringement of a patent before a trial at law, unless the evidence of infringement be such that the Court would on the same evidence commit the defendant for a breach of the injunction. (M. Dig. 506.)

(9) LISTER v. EASTWOOD. [1855]

Where a patentee had brought an action for damages, and at the trial an arbitration had been agreed to, upon which the arbitrator by his award had established the validity of the patent, and the patent had been again invaded; the Court, upon a bill filed for an injunction to restrain the infringement, held, that the award of the arbitrator must be considered as equivalent to a verdict establishing the validity of the patent, against which there had been no motion for a new trial. (26 L. T. Rep. 4.)

(h) GARDNER v. BROADBENT. [1856]

Sir J. Stuart, V.-C., said: "If the plaintiff is in a position to support by proper evidence his title to the patent, and to prove the fact of its having been infringed, he is in every other respect, in spite of the recency of its date (1855), entitled to move in this court ex parte for an injunction. . . . There is no law of this court which prevented a patentee by the recency of his patent from applying for an injunction ex parte; and I wish it to be understood that the law of the court is that laid down by Lord Eldon in the case of The Universities of Oxford and Cambridge v Richardson.” (2 Jur., N. S. 1041.)

(i) BETTS v. MENZIES. [1857]

Where there is doubt as to the validity of the plaintiff's patent, but he has had eight years of undisturbed enjoyment under it, and the defendant had neglected to dispute the validity of the patent on a former occasion, when he had the opportunity of doing so, an injunction was granted, and plaintiff ordered to proceed to trial at law. (3 Jur. N. S. 357.)

Wood, V.-C.: "The law of this court is, that where the patentee has had long enjoyment, there he shall have an injunction to protect his rights until trial, even although his rights under his patent be doubtful." (Ib. 358.)

(j) CLARK v. FERGUSSON. [1859]

Bill for an injunction to restrain the defendants from working the plaintiff's patent, dated April, 1859, for an improved kind of block for lowering boats. The defendants were employed to manufacture blocks for the plaintiff, but having, as they claimed, discovered an improvement on the plaintiff's invention, they requested the plaintiff to introduce such alleged improvements into his specification, and allow the defendants a share of the profits. The plaintiff having refused this the defendants applied for a patent, and claimed a right to work their invention independently of the plaintiff. Injunction granted, under the circumstances, in spite of the recent date of the plaintiff's patent. (1 Giff. 184.) Sir J. Stuart, V.-C.: "It is not a mere matter of course, because a patent is recent, to call on the patentee to establish his rights at law before he can obtain relief in this court. It is in the discretion of the Court to require a plaintiff to assert his rights at law or otherwise, according to the nature of the case." (Ib. 187.)

(k) HILLS v. EVANS. [1862]

Lord Westbury: "It is the habit and the rule of a Court of Equity not to grant that injunction (to restrain infringement), at all events at the hearing, and not to make it perpetual unless the legal validity of the patent has been conclusively established." (4 De G., F. & J. 289.)

(1) DAVENPORT v. JEPSON. [1862]

The Court will, since the 25 & 26 Vict. c. 42, enter into the question of the validity of a patent on a motion for an interim injunction. The powers of the Court are not limited by the above Act. (1 N. R. 173.)

(m) RENARD v. LEVINSTEIN. [1864]

Lord Justice Knight Bruce: "It is necessary, to support a motion to dissolve an injunction, that there should be at least a fair prima facie case in the opinion of the judge or judges who may have to decide the matter as to the validity of the specification; if not in every patent case, at least in one which arises upon a patent of no great age. With a patent no older than the present patent is (three years), though its age is no objection to an inter

locutory injunction of itself, in the present stage of the cause there ought to be no injunction, and upon that ground alone I am of opinion that this injunction should for the present be dissolved." Defendant to keep an account. (10 L. T. Rep., N. S. 177.)

(n) DAVENPORT v. GOLDBERG. [1865]

Where the plaintiffs have had thirteen years' user of their patent, their right to which had been established, once at law and once in a Court of Chancery, the validity of the patent is prima facie sufficiently established as against an infringer. (2 H. & M. 282.)

(0) BOVILL v. GOODIER. [1866]

A defendant is not to be concluded by a trial at law, establishing the validity of the patent, to which he is no party, and is not to be driven to contest the validity of the patent by a scire facias. (35 Beav. 427.)

(p) PENN v. BIBBY. [1866]

After a trial before the Vice-Chancellor, without a jury, in which issues were found for the plaintiff, a motion for a new trial having been refused by the Vice-Chancellor, and on appeal refused by the Lord Chancellor, was being taken by appeal to the House of Lords. The Court declined to suspend the final order for an injunction, pending the appeal to the House of Lords. (L. R., 3 Eq. 308; 36 L. J., Ch. 277.)

(q) THE WILLCOX AND GIBBS SEWING MACHINE COMPANY v. WOOD. [1869]

The Court refused to restrain the defendants from selling as the plaintiffs' sewing machines, "with the latest improvements," old sewing machines manufactured and patented by the plaintiffs without such improvements. (20 L. T. Rep., N. S. 10.)

(r) DUDGEON v. THOMSON. [1874]

Sir G. Jessel: "The Court can grant an injunction before the hearing where the patent is an old one, and the patentee has been in long and undisturbed enjoyment of it, or where its validity has been established elsewhere, and the Court sees no reason to doubt the propriety of the result, or where the conduct of the defeudant is such as to enable the Court to say that, as against the defendant himself, there is no reason to doubt the validity of the patent."

The fact of an interdict having been granted against the defendant by the Court of Sessions in January, 1873, held to be sufficient prima facie evidence of the validity of a patent for the United Kingdom granted in 1866, to warrant the Court granting an interlocutory injunction. (30 L. T. Rep., N. S. 244.)

(8) PLIMPTON v. MALCOLMSON. [1875]

An injunction to restrain an alleged infringement will not be granted on an interlocutory application, unless it can be shown that there has been active user of the invention, even where the

patent has been in force for eight years. (L. R. 20 Eq. 37; 44 L. J., Ch. 257.)

(t) JACKSON v. NEEDLE. [1884]

Formerly the Court was not in the habit of granting injunctions to restrain infringements until the title had been established by an action at law. That rule no longer applies, but at the same time the Court has not shown the same disposition to grant injunctions where the patent said to be infringed is of recent date. So far, at any rate, as cases arising before the Act of 1883 are concerned, the Court abstains from interfering by injunction in the case of a recently dated patent, when there is really a substantial question to be tried. Under the Act of 1883 the question which has still to be determined is, whether the investigation and protection which is given to the public under sects. 10 and 11, may alter this rule when the owner of a patent of recent date comes for an interim injunction. (Griff. 132; 1 O. R. 174; 2 O. R. 191.)

(u) LISTER v. NORTON. [1884]

Chitty, J.: "As to what is exactly a recent patent, and what is a patent of sufficient age to support an injunction, that is a matter no doubt more or less of discretion. But the discretion is limited by the practice; and according to my recollection of the practice a patent three years old would not be sufficient where it is disputed.” (Griff. 148; 1 O. R. 114, at p. 115.)

(v) BRIGGS v. LARDEUR. [1884]

In an action for infringement if the patent is, on the face of it, so hopelessly and irretrievably bad that it is absolutely impossible that it could be supported, the Court will consider before granting an interim injunction, but where a patent has not been challenged for ten years, the Court ought to assume for the purposes of a motion for an interim injunction that the patent is a good patent; leaving it open till the case comes on for trial to determine that the patent is as bad a patent as was ever taken out. (Griff. 55; 1 O. R. 126.) There was an appeal, but owing to a settlement it was not heard, (1 O. R. 192.)

(w) ROTHWELL v. KING. [1886]

Bristowe, V.-C. (citing Davenport v. Jepson): "Where there has been long enjoyment (in that case it was nine years), the Court will not refuse an interlocutory injunction merely on the ground that the defendant if ultimately successful will have been more injured by its being granted than the plaintiffs by its not having been granted." User for six years held sufficient where there had been no action fought, but the plaintiffs had on four different occasions induced people to discontinue infringing. (3 O. R. 379, at p. 380.)

(x) BRITISH TANNING COMPANY v. GROTH. [1889]

The plaintiffs owned a patent two years old for improved apparatus for tanning by aid of electricity, and moved for an interim