process or processes for manufacturing or preparing red and purple dyes which is or are in use by them or either of them at the present time." The applicants declined to enter a disclaimer on these terms. (Newton's London Jour., N. S., vol. xxii., p. 69.)

(y) HEARSON'S PATENT. [1884]

An action for infringements of a patent for improvements in penholders being nearly ready for trial, the plaintiffs obtained, under sect. 19, from a judge liberty to apply for leave to amend. The judge, not having imposed terms as regarded the pending action, and his order not having been appealed from the law officer, declined to impose any terms relating to the action as a condition for leave to amend. But as regards other actions, the law officers stated that, as a general rule and apart from exceptional circumstances, it was proper that, when desired, a condition should be imposed that no action should be brought, or other proceeding taken, in respect of any infringement prior to the 1st January, 1884. (Griff. 309.)

(z) PIETSCHMANN'S PATENT. [1884]

Under sect. 18, subs. 3, the Comptroller-General has the power of imposing such conditions as the law officer on appeal could impose; but the Comptroller-General cannot dismiss an application for amendment with costs, and it follows that he cannot make the payment of costs by the applicant a condition for allowing an amendment. (Griff. 314.)

(a) CODD v. BRATBY. [1884]

In 1883 the plaintiff commenced an action for infringement of a patent dated November, 1870, and in July, 1884, moved for liberty to apply to amend under sect. 19. The defendants asked that in addition to other terms a condition should be imposed that the plaintiff should not in any way sue the defendants on the amended specification. The Court said that that would practically be giving the defendants a licence to infringe the plaintiff's machine, and that although there might be cases in which it would be right to impose such a term, it would be going too far to do so in this case. (Griff. 56; 1 O. R. 209.)

(b) SINGER v. STASSEN & Co. [1884]

The plaintiff having commenced an action before the date at which the Patents Act of 1883 came into operation applied subsequently to that date, under sect. 19, for liberty to apply at the office for leave to amend his specification by way of disclaimer :Held that the section applied, and that the liberty asked ought to be given upon the terms that the costs of and occasioned by the amendment should be defendants' in any event, and that the specification as amended should not be receivable in evidence in the action. (10. R. 121. Sub nomine, Singer v. Hasson, W. N. 1884, p. 82; 50 L. T. 326.)

(c) WESTINGHOUSE'S PATENT. [1885]

The patent having been declared bad in 1883, and an amendment opposed by the railway companies having been allowed in March, 1885, the law officer imposed terms that no action should be brought against any of the opponents in respect of brakes made and fitted to rolling stock prior to 1st January, 1884, each of the opponents to furnish to Westinghouse a list of such rolling stock, and to keep him informed of any changes in any apparatus fitted except mere renewal of parts. (Griff. 315.)

(d) ALLEN v. DOULTON. [1887]

The 18th and 19th sections of the Act give a discretion to the Court or judges as to the terms on which in each particular case he will allow a disclaimer, and this discretion is not fettered by authority (4 0. R. 377). The patent being for the use of pipes of novel form, constructed of earthenware to form, as described, a direct connection, the patentee applied to leave out the words "of novel form" in the claim, and to make corresponding amendments on the ground that the form of the pipes was not new at the date of the patent, and he did not intend to claim them. The law officer allowed the amendment, and declined to impose any condition as to the bringing of actions after the amendments for prior infringements, on the ground that in such an action the Court would have to decide whether sect. 20 applied, and the law officer would not substitute his opinion for that of the Court. (2 Griff. 3.)

(e) BRAY v. GARDNER. [1887]

Where the plaintiff in an action for infringement asks for leave to apply at the Patent Office to amend his specification by way of disclaimer, the Court will, as a general rule, impose the condition that the amended specification shall not be receivable in evidence, though in particular cases less stringent terms may be imposed. (34 Ch. D. 668; 3 T. L. R. 352.)

(el) HASLAM FOUNDRY & ENGINEERING COMPANY v. GOODFELLOW. [1887]

Where plaintiffs asked to be allowed to apply for leave to disclaim after all pleadings had been delivered, the application was granted on terms that the plaintiffs should pay in any event the costs of the application and of the action up to and occasioned by the disclaimer, except only so far as the proceedings in the action might be utilised for the purposes of the amended action; the plaintiffs and defendant to be allowed to make all necessary amendments in their pleadings after disclaimer; the plaintiffs to undertake forthwith to amend their pleadings confining the action to the specifications as amended by the disclaimer, or to consent to the action being dismissed with costs. (37 Ch. D. 118; 5 O. R. 28.)

(f) In re GAULARD & GIBB'S PATENT. [1887]

Where a petition for revocation was pending and was ready for

trial and the patentee asked to be at liberty to apply for leave to amend by disclaimer, liberty was granted on terms that he should apply forthwith and prosecute the application with diligence. The petitioner to have notice of the result, and then fourteen days to decide whether he would amend his particulars of objection or abandon his petition. The respondent to pay all costs up to that date. (5 0. R. 189; W. N., 1887, p. 211.)

(9) FUSEE VESTA COMPANY v. BRYANT & MAY. [1887]

Plaintiffs in an action for infringement of a patent dated 1885 moved for liberty to apply, under sect. 19, for leave to amend their specification by disclaimer, no statement of claim having been delivered. Liberty was granted on terms that no further proceedings be taken in the action until the disclaimer had been properly made, and if so made, the plaintiffs to pay the defendant's party and party costs up to disclaimer; the plaintiffs to undertake forthwith to take proceedings for disclaimer, and then to amend the action by stating their disclaimer, founding the action simply upon the specification as amended. (34 Ch. D. 458; 3 T. L. R. 285.) (h) GAULARD v. LINDSAY. [1885]

Pending an action for infringement of several patents, leave was given to the plaintiffs to apply at the Patent Office to amend one of the specifications by way of disclaimer, and to give the amended specification in evidence at the trial on terms of plaintiff paying all the costs of the action up to the time of leave being given, and waiving all claim to recover damages for infringements prior to the amendment. (38 Ch. D. 38; 5 O. R. 192; 57 L. J. Ch. 687.) (i) LANG v. WHITECROSS COMPANY. C. A. [1889]

The Court of Appeal will not fetter the discretion of the judge as to the terms to be imposed on giving leave to disclaim pending an action by laying down any general rule. When the terms were that no claim should be made for an injunction, or for damages, or for any infringement prior to the disclaimer, and that the plaintiff should pay all costs of action up to that time, the appeal was dismissed with costs. (6 T. L. R. 16 and 57; 62 L. T. Rep. 119.) (j) MEYER v. SHERWOOD. C. A. [1890]

The plaintiff applied after the close of defendants' case for leave to disclaim, and subsequently, having filed a disclaimer, applied for leave to amend his pleadings:-Held, that as the defendants did not intend to infringe the amended patent, leave must be refused and the action dismissed with costs. (7 O. R. 283.)

Operation of.

(1) PERRY v. SKINNER. [1837]

The Act 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 83, had not a retrospective operation so as to make a party liable for an infringement, prior to the time of entering a disclaimer. (2 M. & W. 471; 1 Web. P. C. 250. See sect. 39 of 15 & 16 Vict. c. 83.) (Questioned in R. v. Mills, infra.)

(m) CLARK v. KENRICK. [1843]

The effect of the statute 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 83, was to render the disclaimer, when made, part of the patent and the specification. The patentee, from the moment of the disclaimer, becomes patentee of the undisclaimed part only. (12 M. & W. 221.)

(n) STOCKER v. WALLER. [1845]

Tindal, C.J.: "The mere fact of a disclaimer being made by a party to whom a grant has been made does not necessarily import that the original patent was void; for the object of the statute was not only to enable inventors to set themselves right when the letters patent, from some cause or other, would have been held to be void, but also to remove doubts and difficulties which would otherwise hang over the heads of parties bringing actions for an infringement, by enabling them to enter a disclaimer of a part of the specification or title of the patent." (9 Jur. 138. Reported under name of Stocker v. Warner, 1 C. B. 148.)

(0) R. v. MILL. Sci. fac. [1850]

In an action of scire facias, a disclaimer, though enrolled subsequently to issue joined, is admissible as evidence for the defendant, and is to be read as part of the original specification put in by the prosecutor. Semble, in actions or suits, not being proceedings by scire facias, and which were not pending at the time of the enrolment of a disclaimer, the disclaimer is to be deemed and taken to be a part of the patent or specification from the time of the granting of the letters patent, and not from the time of its enrolment merely. The decision in Perry v. Skinner questioned. (10 C. B. 379; 20 L. J. C. P. 16; 15 Jur. 59; í L. M. & P. 695.)

(p) In re LUCAS'S PATENT. [1854]

There are exceptional cases where a disclaimer should be made retrospective, so as to give the patentee power to proceed against those who infringed before the disclaimer was filed, as where a person, having obtained his information from the patentee, presumes upon a defect in his specification, and infringes the valuable part of his patent. (Macr. P. C. 235.)

(q) In re SMITH'S PATENT. [1855]

Disclaimer allowed, on condition that an undertaking be given that no action shall be brought in respect of anything done prior to the hearing of the application for a disclaimer. (Macr. P. C. 232.)

(r) TETLEY v. EASTON. [1857]

The effect of a disclaimer is merely to strike out from the specification those parts of the machine which are disclaimed; it cannot be read as explanatory of that which remains. (2 C. B., N. S., 706.)

(8) LISTER v. LEATHER. [1857]

In a suit pending at the time of enrolment of a disclaimer, a plaintiff cannot avail himself of it by amending his bill; he must file a fresh bill. (3 Jur., N. S., 433.)

(t) SEED v. HIGGINS. H. L. [1860]

A patentee claimed by his specification "the application of the principle of centrifugal force to the flyers employed in certain machinery for roving cotton and other fibrous substances," but declared that his improvements "applied solely to such part of the machinery, called the flyers, which is employed in connection with the spindle for the purpose of winding cotton." He attached drawings to his specification, and went on to say that these drawings and the specification represented "one particular and practicable mode of applying" his invention, but "I do not intend to confine myself to this particular method, but I claim as my invention the application of the law or principle of centrifugal force to the particular or special purpose above set forth, that is, to flyers used in machinery for preparing cotton." He afterwards disclaimed "all application of the law or principle of centrifugal force as being part of my invention, or as being comprised in my claim of invention contained in the specification, except only the application of centrifugal force, by means of a weight acting upon a presser so as to cause it to press against a bobbin, as described in the specification":-Held, that this disclaimer did not extend the claim, but confined it to a particular mode of applying the principle of centrifugal force, and did not claim the discovery of that principle, or the application of it, except in a particular way, and that, therefore, the patent was good. (4 Jur., N. S., 258; 27 L. J. Q. B. 145; affirmed in Exch. Ch. and Dom. Proc., 27 L. J. Q. B. 411; 8 H. L. Cas. 550; 30 L. J. Q. B. 314; 6 Jur., N. S., 1264.) (v) CANNINGTON v. NUTTALL. H. L. [1871]

The plain language of the operative part of a disclaimer is not to be controlled or modified by any introductory sentences with which the patentee may think fit to preface such disclaimer. (L. R., 5 H. L. 205.)

Lord Westbury: "The reason for a disclaimer is no part of the disclaimer itself. The operative part of the disclaimer begins in this way: 'I, for this reason, wish to disclaim, and do hereby disclaim.' (Ib. 227.)

(w) In re BERDAN'S PATENT. M. R. [1875]

Where a disclaimer has been filed without the consent of the patentee, the Master of the Rolls has jurisdiction, without bill filed, to order it to be taken off the file.

Jessel, M.R., in delivering judgment, said: "The question is, whether the Master of the Rolls has jurisdiction to set this right without bill filed, by removing from the record the documents which have been thus filed. There is no authority on the subject. I may observe that In re Sharp's Patent (3 Beav. 245) has