ants. They called it patent silk, and Mr. Miller, their manager, called it so to me; and in the invoice it is written, patent fringe boiled off at 10s. 6d." He says "it was yarn similar to that I bought at Mr. Campbell's, but 5s. cheaper in the pound; it was not so good as what the patentees furnished. Campbell and Gibson's was always taken in preference to theirs if we had it in hand." You see what was actually produced, and it rests entirely on this man's evidence and on the affidavit put in by the plaintiffs that was made by the defendant, in which, in the Court of Chancery, he says he had been in the course for the last two years of using and making the silk which he was then selling, because it was done openly, and they had never taken any notice of it; and also that he did not think that their patent was an available patent--not, in effect, denying that he was selling what was then manufactured, but defending it on the ground that it was not protected by the letters patent. Upon that you must say whether you are satisfied that the defendant has violated this patent at all. If they have themselves sold an article of exactly the same fabric, made in the same manner as that for which the patent was taken out, such sale may be considered as a using of the invention within the terms of the declaration, and so you would say, if you are satisfied on the evidence, by your verdict. Next, you must say whether the plaintiffs are the true and first inventors, and then whether this is a patent which has been taken out for a new manufacture; that is, either for a new result or a new mode of obtaining a result, although it would be upon an old process and with new combination, and producing new results. Then comes the question of utility, about which you need hardly trouble yourselves; and lastly, the question whether this specification is so worded, and with that accuracy of description, as to enable a person versed in the matter and of competent intelligence to perform the object of the patent.

The verdict was as follows: The jury are of opinion that the invention is not new, but an improved process-not a new combination; that the defendant is guilty; that the

invention is useful, and that the specification is sufficient.

TINDAL, C. J. The verdict will be for the plaintiff on the first, fourth and fifth issues; on the second and third issues there is the special finding, which the court must mould as well as they can.

The report of subsequent proceedings on motion for a nonsuit will be found under date Easter Term, 1842.

REQUISITES OF SPECIFICATION.-Specification must be such in case of a machine that mechanics may be able to make the machine by following directions without any new inventions or additions of their own, and without information from other sources; must fully disclose the invention and contain nothing materially false or defective; the insertion of more things than are requisite constitutes a fatal defect. Rex v. Arkwright, 1 ante, 29. Inventor not restricted to description by words only, but allowed to annex drawings. Bloxam v. Elsee, 1 ante, 373. Patent for combination of substances should name the substances. Savory v. Price, 1 ante, 366. Specification must state at least one method that will succeed. Derosne v. Fairie, 2 ante, 103. Specification must be such as may be followed without invention or addition. Morgan v. Seaward, 2 ante, 262. The most advantageous mode must be stated. Morgan v. Seaward, 2 ante, 262. Whether a word used in specification is the correct description of the thing is not important provided it describes the thing so that no man can doubt what it is. Minter v. Mower, 2 ante, 262.

WALTON v. POTTER.

Common Pleas, Nov. 18, 1841.

(1 Web. P. C. 597.)

Patent for an Adaptation of a known Substance. Pleading. Admissions in Pleading. Form of Verdict.

The adaptation of a substance of known properties to a particular purpose may be the subject of a patent.

An invention of improvements in cards for carding wool, cotton, silk and other fibrous substances, and for raising the pile of woollen and other cloths by the application and adaptation of caoutchouc or india-rubber, as a substitute for the fillets or sheets of leather, is patentable.

Where the judge has left to the jury the specific issues raised on the record

and refused to put to them certain questions of fact suggested by the defendant's counsel, held no misdirection or ground for a new trial.

It appears such questions can only be asked with the consent of all parties, and the jury are not bound to answer them.

The plea that the invention is not a new manufacture known in England admits the invention to be a manufacture and puts in issue the novelty.

Matter stated in a plea as inducement to a specific allegation, upon which an issue in fact is taken, is not on the record for other purposes than the issue.

Rule to enter verdict for the defendants.

The proceedings in the court below are reported at p. 162. Wilde, Bompas and Addison showed cause against a rule nisi obtained in Easter Term last by Channell, to enter a verdict for the defendants, or to arrest the judgment, or for a new trial on the grounds of misdirection and verdict against evidence.

The judgment was sought to be arrested on the ground that the invention was not the subject-matter of letters patent, being the application of a known substance to a purpose and in a manner well known, and it was contended on the part of the defendants that this objection was open to the defendants both under the third and fourth pleas. On the part of the plaintiff it was contended that this objection was not open to the defendants; that the specification having been set out in the fourth plea as inducement to an allegation upon which an issue of fact had been taken and disposed of by the jury in favor of the plaintiff, the plea was altogether disposed of, and the defendants could not resort to the introductory matter for the purpose of raising an objection, which if intended to be raised should have been pleaded in a proper manner. That to admit of recourse being had to matter so stated as inducement would be a violation of the rule of pleading that matter not traversed in one plea was only admitted for the purposes of that plea.

The alleged misdirection was the refusal of the learned judge to leave certain specific questions to the jury in addition to the issues on the record.

TINDAL, C. J. I shall say but little in this case, because

it is, in effect, an appeal from the direction I gave to the jury on the trial of the cause, and I would much rather hear the opinions of my brethren upon that than rely much upon my individual judgment. I am bound, however, to state generally what the opinion I have formed is as to the effect of the verdict.

I take the motion to proceed, 1, upon the ground that the verdict of the jury upon the several pleas that were put upon the record is against the evidence; 2, that in the course and progress of the trial there was a misdirection on my part to the jury; and, 3, that on the face of the record itself there is that which shows the invention is not the subject-matter of a patent within the statute of James.

With respect to the first ground, the cause was debated at very considerable length and with great ability by the counsel on both sides, and I think there was scarcely a point that arose upon the evidence which was not submitted in its turn to the jury, according to the particular view which the respective counsel entertained of it. It was a case in which there was a considerable body of evidence on both sides, and the jury were to form upon the issues that were before them a just conclusion according to the preponderance of the evidence, and I see no reason whatever to be dissatisfied with the conclusion at which they arrived. They were first to say, upon the plea of not guilty, whether the mode which had been used by the defendants was virtually and substantially the same as that described in the plaintiff's specification-a mere matter of fact upon which they had the evidence of the plaintiff's and the defendants' witnesses, and they arrived at the conclusion that the defendants had borrowed their mode from that described in the plaintiff's specification.

Then, upon the two next pleas, the question that was specifically raised for their determination was whether this was a new invention or whether it was known before the time when the plaintiff obtained his patent, and they determined, as far as the public use was concerned, that it was new and not known in England before the date of that

patent; and I see no reason for saying that after they had exercised their judgment upon it, and had the patent of Hancock fully explained to them, and arrived at that conclusion, we should set it aside and send the case to a new trial. Then there was only one other issue which is material, which was whether sheet cards and top cards were useful or not, according to the mode of adaptation described in the specification; and upon that they also found their verdict for the plaintiff; the evidence upon that point being of the actual user of sheet cards and top cards and the trial of experiments, though, perhaps, since the action was brought, yet still bearing upon the question-the same subject-matter which produced the same results. There being, therefore, on the part of the plaintiff, positive evidence that it would answer for the purpose of sheet cards and top cards, and on the part of the defendants nothing but judgment and belief that it would not, why are we to set the verdict aside? Therefore, as far as that ground comes into consideration, I think the cause ought not to be sent back to another jury for the purpose of a second trial.

Then, was there any misdirection? I take the grounds of misdirection, which have been pointed out in the course of the argument, to be these: 1. That two certain questions, which at the close of my summing up to the jury the learned counsel for the defendants wished me to ask the specific opinion of the jury upon, I declined putting to them; and, 2. That I ought to have told the jury that, looking at the whole of the patent and the specification, this was not the subject-matter of a patent within the statute of James. With respect to the first point it appears, I think, almost to be admitted in argument that there was no necessity that I should put to the jury any specific questions which suggested themselves to the minds of the counsel. If they were points which I had overlooked in the course of my summing up, it would be very well to remind me of them, and to request that they should be put more pointedly than they had been in the course of such statement of the evidence to the jury; but it is a very inconvenient thing indeed if, after the cause has been left to the