This was an application on the part of the patentee for the extension of the term of letters patent granted to him April 20, 1825, numbered 5,154, for "improvements in machinery or apparatus for washing, cleansing or bleaching of linens, cottons and other fabrics, goods or fibrous substances."

Several witnesses were called, who spoke of the great utility of the invention, and who attributed the want of introduction of the invention to the embarrassments of the patentee. That the invention had never had a fair chance of success, owing partly to the engagements the patentee was under, to complete a previous invention for making pins by machinery. It was shown that the invention had been used with success by several bleachers.

Campbell, Attorney-General, on behalf of the Crown, stated that he knew of no objection to the prayer of the petition, except that the invention did not appear to have been brought into extensive use.

The LORD PRESIDENT. The committee, looking at the merits of this invention, are disposed to recommend the extension of the patent for the term of seven years, considering that the circumstance of its not having been brought more extensively into use is explained by the evidence. Report accordingly.

Re KOLLMAN'S PATENT.

Privy Council, Feb., 1839.

(1 Web. P. C. 564.)

Grounds for Extension.

The invention being meritorious, but from circumstances beyond the control of the patentee not having been sufficiently appreciated and not productive of reward, an extension was recommended.

Application for an extension.

The patent in question had been granted to G. A. Kollman for "improvements in the mechanism and general con

struction of piano-fortes." The invention was described to consist, 1. In striking down toward the bridge and soundingboard, instead of away from the bridge and sounding-board, as in the old piano; the effect of which was to improve the tone in purity, power and fulness; 2. In the frame-work for fixing of the pegs to which the wires are attached; the arrangements admitting of the use of strong wires, and of adjusting their tension with great accuracy, and effectually maintaining the wire in a state of tension, notwithstanding the motion of the instrument. The tension necessarily put upon the wires deranges the pianos on the old construction very quickly; they also become out of tune by moving or with change of temperature. An instrument made according to Mr. Kollman's invention could be carried to two or three concerts in succession and would not require tuning, whereas an instrument on the old construction must be tuned after each concert. The number of pianos sold by Mr. Kollman was twenty-three, and hitherto he had been a great loser by his invention.

Campbell, Attorney-General, having cross-examined the witnesses as to the nature and novelty of the invention, stated that he did not feel himself called upon, on the part of the public, to oppose the prayer of the petition. The invention appeared to be a meritorious one, though from circumstances beyond the control of the patentee its merits had not been sufficiently appreciated.

Lord LYNDHURST. [Lord BROUGHAM, BOSANQUET and VAUGHAN, JJ., and Dr. LUSHINGTON also sat.] We think this a case for an extension for seven years.

Report accordingly.

BICKFORD v. SKEWES.

Chancery, March 8, 1839.

(2 Carp. P. C. 454.)

Injunction. Delay in Moving to dissolve.

When the court has interfered, in aid of a legal right, by granting an injunetion upon the terms of the plaintiff's bringing an action, it will deprive the plaintiff of the injunction if he does not commence and proceed with his action with due promptness; but it will not do this if the defendant has been supine in the cause.

Appeal from an order.

In this case an injunction had been granted to restrain the defendant from manufacturing fuses, made according to the plaintiff's patent, granted in 1831. The bill was filed in August, 1837. A motion was made by the defendant in December, 1838, to dissolve the injunction, and to make an order that the plaintiffs should proceed to trial at law at the assizes about to be held in the county of Devon. These applications were refused, and the Lord Chancellor simply directed that the plaintiffs should proceed to establish their right at law. From this order the defendants appealed.

It was contended on behalf of the defendant that the order should have directed the earliest opportunity of proving at law the plaintiffs' right to the patent, and that the court ought not to protect the plaintiffs by injunction unless they proceeded at law in such manner as to bring on the trial at Devon the coming assizes. If the court left the plaintiffs to take their own course and time, then the injunction ought to be dissolved.

On the part of the plaintiffs it was urged that all due diligence had been and would be used to bring on the trial. Up to the present time all the delay had been on the part of defendant.

Lord Chancellor COTTENHAM. In matters of this kind an injunction is granted or refused by the court, as the case

may be, until the right has been established at law. I cannot acquiesce in the statement at the bar that the court gives up all protection to the plaintiff when an action has been directed to be brought by him to prove his right, although it might have been reasonable when the defendant was restrained from infringing the patent, to compel the plaintiff to proceed as quickly as possible to try his right at law; yet the court ought not to place the plaintiff at risk and inconvenience if the defendant has conducted himself in such a manner as to have caused the pressure that is complained of. I find that, although the bill was filed and the injunction obtained in the month of August, 1837, no application is made by the defendant to dissolve the injunction till December, 1838. The plaintiff had the possession and enjoyment of his patent for a period of six years before the filing of his bill, and the defendant acquiesces in the injunction granted for a further period of sixteen months; and if the defendant had not been guilty of delay, the plaintiff might have had reasonable time to prepare himself for the trial of the action. The case must be dealt with according to the admitted dates. On this day, March, 8, 1839, I am asked to compel the plaintiffs to proceed to trial in this case on the 18th instant, in Devonshire, after the great delay of the defendant in not making his application to the Vice-Chancellor earlier than the 4th of the present month. I do not consider the application reasonable under the circumstances of the case, and shall refuse the motion; and as I do not find any opinion was expressed by the ViceChancellor to the effect that the defendant could not come to the court in case any delay should arise on the part of the plaintiffs, but that he must apply to the judges in the common law courts, I refuse the motion with costs.

Motion refused.