England had adopted a policy forced upon her by the unjust conduct of France, in order to charge this country with the responsibility of habitually maintaining a doctrine which, in fact, she has always repudiated? The assertion that England has contended for the principle and pursued the practice of paper blockades as the rule of her maritime policy, is wholly untrue; and with the unfounded assertions on which they are based fall to the ground the injurious insinuations which M. Hautefeuille casts upon the motives of our present conduct. What I wish your readers to understand is that, though the dissertations of this French publicist may be very useful in a discussion of what the maritime law of nations ought to be, they are entirely to be disregarded in ascertaining what it actually is. This ingenious writer seems, if possible, to caricature the unfairness of spirit and the inaccuracy of detail by which French legal discussions are too often disfigured.

Nevertheless, if this had been simply a speculative question, in which errors of fact and of theory were alone involved, without any prospect of immediate political results, I should not have ventured to trouble you with this too lengthy letter; but I find in M. Hautefeuille's contribution to the Revue Contemporaine the following remarkable and startling sen

tences:

It is not sufficient to lay down principles and proclaim laws-their execution must be enforced; to do so, it would be sufficient to follow the example given by the small Northern Powers, and to create, in 1862, a coalition of armed neutrality similar to those of 1669 and 1780, which, by uniting in one body all the scattered forces of all neutrals, would secure to each the respect and security which they cannot obtain while remaining isolated.

England could not, more than any other nation, take offence at the formation of the league of armed neutrality. If, as we must suppose, she intends to respect the general law of nations, and faithfully and legally carry out the conventions she has agreed to, the union of neutrals cannot give her the slightest umbrage. That association cannot and will not require anything but the strict fulfillment of the well-known duties of belligerents of the rules of international jurisprudence. In the event of meeting with unjust pretensions on the part of any nation, it would be an additional reason for the union of all isolated forces against the common enemy.

Such language as this put forth in a publication which is understood to be directly in the interest of the French Govern

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ment donne à penser. The practical conclusion which M. Hautefeuille ventures to draw from propositions—the falsity of which I have endeavoured to expose is the necessity of reconstituting a European league, in imitation of the armed || neutrality,' to coerce recalcitrant England. Coming from such a quarter, a menace of this sort cannot be neglected. I have done my best to point out how entirely without foundation are the imputations by which the French publicist seeks to hold up this country to the jealousy and odium of Europe. The conflicting claims of belligerent rights and neutral privileges were settled by mutual agreement upon a firm foundation by the great treaty of 1801, to which I have already referred. By those principles Great Britain has been, and still is, guided; and to them she is ready to be, as she always has been, faithful. If France is satisfied with these doctrines, she will not find any disposition on our side to depart from them. Indeed, in admitting the doctrine that the flag covers the merchandise, we have conceded far more than the armed neutrality' was able to establish. If she meditates forcing us into further concessions by such a league as M. Hautefeuille threatens, I venture to predict that the third armed neutrality' will not be much more successful than its predecessors. England has offered no provocation for these groundless attacks. Upon this question of blockade we have no occasion to wince, for our withers are unwrung.' And if we are to be made the subject of assaults of this description, I doubt not we shall be able to hold our own again as we have held it before.

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I know there are some people who would gladly see the practice of blockade abolished altogether. Those who openly profess this opinion seem to me more candid than M. Hautefeuille, who, by impossible definitions, utterly unknown and repugnant to the Law of Nations, seeks indirectly to render it impracticable. All the most authoritative writers sustain the principle as one not only lawful but necessary. Kent says:Among the rights of belligerents there is none more clear and incontrovertible, or more just and necessary in its application, than that which gives rise to the law of blockade.' Bynkershoek declares that blockade is founded on the principles of natural

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reason as well as on the usage of nations.' I know there are those who are for abolishing everything which has hitherto been considered to constitute the bulwarks of our maritime

power.

Strangely enough, on this as well as the other side of the channel there are to be found those who believe that everything which is English must be detestable, and that all which is old must necessarily be bad. I confess that it is not the conclusion to which such discussions as that on whic I have too long detained you conduct me. I am rather disposed to echo the ancient text which used to be read on Founders' Day' at Trinity College, Let us praise the men of old time, and our fathers who begat us.'

II.

BLOCKADES BY CRUISING SQUADRONS.

I HAVE endeavoured to point out how entirely unfounded was the assertion of M. Hautefeuille that England had habitually maintained the doctrine and pursued the practice of paper blockades, and how completely without justification was the charge which he based upon this groundless proposition. There is, however, another point of his theory of blockade as developed in the pamphlet Quelques Questions, &c., which, from its erroneous and mischievous character, also merits exposure. Any one who is at all acquainted with French literature must have admired the dexterity and skill with which an author, whether he deal in historical or legal disquisitions, devotes himself to the construction of a système. The thing, like the word, is eminently French. M. Thiers's great book is a gigantic specimen of an historical système. M. Hautefeuille's pamphlet is a small illustration of the same science. To the author of a système facts and documents are like the clay on the potter's wheel. They are the subordinate actors in the theory, who are disposed of or dispensed with as may best suit the convenience of the dramatist.

The first proposition, with which I have already dealt, may be thus stated:-The law of nations requires that blockades should be effective; England has always practised ineffective blockades; therefore England is a violater of the law of nations.' Now, this syllogism is disposed of at once by the summary method of disproving the minor premiss. But it will be seen that there is still some room for ambiguity as long as the word effective' is not precisely defined. What, then, is an effective blockade? M. Hautefeuille's second proposition, with which I now propose to deal, may be thus stated:- Blockades by cruising squadrons are ineffective blockades; England maintains the doctrine of blockade by cruising squadrons; therefore

✓

England maintains ineffective blockades.' Now, in this syllogism of M. Hautefeuille's système, I shall take the liberty of denying the major premiss.

I will first state, in M. Hautefeuille's own words, his definition of a real or effective blockade:

Le blocus, pour être obligatoire, doit donc être réel-c'est à dire, formé par des bâtiments de guerre arrêtés, et assez proches pour assurer à leur nation la souveraineté des eaux environnantes, et par conséquent pour rendre l'entrée du port impossible sans passer sous le feu de leur artillerie. (Quelques Questions, &c., p. 43.)

And this he contrasts in his ordinary invidious style with 'le blocus par croisière,' which he calls 'le système anglais de blocus fictif durant les guerres des dix-septième, dix-huitième, et même du commencement du dix-neuvième siècle.' And he calls upon France (p. 47),

de ne reconnaître pour valables que les blocus formés par des bâtiments arrêtés, et suffisamment proches pour qu'il y ait réellement péril à tenter l'entrée; et d'exiger que tout navire marchand portant son pavillon puisse, sans être saisi ni autrement inquiété, se présenter une première fois devant le lieu investi pour vérifier par lui-même l'existence réelle du blocus.

It will be seen from these definitions that M. Hautefeuille by no means confines himself to the requirement that there should be an efficient and adequate force, to keep up the blockade; but he further insists that the ships should be stationary (arrêtés) as well as adequate in force and sufficiently near (suffisamment proches). He further demands that the neutral merchant ship, without any regard to the proclamation of blockade, should be at liberty to sail to the blockaded port in order to ascertain for itself, on the spot, the fact of the sufficiency of the blockade, without subjecting itself thereby to any penalty. This is what is called in the French text-books the notification spéciale. I shall deal with these two requirements separately.

The demand that the blockading force should consist of stationary ships, and not of a cruising squadron, is no new pretension. If M. Hautefeuille had reproduced this doctrine as a speculative opinion which he recommended to the acceptance of Europe, no one could have objected to hearing from an ingenious writer what was to be advanced in favour of a very.