vol. iv.), and considers the overbearing and tyrannical conduct of the Confederate Bourbon Monarchies towards the feeble victim of the family compact,' as detailed in the State papers collected in the Annual Register for 1762, will easily see that Portugal was not a free agent, and that this transaction is of little authority as an international precedent. The reciprocal claims of the French and English Governments on the Cabinet of Washington in the commencement of the revolutionary war have a far more weighty bearing upon the question in hand. Your readers who care to pursue the subject will do well to consult the first volume of the American State Papers and the last volume of Marshall's Life of Washington. It will be seen from the latter work, that in the discussions which took place in the American Cabinet, the opinions of Jefferson, the Secretary of State, and of Randolph, the Attorney-General, upon the legal bearings of the case, correspond pretty closely to those which I have ventured to set forth. It must, however, I think, be admitted that in this important international debate, the belligerents, as usual, claimed more than they were entitled to demand, and the neutral, as often happens, under the pressure of policy, conceded more than he could strictly have been required to grant. I certainly think that, if any similar questions should arise between the Governments which represent the parties to these transactions, the claims of the one and the concessions of the other on that occasion would be in a political point of view elements entitled to the highest consideration. But this department of the question is wholly beyond the province of the discussion I have proposed. We are occupied with the examination, not of that which may be politically expedient, but of that which is internationally exigible. We are seeking to ascertain the limits of legal rights, and not the conditions of political reciprocity. On the whole, I think it may be concluded that a breach of the laws of a neutral State by a belligerent power is a grave offence, which it is the unquestioned right of the neutral to punish and redress. It highly concerns the dignity and inde-' pendence of the neutral State so violated to assert its injured right, and to insist upon the fullest and most complete reparation as against the offender, by judicial remedies within its own M 162 LETTER OF HISTORICUS ON NEUTRAL RIGHTS. jurisdiction, by diplomatic reclamations, if by accident or fraud its jurisdiction has been eluded. The other belligerent, who, though he may have sustained injury, has suffered the violation of no right, has no definite or lawful claim upon the neutral for reparation. He may urge upon the neutral, by way of remonstrance, the duty of obtaining redress for him at the hands of the offender; this, however, is only a duty of imperfect obliga- į tion. He cannot demand at the hands of the neutral, as of right, compensation for the injury he may have sustained, nor can he impose upon the neutral the duty of obtaining for him any remedy beyond that which may be had over persons or things which are infra præsidia, and consequently within the neutral jurisdiction. If the offender has succeeded in evading the neutral jurisdiction, the belligerent cannot, as of right, call upon the neutral to pursue those further remedies to which the latter might be himself entitled. I offer this attempt to elucidate a difficult and important subject to the candid consideration of those who are competent to judge of it, with the diffidence which my consciousness of its incompleteness necessarily inspires. I have carefully abstained from making any practical application of the principles on which I have insisted to the special case of the Alabama.' The facts of that case are far too incompletely stated, and too inaccurately known by the public, to justify any reasonable or discreet person in venturing to express an opinion upon the rights or duties to which they may give rise. Vehement partisans are governed in such matters by their partialities rather than their judgement. The jurist should know no distinction between the Trojan and the Tyrian camps. I have observed with considerable satisfaction that the letters which I have from time to time addressed to you have been in turn displeasing to each set of partisans who espouse opposite sides in the American quarrel. I desire no higher testimony to the impartiality it has been my object to observe. 165 ON THE FOREIGN ENLISTMENT ACT. AT the present moment there is a good deal of discussion as to what acts constitute an offence against the provisions in the Foreign Enlistment Act, which prohibited the arming and equipping of vessels of war with the intent to commit hostilities against States with which the Crown of England is at peace. It will contribute not a little to throw light upon this enquiry, if we should be able to ascertain, on the authority of judicial decisions, what cases have been determined not to constitute such an offence. I must first premise that the provisions of the American municipal law on this subject are so similar to our own as for the purposes of this discussion to be practically identical. A judgement, therefore, pronounced on the American statutes may generally be adopted as applicable to our own. The United States anticipated Great Britain in the policy of the Foreign Enlistment Act, and, indeed, our law is little else than a transcript of theirs. As early as 1794, Congress passed a statute from which it will be sufficient to quote a single section: If any person shall, within any of the ports, harbours, bays, rivers, or other waters of the United States, fit out and arm, or attempt to fit out and arm, or procure to be fitted out and armed, or shall knowingly be concerned in the furnishing, fitting out, or arming of any ship or vessel with intent that such ship or vessel shall be employed in the service of any foreign Prince or State, to cruise or commit hostilities upon the subjects, citizens, or property of another foreign Prince or State with whom the United States are at peace, every such person so offending shall, upon conviction, be adjudged guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be fined and imprisoned, &c. (Third Congress, Sess. I. cap. 50, sec. 3.) The following section makes similar provisions against increasing or augmenting the force of any ship of war or cruiser.' K |