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COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XIX. No. 4.] LONDON, SATURDAY, JANUARY 12, 1811.

[Price 18.

"As to a cordial union of interest between Holland and England, it is as unnatural to happen as. * between two individual rivals of the same trade: And if there is any step that England can take to put it at a still greater distance, it is the part she is now acting. She has increased the animosity of "Holland on the speculative politics of interesting the Stadtholder, whose future repose depends upon waiting with the opposition in Holland, as the present reign did with the Scotch. How foolish then has "been the policy, how needless the expence, of endangering a war on account of the affairs of Holland." -PAINE. Prospects on the Rubicon, 1787.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS. PORTUGAL. THE WAR.--It is truly surprizing to observe into what insignificance this subject has fallen with the public. A little while back nothing else was talked of; nothing else was heard of; it filled every mouth; and, amongst other reasons for imposing restrictions upon the Prince of Wales was this, that, if left uncontrouled, he might totally change the system of warfare, and might abandon Portugal to its fate, at a time when every thing there promised so happy a result; that he might, in short, be advised to

[66 entrapped Massena; of having put him in a situation in which he was an object of ridicule and contempt; in which Lord Talavera laughed at him.--Oh, what a duped, what a gulled, what a cheated people this is! Where are now all the boastings of those swaggering blades, who, two months ago, in their numerous and endless letters from Lisbon and from the army, told us, that Massena was starving? Who told this "thinking nation" that the French General had, by the masterly operations of Lord Talavera, been drawn into a snare? Who told us, that they would give us a good account of him, and "undo all that Lord Talavera had done.” that we might rely upon it, that he never -This is, to be sure, a fine specimen would be suffered to escape ?--We have of the extent to which this nation can be it under their own hands; nay, we have deceived and cheated. Alas! the Prince it in the official dispatches and proclama of Wales can never undo what that famous tions, that some of the fairest parts of Pororiental chief has done in Portugal. His tugal have been, by our army (for what Royal Highness, possess what powers and purpose no matter) laid waste. Reader, prerogatives he may, cannot put Massena pray think a little of that sort of thing, where he was in July last; nor can he called laying a country waste. Think a restore any thing that had been destroyed little of the necessary consequences of in Portugal, nor to us any portion of the burning, cutting up fields of green corn many millions of pounds that have been for horses and mules; of killing flocks expended in that war, and the raising of and herds; of slaughtering the young in which in England must have so largely the mother's belly; of thus cutting off the added to the distresses of the people and means of restoration. Think a little of to the number of paupers. None of this the effect of burning corn-fields, mills, can he do. The readers of the Regis homesteads, and manufactories. Think ter were long ago prepared by me for the a little of the effect of first gutting and immense expences of keeping the army then burning work-shops and warehouses during the winter, and also no small part and cellars and dwellings. Think of the of the population of Lisbon. There can- effects of these upon a people; if you do not now be less than a hundred or a hun- belong to "the most thinking nation in the dred and fifty thousand people to be fed "world," pray think a little of these from England and Ireland, besides, per- things; and, when you have so thought, haps, thirty thousand horses and mules; tell me what we have done in Portugal to while from France not an ounce of food compensate the people for their sufferis required, her general having taken care ings. Tell me what the People of Portuso to dispose his forces as to make Portugal must think of Talavera's campaign, gal find his army in all the necessaries of life, while, to our army, she affords not a mouthful!--Thus terminates the affair of the trap. This is the end of having

-The sufferings, which the enormous expences of this campaign have brought, and will bring, upon us must be very great; we must feel the effects of the

for years; they already press upon us in various ways; but, let us not forget the situation of the people of Portugal; let us not forget the situation of those whom to deliver was the professed object of Talavera's wars. When the Wellesleys were first sent to take the command, political as well as military, in the Peninsula, I said, that we now saw them fairly pitted against the Buonapartés, and I besought the reader to mark the result. "If," said I," these oriental heroes come off victorious; if they beat the Buonapartés; "if they drive them out of the peninsula, I shall be ready to acknowledge, that "their fame has a solid foundation; and "that to gain victories in Hindostan is "the same thing as gaining victories in "Europe." I still stick to my word; but, the criterion for my judgment must be the result.The same criterion must be our guide in judging of the wisdom of the ministers, who planned the war.The public will bear in mind, that I, amongst others, all along protested against a war for the old governments of Spain and Portugal. We said, that, in such a war, the people would have no interests suffi cient to call forth the necessary energies. Mr. Canning and Alderman Birch said that such a war was the very thing for calling forth the energies of the people; that the throne and the altar (the Roman Catholic altar, mind) would call forth every hand in their defence; and the former gentleman, in an official dispatch, argued upon the existence of the hatred of the French in "the universal Spanish nation." How has it turned out? "Aye," say they, as Mr. Pitt used to say, but things have taken an unexpected turn; "who would have thought this, and who would have thought that?" Why, as Mr. Fox used to tell "the great statesman now no more," we should have thought it; we did think it; and we told you it would happen. You scorned our advice; you called us jacobins and levellers; and experience has now proved, that we were right and that you were wrong.Mr. Canning was the minister of foreign affairs when the plan of the peninsular war was laid; he was the prominent person in that measure; he, the eulogist of Mr. Pitt, and the steady pursuer of his system, was the leading author of that war, which will, before it be over, have done more for France than any other of the wars that we have waged against her.Will he pretend that the principle of the war was

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good? The principle, we said, was bad; and, if it had been good, of what consequence is that, unless the means were at hand; and, if the means were at hand, where are we to look for a justification for the want of success?The end is not yet come, to be sure; but, who is there mad enough to expect, that we shall be able to put the French out of the Peninsula either by arms or by negociation? Where is the man, in his senses, who believes, or will say that he believes, that we shall be able to accomplish this? Suppose peace were to become the subject of discussion. Does any one believe, that Napoleon would enter into negociations about Spain and Portugal ? Does any one believe, that we must not leave them to their fate? This is bringing the matter to the test. And, if the reader is persuaded, that we should not, in a negociation for peace, be able to stipulate for the independence of the Peninsula, the question is settled, and the result of the war is, in reality, ascertained.--Let the reader, then, take a fair and full look at this war; at its origin, its principle, its plan, its execution, its feats, its titles and its medals, and at its costs; let him then bear in mind who were its authors and abettors, who have been and yet are its agents; and, if he have a mind capable of profiting from experience, he will not fail to turn his observations to account.

FRENCH MARINE.--In a subsequent part of this Number will be found a report of the French minister of Marine upon the subject of a conscription for sailors, who are to be thus raised in the maritime Departments of France, which Departments are, on that account, to be exempted from the military conscription.--This may serve as some answer to the question, so often put: "how is Buonaparté to get sailors.' Sailors are made of flesh and blood and bone and sinews as well as soldiers, and, while these were in France or her dependencies, it was easy to conceive how he would get them, when the proper time came for their employment.--The nature of the contest has, with him, now, in a great measure, changed. Sir FRANCIS BURDETT said, in the House of Commons, about two years ago, that this would be the case; and that we should, even then, begin to prepare for it. Mr. CANNING laughed at him, just as Mr. Pitt used to laugh, or rather grin, at the predictions of Mr. Fox; but, now, as then, the thing

sons, as to prevent a French force of great amount from reaching England, and especially Ireland. These are the true questions for us to discuss, and not the question of personal bravery, though one cannot refrain from observing, that, of the sailors of our fleet, a full fourth part are supposed not to be the "hardy sons of Britain," but

laughed at is about to be verified.Napoleon has subdued all the continent except Spain and Portugal, which do not require a fourth part of his military means. He has nothing to fear on the side of the land. He has got firm possession of all the North of Europe, its harbours, roads, and fleets; and he now, as was natural to expect, and as was anticipated and fore-foreigners; and, that of the natives on told by more than enough of us, he is making preparations for his last labour, the subjugation of these islands. That he has an abundance of the means of making and of fitting out ships of war all the world knows; that he has all these, subject to no interception or delay is notorious; that he has already made great progress in building a navy is not less notorious; we have seen before how he has collected great numbers of seamen in Holland and the Hans Towns, and now we see his regular, settled, permanent, efficient, and infallible system, for raising seamen in France and for keeping his navy replenished.--Of this system it behoves us to consider the natural effects, and not to suffer our minds to be withdrawn from it by empty effusions of invective like the following in the Morning Post of the 10th instant." We "have already noticed Buonaparte's new "plan for the amelioration of his Marine. "Forty thousand children are to be dragged " from their parents, and to be placed at "the disposal of the Minister of the Ma"rine; and by a new Conscription, one "hundred and twenty thousand men are "to be forced into the army; and, the "People of France submit to these dread"ful privations, not to insure the safety or "to promote the interests of their country, but to gratify the ambition of one individual, and that individual a foreigner! "In order to raise the above forty "thousand a seizure is to take place of "children between the ages of 13 and "16, to be trained to evolutions and "manœuvres on flotillas in the roadsteads " of France! Will the hardy Sons of Bri“ tuin trained on the bosom of the element "submitted to their rule, be ever backward " to face the sailors of this new school ?” – No: I trust not. But, the question is not whether the hardy sons of Britain will be backward to face them; but, whether enough of these hardy sons can be found and maintained afloat to cope with all the force, that, in a short time, France will be able to send forth against them; and not that only, but whether they will be able so completely to cover the sea, at all sea

board our ships of war, a full half were at first taken from the land without ever having been at sea.--The nation heard, one would think, enough of this big, empty talk, about the hardy sons of Britain from Mr. Pitt, to put them upon their guard against it. All the feeders upon the taxes talk in this strain. Their object is to keep the peo ple hood-winked to the last moment. They are snug. They live upon the system. And, as long as they can persuade the people that there is no danger of the country being invaded and subdued, they suppose that they themselves are safe from the dangers of being called to account. If they were to acknowledge the danger from without, it is obvious, that they would be asked how this danger came; from what cause it arose; whose measures and what system have led to it? This would be extremely inconvenient for them. They see very clearly the tendency of such questions; and, therefore, they are always painting prospects in the most flowery dress. They affect to laugh at Buonaparté; but they never fail to utter invectives against, and, if they succeed in making the people join them in these, their work is, for the time, half done; for their hatred of him supplies the place of hatred of them. Just as if we can, with any show of reason blame Buonaparté for doing what he is able against us. We should have laughed at the whimpering of the French, if they had uttered invectives against us for taking Va lenciennes or capturing their Sugar Islands. Lord Melville and his worthy associates told us, that this latter was a true British object. And, is it not childish in the extreme in us to utter invectives against Buonaparté, because he has laid a plan, and digested a system for the ruin of us? Just as if that were not a true French object ?—— The commiseration expressed by this venal writer for the French people; his affectionate regard for them; his tender concern for the poor children, who are to be torn from the bosoms of their weeping mothers to be sent on board of ship; all this is most despicably ridiculous; it is hypocrisy of the meanest, most contemptible

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kind. But, any thing; laughing or crying, canting or cursing, any thing in the world to draw the attention of the people from" the dangers that menace them; because, as I said before, if they see those dangers, in their real character and magnitude, their minds must necessarily be turned towards inquiries into the cause; and the feeders upon the taxes well know to what those inquiries must lead. The trick, however, cannot long succeed. The danger must be seen first or last; and, the longer it is delayed, the more fatal will be the conse quences.

HOLLAND, AND THE HANSE TOWNS.In another part of this Number (if there be room, and, if not, in the next Number) will be found a report of a committee of the French Conservative Senate upon the subject of the annexation of Holland and the Hans Towns to France.--There is nothing new here in the plan or execution; but here are the reasons set forth; and, I would recommend this paper to the reader's particular attention. For, shift off the matter how we will, it must come home to us at last; we must look it in the face; and when that time comes, we shall be all aghast, unless we be duly prepared for it by previous reflection and discussion. Upon this subject, too, we resort to invective; a specimen of which I here give from the Times of the 11th instant."The public was before acquainted with "the organic Senatus-consultum, as it is "called, by which Holland is to be united "with France: we now publish what may "be esteemed Buonaparte's official de"fence of that atrocious and cruel act, con"tained in a Report or Address made by "the Chairman of the Committee on the "measure to the Senate. This is an inte"resting, and, in part, an eloquent paper, "save that it wants the best principles of "eloquence; truth, and the defence of a just cause. The annexation of Holland " is now most necessary, says the Orator, "because, from the first conquest of that "country by the Republican Armies, ""there has not passed a single day, "when her union with the French em""pire would not have been an invalua""ble benefit, since she would have been ""spared a long series of privations, of "" losses and misfortunes." Can any "thing be so aggravating as this; to tell "a people that they have been so harrass"ed, tortured, and oppressed by a tyrant, "that the greatest of all evils, as they ap

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"prehend, namely, the merging their country in the dominions of that tyrant, is perfect happiness when contrasted "with the misery which he has hitherto "inflicted on them?" The public debt ""not having received that immense in""crease to which it has latterly arrived, might have been saved from ship""wreck: enormous charges would not ""for fifteen years have weighed down "" these countries." And who has in"creased the public debt of Holland to so "enormous an extent? Who has crushed "her by such excessive charges but Buo

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naparte himself, who now urges these her "sufferings as a justification of this last of

wrongs, the loss of her name and existence "as a nation."- -Now, of what avail are these invectives? And, indeed, how are they justified? Napoleon takes Holland and does what he pleases with it. I am sorry that he, or that any man, or set of men (for it is, in fact, the same thing), should have the power of doing what they please with any people; but, he holds Holland by the right of conquest, and it is quite wearisome and disgusting to hear invectives against him for appropriating Holland to his own purposes, while it is notorious that we have taken and appropriated to our own purposes so many Islands, and, in Asia, so many Kingdoms or Principalities. It is quite disgusting to hear this; and I am surprized when I meet with any thing of the sort in a print like the TIMES, the editor of which ought to know, that, at the very least, such invectives must tend to withdraw the minds of his readers from the proper view of the subject.--Besides, there are circumstances in the case of Holland, which call for a train of observation of a very different sort.--We see this Holland, which was once able to cope with England upon the sea, now reduced to the state of a French Department. We see her garrisons filled with foreign troops; her offices occupied by foreigners; we see her, in a word, a conquered country.Now, what is the kind of reflections that this fall of Holland is calculated to awaken in the mind of a man whose observations are committed to print for the information or instruction of the public? Not, surely, the kind which this writer has indulged in; not reflections on the character of Napoleon's measures towards Holland; not unavailing lamentations over her fate, and quite as unavailing invectives against her conqueror. No: the reflections which naturally present themselves to a mind not

hurried away by present objects, to a mind | that does not skim upon the surface of things; the reflections, which in the contemplation of the state of Holland, present themselves to such a mind, turn upon the cause, or causes, of what it contemplates. To utter invectives against Napoleon, upon this score, has no more sense in it than there would be in uttering invectives against a wolf, which, in consequence of the fold having been left unprotected, should be found to have mangled the flock. Holland has been conquered by France. Napoleon found her conquered to his hands. He has, as was to be expected, treated her as a conquered nation. There is, therefore, no ground for surprize here. We do what we like with the countries that we conquer. We call the conquered dominions ours. Whether we treat the conquered people in India better than he does the Dutch is quite another question; but it is a question in which we have no interest at all. The question for our consideration, is, what was the cause of Holland being conquered by France, and that, too, in spite of the power of England? What enabled France to make this conquest? Holland and England were formerly able to dictate to France. What was it, then, that produced such a change as to enable France to make a complete and absolute conquest of Holland, and to do those things towards her, which are merely the natural consequences of that conquest?-Am I told, in the old Pitt strain," that the vol"cano of the French revolution, bursting "forth in every direction, spread its de"vouring lava over the States of Holland?" Is this old bombastical rant, this contemptible fustian to be an answer to my question? If it is, let me ask why our advice was not taken, and a little Spanish and Portuguese lava let loose against the French armies? If volcanic revolution be such famous means of conquering foreign countries, one would think that a little of it might be of use for home defence. But, this was all nonsense, or, rather, deception. It was invective intended to divert the public mind from the real facts, and from sober reasoning upon those facts. -It was not the volcano of the French revolution; it was not lava by which Holland was conquered; it was by men and muskets and bayonets and cannons and powder and ball. But, how did it come to pass, that the Dutch did not use these for the defence of their country? How came that to be ? “Oh! why...hem...ha...hem."

What? I ask you how that came to be? I ask you how it came to pass; that Holland, assisted by England, was unable to defend herself against men and muskets and cannons, having so many rivers and fortresses between her and the enemy.

"Oh! why...there were traitors in Holland...and...the people were not true to themselves."--Very well! But, how came that to be? How came there to be traitors in Holland? And how came these traitors to be so powerful as to prevent the Dutch from fighting in defence of this country? If, indeed, the people were not true to themselves, that accounts for the conquest at once, without any reference to the powers of volcanos and lava. But, here again we must push on upwards to the cause. What made the people not true to themselves? Special brutes they must be, if they were traitors to themselves. Pity, indeed! Talk to me not of pity for wretches who were so false in their nature as to be false to themselves.You mean to their government. In any other way your words have no meaning. They are nonsense. Well, then, what made the people not true to their government? What was the cause of this? There is no effect without an adequate cause. What made them so act, that the French found no difficulty in conquering their country? What made them stand cool spectators of the conquest ? This is what we should inquire into. This is what no one ever thinks of exposing to our view. Yet, this is the only point, in which we are at all interested. But, the truth is, that the answering of this question would not suit the views of those who are striving might and main to divert our minds from the real cause by invectives against the conqueror and by pitious descriptions of the situation of the people.

-The real cause of the conquest of Holland by France, and, of course, of all the evils, to Holland and to England, which have followed that conquest, is to be found in the transactions of 1785, and the two or three subsequent years, when the people of Holland, after a long and obstinate struggle for their rights, or what they said were their rights, were reduced to submission by the introduction of a foreign army, and compelled, by maiitary force, to yield to the will of the government. This is the interesting point with the man who reflects. It is not the treatment, or the condition, of Holland now; but the cause which produced this state of things. A minute history of

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