before. But, in talking about giving up the country to the enemy, we have forgotten there might, in the case of reform, have been no enemy to give the country up to. If a reform had taken place the reformers would, of course, have been contented, and, consequently, would have wanted no enemy to subdue their country. "Aye, "but, give them an inch and they will "take an ell. They would not have "stopped with a reform of parliament. have been the situation of the country if reform had been granted in 1793; but, it is fair to presume, I think, that a course the contrary of that which has been pursued would have produced contrary effects, or, at least, that it might have done so. What worse could have happened than that which has happened, it would, I think, puzzle any man to imagine. Where is there a Prince in Europe, formerly our ally, who could have lost more or suffered greater disgrace, than every Prince in Eu-They would have had a republic.". rope, our ally, has lost and suffered? How I do not believe this; but, suppose it to could the Reformers, if they had obtained be true, it makes nothing for the argument; their ends, have put Europe more com- for, having formed their country into a repletely into the hands of France than it public there would have been the less reanow is? Could they have laid more or son for their being at war with the repubheavier taxes upon the people of Eng- licans of France. Indeed, upon that Jand? Could they have cut out, prettier supposition, it is downright absurdity work for the Bullion Committee? Could to talk of an enemy, seeing that there they have made gold and silver more would not have been the smallest chance scarce?I shall be told, perhaps, that of war; and, if a war had, under such they would have done worse than all this, circumstances, taken place, it is imfor that they would have delivered up the possible to conceive a motive for givcountry to the enemy.It is useless to ing the country up to the enemy; for, oppose assertion by assertion, or, I would more than a republic the reformers could say, that they would not have done it. not have got.- -But, though this should But, why is it to be supposed that they be conceded to me, it may be said, that, if would have done this? Where is the reason the reformers had got power, they would for it? The very worst that was said of have taken the property from the rich and them was, that they resembled the Jaco-given it to the poor, as was done in France. bins and Levellers of France; and, the Jacobins and Levellers of France did not give up their country to the enemy, though the Princes of the blood royal, the nobility, the generals, and the admirals, all went off and left them to defend the country themselves, without army, without navy, without government, and without law. In this state they did a great many foolish and horrid acts; but they did not give up their country to the enemy; but, on the contrary, they met their scores of enemies almost with their bare breasts, they resisted, they overcame, they subdued, and they finally conquered those enemies. Numerous were their follies and their crimes; but never did they, for one moment, let fall a word that seemed to say it was possible for them to give up their country to the enemy. So, then, if the charge against the Reformers was true, that they were like the Jacobins and Levellers of France, and would act like them, it follows, of course, that they would have defended England in case of her being attacked; that they would have subdued those who had dared to attack her; and that they would have raised the glory of their country far higher than it ever was -It is strange what notions people imbibe upon this score for the want of a little reflection; for, it requires but a very little indeed to convince them, that this is what never can be done. In the first place for men in power to wish to do this there is no reason whatever; there is no motive for it; and, if it were done, it would answer no levelling purpose; because the poor would merely change places with the rich. It is possible, indeed, to take the large estates and parcel them out in the way of donations to the people at large; but, if this were practicable, and if it had been done by the Reformers, that, at any rate, would not have ruined the people, and the common people would have had no reason to complain. Such an idea is, however, most grossly absurd. It is what was never attempted by the wildest of republicans. In France they seized upon the royal domains and upon the estates of the Church and of the Emigrant Nobility, who were at war against France; they seized upon these and sold them; but, those who remained in France continued and still continue to possess their property. And, if this was the case in France, during so terrible a convulsion as there took place, ! what ground is there to suppose, that the reformers in England, if they had obtained power, would have acted worse, and especially if you reflect, that they would have had nothing to annoy and provoke them?--Those who have an interest in preventing a reform in the parliament always affect to look upon the reformers as men who have nothing. It is false; but, for argument's sake, let it be so; and then point me out an instance where they have rejected the co-operation of the nobility and gentry of the kingdom. Point me out an instance, where they have failed to demonstrate their pleasure at seeing such persons engaged in the cause. Point me out an instance where they have failed to show their gratitude to the full extent for any aid that they have received from such persons. And, surely, if wisdom were the guide of the noblemen and gentlemen of England, they would put themselves at the head of the reformers. The thing would, then, soon be done, and where would, in that case, be the danger to property?This would be the natural course of things. All would then be in their proper place. Nothing need be destroyed or impaired but that which is an injury and a dishonour to the nation. The people, if they were to obtain a reform of parliament, would, notwithstanding all that has passed, never complain of their hardships. They would tug heartly on to the end of the war; and, an end to the war there would then be; but, now, who can say, that he sees the possibility of putting an end to the war? Our internal state is known full as well to our enemy as it is to ourselves. This great cause of the people of England is as well understood by him as by any of us; and, while it remains unsuccessful, he will, I am convinced, never again be disposed for peace. It is not a battle or fifty battles, in Spain and Portugal, that will put an end to this war. Such battles, even suppose them to terminate in real victories, have not, and will never have, the smallest influence upon the contest in general. Napoleon is now at war for the soil of England and Ireland; and, when such is his object, of what import are the battles of Almeida and of Badajoz? A fifth or a sixth part of his army is sent to give employment to the whole of the force that we can spare from our shores. Leopards are destroyed by hanging kettles of food upon the lower limbs of trees, at which they keep jumping 'till they drop down exhausted, when the shepherds run in and end them with their clubs. The building of one French ship at Antwerp, or any where else in the ports of the French empire, is of more consequence to Napoleon than ten battles in Spain. Time is always working for him, and against us, The people of his empire have no fears to distract them; they are in no crisis; they are in perfect safety; his affairs do not press; every day his situation is improv ing; the longer the war in the peninsula the better for him.-Is this our state? It is notoriously the contrary. When Mr. BARING speaks of the necessity of contracting our expenditure, he does not say how it is to be done. It is to be done by diminishing the paid force, and by putting arms into the hands of all the people, and by relieving the government from the necessity of yielding to greedy demands. In this way, and in this way only, is a reduction in the Expenditure to take place, and whether this mode of retrenchment can be adopted without a Parliamentary Reform I leave the reader to judge. A reform in the Commons House of Parliament is as much the cause of the king and his family as it is the Cause of the people. They are all alike interested in it; and, I trust, it is not too much to hope, that his Royal Highness, the Prince, who has never yet shewn himself an enemy to it, will, whenever the occasion offers, shew himself to be its most cordial, as he may be its most powerful, friend. WM. COBBETT. State Prison, Newgate, Tuesday, 4th June, 1811. From the Friends of the People, 26th April, 1811. ADDRESS TO THE PEOPLE OF GREAT BRITAIN. No man, who is not ready to expres his concurrence in our principles, by signing the Declaration, can be admitted into our Society. The objects of it, as we conceive, are of a nature at all times fit to be pursued and recommended to the country. At different periods they have heretofore been avowed and supported by the highest authorities in this kingdom:by eminent individuals, and considerable bodies of men; by Mr. Locke and Judge Blackstone; by the late Earl of Chatham and Sir George Saville; by the Duke of Richmond, the Marquis of Lansdowne, that it is our duty to wait for the return of quiet days, unless we mean to create or increase confusion in the country. The result of this dilemma, if it be suffered to prevail, is pure and absolute inactivity at present, and for ever. On the other hand, if it be true, as we are convinced it is, that, in this general appearance of tranquillity, there is some mixture of discontent, as well as of strong and well Mr. Pitt, and Mr. Fox; by petitions from several counties, and by repeated declarations from the city of London.-In appealing to the avowed opinions of men of established reputation, or of distinguished rank in their country, we do not mean to strengthen the reason, or enforce the necessity of the measure we propose, so much as to obviate all personal imputations, which the enemies of the cause will be ready to throw upon those who sup-grounded opinion, on the subject of abuses port it. It is not that, on our own account, we dread the effect, or regard the impression, which such imputations may produce; but we think it material to the credit and success of our proceedings, to shew that we are not aiming at reforms unthought of by wise and virtuous men : that our opinions neither possess the advantage, nor are liable to the objection of novelty; and that we cannot be accused or suspected of factious purposes or dangerous designs, without extending the same accusation or suspicion to the motives of men whose situation and property, independent of their character, principles, and abilities, have given them a most important stake in the peace and good government of the kingdom. in the government and corruptions of the constitution, we wish it to be considered by men, whose judgment has been formed or enlightened by experience, and whose actions are most likely to be directed by prudence, whether, in taking proper measures to remove the cause and objects of such discontent of opinion, the choice of the time be not a material part of the measure; and whether the earliest time that can be taken, for preventing the increase of an existing evil, be not the safest and the best? The example and situation of another kingdom, are held out to deter us from innovations of any kind. We say, that the reforms we have in view, are not innovations. Our intention is, not to change, but to restore; not to displace, but to re-instate the constitution upon its true principles and its original ground. Convinced by our own reflections, by experience, and by authority, that the thing we propose to do is fit to be done, we have, with equal deliberation, weigh-In the conduct of persons most likely to ed the reasons that may recommend or be objected to the present time, as the most or least proper for bringing it forward. On this point, we have no address to make to the determined enemies of a reform of every kind. Their objection, whether valid or not, is to the substance of the measure, and cannot be abated by circumstances. To those who concur generally in the principle, but who may be inclined, by particular reasons, to defer the attempt, we seriously wish to submit the following considerations:-That admitting this to be a season of general tranquillity in the country, it is, on that account, the more proper for temperate reflection and prudent exertions, to accomplish any necessary improvement; it is the time when practical measures for that purpose are most likely to be adopted with discretion, and pursued with moderation. If we are persuaded to wait for other times, of a different complexion, for times of public complaint, or general discontent, we shall then be told, that general remedies are not fit to be proposed in the moment of particular disorder, and reproach us with a spirit of innovation, we see a solid ground for retorting the imputation. Their professions of admiration of the beauty, and of zeal for the security of the constitution, appear to us too lavish to be sincere, especially when compared with those practical violations with which they suffer this beautiful system to be invaded, and to which they never refuse to give their concurrence. They will not innovate, but they are no enemies to gradual decay; as if the changes insensibly produced by time, and nourished by neglect, were not in effect the most dangerous innovations. But what security have we, that the disposi tions of such men are not something worse than passive? How are we assured that, in praising the constitution, their intention is not to adorn a victim which they wish to sacrifice, or to flatter the beauty they are endeavouring to corrupt? Let their intention be what it may, we answer their accusation in the words of one of the wisest of mankind:* * Lord Bacon. "That time is the greatest innovator; and if time, of course, alter things for the worse, and if wisdom and counsel shall not alter them for the better, what shall be the end?" inseparable from such convulsions. If there be, as it is said, in any part of this kingdom, a disposition to promote confu fusion, or even to arrive at improvement by unconstitutional and irregular courses, we hold ourselves as strictly pledged to resist that disposition, wherever it may appear, as to pursue our objects by unex, ceptionable methods. If, on the con By the reform proposed by Lord Chatham*, he declared in the House of Lords, that he meant to infuse a portion of new health into the constitution. The Duke of Richinond has declared†, that " his rea-trary, it be true that the mass of the peo sons, in favour of a parliamentary reform were formed on the experience of twentysix years; which, whether in or out of government, had equally convinced him, that the restoration of a genuine House of Commons, by a renovation of the rights of the people, was the only remedy against that system of corruption which had brought the nation to disgrace and poverty, and threatened it with the loss of liberty." Other authorities in favour of a parliamentary reform, as direct and explicit as these, might be quoted in abundance. The public is possessed of them. We rather wish to encounter, because we are sure we can efface, in every rational mind, the impression, which may have been made by a view of those events which have attended a total change in the constitution of France. We deny the existence of any resemblance whatever between the cases of the two kingdoms; and we utterly disclaim the necessity of resorting to similar remedies.-We do not believe that, at this day, an absolute avowed despotism in the hands of the executive power, would be endured in this country. But who can say to what conclusion the silent unresisted operation of abuses, incessantly acting, and constantly increasing, may lead us hereafter! what habits it may gradually create! What power it may finally establish! The abuses in the government of France were suffered to gather and accumulate, until nothing but an eruption could put an end to them. The discontent of the people was converted into despair. Preventive remedies were either not thought of in time, or were not proposed until it was too late to apply them with effect. The subversion of the ancient government ensued. The inference from this compari son is at once so powerful and so obvious, that we know not by what argument to illustrate or enforce it. We mean to avert for ever from our country the calamities ple are satisfied with the present state of things, or indifferent about it; if they ap prove of the representation as it stands, the form of election, and the duration of the trust; or if, condemning these things, they are determined, from indolence or despair, not to attempt to correct them,then indeed the efforts of individuals may be ineffectual, but they cannot be inju rious to the peace of the community. If the spirit of the constitution be dead in the hearts of the people, no human indus, try can revive it-To affirm that exten sive mischief may be done by a state. ment of facts or arguments which make no general impression on the public mind, is a proposition that contradicts itself, and requires no other refutation. We trust it will be proved by experiment, that these inconsistent assertions are equally unfounded, and that the people of this country are no more disposed to submit to abuses without complaint, than to look for redress in any proceedings repugnant to the laws, or unwarranted by the con stitution. Between anarchy and despotism, speaking for ourselves, we have no choice to make; we have no preference to give. We neither admit the necessity, nor can we endure the idea of resorting to either of these extremities as a refuge from the other. The course we are determined to pursue, is equally distant from both. Finally, we assert, that it must be blindness not to see, and treachery not to acknowledge, That "the instruments of power are not perhaps so open and avowed as they formerly were, and therefore are the less liable to jealous and invidious reflections; but they are not the weaker upon that account. In short, our national debts and taxes have, in their natural consequences, thrown such a weight of power into the executive scale of government, as we cannot think was intended by our patriot ancestors, who gloriously struggled - for * Blackstone. the abolition of the then formidable parts of the prerogative, and by an unaccounta, ble want of foresight, established this system in their stead." Our general object is to recover and preserve the true balance of the constitution. These are the principles of our Associa tion, and on our steady adherence to them. we look with just confidence to the approbation and support of the people in the prosecution of our object. A measure, so likely to be opposed by the united strength of various interests, can never succeed but by the declared and hearty concurrence of the nation. Resolved unanimously, That a motion be made in the House of Commons, at an early period in the next session of parliament, for introducing a Parliamentary Reform. Resolved unanimously, That Charles Grey, Esq. be requested to make, and the Hon. Thomas Erskine to second, the above motion. Signed by the unanimous order of this Meeting. W. H. LAMBTON, Chairman. Authentic Copy of a Petition praying for a Reform in Parliament, presented to the House of Commons by Charles Grey, Esq. on Monday, 6th May, 1793; and signed only by the Meinbers of the Society of the Friends of the People, associated for the Purpose of obtaining a Parliamentary Reform. To the Honourable the Commons of Great Britain in Parliament assembled. Sheweth, That by the form and spirit of the British constitution, the king is vested with the sole executive power. That the House of Lords consists of dords spiritual and temporal, deriving their titles and consequence either from the crown, or from hereditary privileges. That these two powers, if they acted without controul, would form either a despotic monarchy, or a dangerous oli garchy. That the wisdom of our ancestors hath !contrived, that these authorities may be rendered not only harmless, but beneficial, › and be exercised for the security and hap. piness of the people. lature; created by, representing, and responsible to the people themselves. That so much depending upon the preservation of this third estate, in such its constitutional purity and strength, your Petitioners are reasonably jealous of whatever may appear to vitiate the one, or to impair the other. That at the present day the House of Commons does not fully and fairly repre sent the people of England, which, consistently with what your Petitioners conceive to be the principles of the constitution, they consider as a grievance, and therefore, with all becoming respect, lay their complaints before your honourable House. That though the terms in which your petitioners state their grievance may be looked upon as strong, yet your honourable House is intreated to believe that no expression is made use of for the purpose of offence. Your Petitioners in affirming that your honourable House is not an adequate representation of the people of England, do but state a fact, which, if the word "Representation" be accepted in its fair and obvious sense, they are ready to prove, and which they think detrimental to their interests, and contrary to the spirit of the constitution. How far this inadequate representation is prejudicial to their interests, your Petitioners apprehend they may be allowed to decide for themselves; but how far it is contrary to the spirit of the constitution, they refer to the consideration of your honourable House. If your honourable House shall be pleased to determine that the people of England ought not to be fully represented, your petitioners pray that such your de termination may be made known, to the end that the people may be apprized of their real situation; but if your honourable House shall conceive that the people are already fully represented, then your petitioners beg leave to call your attention to the following facts: Your Petitioners complain, that the number of representatives assigned to the dif ferent counties is grossly disproportioned to their comparative extent, population, and trade. Your Petitioners complain, that the That this security and happiness are to elective franchise is so partially and un- be looked for in the introduction of a equally distributed, and is in so many in--third estate, distinct from, and a check stances committed to bodies of men of upon the other two branches of the legis-such very limited numbers, that the ma |