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of the financial illumination of the spirit. I am, Sir, &c. W. F. S.-Lincoln's Inn, April 27, 1811.

PROPOSITIONS RESPECTING MONEY, BULLION AND EXCHANGES.-26th April 1811.

I. That the right of establishing and regulating the legal Money of this Kingdom hath at all times been a royal prerogative, vested in the sovereigns thereof, who have from time to time exercised the same as they have seen fit, in changing such legal Money, or altering and varying the value, and enforcing or restraining the circulation thereof, by Proclamation, or in concurrence with the Estates of the Realm by Act of Parliament: and that such legal Money cannot lawfully be defaced, melted down or exported.

II. That the Promissory Notes of the Governor and Company of the Bank of England are engagements to pay certain sums of Money in the legal Coin of this Kingdom; and that for more than a century past, the said Governor and Company were at all times ready to discharge such Promissory Notes in legal Coin of the Realm, until restrained from so doing on the 25th of February 1797, by his Majesty's Order in Council, confirmed by Act of Parliament.

III. That the Promissory Notes of the said Company have hitherto been, and are at this time, held to be equivalent to the legal Coin of the Realm, in all pecuniary transactions to which such Coin is legally applicable.

IV. That at various periods, as well before as since the said Restriction, the exchanges between Great Britain and several other countries have been unfavourable to Great Britain: and that during such periods, the prices of Gold and Silver Bullion, especially of such Gold Bullion as could be legally exported, have frequently risen above the Mint price; and the coinage of Money at the Mint has been either wholly suspended or greatly diminished in amount: and that such circumstances have usually occurred, when expensive naval and military operations have been carried on abroad, and in times of public danger or alarm, or when large importations of Grain from foreign parts have taken place.

V. That such unfavourable Exchanges, and rise in the price of Bullion, occurred to a greater or less degree during the wars carried on by King William the 3rd and

Queen Ann; and also during part of the seven years war, and of the American war; and during the war and scarcity of grain in 1795 and 1796, when the difficulty increased to such a degree, that on the 25th of February 1797, the Bank of England was restrained from making payments in cash by his Majesty's Order in Council, confirmed and continued to the present time by divers Acts of Parliament; and the Exchanges became afterwards still more unfavourable, and the price of Bullion higher, during the scarcity which prevailed for two years previous to the Peace of Amiens.

VI. That during the period of 75 years, ending with the 1st of January 1796, and previous to the aforesaid restriction whereof, with the exception of some small intervals, accounts are before the House, the price of Standard Gold in bars has been at or under the Mint price 34 years and 5 months; and above the said Mint price 39 years and 7 months; and that the price of foreign Gold Coin has been at or under 31. 18s. per oz. 31 years and 2 months, and above the said price 42 years and 10 months. And that during the same period of 75 years, the price of standard Silver appears to have been at or under the Mint price, 3 years and 2 months only.

VII. That the unfavourable state of the Exchanges, and the high price of Bullion, do not, in any of the instances above referred to, appear to have been produced by the restriction upon Cash payments at the Bank of England, or by any excess in the issue of Bank Notes; inasmuch as all the said instances, except the last, occurred previously to any restriction on such Cash payments; and because, so far as appears by such information as has been procured, the price of Bullion has frequently been highest, and the exchanges most unfavourable, at periods, when the issues of Bank Notes have been considerably diminished, and to have been afterwards restored to their ordinary rates, although those issues have been increased.

VIII. That during the latter part and for sometime after the close of the American war, during the years 1781, 1782 and 1783, the exchange with Hamburgh fell from 34. 1 to 31.5, being about 8 per cent.; and the price of foreign gold rose from 31. 17s. 6d. to 4l. 2s. 3d. per oz. and the price of Dollars from 5s. 44d. per oz. to 5s. 114d. and that the Bank Notes in circulation were reduced between March

1782 and December 1782, from 9,160,000l. | referred to, previous to the commenceto 5,995,000l. being a diminution of above ment of the war with France in 1793, the one third, and continued (with occasional principal States of Europe preserved their variations) at such reduced rate until De-independance, and the trade and correscember 1784: and that the exchange pondence thereof were carried on conwith Hamburgh rose to 34. 6, and the formably to the accustomed law of naprice of gold fell to 31. 17s. 6d. and Dol- tions; and that although from the time of lars to 55. 1d. per oz. before the 25th the invasion of Holland by the French in February 1787, the amount of Bank Notes 1795, the trade of Great Britain with the being then increased to 8,688,000!. Continent was in part circumscribed and interrupted, it was carried on freely with several of the most considerable ports, and commercial correspondence was maintained at all times previous to the summer of 1807.

IX. That the amount of Bank Notes in February 1787 was 8,688,000l. and in February 1791 11,699,000l.; and that during the same period, the sum of 10,704,000l. was coined in Gold; and that the exchange with Hamburgh rose about 3 per cent.

X. That between the 25th of February 1795, and the 25th of February 1797, the amount of Bank Notes was reduced from 13,539,000l. to 8,640,000l. during which time the exchange with Hamburgh fell from 36 to 35, being about 3 per cent., and the said amount was increased to 11,855,000l. exclusive of 1,542,000l. in Notes of 11. and 21. each on the 1st of February 1798, during which time the exchange rose to 38. 2, being about 9 per

cent.

XI.-That the average price of Wheat per quarter in England, in the year 1798 was 50s. 3d.; in 1799, 67s. 5d.; in 1800, 113s. 7d.; in 1801, 118s. 3d.; and in 1802, 67s. 5d.

XIII. That since the month of November 1806, and especially since the summer of 1807, a system of exclusion has been established against the British trade on the Continent of Europe, under the influence and terror of the French power, and enforced with a degree of violence and rigor never before attempted; whereby all trade and correspondence between Britain and the continent of Europe has (with some occasional exceptions, chiefly in Sweden and in certain parts of Spain and Portugal) been hazardous, precarious and expensive, the trade being loaded with excessive freights to foreign shipping, and other unusual charges: and that the trade of Britain with the United States of America has also been uncertain and interrupted; and that in addition to these circumstances, which have greatly

The amount of Bank Notes, of 51. and up- affected the course of payments between

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this country and other nations, the Naval and Military Expenditure of the United Kingdom in foreign parts, has for three years past, been very great; and the price of Grain, owing to a deficiency in the crops, higher than at any time, whereof the accounts appear before Parliament, except during the scarcity of 1800 and 1801; and that large quantities thereof have been imported.

XIV. That the amount of Currency necessary for carrying on the transactions of the Country, must bear a proportion to the extent of its Trade and its public Revenue and Expenditure; and that the annual amount of the Exports and Imports of Great Britain, on an average of three years, ending 5th of January 1797, was 51,199,1414. official value; the average amount of Revenue paid into the Exchequer, including the Profit on the Lottery, 19,495,9451.; and the average amount of the Total Expenditure of Great Britain, 42,855,1117.; and that the average amount

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POLITICAL REGISTER.-Aphorisms relative to Public Currency.

of Bank Notes in circulation (all of which were for 51. or upwards) was about 11,262,000l.; and that 57,274,6171. had been coined in gold during his Majesty's reign, of which a large sum was then in circulation.

That the annual amount of the Exports and Imports of Great Britain, on an average of three years, ending 5th January 1810, was 70,554,719.; the average amount of Duties paid into the Exchequer 59,960,5251.; and the average amount of the Total Expenditure of Great Britain, 77,802,6741.; and that the amount of Bank Notes, above 51. on an average of the years 1808 and 1809, was 13,763,000l.; and of Notes under 51. about 4,500,000l.; and that the amount of Gold Coin in circulation was greatly diminished..

XV. That the situation of this Kingdom, in respect of its political and commercial relations with foreign countries, as above stated, is sufficient, without any change in the internal value of its currency, to account for the unfavourable state of the foreign Exchanges, and for the high price of Bullion.

XVI. That it is highly important that the restriction on the payments in Cash of the Bank of England, should be removed, whenever the political and commercial relations of the Country shall render it compatible with the public interest.

XVII. That under the circumstances affecting the political and commercial relations of this Kingdom with foreign Countries, it would be highly inexpedient and dangerous, now to fix a definite period for the removal of the restriction of Cash Payments at the Bank of England, prior to the conclusion of a definitive treaty of peace.

APHORISMS,

RELATIVE TO PUBLIC CURRENCY AND CREDIT.

By Sir Richard Phillips.

1. Currency is the medium by which the interchange of commodities is effected, and, being intended to pass as the representative of property, it ought to be of intrinsic value, and always worth the property which it represents.

2. The stability and intrinsic worth of currency is the foundation of the commercial system, and the basis of public confidence in all transactions and considerations relative to property.

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3. Gold and silver are among civilized nations the common medium or homogeneous representative of commodities, on account of their beauty, their durability, their susceptibility of being coined, and their intrinsic and absolute worth, arising from the labour expended in procuring them at the mines.

4. Paper, or arbitrary currency, as the result of local or national convention, and as the creature of the will of man, is subject to the fluctuations of public confidence, and liable to the errors and miscalculations which attend all human combinations and arrangements.

5. The circulation of the precious metals, effected by exchanging them for commodities, is natural and regular, while the circulation of artificial currency is necessarily forced, unnatural, and irregular. The one is in its origin the representative of labour, and can only be obtained for property; while a paper, or arbitrary currency, is generally but the representative of credit, and may be obtained by artifice or intrigue.

6. Capital is the basis of trade and social intercourse, when the currency consists of the precious metals; but credit, address, and intrigue, stand in the place of capital, when the national currency can be created, extended, and issued at pleasure.

7. The nominal and relative value of all property will be in proportion to the amount of the currency employed in the circulation of that property; and this can only find its true level when the currency itself, in all the stages of its circulation, is the special representative of transferred property. Increase the amount of the currency, and all commodities will rise in nominal value; or make it bear unequally on particular kinds of property, and these will attain a factitious or unnatural price.

8. The novel mode of putting artificial currency into circulation, by discounting bills or promissory notes, is objectionable and pernicious, because such bills and notes essentially represent nothing but the credit of the parties, may be created at pleasure, and are often likely to represent no real transaction of which commodities are the basis.

9. Such novel mode of issuing the na tional currency in exchange for notes and bills, affords an undue and dangerous influence to speculators, middle-men, and monopolists, who, to enhance their gains, will not hesitate to increase their accep

tances and indorsements, as the means of raising an indefinite capital, and thereby of indefinitely extending their speculations. 10. The security of the public against speculators being the natural limits of their capital, it is evident that if, under a system of paper currency, they are enabled to raise unbounded capitals by creating and discounting bills and notes, they will be enabled to accumulate indefinite stocks; and being under no obligation to sell for want of currency, the prices of such property can have no limit besides the conscience and the prudence of the speculators.

11. The hydra of monopoly will therefore have as many heads as there are manufactories, or fountains, of paper currency; a colossal head, representing the metropolitan manufactory, and five hundred other heads, generated by the small manufactories which spread over all parts of the empire, serve as the convenient and necessary engines of monopolists and speculators.

12. As long as the paper currency is simply and solely the representative of specie, and can therefore be exchanged for specie at pleasure, no preference will exist in the public mind in favour of specie; but, as soon as the re-conversion becomes matter of difficulty, a preference will be universally felt; and, as an affair of self-security, every one will hoard specie, to guard his family against the possible contingencies of a vague paper

currency.

13. From this feeling arises the present scarcity of specie; the usual quantity having been about twenty-five millions, and the number of families, or inhabited houses, in the United Kingdom, being about three millions, a hoard of eight pounds to a house will account for its total disappearance, without referring to the temptations afforded to foreign traders, to speculating exporters, to subsidies to foreign powers, and to numerous mal-practices of Jews and money dealers.

14. As long as the cause exists which led to the preference of specie over paper, and to the system of hoarding, specie will continue scarce, and will be likely to rise in nominal value, relatively to Bank notes and paper currency: but as soon as paper can be converted on demand into specie, the preference in favour of specie will cease, the hoards will be opened, and specie will become as plentiful as heretofore.

15. The power of Jews and moneydealers to speculate in the specie, and affect its value, will always be in the inverse ratio of the quantity in circulation; and their controul would cease, if the grounds of the hoarding system were removed, and the Bank paid their notes in specie, when the amount of the specie in circulation would of course exceed the compass of their capitals.

16. The Bank of England being the fulcrum on which are balanced the fortunes of the country, it appears to be expedient, at this crisis, to place it under the vigilant controul of a Committee of Parliament; and the private property of the Directors and of the Bank Company, or the pledge of Parliament, ought to be committed to the public as a security for the notes of the Company now in circulation.

17. In like manner, country bankers, who issue paper currency, ought to be called upon to give landed security for the amount of their issues; and these companies, as well as the company of the Bank of England, ought to pay a half rate of interest to the revenue, for the sums which, by the issue of paper currency, they now borrow of the public without interest.

18. The alternative to prevent greater, perhaps irremediable evils, is to dissolve the existing spell by paying specie on demand for Bank notes. The consequent restoration of public confidence would occasion specie to re-appear in quantities too great to be affected by the inachinations of speculators. Paper and specie would be again at par. The motive to hoard would be destroyed; alarms would be dissipated; and public prosperity would stand once more on a solid and permanent basis.

Chelsea, April 12, 1811.

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'67th, 82d, 87th, and 95th of the line, and the 20 Hussars, to which is added the 20th Portuguese; in all twelve different corps, making fifteen English battalions, which at 500 each, gives a total of 7,500 men, and (including the 20th Portuguese, of 1,000) of 8,500 men in your pay, who were actually engaged."

Letter" Lieut. General Graham, with the troops under his command, had crossed St. Peter's river, and re-entered the Isle of Leon."

could not know the intention of the enemy with respect to this place: but in case he should endeavour to maintain it, I proposed to post myself between him and Badajoz, and thus cut him off from the latter.-We discovered the enemy's advanced cavalry on the heights of Lopo de Matto about a league distant; but perceiving that we were manoeuvring on their flank, they retreated, and some skirmishing took place at the foot of the walls of the town, with the advanced cavalry. Moniteur" General Graham, you em- When I reached the heights of the place, barked at Cadiz on the 25th of February, I discovered the enemy's force on the outand, on the 28th you disembarked at Al-side of the town. I did not, however, gesiras, with your division, and the know whether or not he was master of the Spaniards. Tell us, then, why you under- place. There were four regiments of under-place. took this military promenade, and incurred cavalry, the regiment of infantry No. 100, so large an expence. You intended to of three battalions, with some horse artilturn the line of the Duke of Belluno-have lery.-I ordered Brigadier General Long, you done it? Your design was to raise the with the cavalry, to endeavour to turn the siege of Cadiz; have you done it? If you car- enemy's right, keeping out of the reach ried every thing before you, why did you of the place. My object was to detain stop half way? It was not in the Isle of Leon, the force of the enemy till some infantry but at Chiclana, which is but a very short could arrive. The Brigadier made a wider distance from it, that the field of battle was, circuit than was intended, so that he more where you expected to take up your quarters effectually flanked the enemy, and obliged on the night of the 5th. You would have him to retreat hastily, and indeed with taken 100 pieces of cannon, 60 gun-boats, extraordinary rapidity. The cavalry adand immense magazines, baggage, hos- vanced upon his right flank, and Brigadier pitals, &c. &c. This was the object of General Long, seeing a favourable opporyour expedition-have you attained it? tunity, ordered Colonel Head, with two You were beaten-you lost half your squadrons of the 13th Light Dragoons, to troops and you were very near being charge the cavalry of the enemy, which taken. Your numbers, and the steadiness obliged the infantry to fall back to support of your troops, saved you from entire it. This charge, followed by Col. Otway, ruin. Was it, then, merely for the pur- with two squadrons of the 7th Portuguese, pose of returning to Cadiz that you left and supported by General Long with the it ten days before? Would it not have remainder of that regiment, the 1st Portubeen better that you had remained there?guese and the brigade of Colonel De Grey, You would have had under your command 4,000 more English or Spaniards."

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ford to Lord Talavera, dated Campo Mayor, March 26, 1811.

was made with the most determined courage, and the French were entirely routed, and pursued into the town of Badajoz, two Beres-leagues distant, in which flight the greater conductors and artillerymen of 16 pieces part of them were sabred, as were the of cannon, which were taken on the road, but afterwards abandoned. This success, though it occasioned a great loss to the enemy, was in some manner unfortunate, because, not knowing what had been done by the cavalry that had made the charge, and continuing to pursue the infantry with the remaining cavalry and two pieces of artillery for the space of a league, to support the detached body which had advanced, and not having received any notice from it, nor knowing what new force the enemy might send from Badajoz, prudence obliged me to halt with my cavalry

My Lord;-I had communicated to your Excellency my arrival at Arronches with all my forces, except the division of Brigadier General Cole, to which, in consequence of the continued marches it had made, it was judged necessary to give a day's rest at Portalegre. On the 24th I caused the troops to move from Arronches for Quinta de Reguenga, a little more than half way to this place, and the division of General Cole for Arronches; and having joined yesterday at ten in the morning,

put the whole in motion for this town, I

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