us, the Sanskrit, the classic and the Germanic languages always took the lead.

Not only the extension of knowledge, but also the position taken with regard to phonetic laws, seems characteristic of this period. What I mean is clearly illustrated by a passage from CURTIUS' remarks on the extent of phonetic laws (Ueber die Tragweite der Lautgesetze, Berichte der phil.-histor. Classe der Königl. Süchs. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften, 1870), which is as follows:

"Since the first bold onset of the founders of our science, a younger generation, from 1840 or thereabouts, has had for its watch-word: 'strictest regard for phonetic laws'. The abuses of which even meritorious scholars had been guilty, through the assumption of weakenings, corruptions, mutilations etc., had engendered a well-founded distrust, which inevitably led to a greater strictness and conservatism in this respect. The results of this tendency, which in this sense is a more rigorous one, we can certainly call beneficent. More accurate observation of the phonetic changes and their causes, more careful separation of the individual languages, linguistic periods and linguistic varieties, more definite insight into the origin of many sounds and sound-groups have been attained. In this respect we can see much farther and more clearly than twenty years ago, as is most evident from the fact that many an airy assertion formerly propounded has been recognized as impossible even by its originators."

Finally, we must regard as especially important the attempt to separate the individual languages more strictly from each other. Bopp did not scruple to confirm an asserted phonetic change in Latin by a reference to the Armenian. Such freedom could from this time forth no longer be tolerated. Each separate language must be recognized in its own peculiarities. In this direction the works of GEORG CURTIUS (of whose labors in the general Indo-European field we shall speak later) were of great influence, i. e., his investigations concerning the formation of moods and tenses in Greek and Latin, and his Grundzüge der griechischen Etymologie. It was the aim of this latter book to record the sure gain accruing to Greek etymology from linguistic comparison, and this task

has been, to use AscoLr's words, executed with that masterly power in the use of positive, creative criticism which characterizes the author. Less fortunate were CORSSEN's efforts in the Italic field. BENFEY (Orient & Occident, 1, page 230 seq.) has justly censured the individualizing style of this scholar, whose method of observation must necessarily cause that to be regarded as individually Italic which certainly had belonged to the Indo-European parent speech. Yet it is impossible to deny that CORSSEN, especially in the first edition of his work, where comparison is not so prominent a feature, contributed to the better knowledge of the Italic languages in a way to deserve very considerable credit. (Cf. on this point ASCOLI'S admirable verdict in the Kritische Studien, page IX.)

Many of the attempts of this period (not all, for BENFEY'S school has always gone its own way) are, to a certain extent, summed up in SCHLEICHER'S Compendium. It therefore seems to me expedient just here to devote to SCHLEICHER a somewhat more detailed consideration.

CHAPTER III.

AUGUST SCHLEICHER.

On our first acquaintance with the works of AUGUST SCHLEICHER (born 1821, died 1868) we are compelled to observe that an influence, recognized by himself, was exerted upon this scholar from two fields of science which lie outside the domain of philology, viz., HEGEL's philosophy, of which he was an adherent in his youth, and modern natural science, for which in the latter part of his life he showed a passionate predilection 1). Let us try to define the nature and strength

1) Although the inclination appeared much earlier, lehre der kirchenslawischen Sprache, preface, page VI, note.

cf. Formen

of this influence in general, before we follow SCHLEICHER into the details of his investigations.

At the outset, in the introduction to his first great work, the Sprachvergleichende Untersuchungen (Bonn, 1848), SCHLEICHER shows himself an adherent of HEGEL, as we can see from the ideas he introduces there.

Language (as he explains in detail) is made up of meaning and relation. The former is contained in the root, the latter in the formative syllables. Therefore there can be three and only three classes of languages. Either the meaning alone is designated, as occurs in the isolating languages; or the sound showing the relation [Beziehungslaut] is affixed to the sound showing the meaning [Bedeutungslaut], as happens in the agglutinating languages; or, finally, the two varieties of sounds form the closest union, as in the inflectional languages. A fourth case is not possible, since the Beziehungslaut cannot stand alone. Now three periods of development must correspond to these three norms of the system. We are accordingly compelled to assume that the isolating languages represent the oldest form, that from these have arisen the agglutinating, and from these in turn the inflectional languages, so that the last stage of the process contains the two previous ones. But SCHLEICHER argues further that our actual experience is not in harmony with this theoretical construction, for we find the languages which come within the circle of our experience not in a state of development, but of decomposition; higher forms do not arise before our eyes, but existing ones fall to pieces. Yet since philosophical construction and the result of observation must both claim credence, the inevitable conclusion is that the two processes in question must be located in different periods. Languages were formed in pre-historic times, and are destroyed in historic ones. The making of languages and of history are activities of the human mind which mutually exclude each other.

The above is a condensed reproduction of SCHLEICHER'S reasoning, which recurs, at least partially, in his later works, and was not wholly set aside even by the leaning to natural science which was so strong in his latter years.

This is not the place to criticise these views, whose

weakness is self-evident at the present day, but it may be interesting to observe in how far SCHLEICHER shows himself dependent upon HEGEL. This dependence is evidently slight as regards material. In the first place, the division of language into the three groups mentioned above was not derived from HEGEL, but from experience. SCHLEICHER had worked it out for himself under the guidance of FRIEDRICH SCHLEGEL and WILHELM V. HUMBOLDT. (Cf. the Beiträge of KUHN and SCHLEICHER, 1, page 3, note.) Further, the opinion that inflection sprang from composition followed from BOPP's formanalysis, which SCHLEICHER on the whole favored; and Bopp had likewise originated the theory that it is only possible to observe languages (at least the Indo-European) while in a state of decline. We can therefore recognize the material influence of HEGEL only when SCHLEICHER assumes that in the development of mankind we must distinguish between a pre-historic period, during which the mind was still in dreamy thraldom, and a historical period, in which it awakes to freedom. This classification of human development into a pre-historic and a historical period (language being perfected in the pre-historic period) was always retained by SCHLEICHER, and it is not improbable that this view was induced by HEGEL.

While, therefore, but little of the subject-matter in SCHLEICHER'S writings could be pronounced Hegelian, yet in the early work which was mentioned above, the influence of HEGEL is unmistakable in the formulation of the thoughts and the structure of the argument. This influence waned with SCHLEICHER'S growing maturity, yet we can still feel it in his later works, and trace it here and there, particularly in his terminology.

We accordingly come to the conclusion that the influence of HEGEL's philosophy on SCHLEICHER was only a moderate and comparatively superficial one.

SCHLEICHER took a different position from most philologists in regard to the natural sciences, inasmuch as he really possessed considerable knowledge of them. He was especially versed in botany. According to scientists who knew him, he was celebrated for his admirable preparations for the microscope, as well as for certain productions of horticultural art. As the years went on, these studies and favorite pursuits gained

an ever greater influence upon his philological views. When he walked up and down in his beloved garden, and analyzed forms of speech, the thought must have often occurred to him that the analyzer of word-forms and the analyzer of plants have in reality the same profession; and when he contemplated the law-abiding nature of linguistic development, which it was his most earnest endeavour to demonstrate, the idea seemed to him very natural that language was nothing less than an organic being. In his methodical mind these thoughts and impressions took the shape of a serious system, whose axioms are as follows:

Language is a natural organism; it lives like other organisms, although its mode of action is not that of man. The science of this organism belongs to the natural sciences, and the method by which it must be treated is that of natural science.

SCHLEICHER set great value upon these axioms, and I would venture to assert that if he had been asked in his last years what in his own opinion constituted his chief service to science, he would have answered, the application of the method of natural science to philology. The judgment of the majority of his contemporaries was different, and at the present day it is almost unanimously agreed that SCHLEICHER'S three axioms cannot find approval. BOPP had already applied the expression “organism" to language, but he had simply meant that language is not arbitrarily manufactured. Such a figure can be tolerated, but when the metaphor is taken literally, the contradiction becomes evident. Language is not a being, but the utterance of beings; accordingly, if we are to use the phraseology of natural science, it is not an organism, but a function. It will also be found extremely difficult to classify philology with the natural sciences. Since language is manifested in human society, the science of language cannot belong to the natural sciences, at least, if this name is used in the accepted technical sense. And finally, as regards the method, I feel certain that there is no single method adapted to all natural sciences. For one part of the natural sciences the application of mathematics is characteristic; for another, experiment; for a third, to which biology belongs,