the establishment of a National Convention | India, by giving them a tract of territory toat the Hague, and with an affectation of feel-wards the Meuse (I could not find out wheing, that by it the cause of freedom had ex- ther he meant Aix la Chapelle, Liege, or the tended itself over such a large number of countries of Juliers and Berg), and hinted, people. He, however, was ready to confess, that if this was not to be done, an additional that from the great losses the Dutch re- sugar island might, perhaps, be ceded to the public had sustained in its colonies, and Dutch republic. I told him all this might particularly from the weak manner in which become a subject of future discussion, and I they had defended them, it could not be ex- conceived, that if we could agree upon the pected that his majesty would consent to a more essential points, the treaty would not full and complete restitution of them, and break off on these secondary considerations. that it was reasonable that some should be Our conversation had now been extremely sacrificed; and he asked me if I could inform long, and M. Delacroix ended by saying, that him, how far our views extended on this although he had taken upon himself to enter point? I said I had reason to believe that with me thus far upon the subject, yet I must what his majesty would require would be not consider any thing he said as binding, possessions and settlements which would not or as pledging the republic, till such time as add either to the wealth or power of our In- he had laid the papers I had given him bedian dominion, but only tend to secure to us fore the Directory; and, in order to do this their safe and unmolested possession. You with more accuracy, he again asked me, whemean by this, said M. Delacroix, the Cape ther in his report he was to state the disunitand Trincomalé. I said they certainly came ing Belgium from France as a sine qua non from under that description, and I saw little pros- which his majesty would not depart. I respect of their being restored to the Dutch. plied it most certainly was a sine qua non M. Delacroix launched forth on this into a from which his majesty would not depart; most laboured dissertation on the value of and that any proposal which would leave the the Cape of Good Hope, which he did not Netherlands annexed to France, would be atconsider at all as a Port de Relache, but as a tended with much greater benefit to that possession which, in our hands, would become power and loss to the allies, than the preone of the most fertile and most productive sent relative situation of the belligerent colonies in the East; and, according to his powers could entitle the French government estimation of it, he did not scruple to assert, to expect. that it would ultimately be an acquisition of infinitely greater importance to England than that of the Netherlands to France; and, if acquiesced in, should be reckoned as a full and ample compensation for them. He added, if you are masters of the Cape and Trincomalé, we shall hold all our settlements in India, and the islands of France and Bourbon, entirely at the tenure of your will and pleasure; they will be our's only as long as you choose we should retain them. You will be sole masters in India, and we shall be entirely dependent upon you. I repeated to him, that it was as means of defence, not of offence, that these possessions would be insisted on, and that if the matter was fairly and dispassionately discussed, he would find that they afforded us a great additional security, but no additional power of attack, even if we were disposed to disturb the peace of that part of the world. If these, and perhaps some few other not very material settlements belonging to the Dutch, were to be insisted upon, and if he would be pleased to enumerate all we should still have to restore to them, while they had nothing to restore to England, it was impossible not to consider the terms on which his majesty proposed peace to Holland as generous and liberal. M. Delacroix was not at all disposed to agree with me on this point, and said, Holland, stript of these possessions, would be ruined. He then held out, but as if the idea had just crossed his mind, the possibility of indemnifying the Dutch for their losses in M. Delacroix repeated his concern at the peremptory way in which I made this assertion, and asked me whether it would admit of no modification? I replied, if France could, in a contre projet, point out a practicable and adequate one, still keeping in view that the Netherlands must not be French, or likely again to fall into the hands of France, such a proposal might certainly be taken into consideration. M. Delacroix by no means encouraged me to explain myself more fully; he repeatedly said that this difficulty relative to the Netherlands was one which could not be over come. Just as I was taking leave of him, he begged me to explain what was meant by the words in the memorial (A.) in the fourth paragraph, beginning" de s'entendre mutuellement sur les moyens d'assurer," and ending at "Leurs possessions respectives." I told him it referred to the destructive system adopted by France in the West Indies, and went to express a wish, that the two powers should agree on some general and uniform system of internal police in the settlements there, which would contribute to the security of these possessions to the respective countries, and at the same time to the happiness of every description of inhabitants in them. M. Delacroix, a little hurt at my expression relative to the system adopted by France, endeavoured to recriminate on us; but he ended by saying, that they should certainly be willing to concur in any arrangement relative to We con annexed to a note actually signed, and that I scarcely felt myself authorized to depart from what was, I believe, an invariable rule. That as to the second demand, made in so peremptory and unprecedented a way, I could without much hesitation say at once that it could not be complied with. M. Guiraudet lamented this much, and said, that this being the case, he feared our principles of negotiation would never coincide. I agreed with him in my expressions of concern. versed together afterwards for some time, but nothing passed at all worthy remark. I told him I should send my answer the next day. On reflecting more attentively on the request that I would sign the two memorials which I had given in, it struck me that the complying with it pledged me to nothing, that it was merely gratifying them on a point insisted on peevishly, and that the doing it would put them still more in the wrong. the negroes which did not militate against the principles of their constitution. Here our conference ended, and as, during the whole course of it, I bore in my mind, the possibility, that this, although our first, might be the only favourable opportunity I should ever have of speaking on the general principles on which his majesty was disposed to treat, I endeavoured, by adverting more or less to almost every point in my instructions, to enable M. Delacroix (if he reports faithfully) to state to the Directory what I said in such a manner as to put it out of their power to misconceive what were his majesty's intentions, to remove all possibility of cavil on this case, and to bring them to a clear and distinct answer whether they would agree to open a negotiation on the principle of the status ante bellum, or on one differing from it only in form, not in substance. I hope in attempting to do this I did not, in the first instance, commit myself, or discover more of my instructions than it became me to do, and that in the conversation with M. Delacroix nothing escaped me which might, at some subsequent period, hurt the progress of the negotiation. I have, I believe, given this conference nearly verbatim to your lordship; and I was particularly anxious to do this correctly and minutely, as well that you may judge on the propriety of what I said myself, as that what M. Delacroix said to me may be accurately known, and remain on record. It must, however, be remembered (as I observed in the beginning of this dispatch) that he spoke from himself, as minister indeed, but not under the immediate instructions of the Directory, and this consideration will take a little away from the singularity of some of the positions he advanced. I confess, my lord, from the civility of his manners, and from his apparent readiness to discuss the subject, the impression which remained on my mind on leaving him was that the negotiation would go on, but be liable to so many difficulties, and some of them so nearly insurmountable, that knowing as I do the opinion of the Directory, I saw little prospect of its terminating successfully.-But I did not expect the conduct of the Directory would immediately be such as to evince a manifest inclination, and even determination, to break of on the first proposals; and I was not a little surprised at receiving, on Sunday, at three P. M. the inclosed letter (A) from M. Delacroix: He sent it me by the principal secretary of his department (M. Guiraudet) who communicated to me the original of the arrété of the Directory, of which this letter, abating the alteration in the form, is a literal copy. After perusing it, I asked M. Guiraudet whether he was informed of its contents, and this led to a short conversation on them. I told him that both the demands were so unexpected that I could not reply to them off hand that as to the first, it was quite unusual to sign memorials which were As to the strange demand of an ultimatum, it was perfectly clear what it became me to say, and I hope that in the inclosed answer, (B.) (which I sent yesterday morning at twelve o'clock) to M. Delacroix, I shall be found to have adhered as closely as possible to the spirit of my instructions. Yesterday evening, at half past nine, M. Guiraudet brought me the note (C.) to which I immediately replied by the note (D.). They require no comment; and as I intend leaving Paris to-morrow, and travelling with all convenient speed, I shall so soon have it in my power to say the little which remains to say relative to this sudden, though perhaps not unlooked-for close to my mission, that I need not trespass any further on your lordship's patience.-I have the honour to be, &c. MALMESBURY. No. 31. (A)-NOTE from the Minister for Foreign Affairs to lord Malmesbury; dated Paris, 28th Frimaire, 5th year. (Dec. 18.) Sir;-the Executive Directory has heard the reading of the official note signed by you, and of two confidential Memorials without signatures, which were annexed to it, and which you gave in to me yesterday. I am charged expressly by the Directory to declare to you, that it cannot listen to any confidential note without a signature, and to require of you to give in to me, officially, within four and twenty hours, your ultimatum, signed by you. Accept, sir, the assurance of my high consideration. CH. DELACROIX. No. 32. (B.)-NOTE from lord Malmesbury to the Minister for Foreign Affairs; dated Paris, December 19th, 1796. Lord Malmesbury, in answer to the letter which the minister for foreign affairs had the goodness to transmit to him through the hands of the secretary general of his department, must remark, that in signing the official note which he gave in to that minister, by order of his court, he thought he had complied with all the usual formalities, and had given the necessary authenticity to the two confidential Memorials which were annexed to it. Nevertheless to remove all difficulties, as far as lies in his power, he willingly adopts the forms which are pointed out by the resolution of the Executive Directory, and hastens to send to the minister for foreign affairs the two Memorials signed by his hand. With respect to the positive demand of an ultimatum, lord Malmesbury observes that insisting on that point in so peremptory a manner, before the two powers shall have communicated to each other their respective pretensions, and that the articles of the future treaty shall have been submitted to the discussions, which the different interests which are to be adjusted, necessarily demand, is to shut the door against all negotiation. He, therefore, can add nothing to the assurances which he has already given to the minister for foreign affairs, as well by word of mouth, as in his official note; and he repeats that he is ready to enter with that minister into every explanation of which the state and progress of the negotiation may admit, and that he will not fail to enter into the discussion of the proposals of his court, or of any counter project which may be delivered to him, on the part of the Executive Directory, with that candour and that spirit of conciliation which correspond with the just and pacific sentiments of his court. Lord Malmesbury requests the minister for foreign affairs to accept the assurances of his high consideration. No. 33. (C.)-NOTE from the Minister for Foreign Affairs to lord Malmesbury; dated Paris, 29th Frimaire, 5th year. (Dec. 19.) The undersigned minister for foreign affairs is charged by the Executive Directory, to answer to lord Malmesbury's two notes of the 27th and 28th Frimaire (17th and 19th December, O. S.) that the Executive Directory will listen to no proposals, contrary to the 'constitution, to the laws, and to the treaties which bind the republic. And as lord Malmesbury announces at every communication, that he is in want of the opinion of his court, from which it results that he acts a part merely passive in the negotiation, which renders his presence at Paris useless; the undersigned is further charged to give him notice to depart from Paris in eight-and-forty hours, with all the persons who have accompanied and followed him, and to quit as expeditiously as possible, the ter ritory of the republic. The undersigned declares moreover, in the name of the Executive Directory, that if the British cabinet is desirous of peace, the Executive Directory is ready to follow the negotiations, according to the basis laid down in the present note, by the reciprocal channel of couriers. CH. DELACROIX. No. 34. (D.)-NOTE from lord Malmesbury to the Minister for Foreign Affairs; dated Paris, December 20th 1796. Lord Malmesbury hastens to acknowledge the receipt of the note of the minister for foreign affairs, dated yesterday. He is preparing to quit Paris to-morrow, and demands, in consequence, the necessary passports for himself and his suite. He requests the minister for foreign affairs to accept the assurances of his high consideration. DECLARATION On the Rupture of the Negotiation for Peace with France, dated Whitehall, December 27, 1796. The negotiation which an anxious desire for the restoration of peace had induced his majesty to open at Paris, having been abruptly terminated by the French government, the king thinks it due to himself and to his people to state in this public manner the circumstances which have preceded and attended a transaction of so much importance to the general interests of Europe. It is well known that early in the present year his majesty, laying aside the consideration of many circumstances of difficulty and discouragement, determined to take such steps as were best calculated to open the way for negotiation, if any corresponding desire prevailed on the part of his enemies. He directed an overture to be made in his name by his minister in Switzerland, for the purpose of ascertaining the dispositions of the French government with respect to peace. The answer which he received in return was at once haughty and evasive: it affected to question the sincerity of those dispositions of which his majesty's conduct afforded so unequivocal a proof; it raised groundless objections to the mode of negotiation proposed by his majesty (that of a general congress, by which peace has so often been restored to Europe); but it studiously passed over in silence his majesty's desire to learn what other mode would be preferred by France. It at the same time asserted a principle which was stated as an indispensable preliminary to all negotiation; a principle under which the terms of peace must have been regulated, not by the usual considerations of justice, policy, and reciprocal convenience; but by an implicit submission on the part of all other powers to a claim founded on the internal laws and separate constitution of France, as having full authority to supersede the treaties entered into by independent states, to govern their interests, to control their engagements, and to dispose of their dominions. A pretension in itself so extravagant could in no instance have been admitted, or even listened to for a moment. Its application to the present case led to nothing less than that France should, as a preliminary to all discussion, retain nearly all her conquests, and those particularly in which his majesty was most concerned, both from the ties of interest, and the sacred obligations of treaties; that she should in like manner recover back all that had been conquered from her in every part of the world. and that she should be left at liberty to bring forward such further demands on all other points of negotiation, as such unqualified subinission on the part of those with whom she treated could not fail to produce. On such grounds as these it was sufficiently evident that no negotiation could be established: neither did the answer of his majesty's enemies afford any opening for continuing the discussion, since the mode of negotiation of fered by his majesty had been peremptorily rejected by them, and no other had been stated in which they were willing to concur. Ilis majesty was however not discouraged even by this result, from still pursuing such measures as appeared to him most conducive to the end of peace; and the wishes of his ally the Emperor, corresponding with those which his majesty had manifested, sentiments of a similar tendency were expressed on the part of his imperial majesty at the time of opening the campaign: but the continuance of the same spirit and principles on the part of the enemy rendered this fresh overture equally unsuccessful. and undisguised avowal of a determination to refuse to Europe all hope of the restoration of tranquillity. A channel was therefore at length indicated through which the government of France professed itself willing to carry on a negotiation, and a readiness was expressed (though in terms far remote from any spirit of conciliation) to receive a minister, authorized by his majesty to proceed to Paris for that purpose. Many circumstances might have been urged as affording powerful motives against adopting this suggestion, until the government of France had given some indication of a spirit better calculated to promote the success of such a mission, and to meet these advances on the part of Great Britain. The king's desire for the restoration of general peace on just and honourable terms, his concern for the interest of his subjects, and his determination to leave to his enemies no pretext for imputing to him the consequences of their own ambition, induced him to overlook every such consideration, and to take a step which these reasons alone could justify. The repeated endeavours of the French government to defeat this mission in its outset, and to break off the intercourse thus opened, even before the first step towards negotiation could be taken; the indecent and injurious language employed with a view to irritate, the captious and frivolous objections raised for the purpose of obstructing the progress of the discussion: all these have sufficiently appeared from the official papers which passed on both sides, and which are known to all Europe. But above all the abrupt termination of the negotiation has afforded the most conclusive While the government of France thus per-proof, that at no period of it was any real wish sisted in obstructing every measure that could for peace entertained on the part of the French even open the way to negotiation, no endea- government. vour was omitted to mislead the public opinion throughout all Europe with respect to the real cause of the prolongation of the war, and to cast a doubt on those dispositions which could alone have dictated the steps taken by his majesty and his august ally. After repeated evasion and delay, that government had at length consented to establish as the basis of the negotiation, a principle proposed by his majesty, liberal in its own nature, equitable towards his enemies, and calculated to provide for the interests of his allies, and of Europe. It had been agreed that compensation should be made to France by proportionable restitutions from his majesty's conquests on that power, for those arrangements to which he should be called upon to consent, in order to satisfy the just pretensions of his allies, and to preserve the political balance of Europe. At the desire of the French government itself, memorials were presented by his majesty's minister, which contained the outlines of terms of peace, grounded on the basis so established, and in which his majesty proposed to carry to the utmost possible extent, the application of a principle so equitable as with respect to France, and so liberal on his ma In order to deprive his enemies of all possibility of subterfuge or evasion, and in the hope that a just sense of the continued calamities of war, and of the increasing distresses of France herself, might at length have led to more just and pacitic dispositions, his majesty renewed in another form, and through the intervention of a friendly power, a proposal for opening negotiations for peace. The manner in which this intervention was received, indicated the most hostile dispositions towards Great Britain, and at the same time afforded to all Europe a striking instance of that injurious and offensive conduct which is observed on the part of the government of France towards all other countries. The re-jesty's part. The delivery of these papers was peated overtures made in his majesty's name were nevertheless of such a nature, that it was at last found impossible to persist in the absolute rejection of them, without the direct accompanied by a declaration expressly and repeatedly made, both verbally and in writing, that his majesty's minister was willing and prepared to enter, with a spirit of conciliation and fairness, into the discussion of the different points there contained, or into that of any other proposal or scheme of peace which the French government might wish to substitute in its place. such a discussion has been repeatedly invited, and even solicited on the part of his majesty, but has been in the first instance, and absolutely, precluded by the act of the French go vernment. It arises exclusively from the determination of that government to reject all means of peace: a determination which appeared but too strongly in all the preliminary discussions; which was clearly manifested in the demand of an ultimatum made in the very outset of the negotiation; but which is proved beyond all possibility of doubt by the obstinate adherence to a claim which never can be admitted. government affects to put (though even in that respect unsupported by the fact) on the internal constitution of its own country, shall be received by all other nations as paramount to every known principle of public law in Europe, as superior to the obligations of treaties, to the ties of common interest, to the most pressing and urgent considerations of general security. On such grounds it is that the French government has abruptly terminated a negotiation, which it commenced with a reluctance, and conducted with every indication of a resolution to prevent its final success. On these motives it is that the further effusion of blood, the continued calamities of war, the interruptions of peaceable and friendly intercourse among mankind, the prolonged distresses of Europe, and the accumulated miseries of France itself, are by the government of that country to be justified to the world. In reply to this communication, he received a demand, in form the most offensive, and in substance the most extravagant, that ever was made in the course of any negotiation. It was peremptorily required of him that in the very outset of the business, when no answer had been given by the French government to his first proposal, when he had not even learnt, in any regular shape, the nature or extent of the objections to it, and much-A claim that the construction which that less received from that government any other offer or plan of peace, he should in twenty-four hours deliver in a statement of the final terms to which his court would in any case accede. A demand tending evidently to shut the door to all negotiation, to preclude all discussion, all explanation, all possibility of the amicable adjustment of points of difference. A demand in its nature preposterous, in its execution impracticable, since it is plain that no such ultimate resolution respecting a general plan of peace ever can be rationally formed, much less declared, without knowing what points are principally objected to by the enemy, and what facilities he may be willing to offer in return for concession in those respects. Having declined compliance with this demand, and explained the reasons which rendered it inadmissible, but having, at the same time, expressly renewed the declaration of his readiness to enter into the discussion of the proposals he had conveyed, or of any other which might be communicated to him, the king's minister received no other answer than an abrupt command to quit Paris in forty-eight hours.-If, in addition to such an insult, any further proof were necessary of the dispositions of those by whom it was offered, such proof would be abundantly supplied from the contents of the note in which this order was conveyed. The mode of negotiation on which the French government had itself insisted, is there rejected, and no practicable means left open for treating with effect. The basis of negotiation so recently established by mutual consent, is there disclaimed, and, in its room, a principle clearly inadmissible is re-asserted as the only ground on which France can consent to treat :-The very same principle which had been brought forward in reply to his majesty's first overtures from Switzerland, which had then been rejected by his majesty, but which now appears never to have been in fact abandoned by the government of France, however inconsistent with that on which they had expressly agreed to treat. It is therefore necessary that all Europe should understand, that the rupture of the negotiation at Paris does not arise from the failure of any sincere attempt on the part of France to reconcile by fair discussion the views and interests of the contending powers; His majesty, who had entered into the negotiation with good faith, who has suffered no impediment to prevent his prosecuting it with earnestness and sincerity, has now only to lament its abrupt termination; and to renew in the face of all Europe the solemn declaration, that whenever his enemies shall be disposed to enter on the work of general pacification in a spirit of conciliation and equity, nothing shall be wanting on his part to contribute to the accomplishment of that great object, with a view to which he has already offered such considerable sacrifices on his part, and which is now retarded only by the exorbitant pretensions of his enemies. The said Papers were ordered to lie upon the table, to be perused by the members of the House. Debate in the Commons on the King's Message respecting the Rupture of the Negotiation for Peace.] Dec. 30. The order of the day being read for taking his Majesty's Message into consideration, Mr. Pitt addressed the House to the following effect :-I am perfectly aware, Sir, in rising upon the present occasion, that the motion which I shall have the honour to propose to the House in consequence |