The cases of Barfield v. Kelly (4 Russ. 355), and Millington v. Fox (3 Myl. & Cr. 338), were cited. plaintiff gave was unlawful, and the defendant vio- PATTESON, J.-The 59 Geo. 3, c. 129, only refers Lord DENMAN, C.J.-The expression is, " If any number of persons shall intend to form a society." Kinglake, Serjt.-For the purposes of that Act every society that is unenrolled must be taken to be one which is not yet formed. There is no proof that this society was in existence before. Lord DENMAN, C.J.-You have left it uncertain Kinglake, Serjt.-This objection is quite new. The cross rule was also discharged after a short TURQUAND V. SMITH. This was an action by the assignees of a bankrupt will be most severely punished. We restore things to Bovill moved to set aside a demurrer as frivolous. Assumpsit, by indorsee, against acceptor of a bill of exchange. Plea. That the bill was obtained by the fraud of the plaintiff and the drawer. Replication.-De injuria; and Demurrer thereto; citing Cowper v. Garbett (13 M. & W. 33.) Rule nisi. BRISTOWE v. PINNA. Evidence-Refreshing witness's recollection. Case for wrongfully seizing goods. Pleas.-1st. Not guilty; 2nd. That the goods were not the goods of the plaintiff. Verdict for the plaintiff. At the trial it appeared that the goods had been seized under an execution for 251. against one Munyard, at the suit of one White; and that the plaintiff claimed under a deed of assignment by way of mortgage from Munyard. Munyard being examined as a witness, a paper was put into his hands, containing a statement by the plaintiff of the amount of the debt due from him to the plaintiff; to which statement he assented; this evidence was objected to, but allowed. A letter also was received in evidence, which had been written by the plaintiff to the person who afterwards became defendant's attorney, in which he spoke of the goods as being mortgaged to him for more than they were worth. The VICE-CHANCELLOR. The plaintiff alleges, in this case, that he had certain trade marks which he used to distinguish goods sold at his shop, and which goods, in being sold at his shop, would carry with them a certain degree of credit or recommendation. It is not material that goods so marked were manufactured by the plaintiff, or by Newman who was employed for that purpose. The defendant, without the plaintiff's authority, stamps that mark upon goods of the same class, but manufactured by the defendant for a stranger, the object being untruly to represent the goods-which were manufactured by the defendant, whom the plaintiff never employed-as sold at the plaintiff's shop, assent by him into the world, and the defendant did this with that knowledge of the circumstances which might have been derived from the apprenticeship which the defendant served with Newman. The act was one which the plaintiff had a right to consider as injurious to him, and from which he had, and has, a right to be protected by injunction. The plaintiff waiving the account, the injunction must be made perpetual. As to the costs, I had at first some doubt what might be the effect of Millington v. For. I should have been very unwilling to deport from any principle which was laid down in that case, but I find that Lord Cottenham's expressions there are these; he says, "I am very much disposed, as a general rule, to make the costs follow the result; because, however doubtful the title may be, or however proper it may be to dispute it, it is but fair that Humfrey, Q.C. moved for a rule nisi for a new the party who really has the right should be re- trial on the ground of misdirection. The defence imbursed, as far as giving him the costs of the suit was, that the piles had been made over to the decan reimburse him. But then there is another object fendants to serve an antecedent debt, without any Knowles, Q. C. now moved for a new trial, on the which the Court must keep in view, namely, to re- present advantage to the debtor. That was a frau-ground of the improper reception of the evidence. press unnecessary litigation, and to keep litiga- dulent preference, and the judge should have so dition within those bounds which are essential to ena-rected the jury. It has so been held by Cresswell, ble the parties to vindicate and establish their rights." I agree almost in terms with every thing| here said. The question, looking upon this as affording a real question, is, whether there has been here unnecessary litigation caused? I cannot say that there has been. It appears to me, as far as the plaintiff is concerned, litigation has been kept within those bounds which were useful, namely, to found and establish his right, and therefore he is entitled to the costs of the suit, subject to this observation, that there is an assertion that certain other marks were private marks of the plaintiff. That seems to be without foundation. If that is a material assertion, so being without foundation, it may have increased the expense. That may have been increased by the use of the single word "private." There does not appear to be any evidence that these were private; and it is alleged that they were used in the trade to denote the hardness of the brushes. The plaintiff waiving the account, the injunction must be perpetual. Let him have the costs of the suit, except so far as they have been increased, if at all, by the allegation in the the other marke being private marks. Let the plaintiff pay those costs to the defendant, or let them be deducted. Common Law Courts. COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH, Wednesday, Jan. 14. The 59 Geo. 3, c. 129, applies only to societies formed after the passing of that Act. This was an action for money had and received, brought by the trustee of the Pulborough Friendly Society against the steward, for the purpose of recovering certain sums of money which the defendant, on the dissolution of the society, had apportioned among the members. Plea.-Never indebted. The plaintiff did not sue in his character of trustee. The jury found that he had specially directed the defendant to pay over the money; and they also found that six members had not assented to the dissolution of the society. The society was established in 1784; the rules had been enrolled under the 59 Geo. 3, c. 129, and they shewed that the society could not be dissolved if six members were dissentient. The plaintiff, on these facts, elected to be nonsuited, leave being reserved to either side to move. Subsequently, Kinglake, Serjt. obtained a rule nist for setting aside the nonsuit, and entering a verdict for the plaintiff; and Crowder, Q.C. obtained a rule nisi for setting aside the nonsuit, and entering it for the defendant. Against the first rule cause was now shewn by J. in a recent case. Lord DENMAN, C.J.-We will speak to that Thursday, Jan. 15.-Lord DENMAN, C.J.-There Thursday, Jan. 15. Gaming debt-Account stated-Surprise. Assumpsit, by assignees of a bankrupt, for goods sold, money lent, money paid, and on an account stated. Plea-Non assumpsit, except as to part, and as to The particulars of demand stated that the action Re HARRIET ELIZA WALMINGTON. A writ of habeas corpus having issued at the instance Henderson, on the part of the wife, excused her non-appearance in court on the ground of ill-health and a fear of interference from the husband. Lord DENMAN, C.J.-I think she ought to appear, Bramwell, on the part of the husband, submitted DI. We shall ha able to do so, The lady then came into court, and, in answer to questions by the Lord Chief Justice, stated that she was under no control, and wished to remain with Mr. and Mrs. Cox.. Lord DENMAN, C.J.-Then you are at liberty to do so. Bramwell.-It must now be taken that the iady is perfectly free; and if so, the ordinary right of the husband to the society of his wife attaches. It is supposed, therefore, that the protection of the Court will not extend beyond its walls. Crowder, Q.C. and Taprell.-The plaintiff does not By the COURT.-As to the 1st point, the paper which was given to the witness to refresh his memory was part of the res gesta. He might well recollect that a paper which he had before seen was correct, although he did not recollect the amount which it mentioned without seeing it. Upon the. 2nd point, the letter was evidence of the notoriety of the transaction. Therefore, Rule refused. DOE dem. v. BRENT. Ejectment-Statute of limitations-3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 27. Ejectment for a slip of land. Verdict for the defendant. It appeared at the trial that the defendant, or the person through whom he claimed, had held under a lease from the lessors of the plain-tiff another close, together with a right of way over the whole of the land in question, at two.. specified and distinct rents, which lease expired in 1811; that after that time there had been no fresh demise, but a rent of 307. only had been paid. Upon that evidence Coleridge, J. who tried the cause, suggested that the lessors of the plaintiff had not shewn themselves in possession within twenty years, and for that purpose an award by Inclosure which this identical land was allotted to the lessor Commissioners in 1818 was tendered in evidence, by of the plaintiff; but that document was rejected. Humfrey, Q.C. now moved for a new trial, on the ground of misdirection and the rejection of evidence. He contended, first, that upon the facts found the lessors of the plaintiff had never been out of possession of the land, until, upon application to the defendant, he refused to give it up; and, secondly, that the award was not only evidence, but conclusive evidence, of their possession and property at that time. Rule nisi, FOSTER . SMITH. Guarantee-Collateral security. Assumpsit on a guarantee, whereby plaintiff agreed to pay defendant for bricks supplied to one Robins. Pleas.-1st. Non assumpsit; 2nd, a special plea, which stated, that by a building agreement it was covenanted that Robins should build a dwelling-house on the land of Goodbody, and that Goodbody should advance money to Robins from time to time, by payments out of a certain fund of 8007.; that bricks were furnished by plaintiff; and that afterwards Robins consented and agreed with the plaintiff that the plaintiff's debt should be liquidated by taking 5 per cent. out of the payments to be made by Goodbody; and that Goodbody promised to retain the money for the plaintiff. The plea then went on to allege, that the plaintiff undertook to forbear, and give time to Robins. The latter allegation only was traversed, not forbear and give tiine tv rovins. verdict for the and upon that the jury found that the plaintiff did plaintiff. Knowles, Q.C. now moved for a rule for judgment non obstante veredicto. Upon the pleadings enough is confessed to raise an answer to the action. That part of the plea which is untraversed is the same in effect as a plea that Robins had given to the plaintiff a cheque on a banker. (Smith v. Hearm, 7 B. & C. 759.) The plaintiff's right to sue defendant was sus pended because he had a fresh right, the responsibility of Goodbody. Lord DENMAN, C. J.-What is there to shew that that was not intended as a collateral security? Rule refused. Ex parte GEORGE CHILCOTE. Caroner's inquisition—Misconduct of coroner. Crowder, Q. C. moved for a rule nisi to quash a coroner's inquisition, and to discharge the applicant from his recognizance, on affidavits which stated that the jury having found their verdict on the 13th of last month, on the 23rd an inquisition was presented to them for signature; but they at first refused to sign it, alleging that it did not contain their verdict, but afterwards did sign it, in consequence of a threat from the coroner to commit them to Dorchester gaol if they refused. There were also objections to the inquisition upon the face of it. Rule nisi. HUNTER V. CALDWELL. Attorney-Negligence-Filing writs. This was an action against an attorney for negligence in the conduct of an action, the alleged negligence consisting in the omission to file certain writs. Verdict for the plaintiff. Knowles, Q.C. now moved for a new trial, and in arrest of judgment, contending, first, upon the construction of 2 Wm. 4, c. 39, s. 10, that filing is the duty of the officer and not of the attorney (Snow v. Stevens, 2 Dowl. 664; 1 Cr. M. & Ros.); and secondly, that the question whether an attorney is liable for negligence, is one of law rather than of fact; and that he is not liable where he has done no more than misconstrue a doubtful Act of Parliament. (Doorman v. Jenkins, 2 Ad. & E. 256; Bulmer v. Gilman, 4 M. & G. 108; Elkington v. Holland, 9 M. & W. 659; Baikie v. Chandless, 3 Camp. 17; Laidler v. Elliott, 3 B. & C. 738.) On the following day, Cur, adv. vult. REG. v. SCHLESHINGER. The Attorney-General now moved for a rule to shew cause why the verdict should not be entered for the defendant, and in arrest of judgment. The indictment charged the perjury to have been committed on the trial of certain issues before W. Hunter and R. Sidney, esquires, Sheriffs of London; whereas, in fact, the trial took place before the Secondary. The assignment of perjury was that the defendant had falsely sworn that certain words in a document were not written by him "in the presence of" a person named; it being wholly immaterial whether they were written in his presence or not. Lastly, the indictment stated that certain issues came on to be tried, whereas, in fact, there was only one issue on which any verdiet was found (3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 42, s. 17; 3 Co. Inst. 166). Lord DENMAN, C. J.-This application is, in form, only a notice of the points which you intend to take when the defendant is brought up for judgment. Saturday, Jan, 17e pation. A pauper's father lived with his father till the age of seventeen; he then voluntarily entered the local militia for a term of four years, and served twentyeight days in each year; during the remainder of each year he worked at his trade, and maintained himself, living apart from his father. At the age of twenty he married; and when he was about eighteen his father acquired a settlement.-Held, that at that time he was unemancipated; and therefore derived from his father the settlement so acquired. 345); and by parity of reasoning, if he does not re- The question is, whether marrying another person is R. Hall (with whom was Pickering), contrà.-These Peacock, in reply. It is admitted that the request is a condition precedent, and must be performed or dispensed with; but dispensation is a matter of lawy and here the marriage of the defendant was a dispen sation. (Sugden's Vendors and Purchasers; Amorg v. Broderick, 5 B. & Ald. 12.) It cannot be reunite that the plaintiff should request the defendant to do what is impossible without committing bigas. Be.. sides, the clear intention of the parties to this con tract is, that neither should marry another. Sap posing the defendant's wife had died immediately afterwards, still the plaintiff would not be bound to marry him, after she had thus ascertained his affec tions had been placed elsewhere. Suppose the wond marries, is the man bound afterwards to marry her when a widow. He might have entailed upon him the support of her children, and although no request had ever been made by him, yet the contract would be broken. Lord DENMAN, C.J.-This must be considered: with a view to the intention of both parties at the time of the contract, and it is impossible to doubt but that it was that they should each remain in their then state and condition. If either puts himself or herself ont of that condition, he so far dispenses with the con ditions precedent, inasmuch as performance is remu dered impossible, and there is a right to sue ime diately. It is not necessary to consider questions of analogy, for it must be determined by the intention of the parties. PATTESON, Tue ʊmy difficulty that I had was that the contract was laid to marry within a reason. able time after request; and in the case cited imet Lord Raymond, it was "on request;" but there seems, upon consideration, to be no real difference between the two expressions. Then, since the defendant has put it out of his power to perform has By the COURT.-Lord Tenterden, in R. v. Wil-promise, by ceasing to be in the same plight or con mington, has laid down a clear and intelligible rule on dition, no request is necessary; therefore it is not this subject, and we ought not to disturb it. We necessary to aver the continuance of the life of his wife. cannot enter into a minute inquiry as to the period at COLERIDGE, J. and WIGHTMAN, J. concurred, which, by the common law, different persons were Judgment for plaintiff. considered to have come of age, a matter which seems in some respects to have depended on the personal qualities of the individual. Here the dividing point is marriage; and before that a settlement is gained by the father; but at the time it is gained the son is absent from the father's house working for himself, and has entered the local militia. The mere absence from home of course could not alone shew emancipation; and then the entering the local militia is, under ordinary circumstances, only a contract to serve a few days in each year, and therefore involves no para-volving numerous deeds, and illustrated by plans, the mount control. Orders quashed. On appeal, an order of two justices removing Alice Hirst from the township of Barkisland to the parish of Scammonden, both in the West Riding of the County of York, was confirmed, subject to the opinion of this Court upon a case, which stated that the father of the pauper lived with his father in the appellant township, until he was about seventeen; when he voluntarily entered the local militia for a term of four years, in each of which he served as a militia-man twenty-eight days, living during the other months in the respondent parish, following his own trade of a weaver, and maintaining himself. He never returned to his father's house, and when he was about twenty years of age got married. His father having acquired The contract made between the parties upon mutual a settlement in a third parish when the pauper's father was about eighteen, the question was whether at that time he was unemancipated. If the Court should think that he was unemancinated, the ande of sessions and order of removal to be quashed; otherwise confirmed. Pashley and Overend in support of the order of sessions.-The question here raised has never been de cided (Nolan, P. L. 318); but the principle to be deduced from all the authorities will shew that the pauper's father was emancipated at the time when his father acquired the settlement in a third parish. The question is not simply whether the son had attained twenty-one or married, but whether the separation between him and his father's family is complete, whether he has left without the intention of returning. If he returns before he is twenty-one, it has been held that he is not emancipated (R. v. Rotherfield, 1 B.&C. Tuesday, Jan. 20. promises to marry within a reasonable time after re- Demurrer to plea.-Declaration for breach of pro- The defendant pleaded, inter alia, that he was not, before the commencement of the action, requested by the plaintiff to marry her. To this the plaintiff demurred, LOMAX v. Ashworth. Right to watercourse. "Belonging and appertaining" in a conveyance me only legally belonging and appertaining, and the vendor is not estopped thereby from disputing the right to a watercourse which had previously been used by the occupier of the premises conveyed, but much was not enjoyed by right. Special case. This was a long special case, in question being whether a certain watercourse passed to the plaintiff under a conveyance from the de fendant. It appeared that the watercouse was not strictly parcel of the property sold, but it was contended that as the defendant had used the general words "belonging and appertaining," he at least was estopped from disputing that it had passed, when in fact it had lang hans used with the land sold. Cowling for the defendant. Knowles, Q.C. contrà, was not heard. Thursday, Jan. 22, Peacock now argued in support of the demurrer.-A railway company were the sole occupiers of a line of railway, of which also they were owners; they were also sole occupiers and lessees of two branch lines of railway, on all of which they carried on a large trade as carriers. As lessees of the two branch lines, the company incurred a considerable annual loss; and "this loss was incurred by them solely for the purpose * of benefitting by the increased traffic occasioned by those lines on the main line of railway. The company did not maintain or repair the branch railways, or ** The buildings connected therewith; and the different stations and buildings throughout the three lines were rated separately from the railways. The main line passed through the parish of T. and was -rated in that parish in an amount ascertained by taking the gross receipts of each mile in that parish, * and deducting therefrom various expenses, including maintenance of way, rates, and taxes, other than the Property Tax, and the annual depreciation of the plant or moveable stock, together with interest on the plant and tenants' profits. Against that rate the company appealed, and upon that appeal they claimed the following, in addition to the above deductions:1st. The buildings, stations, &c. rated or rateable separately from the railway; 2nd. The depreciation and wear and tear of rails, sleepers, &c. (not included in the above item of “maintenance of way"); 3rd. A per centage on the outlay in forming the company, obtaining the Act, and other original expenses; 4th. Income Tax; 5th. Additional parochial assessments, not actually paid, but which will be payable in consequence of the recent decisions of this Court on the rating of railways; 6th. The * ́annual total loss on the two branch lines. Held, by this Court, on a case reserved, that the 1st and 4th deductions were proper; the 3rd, 5th, and 6th, improper; and that the second deduction, though correct in principle, could not be made in this case, because no annual fund had in fact been appropriated for the purpose. In ascertaining the amount to be deducted as tenants' profits by a per centage on the value of the plant, the respondents contended that the per centage should be on the depreciated value of the plant, and not its original value; and this Court held that that mode was correct. This was an appeal against two several rates, bearing date respectively the 3rd day of November, 1842, and the 16th day of February, 1843, in the former of which the Great Western Railway Company were rated as occupiers of the Great Western Railway with the appurtenances, in respect of a portion of the said railway, extending two miles and one sixteenth of a mile in length, within the said parish, and containing thirty acres of land, at the sum of 2,4751. and in the latter, în respect of the same property, at the sum of 3,0937. 158. the said two rates being respectively at the rate of 1,200l. to 1,500l. per mile; against both of which rates the said company appealed, and at the hearing of the said appeals at the Easter Quarter Bessions for the county of Berks, 1843, the Court confirmed the said rates, subject to the ronowing CASE. The Great Western Railway Company are estabHished by a certain Act of Parliament passed in the 5th year of King William the Fourth, intituled "An Act for making a Railway from Bristol to join the London and Birmingham Railway near London, to be called The Great Western Railway,' with Branches therefrom to the towns of Bradford and Trowbridge, in the county of Wilts ;" and three other Acts of Parliament respectively passed in the 6th year of William the Fourth and 1st and 2nd years of her present Majesty Queen Victoria. Copies of these Acts, and also of the two half-yearly Reports made at two general meetings of the said company, held respectively on the 18th day of August, 1842, and 10th Feb. 1843, which accompany this case, and are admitted to be correct statements, are to be deemed to constitute part 'thereof, and may be referred to by the Court or either party at the hearing thereof. Under the power contained in those Acts, or one of them, the company have completed a line of railway from Paddington, in the county of Middlesex, to Bristol, being a length of 118 miles; and this railway for two miles and 1-16th of a mile thereof, passes through the parish of Tilehurst. The Great Western Railway Company, in order to increase the traffic on their line, became, and were, before and at the making of the rates, lessees of a 'branch line from Bristol to Taunton, in the county of Somerset, for a term of years, on the terms of paying to the proprietors thereof, for the use of the said branch line, being a distance of forty-four miles, including a right to use the stations and the right of taking all rates and tolls for the conveyance of passengers, cattle, and goods, the sum of 50,000l. per annum. In like manner, and for the same purpose, the said company became lessees of a branch line from Swindon to Cirencester, being a distance of eighteen miles, and for the use of which, including all the rights and privileges above-mentioned, the said company, at the making of the rates, were liable to pay to the proprietors thereof a rent of 17,0001. per annum. the Great Western Railway Company, both as proprietors and as such lessees, amounted during the current year of rating to 175 miles only. Gross receipts £3,680 0 0 £1,584 2,081 0 0 497 £1,599 0 0 The company, as such lessees of the two last mentioned lines, were, in fact, at the time of making the rates incurring annually a loss of 10,5001, over and above the actual net receipts in respect of those two This balance of 1,5991. was taken by the responbranch lines, the rents exceeding by that sum the net dents, and found by the sessions to represent the net profits earned on those lines, and this loss was incurred rateable value of each mile of the railway in Tilehurst solely for the purpose of benefiting by the increased parish, and the sessions find the above amounts and traffic occasioned by those lines on the Great Western sums to be correct, but submit to the judgment of Railway. this Court the principle on which the calculation is The appellants do not themselves maintain or re-founded, and the propriety and sufficiency of the depair the above branch railways or the buildings con- ductions. They further state that the per centage nected with them, but they pay rates in respect of mentioned above as tenants' profits, is not to be taken them, and they carry on the business of carriers joint- as the actual profits of the company from trade; the ly on the whole of the united lines as one entire con- whole of their receipts and profits being, in fact, cern. derived directly from their trade; but the sessions The said company, since the passing of their Act find that per centage to include such a reasonable and the completion of the railway, have not only profit of trade as would induce a lessee, who carried taken certain tolls authorized by the said Act, but on the like business under the same circumstances, they have also provided the locomotive powers and to forego the rest, and to pay it as rent. carriages, and have themselves conveyed upon all the three railways passengers, cattle, and goods, for hire, in addition to the said rates and tolls, and in point of fact the said company, since the completion of the said railways have been in exclusive occupation of the said railways as carriers, no other carriers having availed themselves of the privileges conferred by the Act, of providing carriages or power independent of the company. There is no station or building in Tilehurst, nor is there any extraordinary profit or expense in the repair or maintenance of the way in that parish, but the expenses may for the purpose of these rates be fairly taken as proportionable to the length in the parish as compared with the whole length of the united lines. The different stations and buildings throughout the lines are to be considered as rated separately from the railway. The appellants contended, that assuming the estimate of the respondents to be founded on just principles, the following additional deductions ought to be made: 1. The buildings, stations, shops, sheds, and other erections appurtenant to the Great Western line alone, rated or rateable separately from the railway, and necessary for the profitable enjoyment of it, may be taken for the purposes of these rates as worth 35,000l. a year rateable value, at the time of making the rates, and the appellants claim a portion of this sum to be deducted from the receipts in Tilehurst parish. This deduction If to be taken as 1-118th of the whole, 2961. per mile. If to be taken as 1-175th of the whole, 2001. per mile. In like manner the annual value of the buildings, stations, &c. on the two branch railways above mentioned, may be taken at 10,000l. per annum; and if The following are the detailed particulars of the the united value of these buildings, in all the three mode in which the rate allowed by the Court of Quar-railways, is a proper deduction, then the deduction, ter Sessions was ascertained by the parish officers. being 1-175th of the whole, 2571. per mile. The gross receipts of each mile in the parish of Tilehurst were ascertained to be 3,6801. The expenses of the whole line of the three railways during the period to which the rates apply, amounted to the sum of 257,205l. 14s. 11d. comprised under the following heads : £ s. d. 49,643 6 74,725 9 5. Disbursements for repairs and alterations of stations and buildings connected with the railway 6. Compensation for fire and other accidents and other annual returns and allowances connected with the trade 7. Government duty on gross receipts from passengers 8. Rates and taxes of all kinds assessed on the company in respect of the property and actually paid (other than the property tax) Direction and office expenses Total 5 2. The appellants further claimed a deduction in respect of depreciation, and wear and tear of rails and sleepers, being the solid timber and iron work of the Great Western Railway alone. This expense is not included in the item of "maintenance of way "above mentioned, nor has it been found necessary, as yet, by the company to appropriate any annual fund for this purpose, because this expense has hitherto been taken from the capital, and not deducted from the revenue. But such deduction, if proper, is to be taken at 20,000t. a year in respect 0 of the whole of the Great Western Railway, exclusive of the branches. If divided by 118, the amount per mile is 1697.; if divided by 175, the amount per mile 1,536 10 25,783 4 0 annum. 4. Income tax paid by the company in pursuance of statute 5 & 6 Vict. c. 35, amounting in the whole to 10,000l. 5. Additional parochial assessments not actually paid, but which will be payable in consequence of the recent decisions of this Court on the rating of railways, 12,000l. at least. This last item includes the rates on all the three railways occupied by the company. It has not yet 6 been paid, nor can it be clearly ascertained until the deductions are settled in each rate. Adding to this the annual depreciation of the plant or moveable stock necessary for working the whole line of railway, together with the branches, which amounted to 20,000l. a year, the total expenses amounted to 277,205, 14s. 11d. The proportionable expenses of one mile being, 1-175th of the whole (1,5841.) The value of the whole plant or moveable stock at its first cost was about 580,000. On this sum the respondents al. lowed 51. per. cent. as interest on that stock 107. per cent. as tenants' profits, including the profits of trade, 6. The annual total loss on the two branch lines already referred to, 10,500l. The appellants further contended that instead of ascertaining the tenants' profits by a per centage on the original value of the plant, or moveable stock, they will be more correctly represented by a per centage on the gross receipts, and that for that purpose fifteen per cent. on 3,6801. should be deducted, viz. 5521. It was stated, on the part of the respondents, that the plant, or moveable stock of the company, was, at the time of making the rate, depreciated in value, and the sessions find that, in fact, it was so depreciated, and was then worth about 500,000l. and not the sum of 580,000l. as above stated, and if any of tire deductione damanded by the company were allowed, then the respondents claimed to take such reduced value as the sum upon which interest and tenant's profits should be calculated; that is to say, 15 per cent. on this sum, 75,000l. and the portion of this in respect of a mile in Tilehurst, 4281. The sessions find the several sums and particulars above mentioned correct in amount for the purposes of the present case, and they refer to this Court the proThe portion of this in respect of one mile in Tile-priety and principle of all or any of the above deduchurst parish, being 1-175th of the whole (4977.) tions. The rates are to be confirmed, quashed, or amended; ex-or the appeal remitted for further enquiry, according to the opinion of this Court upon all or any of the Labove points. From the gross receipts for each mile in Tilehurst, they then deducted the proportion of the above By reason of the incomplete state of the branch rail- penses chargeable on it, and the portion of the above ways the whole length of permanent way worked by 1 per centages due in respect of it, thus : respondents properly treat the whole line, the whole profits, and the whole outgoings as entire; and then the question is, whether there is any distinction between these and the other outgoings necessary to earn the profit, and by which the rateable value of the land in the respondent's parish is to be enhanced; and it seems to us there is none. If so, we agree with the learned counsel for the appellant in principle, and it is indifferent whether the stations be in the same parish or at a distance. The appellants claim, thirdly, an allowance of 21,000l. yearly interest upon the sum expended in forming the company, obtaining their Act of Parliament, raising the capital, and other original expenses. For this there is no foundation. These expenses have no connection with the rateable value of the railway, and might all have been incurred if no railway had ever been made. As well might the purchaser of an estate, who borrows money upon it, after an expensive litigation as to the title, claim to deduct interest on those expenses from the poor rate upon the land in his occupation, though it does not add to the value of the occupation. The appellants have next claimed to be allowed a deduction in respect of 10,000l. paid by them as income tax, under the 5 & 6 Vict. c. 35. This claim is very shortly and unsatisfactorily stated; in respect to what the claim is made, we are not informed on either side, and the argument was short. The respondents treat the claim as made in respect of a charge on property in land, payable by the owner; the appellants claim in respect of a charge on occupation, payable by the tenant. To this extent, at least, it does not strike us there is any essential distinction between this and any other outgoing chargeable on the tenant, which would certainly affect the amount of rent he would be willing to pay. The fifth claim of the appellants is for an allowance for such proportion of parochial assessments as shall become payable (it is not stated when or where) in consequence of the recent decisions of this Court. On this point we only say we think the court of quarter sessions would have been justified in refusing to let this item stand part of the case. In the sixth place, the appellants claim a deduction in respect of the loss on the two branch lines before referred to. We think this cannot be allowed. If the rate in question had been imposed on land forming any part of the branch lines themselves, it is clear that if the line was worked at a loss it would not affect the rate; that the occupation would still have been a beneficial one in the sense in which that word is used, for the purpose of assessing the rate; and that the rent would have regulated the amount. This is not that case in the way in which it is here sought to make this expenditure bear on the rates assessed on any part of the main line. It is more like the case of money laid out in the way of improvement for which no deduction can be made. If the lessee of a coal mine were to open roads on adjoining lands rented under a separate demise, in order to facilitate the access of customers to the mine, and so increase the profit, such expenses would not be allowed as outgoings. Two more questions are stated the first as to the mode of ascertaining the tenant's profits. In order to ascertain the rateable value, the respondents have taken the original value of the plant or moveable stock, and allowed 10 per cent. thereon for these profits. The appellants say, the more correct mode is to ascertain it by a per-centage on the gross receipts, and claim to have 15 per cent. deducted on that account, which they are willing to abide by. The Quarter Sessions have required us to give an opinion, but it not appearing to be a question of law, we think we ought not to go beyond our province, which it might lead us to do; and this question involving no principle of law, we decline to answer it. The last is only a question which has been raised by the respondents provisionally, in case any of the appellants' deductions should be allowed by us. But this has been done. In ascertaining the tenant's profits, they have calculated a percentage on the original value of the moveable stock. The sessions have found, that since the railway was made the value had become less by 80,000%, and the respondents contended that the tenants' profits should be calculated on the smaller sum; and this seems to us correct. They are to make a rate, from year to year, upon the rateable value of all property, from whatever source of income derived. They may not know, nor have the means of knowing, what the value was originally, or what was the proat of any former year; and if, at the end of five or ten years, they are driven back to the original value, they may be equally required to ascertain it after the lapse of a century. No hardship is inflicted on the appellants by this; for we say they ought, as prudent owners, to keep up their stock at its original value. In this case they have claimed a reduction for doing so, but the claim was improperly made. Although, however, we thus answer this question in favour of the respondents, they cannot avail themselves of the decision to increase the assessment beyond its present amount. The consequence of the several decisions we have come to is the amendment of the rate in one or two particulars in the sums ascertained by the sessions; this may be REG. v. done by the counsel, without remitting the case Cur, ade, vult. MAY v. BURDETT. Part heard. to rescind so much of an order of Patteson, J. for a com- Friday, Jan. 16. Rule nisi. Part heard. GOSLING V. VELEY. Saturday, Jan. 17. Rule granted, Cur, adv. vult. Monday, Jan. 19. RUMBALL v. MUNT. Part heard. Tuesday, Jan. 20. REG. U. NEVILL. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS. Friday, Jan. 16. FIVAZ V. NICHOLLS. John Ashall Leeman with the said offences, upon the oath of the said defendant before James Traill, esq. one of the magistrates of the police courts of the metropolis, sitting at the police court in Union Hall, within the metropolitan police district; and the said John Ashall Leeman was then in custody of the governor of, and a prisoner in, the county gaol at Newington, in the county of Surrey, within the metropolitan police district, for and charged with the same offence; and the said defendant had before and at the time of the accepting of the bill of exchange thereinafter mentioned, threatened to prosecute, and was about to prosecute, the said John Ashall Leeman for the said offence. And thereupon, and before the making and accepting of the said bill thereinafter mentioned, to wit, on, &c. it was amongst other things agreed by and between the said defendant and the plaintiff that the said defendant should not prosecute, and should desist from all further prosecution of the said John Ashall Leeman for the said offence so charged against him as aforesaid, and should procure the said John Ashall Leeman to be discharged from the said custody, and that in consideration thereof, the said John Ashall Leeman should, amongst other considerations, draw, and that the plaintiff should accept, a bill of exchange for the payment to the order of the said John Ashall Leeman of the sum of 331. 6s. 8d. after the date thereof, and that the said John Ashall Leeman should indorse the same to the said defendant; and the plaintiff avers that thereupon, in pursuance of the said agreement, the said John Ashall Leeman did, to wit, on &c. make his bill of exchange in writing, and directed the same to the plaintiff, and thereby required the plaintiff to pay him or his order the sum of 331. 6s. 8d. for value received, six months after the date thereof, and the plaintiff then accepted the said bill as and for the said bill, to be so drawn, accepted, and indorsed as aforesaid, and on no other account, and for no other consideration whatsoever; and the said John Ashall Leeman did then, in further pursuance of the said corrupt and illegal agreement, indorse the said bill to the said defendant, and the said defendant then took and received the said bill, in pursuance of the said agreement, on no other acand the said defendant did then accordingly forbear, count, and for no other consideration whatsoever, and has from thence hitherto forborne, to prosecute, and hath desisted from all further prosecution, of the said John Ashall Leeman for the said offence so charged against him as aforesaid, and the said de fendant then procured the said John Ashall Leeman the said custody; and the plaintiff saith that, after to be, and he was then accordingly, discharged from the accepting of the said bill by the said plaintiff as aforesaid, and after the discharge of the said John Ashall Leeman as aforesaid, and before the indorsement of the said bill as thereinafter mentioned, to wit,on, &c. the said defendant well knew and was acquainted with the fraudulent and illegal nature of the transaction hereinbefore mentioned, and was well aware that the plaiutiff was not liable at law to pay the amount of the aforesaid bill of exchange, and that there was no reasonable or probable cause whatsoever for suing him thereon, but the defendant maliciously and unjustly contriving and intending to harass, oppress, and injure the plaintiff, and to cause and procure him to be unjustly and oppressively sued and harassed in respect thereof, fraudulently and collusively combined and conspired to and with one George Rouse, who then was and from thence hitherto hath been a person in poor and embarrassed circumstances, and unable to pay the costs of the action hereinafter mentioned; that, in order to make the defence of the plaintiff to the payment of the said bill more difficult, and to deprive the plaintiff of an effectual remedy for the costs of such defence in case of his success, the said bill should be indorsed by the defendant to the said George Rouse, and that the said George Rouse should, for enforcing payment thereof, sue the plaintiff thereon, as herein after mentioned, for the sole benefit and advantage of the defendant; and the defendant thereupon, for the purpose and with the intent, and in pursuance of the combination and conspiracy aforesaid, then, and after the said bill became due, indorsed the said bill to the said George Rouse, in order that he, the said George Rouse, might sue the plaintiff for the amount thereof in his the said George Rouse's name, but for the sole benefit and advantage of the said defendant; and that the said George Rouse did accordingly, in further ance of such purpose, intent, and conspiracy as aforeCase The declaration stated that before the mak-said, to wit, on, &c. before the barons of her ing and accepting of the bill of exchange thereinafter Majesty's Court of Exchequer of Pleas at Westmin mentioned, to wit, &c. the defendant had accused ster, in the county of Middlesex, implead the plaintiff and charged one John Ashall Leeman with having by writ of summons in an action on promises. The committed a certain offence, that is to say, that declaration then set out the declaration and pleadings he, the said John Ashall Leeman, being employed as in the said action brought by Rouse against the now the clerk of the said defendant, did, by virtue of his plaintiff, the declaration being upon the said bill of said employment, and whilst he was so employed, re-exchange for 331. 6s. Sd.; and the pleas a traverse of ceive and take into his possession certain moneys to the acceptance, and also that the bill was drawn and a large amount, to wit, the sum of 4001. for and in accepted for the consideration and in pursuance of the the name of and on account of the said defendant, his illegal agreement not to prosecute Leeman for the master; and that the said money the said John Ashall said offence of embezzlement. The declaration then Leeman did fraudulently and feloniously embezzle, stated, that, on the trial of the issues joined on these steal, take, and carry away, against the form of the pleas, a verdict was found for the said George Rouse statute in such case made and provided; and the said on the issue that the now plaintiff accepted the bill, defendant had, to wit, on, &c. charged the said and for the now plaintiff on the other issues, and that In an action on the case, the declaration, after setting |