No. 42. Dispatch from Lord Whitworth to Lord Hawkesbury, dated March 12, 1803. My lord, The messenger Mason, arrived yesterday morning early, with your lordship's letter of the 7th, informing me, that, in consequence of the preparations in the ports of France and Holland, which, though avowedly intended for colonial service, might, in the event of a rupture, be turned against some part of the British dominions, his majesty had judged it expedient to send a message to both houses of parliament, recommending, in terms void of offence, the adoption of such measures, as may be consistent with the honour of his crown, and the security of his dominions, and, at the same time, such as will manifest his majesty's disposition for the preservation of peace. I beg leave to return your lordship my thanks for having apprized me of this circumstance by a special messenger; I found, however, on going to M. de Talleyrand, at two o'clock, that he was already informed of it. He was just setting out to communicate it to the first consul, and appeared under considerable agitation. He returned with me to his cabinet, and though he told me he was pressed for time, he suffered me to relate the circumstance without interruption. I endeavoured to make him sensible that this measure was merely precautionary, and not, in the least degree, intended as a menace. I concluded my observations by repeating that it was merely a measure of self-security, founded on the armaments which were carrying on in the ports of France and Holland, remarking, at the same time, that had not even these armaments been as notorious as they were, the very circumstance of the first consul's determination to augment so considerably his ar my, in time of peace, would have been a full and sufficient motive for such a measure of precaution. M. de Talleyrand now informed me that he was already acquainted with the business; that a messenger had that morning arrived, who had brought him a copy of the message, which he communicated to me. could draw from him no reply whatever to my observations. He confined himself strictly to the assu rance which he has so repeatedly made, that there was no foundation whatever for the alarm which was felt by his majesty's ministers; that the first consul was pacific; that he had no thoughts whatever of attacking his majesty's dominions, uuless forced to do so by a commencement of hostilities on our part; that he should always consider the refusal to evacuate Malta as such a commencement of hostilities; and that, as we had hitherto hesitated to do so, he was justified in adopting the measures which might e tually be necessary. He disclaimed every idea of the armaments fitting out in the Dutch ports having any other destination than to the colonies; and concluded, that, for his part, he could not comprehend the motives which had necessitated a resort to such a measure on the part of his majesty's government. He then desired leave to go to the first consul, promising that he would let me know the result when we met at dinner at the Prussian minister's. He did not come there till ncar seven o'clock, and when we rose from dinner, he took me morandum to assist me, but such as bury, &c. &c. &c. aside, and informed me, that al- Note Verbale referred to in No. 42. I. If his Britannic majesty, in his message, means to speak of the expedition of Helvoetsluys, all the world knows that it was destined for America, and that it was on the point of sailing for its destination, but, in consequence of his majesty's message, the embarkation and putting to sea are about to be countermanded. M. de Talleyrand now told me, that, in order to facilitate my communication of the first consul's sentiments, he would communicate to me a paper which he had that morning drawn up with him; that it was not to be considered as any thing absolutely official; that it was a me. II. If we do not receive satisfactory explanation respecting these armaments in England, and if they actually take place, it is natural that the first consul should march 20,000 men into Holland, since Holland is mentioned in the mes sage. III. These troops being once in the country, it is natural that an encampment should be formed on the frontiers of Hanover; and, moreover, that additional bodies should join those troops which were already embarked for America, in order to form new embarkations, and to maintain an offensive and defensive position. IV. It is natural that the first consul should order several camps to be formed at Calais, and on dif. ferent points of the coasts. V. It is likewise in the nature of things that the first consul, who was on the point of evacuating Switzerland, should be under the necessity of continuing a French army in that country. VI. It is also the natural consequence quence of all this, that the first consul should send a fresh force into Italy, in order to occupy, in case of necessity, the position of Tarentum. VII. England arming, and arming with so much publicity, will compel France to put her armies on the war establishment, a step so important, as cannot fail to agitate all Europe. The result of all these movements will be to irritate the two countries still more. France will have been compelled to take all these precautions in consequence of the English armaments, and, nevertheless, every means will be taken to excite the English nation, by the assertion that France meditates an invasion. The whole British population will be obliged to put themselves under arms for their defence, and their export trade will, even before the war, be in a state of stagnation throughout the whole extent of the countries occupied by the French arms. The experience of nations, and the course of events, prove, that the distance between such a state of things and actual hostility, is unfortunately not remote. As to the differences, of which mention is made in his Britannic majesty's message, we know not of any that we have with England; for it cannot be imagined, that a serious intention can have existed in England, of evading the execution of the treaty of Amiens, under the protection of a military armament, Europe well knows, that it is possible to attempt the dismemberment of France, but not to intimidate her. No. 43. Dispatch from Lord Whitworth to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Paris, March 14, 1803. My lord, The messenger, Mason, went on Saturday with my dispatches of that date, and, until yesterday, Sunday, I saw no one, likely to give me any farther information, such as I could depend upon, as to the effect which his majesty's message had produced on the first consul. At the court which was held at the Thuilleries upon that day, he accosted me, evidently under very considerable agi. tation. He began by asking me if I had any news from England. I told him that I had received letters from your lordship two days ago. He immediately said, and so you are determined to go to war. No! I replied, we are too sensible of the advantages of peace-Nous avons, said he, déjà fait la guerre pendant quinze ans.- -As he seemed to wait for an answer, I observed only, c'en est déjà trop.-Mais, said he, vous voulez la faire encore quinze annés, et vous m'y forçez.-I told him, that was very far from his majesty's intentions. He then proceeded to count Marcow and the chevalier Azara, who were standing together, at a little distance from me, and said to them, les Anglois veulent la guerre, mais s'ils sont les premiers à tirer l'epée, je serai le dernier à la remettre. Ils ne re. spectant pas les traités. Il faut dorénavant les couvrir de crepe noir, In a He then went his round. few minutes he came back to me, and resumed the conversation, if such it can be called, by something personally civil to me. He began again - Pourquoi des armémens ? Contre qui des mesures de pràcaution? Je n'ai pas un seul vaisseau de ligne dans les ports de France; mais si vous voulez armer, j'armerai aussi; si vous voulez vous battre, je je me battrai aussi. Vous pourrez peut-etre tuer la France, mais jamais l'intimider.-On ne voudroit, said I, ni l'un ni l'autre. On voudroit vivre en bonne intelligence avec elle. Il faut donc respecter les traitês, replied he; malheur à ceux qui ne respectent pas les traités; ils en seront responsable à toute l'Europe. He was too much agitated to make it adviseable for me to prolong the conversation; I therefore made no answer, and he retired to his apartment, repeating the last phrase. It is to be remarked, that all this passed loud enough to be overheard by two hundred people who were present, and I am persuaded that there was not a single person, who did not feel the extreme impropriety of his conduct, and the total want of dig. nity as well as of decency on the occasion. I propose taking the first opportunity of speaking to M. Talleyrand on this subject. I have the honour to be, &c. (Signed) Whitworth. The Right Hon. Lord Hawkesbury, &c. &c. &c. No. 44. Extract of a Dispatch from Lord Hawkesbury to Lord Whitworth, dated March 15, 1803. I send your excellency a copy of the note presented to me by general Andreossy on the 10th instant*, and a copy of the answer which I have, this day, by his majesty's commands, returned to it. No. 45. Note from Lord Hawkesbury to General Andreossy, dated March 15, 1803. Vide The undersigned, his majesty's principal secretary of state for ioreign affairs, has laid before the king the note of his excellency the French ambassador of the 10th instant. In obeying the commands of his majesty, by returning an official answer to this note, the undersigned feels it necessary for him to do little more than repeat the explanations which have been already given, on more than one occasion, by himself verbally to general Andreossy, and by lord Whitworth to M. Talleyrand, on the subject of the note, and of the points which appear to be connected with it. He can have no difficulty in assuring the French ambassador, that his majesty has entertained a most sincere desire that the treaty of Amiens might be executed in a full and complete manner; but it has not been possible for him to consider this treaty as having been founded on principles different from those which have been invariably applied to every other antecedent treaty or convention, namely, that they were negociated with reference to the actual state of possession of the different parties, and to the treaties or public engagements by which they were bound at the time of its conclusion; and that if that state of possession and of engagements was so materially altered by the act of either of the parties as to affect the nature of the compact itself, the other party has a right, according to the law of nations, to interfere for the purpose of obtaining satisfaction or compensation for any essential difference which such acts may have subsequently made in their relative situation; that if there ever was a case to which this principle might be ap-plied page 694. arrangement conformable to the true intent and spirit of the tenth article; the execution of that arrangement, according to its terms, having been rendered impracticable by circumstances which it was not in his ma plied with peculiar propriety, it was that of the late treaty of peace; for the negociation was conducted on a basis not merely proposed by his majesty, but specially agreed to, in an official note, by the French government, namely, That his majesty's power to control. Whilst jesty should keep a compensation out of his conquests for the important acquisition of territory made by France upon the continent. That is a sufficient proof that the compact was understood to have been concluded in relation to the then existing state of things; for the measure of his majesty's compensation was to be calculated with reference to the acquisitions of France at that time; and if the interference of the French government in the general affairs of Europe since that period; if their interposition with respect to Switzerland and Holland, whose independence was guaranteed by them at the time of the conclusion of the treaty of peace; if the acquisitions which have been made by France in various quarters, but particularly those in Italy, have extended the territory and increased the power of France, his majesty would be warranted, consistently with the spirit of the treaty of peace, in claiming equivalents for these acquisitions, as a counterpoise to the augmentation of the power of France. His majesty, however, anxious to prevent all ground of misunderstanding, and desirous of consolidating the general peace of Europe, as far as might be in his power, was willing to have waved the pretensions he might have a right to advance of this nature; and as the other articles of the definitive treaty have been in a course of execution on his part, so he would have been ready to have carried into effect an his majesty was actuated by these sentiments of moderation and forbearance, and prepared to regulate his conduct in conformity to them, his attention was particularly attracted by the very extraordinary publication of the report of colonel Sebastiani to the first consul. This report contains the most unjustifiable insinuations and charges against his majesty's government; against the officer commanding his forces in Egypt, and against the British army in that quarter: insinuations and charges wholly destitute of foundation, and such as would have warranted his majesty in demanding that satisfaction which, on occasions of this nature, independent powers, in a state of amity, have a right to expect from each other. It dis closes, moreover, views in the highest degree injurious to the interests of his majesty's dominions, and directly repugnant to, and utterly inconsistent with, the spirit and letter of the treaty of peace concluded between his majesty and the French government. His majesty's ambassador at Paris was accordingly directed to make such a representation to the French government as his majesty felt to be called for by imputations of the nature above described, by the disclosure of purposes inconsistent with good faith, and highly injurious to the interests of his people; and as a claim had recently been made by the French government on the subject of the evacuation of Malta, lord Whit worth |