the next morning at four o'clock, and the place was carried in the most gallant manner in about half an hour, without much loss, if the boldness of the enterprize be considered. That on the British side, was about 138 men killed and wounded, including some officers. The number of the French garrison made prisoners of war amounted to 640. Besides the possession of a valuable sugar Island, his victory was important in many Coints of view. In the first place he storming so gallantly a fort trongly garrisoned by the French, roved again to the world that French troops were not invincible; and that the same armies which beat them in Egypt could conquer them again in any part of the world. At the same time that it established he reputation of the British army or gallantry and spirit, it was attended by a circumstance that displayed that generosity of national character, which is inseparable from true courage. The French general had refused a capitulation, he was

rmined to abide the assaults; and although it might be supposed that conquering troops, provoked by e losses which the obstinacy of the enemy exposed them to, would have revenged themselves by a bloody victory, yet to the honour of the British name, notwithstanding the extent of the provocation, they did not kill or wound a single Frenchman after the works had been carried. This was a triumph worthy of a civilized nation, and the brilliant display of British gallantry and generosity on this occasion was of infinitely more importance than even the capture of St. Lucie.

This first success of the British,

was of a nature to excite respect and admiration from those great powers of Europe that remained anxious spectators of the contest between France and England; while the successes of France in Hanover could only be considered by them as a daring violation of the territories of an independent and neutral nation, and an alarming proof of the disregard with which Bonaparte viewed his most solemn treaties.

On the first of July the island of Tobago surrendered to general Grinfield, who after the conquest of St. Lucie directed his force thither. The garrison were too feeble to oppose any resistance, and therefore immediately proposed a capitulation, in virtue of which they were to be sent over to France at the expence of Great Britain. Beside the French islands of St. Lucie and Tobago, in the West Indies the Dutch. settlements of Berbice and Demerara fell into the hands of the British in the course of the present year, but without experiencing any resistance worth a particular detail,

When two nations such as France and England were at war, it night naturally be expected that each would have recourse not only to every measure of serious annoyance, but also to such as might afford matter of temporary triumph; of the latter nature may be reckoned the successes of the British arms in the West Indies, the fruits of which, in conformity to the fatal precedent established by the peace of Amiens, will in all probability be restored whenever hostilities shall cease, in a vastly more improved state than when captured. The loss of St. Domingo to France was however of more serious consequence, as it is

by no means likely that the French will ever be able to repossess themselves of it in the event of peace. And it is certain that should they even be able entirely to subdue and exterminate the black army that defends it, the island will be so completely ruined in the struggle, that France cannot hope for ages to place it once more on the footing of a productive possession.

Previously to the war, Bonaparte appeared determined to establish a colonial power in St. Domingo and Louisiana, which would bid fair not only to out-rival the British empire in the West Indies, but also to check the rising greatness of the united states of America. These objects were entirely deranged and defeated by the rupture with England-his plan of possessing himself of Egypt and the Levant, has been also crushed by the constant superiority of the British fleet in the Mediter

ranean.

The views of the first consul have therefore necessarily taken a different direction, and he now seeks to establish his power on other grounds. He has made himself the absolute master of Italy, and shewn the kings of Naples, Etruria, and the pope, that notreaties can bind him to respect their neutrality, or will prevent him from entering and occupying their territories whensoever he shall please; and of levying contributions upon them the measure of 'which must be determined by a compromise between their ability and his extortive rapacity. Spain and Portugal have been reduced to the state of provinces on which he can at pleasure levy what sums of money he may deem necessary, and at the same time enjoy all the advantages of their great possessions in

southern America, without incurring the risk or expence of governing them.

Already master of France, Switzerland, Italy, Spain, Portugal, & South America, Bonaparte appears not far removed from that universal empire which alone can satisfy his ambition. All the smaller states of Germany have sunk under the power of France. Although Hanover was seized under the pretence of its appertaining to the king of Great Britain, yet Hamburgh and Bremen have been plundered without the slightest excuse, save the necessities of the French army. We have seen that when Bonaparte was allowed to conquer Han over, the smaller states of the north of Germany were abandoned to France, who was already, by conquest or intrigue, mistress of the lesser powers of the south. The French official journals had not hesitated to state, that if war should take place between Austria and France, Bavaria and Suabia would certainly be compelled to join the latter. It is evident therefore that the German nation can no longer consider the Rhine as its boundary. The power of the first consul is nearly as well established on the right bank of that river as on the left, and so long as the king of Prussia is content to be his instrument, it is the latter and not Francis who will really be the emperor of Germany.

The grand results therefore of the first year of the war, are that on the continent of Europe, France has exercised a more extended and despotic power than even she had manifested during the peace, and that she has reduced Europe so low, that it is become extreely problematical whether it be

possible

possible to prevent her from achieving the absolute sovereignty of the

continent.

On the part of Great Britain her victories in India have been certainly brilliant and have added much to her territory. In the West Indies she has completely frustrated the plans of France; and at home has raised a very considerable force to enable her to meet the threatened invasion: her various attacks however on the flotilla of France have met with slender success, and the different bombardments which were directed against the towns of Granville, Dieppe, Calais and Boulogne, but slightly annoyed the enemy. It appears then to be perfect ly ascertained that France can assemble a flotilla to almost any amount on her immense line of coast, opposite the shore of England. The experiment therefore which Great Britain has to make is, to try whether in an empire of her population, resources, and national spirit, such a

military organization cannot be established, as to be permanently adequate to repel any force which France may send to invade her. This is the grand and awful hour of trial which the present generation is called upon to witness. If Bonaparte be permitted to break down altogether the independence of the different nations of Europe, and collect the whole disposeable force of France and that of her allies in her ports upon the channel, the destiny of this country appears to be sealed: and unless heaven shall in its mercy bless it with such an administration, as can unite the confidence and energies of all parties, all persuasions, all ranks and conditions of the people, in checking, resisting, and controuling so powerful and implacable an enemy; the time may shortly come, when patriotism itself may despair, and say of England what Hannibal exclaimed of his devoted country," Agnosco fata Carthaginis!"

CHAP.

jects.

Those wretched creatures were deluded to act, not from any political stimulus--for abstract polities could never have been made a motive of action with their class, by the most refined intrigue. The artifice used to set them in motion, was more familiar to their business. and bosoms, more adapted to their powers of comprehension-they were invited to x a rate for potatoes, the almost universal food of the multitude in those parts; and to join in a system of opposition to the introduction of strangers (by whom were meant, persons of any other vicinity) from becoming the tenants of farms, and to compel the land proprietors in their counties to treat with, exclusively, the ancient occupiers-causes which constituted popular pretexts and clamours of long standing in Ireland. It also appeared that a forward lead in these matters was taken, by men of the disbanded regiments of militia, who had, during the calamitous period of the troubles of their country, been indulged in so much licentiousness; and so much of party, more than of military disci

pline, had been instilled into their superiors, that it is not to be wondered at that they were, on their return to their counties, utterly unfitted for the purposes and habits of sober life. Upon this head we must ever refer to the just and animated censure of the illustrious Abercromby.

The sacrifices which were mad. to public justice on the above occasion, restored at least the appear, ance of tranquillity. The people were awed to submission-that they were reclaimed, we have every reason to doubt. There have since manifested themselves repeated indications of an angry unappeased spirit, and of unsubdued rancour; but since the period to which we have alluded, no overt act of considerable extent or moment has occurred in those counties. The magistrates of Tipperary and Limerick upon this occasion, earnestly peti-, tioned to be indulged with the power of inflicting discretionary punish ment, and transportation, under what is called in Ireland' the insurrection act," to which his majes ty's government in Ireland refused

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