devotion of their time to the public service, to be paid out of the national treasury; to be ineligible to any office established by a particular state, or under the authority of the United States, (except those peculiarly belonging to the functions of the second branch,) during the term of service, and, under the national government, for the space of one year after its expiration.

5. Resolved, That each branch ought to possess the right of originating acts.

6. Resolved, That the national legislature ought to be empowered to enjoy the legislative rights vested in Congress by the Confederation; and moreover, to legislate in all cases to which the separate states are incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation; to negative all laws passed by the several states contravening, in the opinion of the national legislature, the Articles of Union or any treaties subsisting under the authority of the Union.

7. Resolved, That the rights of suffrage in the first branch of the national legislature ought not to be according to the rule established in the Articles of Confederation, but according to some equitable ratio of representation; namely, in proportion to the whole number of white and other free citizens and inhabitants, of every age, sex, and condition, including those bound to servitude for a term of years, and three fifths of all other persons, not comprehended in the foregoing description, except Indians not paying taxes in each state.

8. Resolved, That the right of suffrage in the second branch of the national legis. lature ought to be according to the rule established for the first.

9. Resolved, That a national executive be instituted, to consist of a single person; to be chosen by the national legislature, for the term of seven years; with power to carry into execution the national laws, to appoint to offices in cases not otherwise provided for, to be ineligible a second time, and to be removable on impeachment and conviction of malpractices or neglect of duty; to receive a fixed stipend by which he may be compensated for the devotion of his time to the public service, to be paid out of the national treasury.

10. Resolved, That the national executive shall have a right to negative any legislative act which shall not be afterwards passed by two thirds of each branch of the national legislature.

11. Resolved, That a national judiciary be established, to consist of one supreme tribunal, the judges of which shall be appointed by the second branch of the national legislature, to hold their offices during good behavior, and to receive punctually, at stated times, a fixed compensation for their services, in which no increase or diminution shall be made so as to affect the persons actually in office at the time of such increase or diminution.

12. Resolved, That the national legislature be empowered to appoint inferior tribunals.

13. Resolved, That the jurisdiction of the national judiciary shall extend to all cases which respect the collection of the national revenue, impeachments of any national officers, and questions which involve the national peace and harmony.

14. Resolved, That provision ought to be made for the admission of states lawfully arising within the limits of the United States, whether from a voluntary junction of government and territory, or otherwise, with the consent of a number of voices in the national legislature less than the whole.

15. Resolved, That provision ought to be made for the continuance of Congress, and their authorities and privileges, until a given day after the reform of the Articles of Union shall be adopted, and for the completion of all their engagements.

16. Resolved, That a republican constitution, and its existing laws, ought to be guarantied to each state by the United States.

17. Resolved, That provision ought to be made for the amendment of the Articles of Union, whensoever it shall seem necessary.

18. Resolved, That the legislative, executive, and judiciary powers, within the several states, ought to be bound by oath to support the Articles of Union.

19. Resolved, That the amendments which shall be offered to the Confederation by the Convention, ought, at a proper time or times after the approbation of Congress, to be submitted to an assembly or assemblies recommended by the several legislatures, to be expressly chosen by the people to consider and decide thereon.110

THURSDAY, June 14.

Mr. PATTERSON observed to the Convention, that it was the wish of several deputations, particularly that of New Jersey, that further time might be allowed them to contemplate the plan reported from the Committee of the Whole, and to digest one purely federal, and contradistinguished from the reported plan. He said, they hoped. to have such a one ready by to-morrow to be laid before the Convention and the Convention adjourned, that leisure might be given for the purpose.

FRIDAY, June 15.

In Convention. Mr. PATTERSON laid before the Convention the plan which, he said, several of the deputations wished to be substituted in place of that proposed by Mr. Randolph. After some little discussion of the most proper mode of giving it a fair deliberation, it was agreed, that it should be referred to a Committee of the Whole; and that, in order to place the two plans in due comparison, the other should be recommitted. At the earnest request of Mr. Lansing, and some other gentleman, it was also agreed that the Convention should not go into Committee of the Whole on the subject till to-morrow; by which delay the friends of the plan proposed by Mr. Patterson would be better prepared to explain and support it, and all would have an opportunity of taking copies.*

The propositions from New Jersey, moved by Mr. Patterson, were in the words following:

1. Resolved, That the Articles of Confederation ought to be so revised, corrected and enlarged, as to render the federal Constitution adequate to the exigencies of government, and the preservation of the Union.

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2. Resolved, That, in addition to the powers vested in the United States in Congress by the present existing Articles of Confederation, they be authorized to pass acts for raising a revenue, by levying a duty or duties on all goods or merchandises of foreign growth or manufacture, imported into any part of the United States; by stamps on paper, vellum, or parchment; and by a postage on all letters or packages passing through the general post-office; to be applied to such federal purposes as they shall deem proper and expedient: to make rules and regulations for the collection thereof; and the same, from time to time, to alter and amend in such manner as they shall think proper: to pass acts for the regulation of trade and commerce, as well with foreign nations as with each other; — provided that all punishments, fines, forfeitures, and penalties, to be incurred for contravening such acts, rules, and regulations, shall be adjudged by the common-law judiciaries of the state in which

This plan had been concerted among the deputations, or members thereof, from Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, and perhaps Mr. Martin, from Maryland, who made with them a common cause, though on different principles. Connecticut and New York were against a departure from the principle of the Confederation, wishing rather to add a few new powers to Congress than to substitute a national government. The states of New Jersey and Delaware were opposed to a national government, because its patrons considered a proportional representation of the states as the basis of it. The eagerness displayed by the members opposed to a national government, from these different motives, began now to produce serious anxiety for the result of the Convention. Mr. Dickinson said to Mr. Madison, "You see the consequence of pushing things too far. Some of the members from the small states wish for two branches in the general legislature, and are friends to a good national government; but we would sooner submit to foreign power than submit to be deprived, in both branches of the legislature, of an equality of suffrage, and thereby be thrown under the domination of the larger states.'

any offence contrary to the true intent and meaning of such acts, rules, and regulations, shall have been committed or perpetrated, with liberty of commencing in the first instance all suits and prosecutions for that purpose in the superior common-law judiciary in such state; subject, nevertheless, for the correction of all errors, both in law and fact, in rendering judgment, to an appeal to the judiciary of the United States.

3. Resolved, That whenever requisitions shall be necessary, instead of the rule for making requisitions mentioned in the Articles of Confederation, the United States in Congress be authorized to make such requisitions in proportion to the whole number of white and other free citizens and inhabitants, of every age, sex, and condition, including those bound to servitude for a term of years, and three fifths of all other persons not comprehended in the foregoing description, except Indians not paying taxes; that, if such requisitions be not complied with in the time specified therein, to direct the collection thereof in the non-complying states, and for that purpose to devise and pass acts directing and authorizing the same; — provided, that none of the powers hereby vested in the United States in Congress shall be exercised without the consent of at least states; and in that proportion, if the

number of confederated states should hereafter be increased or diminished. 4. Resolved, That the United States in Congress be authorized to elect a federal executive, to consist of persons; to continue in office for the term of years; to receive punctually, at stated times, a fixed compensation for their services, in which no increase nor diminution shall be made so as to affect the persons composing the executive at the time of such increase or diminution; to be paid out of the federal treasury to be incapable of holding any other office or appointment during their time of service, and for years thereafter; to be ineligible a second time, and removable by Congress, on application by a majority of the execu tives of the several states: that the executive, besides their general authority to execute the federal acts, ought to appoint all federal officers not otherwise provided for, and to direct all military operations; provided, that none of the persons composing the federal executive shall, on any occasion, take command of any troops, so as personally to conduct any military enterprise, as general, or in any other capacity.

5. Resolved, That a federal judiciary be established, to consist of a supreme tribunal, the judges of which to be appointed by the executive, and to hold their offices during good behavior; to receive punctually, at stated times, a fixed compensation for their services, in which no increase nor diminution shall be made so as to affect the persons actually in office at the time of such increase or diminution. That the judiciary so established shall have authority to hear and determine, in the first instance, on all impeachments of federal officers, and, by way of appeal, in the dernier resort, in all cases touching the rights of ambassadors; in all cases of captures from an enemy; in all cases of piracies and felonies on the high seas; in all cases in which foreigners may be interested; in the construction of any treaty or treaties, or which may arise on any of the acts for the regulation of trade, or the collection of the federal revenue: that none of the judiciary shall, during the time they remain in office, be capable of receiving or holding any other office or appointment during their term of service, or for thereafter.

6. Resolved, That all acts of the United States in Congress, made by virtue and in pursuance of the powers hereby, and by the Articles of Confederation, vested in them, and all treaties made and ratified under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the respective states, so far forth as those acts or treaties shall relate to the said states or their citizens; and that the judiciary of the several states shall be bound thereby in their decisions, any thing in the respective laws of the individual states to the contrary notwithstanding; and that if any state, or any body of men in any state, shall oppose or prevent the carrying into execution such acts or treaties, the federal executive shall be authorized to call forth the power of the confederated states, or so much thereof as may be necessary, to enforce and compel an obedience to such acts, or an observance of such treaties. 7. Resolved, That provision be made for the admission of new states into the Union.

8. Resolved, That the rule for naturalization ought to be the same in every state. 9 Resolved, That a citizen of one state, committing an offence in another state of

the Union, shall be deemed guilty of the same offence as if it had been committed by a citizen of the state in which the offence was committed.* 111

Adjourned.

SATURDAY, June 16. In Committee of the Whole, on the resolutions proposed by Mr. Patterson and Mr. Randolph, Mr. LANSING called for the reading of the first resolution of each plan, which he considered as involving principles directly in contrast. That of Mr. Patterson, says he, sustains the sovereignty of the respective states, that of Mr. Randolph destroys it. The latter requires a negative on all the laws of the particular states, the former only certain general power for the general good. The plan of Mr. Randolph, in short, absorbs all power, except what may be exercised in the little local matters of the states, which are not objects worthy of the supreme cognizance. grounded his preference of Mr. Patterson's plan, chiefly, on two objections to that of Mr. Randolph,-first, want of power in the Convention to discuss and propose it; secondly, the improbability of its being adopted.

1. He was decidedly of opinion that the power of the Convention was restrained to amendments of a federal nature, and having for their basis the Confederacy in being. The acts of Congress, the tenor of the acts of the states, the commissions produced by the several deputations, all proved this. And this limitation of the power to an amendment of the Confederacy marked the opinion of the states, that it was unnecessary and improper to go farther. He was sure that this was the case with his state. New York would never have concurred in sending deputies to the Convention, if she had supposed the deliberations were to turn on a consolidation of the states, and a national government.

2. Was it probable that the states would adopt and ratify a scheme which they had never authorized us to propose, and which so far exceeded what they regarded as sufficient? We see by their several acts, particularly in relation to the plan of revenue proposed by Congress in 1783, not authorized by the Articles of Confederation, what were the ideas they then entertained. Can so great a change be supposed to have already taken place? To rely on any change which is hereafter to take place in the sentiments of the people, would be trusting to too great an uncertainty. We know only what their present sentiments are; and it is in vain to propose what will not accord with these. The states will never feel a sufficient confidence

This copy of Mr. Patterson's propositions varies in a few clauses from that in the printed Journal furnished from the papers of Mr. Brearly, a colleague of Mr Patterson. A confidence is felt, notwithstanding, in its accuracy. That the copy in the Journal is not entirely correct, is shown by the ensuing speech of Mr. Wilson, (June 16,) in which he refers to the mode of removing the executive "by impeachinent and conviction" as a feature in the Virginia plan forming one of its contrasts to that of Mr. Patterson, which proposed a removal "on application of a majority of the executives of the states." In the copy printed in the Journal, the two modes are combined in the same clause; whether through inadvertence, or as a contemplated amendment, does not appear.

in a general government, to give it a negative on their laws. The scheme is itself totally novel. There is no parallel to it to be found. The authority of Congress is familiar to the people, and an augmentation of the powers of Congress will be readily approved by them.

Mr. PATTERSON said, as he had on a former occasion given his sentiments on the plan proposed by Mr. Randolph, he would now, avoiding repetition as much as possible, give his reasons in favor of that proposed by himself. He preferred it because it accorded, — first, with the powers of the convention; secondly, with the sentiments of the people. If the Confederacy was radically wrong, let us return to our states, and obtain larger powers, not assume them ourselves. I came here not to speak my own sentiments, but the sentiments of those who sent me. Our object is not such a government as may be best in itself, but such a one as our constituents have authorized us to prepare, and as they will approve. If we argue the matter on the supposition that no confederacy at present exists, it cannot be denied that all the states stand on the footing of equal sovereignty. All, therefore, must concur before any can be bound. If a proportional representation be right, why do we not vote so here? If we argue on the fact that a federal compact actually exists, and consult the articles of it, we still find an equal sovereignty to be the basis of it. [He reads the fifth Article of the Confederation, giving each state a vote; and the thirteenth, declaring that no alteration shall be made without unanimous consent.] This is the nature of all treaties. What is unanimously done, must be unanimously undone. It was observed, (by Mr. Wilson,) that the larger states gave up the point, not because it was right, but because the circumstances of the moment urged the concession. Be it so. Are they for that reason at liberty to take it back? Can the donor resume his gift without the consent of the donee? This doctrine may be convenient, but it is a doctrine that will sacrifice the lesser states. The larger states acceded readily to the Confederacy. It was the small ones that came in reluctantly and slowly. New Jersey and Maryland were the two last; the former objecting to the want of power in Congress over trade; both of them to the want of power to appropriate the vacant territory to the benefit of the whole. If the sovereignty of the states is to be maintained, the representatives must be drawn immediately from the states, not from the people; and we have no power to vary the idea of equal sovereignty. The only expedient that will cure the difficulty is that of throwing the states into hotchpot. To say that this is impracticable, will not make it so. Let it be tried, and we shall see whether the citizens of Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, accede to it. It will be objected, that coercion will be impracticable. But will it be more so in one plan than the other? Its efficacy will depend on the quantum of power collected, not on its being drawn from the states, or from the individuals; and, according to his plan, it may be exerted on individuals as well as according to that of Mr. Randolph. A distinct executive and judiciary also were