side; but those cases were distinctly overruled in The King v. St. Mary's, Leicester (4). This is a stronger case, as there is but one county mentioned, and primá facie it must be taken, as the fact is, that both parishes are in the same county. The case of The King v. Holbeck in Leeds(5), and The King v. Southwold (6) shew that the Court will look to the margin to ascertain the county for which the Magistrates profess to act. Even if it is possible to read the order in two ways, the Court will so read it as to support it-The King v. Countesthorpe (7). The words "in the said county" govern the whole, there being but one county mentioned. This is the rule in construing acts of parliament, even when there are disjunctive words, as in Magna Charta, c. 29, "Nullus liber homo capiatur vel imprisonetur .... aut utlagetur, nec super eum ibimus, nec super eum mittemus, nisi per legale judicium parium suorum, vel per legem terræ," where the concluding words have always been held to refer to all the precedent matter (8).

Pashley, contrà.-As to the first objection, the order of Sessions merely states that an appeal was depending against a certain order of J. W. Esq. and T. F. Esq. The jurisdiction of the Quarter Sessions is given by 13 & 14 Car. 2. c. 12. s. 2, which provides, that "all such persons as think themselves aggrieved by such judgment of the said two Justices (i. e. of the division which the pauper comes to inhabit), may appeal to the Justices of the Peace of the said county, at their next Quarter Sessions." It should, therefore, be shewn on the face of the order, that it was made by Justices of the Peace of the county for which the Sessions were holden. No intendment will be made in favour of jurisdiction-The King v. Chilverscoton, (which has never been overruled), In re Clarke (9), The Queen v. Toke (10), Christie v. Unwin (11), Wilson (4) 1 B. & Ald. 327. (5) Burr. S.C. 198. (6) Ibid. 143.

(7) 2 B. & Ad. 487; s. c. 9 Law J. Rep. M.C. 77.

(8) Dwarris on Statutes, pp. 704, 806.

(9) 2 Q.B. Rep. 619; s. c. 11 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Q.B. 75.

(10) 8 Ad. & El. 227; s. c. 7 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) M.C. 74.

(11) 11 Ibid. 373; s. c. 9 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Q.B. 47.

v. Dodd (12), as cited in Lutw. 1413. The proper form of these orders is perfectly well known, and the Court will not assist parties who do not adhere to them. The order of Sessions cannot, in this respect, be aided by the order of Magistrates, as the one is not incorporated with the other, but annexed in a schedule. Secondly, there is no present adjudication. In The King v. Maulden there were the words. " do order," &c. after the words "having adjudged." Thirdly, for anything that appears any two Magistrates of the county may have been the respondents in the appeal. Lastly, the uncertainty as to the county in which Kirkby Lonsdale is, vitiates the order. A special statutory authority should be strictly pursued-The King v. Chilverscoton, The Queen v. Toke, The King v. Austrey (13). Suppose the order had been " to the overseers of Bodmin and to the overseers of Casterton, in the county of Westmoreland, would that shew that Bodmin was in Westmoreland?" All that can be said is, that the words "in the said county" may be referred to the township of Casterton as the last antecedent-Vin. Abr. tit. 'Maxims,' Baker v. Bacon (14). The same objection applies to the order of removal.

Cur. adv. vult.

LORD DENMAN, C.J.-The principal question is, whether the Justices making the original order of removal, appear on the face of it to have jurisdiction, or, in other words, whether there are statements therein of sufficient circumstances to shew the Justices to be Justices of and for the county in which the removing township is situated. The order, so far as this point is concerned, is in the following terms:-" Westmoreland, to wit: to the overseers of the poor of the township of Kirkby Lonsdale, and the overseers of the poor of the township of Casterton, in the said county." It then proceeds to state the complaint of the overseers of Kirkby Lonsdale, " to us whose names are hereunto affixed, being two of her Majesty's Justices of the Peace in and for the said county." The rest of the order, being in the usual form, and not being objected to, is not material to be set out. It was con

(12) 1 Roll. Rep. 135. (13) 6 Mau, & Selw. 325. (14) Moore, 754.

tended in argument, that, inasmuch as the Justices had failed to describe themselves in terms as being Justices of and for the county of Westmoreland, their jurisdiction for making the order is not shewn, and, therefore, it cannot be supported. Two cases were cited; one of The King v. Chilverscoton, and the other of The King v. Moor Critchell. It was admitted by the learned counsel, in arguing against the validity of the order, that the latter can no longer be considered as law by us, and we are of opinion that neither of the cases cited are applicable to the present. In the case of The King v. Chilverscoton the county was named in the margin of the order, and in the body of it one parish was described as being in one county, and the other in the other; and it was on this circumstance, the mention of the two counties, that the want of jurisdiction of the removing Justices was made to depend, the Court considering that it was left uncertain of which county they were Justices. In the case of The King v. Moor Critchell, the county of Wilts was in the margin of the order, but in the body of it the county of Dorset was mentioned; also the Justices described themselves as "Justices in and for the said county;" and upon this the Court held that it ought expressly to appear that the Justices had jurisdiction to make the order, and that two counties having been mentioned before, they ought to have stated of which county they were Justices. It is obvious, therefore, that the order in the present case is free from that uncertainty which, in both the instances referred to, the Court considered to be fatal. And the question seems to resolve itself into this, whether the margin is to considered part of the order or not, because if it be, the two contending townships are described as being in the county of Westmoreland, none other being named, and the removing Justices as being Justices of that county, by words of direct reference. Now this point seems to have been long settled; the case of The King v. Holbeck is thus reported. It was objected to the order of removal that the borough of Leeds is not mentioned in the body of the order, but only in the margin, and therefore it does not appear that the two Justices had jurisdiction to make this order. Lee, C.J. said, "I take it to be settled that in orders

the margin is ever to be considered as part of the order, and a clear, plain reference to it is sufficient," and the Court decided thereupon. We are of opinion, so construing the present order, that it may be sustained, and that the jurisdiction of the Justices making the order sufficiently appears. It was also objected, although to this I believe an answer was given at the time, that the order of Sessions is defective, insomuch as it purports to be in the shape of recital, and not of direct allegation; we think, however, that the order does adjudicate, and that objection must therefore fail, and that the rule must be discharged.

Where the landlord stated in his examination that, on the 22nd of July 1839, he let a house, situate, &c. to A. "at the rent of 10l. per annum,' exclusive of parochial rates, and that A. occupied the house until the 22nd of July 1841, and paid him the whole of the rent during that time; and the examination of A.'s widow stated, that she and her husband went to the house in July 1839, and resided in it till March 1842, when her husband died:-Held, (dissentiente Coleridge, J.) that the examination did not sufficiently disclose a hiring for a year or a residence under a yearly hiring.

"on the 22nd of July 1839, I let a house, situate at No. 10, in Leicester-street, in the parish of St. Sepulchre, in the town of Northampton, to Thomas Adams, the husband of the pauper Ann Adams, at the rent of 107. per annum, exclusive of parochial rates. The said Thomas Adams occupied the house until the 22nd of July 1841, and paid me the whole of the rent during that time."

The examination of the pauper Ann Adams, 13th of December 1843, states, "in the month of August 1832, I was married to Thomas Adams, shoemaker, who, at that time, resided in the parish of Weedon Beck, in the said county, at the parish church of Weedon Beck aforesaid. In the month of July 1839, my said husband and I went, with our two children, Reuben Adams and Mary Adams, to a house, No. 10, in Leicester-street, in the parish of St. Sepulchre, in the town of Northampton, belonging to Mr. Putley; we resided in that house till March 1842, when my husband died. I am chargeable to the parish of Farthingstone."

Amongst other grounds of appeal were the following:-Fourthly, that the said examinations are defective and insufficient, inasmuch as it is not therein stated, nor does it appear therefrom that the said Thomas Adams rented or occupied the house No. 10, Leicester-street, in the parish of St. Sepulchre, in the said examinations mentioned, or any other house or tenement in the said parish under a yearly hiring. Fifthly, that it is not stated in the said examination, nor does it appear therefrom, that the said Thomas Adams ever bona fide rented a tenement in the said parish of St. Sepulchre, at the sum of 10l. a year at the least, for the term of one whole year, or that he occupied any such tenement under such yearly hiring, and actually paid the rent for the said time, to the amount of 10%. at the least, for the term of one whole year. Sixthly, that it is not stated in the said examination, nor does it appear therefrom, that the said Thomas Adams resided for forty days or upwards, in the said parish of St. Sepulchre, whilst renting and occupying a tenement therein, at a yearly rent of 101. or upwards.

At the trial of the appeal it was objected, on behalf of the appellants, that the exNEW SERIES, XIV.- MAG. CAS.

If

aminations were defective for the causes set forth in the foregoing grounds of appeal. The Court of Quarter Sessions confirmed the order, subject to the opinion of this Court, on the above objections. the Court should be of opinion that the Court of Quarter Sessions ought to have given effect to the above objections, or either of them, the order of Sessions to be quashed, otherwise the order of Sessions to be confirmed.

Macaulay and Mills, in support of the order of Sessions.-There is, on these examinations, sufficient evidence that the pauper's husband rented a tenement for a year at the rent of 107., and as he occupied and paid rent for a year, and, by the statement of the wife, resided more than forty days in the appellant parish, the Sessions were right in holding the examinations sufficient, for, if what was stated in them was true, a settlement would be gained. The Queen v. the Recorder of Pontefract (1) will be relied on on the other side, but that case is distinguishable, as there was there no contract at all, but the mere fact of occupation and payment of rent, which the Court considered might have been consistent with a tenancy at will. In this case the contract as set out is for taking a tenement at 107. per annum, which is equivalent to a taking at 107. by the year, within the statute 6 Geo. 4. c. 57-The King v. Herstmonceaux (2); and in The Queen v. the Inhabitants of Pilkington (3), Lord Denman says, "If the facts stated (in the examination) amount to a hiring for a year, the Justices may properly adjudicate that the settlement was gained, and remove the party; and they must form their opinions upon the effect of such statement." The Justices have done so in this case; they have properly adjudicated upon a state of facts which amount to clear evidence of a renting for a year. So as to the occupation. The yearly hiring being made out by sufficient evidence, the occupation for two years and the payment of the yearly rent during the whole time are sufficient evidence of an occupation under the yearly hiring. With respect to the residence the pauper expressly states it.

(1) 2 Q.B. Rep. 548; s.c. 12 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 81.

(2) 7 B. & C. 551; s.c. 6 Law J. Rep. M.C. 35.
(3) 13 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 61.

C

Miller and Barlow, contrà.-The Court cannot confirm the order without overruling The Queen v. the Recorder of Pontefract, for though in that case it was observed, that there was a hiring, yet as there can be no doubt that the occupation for a year, and the payment of a yearly rent, is evidence of a taking by the year, that case would have been decided differently if it were sufficient to state facts from which a hiring for a year might be inferred. In The Queen v. Pilkington a hiring and service were distinctly. found by the Sessions, and the Court decided that, they having done so upon the evidence of facts which warranted such finding, this Court would not take upon itself to say that they had put the wrong construction upon that evidence. In this case nothing has been found by the Sessions; and the question entirely turns on the examinations, by which the order must stand or fall. Now, in drawing up the examinations the parties have but to look to the plain requirements of the statute 6 Geo. 4. c. 57, which are, that the tenement "shall be bona fide rented at and for the sum of 10l. a year at the least for the term of one whole year; and that it shall be occupied under such yearly hiring, and the rent paid for the term of one whole year." Parties who endeavour to charge a parish with the support of a pauper, should take care to bring themselves within the provisions of the act of parliament. Have the respondents done so in this case? There is no allegation that the house was hired for a year, or that it was occupied under such yearly hiring. There is only one of the three ingredients required by the statute set out, namely, the rent of 107. With respect to the occupation, The King v. Banbury (4) shews that it is necessary that the occupation for a year should be under the same yearly hiring, and the Court will not intend in favour of the respondents what they have not alleged The Queen v. Wymondham (5), The Queen v. the Inhabitants of Leeds (6), in which latter case the taking "for a year" was alleged.

(4) 1 Ad. & El. 136; s. c. 3 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) M.C. 76.

(5) 2 Q.B. Rep. 541; s. c. 12 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 74.

(6) 13 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 88.

LORD DENMAN, C.J.-I am of opinion, that in this case we are bound to adhere to the express words of the statute, and to hold that the statement in these examinations is not sufficient. We cannot infer anything beyond what the examinations themselves disclose; and this Court has, in successive decisions, laid down certain rules to which we must adhere. We shall have no reason to regret so doing in this case, if the effect is to produce greater care and precision in framing these documents. The order of Sessions must be quashed.

WILLIAMS, J.-I am of the same opinion. I think we must be guided by The Queen v. the Recorder of Pontefract, which has never been overruled; and we cannot go beyond the examinations themselves, to intend anything to support them.

COLERIDGE, J.-In this case I am not satisfied that the examinations do not disclose sufficient to support the order of Sessions; and I am bound to say, that I cannot agree with the rest of the Court in the conclusion at which they have arrived. Were it not for the case of The Queen v. the Recorder of Pontefract, I should have felt no difficulty in saying that there was a sufficient statement of a yearly hiring; if this case was not distinguishable, I should, of course, be bound by it. Mr. Macaulay, however, has succeeded in satisfying my mind that the cases are distinguishable, on the ground that there was in this case an actual contract of hiring. The examination states, that on a given day A. lets to B. a house at the rent of 107. per annum;" there is then a statement of occupation in general terms, till a period two years subsequent; and, under the allegation of payment of the whole of the rent during that term, I ought, in all fairness, to infer the rent for the premises mentioned to have been let; if so, there is sufficient evidence of a renting, occupation, and payment of rent, to support the order of removal.

66

WIGHTMAN, J.-In this case I agree with my Lord and my Brother Williams, that the order of Sessions ought to be quashed. There are many cases in which it has been laid down that nothing is to be taken by intendment in examinations, and that it is not sufficient to state evidence from which a material fact is to be inferred. The statute distinctly says, that the tenement must

An order of removal of three paupers from the township of Alverthorpe with Thornes, to the township of Stanley cum Wrenthorpe, was made on the 29th of July 1844; and a copy of it, with the proper notices, and a copy of the examination, put into the post, on the 1st of August, and received by the overseers of the appellant township on the 2nd of August. On the 24th of that month, notice of appeal was served, and no removal having taken place, the appeal came on to be heard at the Michaelmas Quarter Sessions, for the West Riding of Yorkshire. It was then objected by the respondents, that the notice of appeal was a nullity, inasmuch as it was given after the expiration of more than twenty-one days from the service of the order allowed by the 79th section of 4 & 5 Will. 4. c. 76, and before the removal. The Sessions held this to be a fatal objection, and refused to hear the appeal. A rule nisi for a mandamus to the Sessions, to enter continuances and hear the appeal having been obtained,

Hall and Overend shewed cause.-The right of appeal against orders of removal

was given by the statute 13 & 14 Car. 2. c. 12. s. 2. in the first instance; and upon the words of that statute it was held, that there was no appeal till the removal, because no person was aggrieved by an order, which the parties obtaining it might never execute-The King v. the Inhabitants of Norton (1). Lord Kenyon's observations, in The King v. the Justices of Herefordshire (2), also shew that the appeal was to be to the next practicable sessions after the removal, and not after the date of the order. This right was extended by statute 49 Geo. 3. c. 124. s. 3, which permitted an appeal at once in cases of suspended orders. Then, by the 79th section of the Poor Law Amendment Act, 4 & 5 Will. 4. c. 76, it is provided that no poor person shall be removable, until twenty-one days after notice of chargeability, and a copy orcounter part of the order and a copy of the examination shall have been sent by post to the overseers of the parish to whom the order is directed; and that if notice of appeal shall be received by the officers of the parish, procuring the order, within the said period of twenty-one days, it shall not be lawful to remove such poor person until after the time for prosecuting such appeal shall have expired, or in case such appeal shall be duly prosecuted, until after the determination of such appeal. Under that section the present question arises; and it is, whether, when parties have omitted to appeal within the twentyone days after the sending of the order and notices, they can appeal, until after a removal has taken place. A power of appeal can only be conferred by the express terms of a statute; and, being an infringement on the common law, the clauses giving the right must be construed strictly-The King v. Hanson (3), The King v. Skone (4), The Queen v. Stock (5). Then a new right of appeal is given by the concluding words of this section, but it is confined within the terms of it; and, therefore, can only be given within the twenty-one days mentioned in it. The King v. the Justices of Suffolk (6) is