tries, till a Peace is made. The Duke of Anjou at the beginning of this War, maintained fix and thirty Thousand Men out of thofe Spanish Provinces he then poffeffed; To which if we add the many Towns fince taken, which were not in the late King of Spain's Poffeffion at the Time of his Death, with all their Territories and Dependencies, it is visible what Forces the States may be able to keep, even without any Charge to their peculiar Do

minions.

The Towns and Chatellanies of this Barrier always maintained their Garrifons when they were in the Hands of France, and, as it is reported, returned a confiderable Sum of Mony into the King's Coffers; yet the King of Spain is obliged by this Treaty (as we have already obferved) to add, over and above, a Revenue of Four hundred thousand Crowns a Year. We know likewife, that a great part of the Revenue of the Spanish Netherlands is already pawned to the States; so that after a Peace, nothing will be left to the Sovereign, nor will the People be much eased of the Taxes they at prefent labour under.

Thus the States, by vertue of this BarrierTreaty, will, in effect, be abfolute Sovereigns of all Flanders, and of the whole Revenues in the utmost Extent.

And here I cannot, without fome Contempt, take notice of a fort of Reafoning offered by feveral People, that the many Towns we have taken for the Dutch are of no Advantage, be

cause the whole Revenues of thofe Towns are spent in maintaining them. For Firft, The Fact is manifeftly falfe, particularly as to Life and fome others Secondly, The States, after a Peace, are to have Four hundred thoufand Crowns a Year out of the remainder of Flanders, which is then to be left to Spain: And laftly, Suppofe all these acquired Dominions will not bring a Penny into their Treafury; What can be of greater Confequence, than to be able to maintain a mighty Army out of their new Conquefts, which before they always' did by taxing their natural Subjects?

How fhall we be able to answer it to King Charles the Third, that while we pretend to endeavour restoring him to the entire Monarchy of Spain, we join at the fame time with the Dutch to deprive him of his natural Right to the Low-Countries?

But fuppofe by a Dutch Barrier must now be understood only what is to be in Poffeffion of the States; yet even under this Acceptation of the Word, nothing was originally meant except a Barrier againft France; whereas feveral Towns demanded by the Dutch in this Treaty, can be of noufe at all in fuch a Barrier. And this is the Sentiment even of Prince Eugene himself (the prefent Oracle and Idol of the Party here) who fays, That Dendermond, Oftend, and the Caftle of Gand, do in no fort belong to the Barrier, nor can be of other ufe than to make the States-General Masters of the Low-Countries, and hinder their Trade with England. And further, That

&

thofe

those who are acquainted with the Country know very well, that Lier, and Hale to fortifie, can give no Security to the States as a Barrier, but only raife a Jealoufie in the People, that these Places are only fortified in order to block up Bruffels, and the other great Towns of Brabant.

In thofe Towns of Flanders where the Dutch are to have Garrifons, but the Ecclefiaftical and Civil Power to remain to the King of Spain after a Peace; the States have Power to fend Arms, Ammunition and Victuals without paying Customs; under which Pretence they will engrofs the whole Trade of thofe Towns, exclufive to all other Nations. This, Prince Eugene likewife forefaw, and, in his Obfervations upon this Treaty here annexed, propofed a Remedy for it.

And if the

the whole Dutch fhall please to think, that

the whole Spanish Netherlands are not a fufficient Barrier for them, I know no Remedy from the Words of this Treaty, but that we must still go on, and Conquer for them as long as they please. For the Quis obliged, whenever a Peace is treated, to procure for them whatever shall be thought neceffary befides; and where their Neceffity will terminate, is not very eafie to forefee.

Could any of Her Majefty's Subjects conceive, that in the Towns we have taken for the Dutch, and given into their Poffeffion as a Barrier, either the States fhould demand, or our Ministers allow, that the Subjects of Britain fhould, in respect to their Trade, be used

B 2

worfe

worse in those very Towns, than they were under the late King of Spain? Yet this is the Fact, as monstrous as it appears: All Goods going to, or coming from Newport or Offend, are to pay the fame Duties as those that pass by the Scheld under the Dutch Forts; And this, in effect, is to fhut out all other Nations from Trading to Flanders. The English Merchants at Bruges complain, That after they have paid the King of Spain's Duty for Goods imported at Oftend, the Jame Goods are made liable to further Duties, when they are carried from thence into the Towns of the Dutch new Conquefts and defire only the fame Privileges of Trade they had before the Death of the late King of Spain, Charles II. And in confequence of this Treaty, the Dutch have already taken off 8 per Cent, from all Goods they fend to the Spanish Flanders, but left it ftill upon Us.

But what is very furprifing; in the very fame Article where our good Friends and Allies are wholly fhutting us out from Trading in those Towns we have Conquered for them with fo much Blood and Treafure, the Qu- is obliged to procure that the States fhall be used as favourably in their Trade over all the King of Spain's Dominions, as Her own Subjects, or as the People most favoured. This I humbly conceive to be perfect Boys Play, Cross I win, and Pile you lofe; or, What's yours is mine, and What's mine is my own. Now if it fhould happen that in a Treaty of Peace, fome Ports or Towns fhould be yielded us for the Security

of

of our Trade in any Part of the Spanish Dominions, at how great a distance foever; I fuppofe the Dutch would go on with their Boys Play, and challenge Half by Virtue of that Article: Or would they be content with the Military Government and the Revenues, and reckon them among what fhall be thought neceffary for their Barrier?

This prodigious Article is introduced as fubfequent to the Treaty of Munfter, made about the Year 1648, at a time when England was in the utmoft Confufion, and very much to our Disadvantage. Thofe Parts in that Treaty, so unjuft in themfelves, and fo prejudicial to our Trade, ought in reafon to have been remitted, rather than confirmed upon us for the Time to come: But this is Dutch Partnerfhip, to share in all our beneficial Bargains, and exclude us wholly from theirs, even from those which we have got for them.

In one Part of The Conduct of the Allies, &c. among other Remarks upon this Treaty, I make it a Queftion, whether it were right in point of Policy or Prudence to call in a Foreign Power to be Guarantee to our Succeffion; becaufe by that means we put it out of the Power of our own Legislature to alter the Succeffion, how much foever the Neceffity of the Kingdom may require it? To comply with the Cautions of fome People, I explained my Meaning in the following Editions. I was affured that my L-d Ch—f Jce affirmed that Paffage was Treafon; one of my Anfwerers, I think, decides as favou

rably,