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be established against a great number of persons, a Perpetual court of equity will interpose, in order to prevent Injunctions. multiplicity of suits; and instead of suffering the parties to be harassed by a number of separate actions, each of which would only determine the particular right in question, between the plaintiff and the defendant to it, it will at once determine the rights by a decree, having previously, if necessary, directed issues for its information (a). A bill of this nature may be brought by a parson for tithes against his parishioners; by parishioners to establish a modus; by a lord against tenants for encroachments, or by tenants against the lord for disturbance (6). The jurisdiction has also been entertained to establish toll due by custom (c).
Upon this principle in two early cases, where a lord of a manor had enclosed under the statute of Merton, injunctions were granted to restrain the
(a) 2 Atk. 484. Redes. Tr. 118, 119.
(6) How v. Tenants of Broomsgrove, 1 Vern. 22. Ewelme Hospital v. Andover, ib. 266. Powlet v. Ingrey, ib. 308. Brown v. Vermuden, 1 Ch. Ca. 272. Rudge v. Hopkins, 2 Eq. Ab. 170. Mayor of York v. Pilkington, 1 Atk. 282. Conyers v. Lord Abergavenny, ib. 285. Poore v. Clark, 2 Atk. 515.
(c) Currier v. Cryer, Hard. 21. Green v. Robinson, ib. 174. City of London v. Pallister, cit. Bunb. 101. Ibid. v. Perkins, 3 Bro. P. C. Ed. Toml. 602. Corporation of Carlisle v. Wilson, 13 Ves. 276. Duke of Norfolk v. Myers, 4 Mad. Rep. 83. Marshall v. Walmesley, Lady Petre v. Clarkson, Earl of Warrington v. Mosely, cit. ib. Though this is now fully settled, yet there are many precedents in which courts of equity have refused to interpose. Disney v. Robertson, Bunb. 41. Bond v. City of Exeter, ib. Mayor of Boston v. Jackson, ib. 101. Harding v. Ainge, ib. Vide also Fines v. Cobb, 2 Vern. 116.
Perpetual a tenants from throwing down the enclosures (a).
· Lord Eldon has recognised the authority of these
cases, considering it established that a lord of a manor may file a bill, stating that he has approved under the statute, and left sufficient common of pasture; that by the operation of the statute the inclosure has become his exclusive soil. Upon such a bill, however, the prayer must be, not in the nature of waste, for an injunction, but for the establishment of the exclusive right under the statute, and to have that right declared : accordingly in the case before him, where an injunction had been obtained on affidavit, against cutting and pasturing cattle in a wood, the plaintiff praying the injunction as tenant in fee, or as lord of the manor inclosing under the statute; the defendants denying the former title, and as to the latter claiming common of pasture and estovers, and stating that after the enclosure sufficient common of pasture would not be left, the injunction was under the circumstances dissolved upon the answer (6).
Upon the principle of preventing multiplicity of suits, a bill will lie to settle a general fine to be paid
by all the copyhold tenants of a manor (c). Such bill will A bill of this sort, however, cannot be maintained not lie where the right is where a right is disputed between two persons only, disputed be- and the decree sought cannot conclude any one tween two persons only.
(a) Weeks v. Staker, 2 Vern. 305. Arthington v. Fawkes, ib. 356.
(6) Hanson v. Gardiner, 7 Ves. 305.
(c) Middleton v. Jackson, 1 Ch. Rep. 18. Popham v. Lancaster, ib. 51. Cowper v. Clerk, 3 P. W. 157.
except the defendants (a). Accordingly in the above Perpetual noticed case of Cowper v. Clerk, a bill by a single Injunctions. copyholder to be relieved against an excessive fine was dismissed with costs, as determinable at law. Thus in one of the leading cases upon this subject, a. bill by a lord of a manor to establish his legal title to : the manor, and for a perpetual injunction to restrain the defendant from appointing a steward or gamekeeper for the said manor, and from setting up any further claim thereto, was dismissed with costs, and that decree was affirmed upon appeal by the House of Lords (6).
We may here notice, though not exactly belong- Bills for seting to the subject, yet not entirely foreign from ries and res
m tling boundait, the doctrine upon the subject of bills for settling covery of boundaries, and of bills for the recovery of quit qu rents. As to the former, it is settled that the mere confusion of boundaries is not a sufficient ground for the court to interpose, the jurisdiction must be superinduced by some equitable circum
it quit rents.
(a) Disney o. Robertson, sup. City of London v. Ainsley, 1 Anst. 158. Whitchurch v. Hide, 2 Atk. 391. Lord Teynham v. Webb, ib. 483. Weller v. Smeaton, 1 Bro. C. C. 572. 1 Cox, 102. There are some old cases upon this subject to the contrary, where the court acted upon the great length of possession in the plaintiff, but they are not law at present. Bush v. Western, Pr. Ch. 530. Finch v. Resbridge, 2 Vern. 390. Where a person was in possession of a fishery, he was allowed to file a bill to perpetuate testimony and establish his right, though he had not recovered in affirmance of it at law. Duke of Dorset v. Girdler, Pr. Ch. 531. But where the plaintiff has been interrupted and dispossessed, and therefore has a remedy at law, a bill of this nature will not lie. Wynn v. Hatty, cit. ib.
(6) Welby v. Duke of Rutland, 3 Bro. P. C. Ed. Toml. 39.
Perpetual stance (a). In the cases of quit rents, relief has been Injunctions.
given where the remedies at law have either been Where the lost or become very deficient (b). lands of There are several ancient cases upon the subject several are subject to a of rentcharges, which proceeded upon the equity rentcharge, which the plaintiff had to contribution, viz. where grantee restrained from the lands of several being liable to a rentcharge, suing one
and the person entitled to it was suing one alone, alone.
the court has restrained him without making the rest parties (c).
(a) Wake v. Conyers, 2 Cox, 260. 1 Eden, 331. St. Luke's v. St. Leonard's, 1 Bro. C. C. 40. Atkins v. Hatton, 3 Anst. 387. Rous v. Barker, 3 Bro. P. C. Ed. Toml. 660. Loker v. Rolle, 3 Ves. 4. Duke of Leeds v. Earl of Strafford, 4 Ves. 180. The Attorney General v. Fullarton, 2 V. & B. 263. Spear o. Crawter, 2 Meriv. 410.
(6) Vide Holder v. Chambury, 3 P. W. 256. and the cases there cited. Bouverie v. Prentice, 1 Bro. C. C. 200. Duke of Leeds v. New Radnor, 2 Bro. C. C. 340. 518.
(c) Cary 33. Dolman v. Vavasor, ib. 132. The Queen v. Colborne, ib. 159.
Of Injunctions to yield up, quiet, or continue Possession
The injunction to yield up, quiet, or continue possession of land is a judicial writ; and subsequent to a decree, in the nature of a writ of execution (a).
The strict primary decree of a court of equity, as observed by Lord Hardwicke, is in personam; and he adds, that it was not till the time of James I. that it was settled that the court would issue an injunction and writ of assistance to the sheriff to put into possession in a suit of lands (6). This, however, is clearly a mistake, and his Lordship must here be understood as speaking of sequestrations upon lands not in question in the cause, which have been frequently said to have been introduced by Lord Bacon in the time of James I.(c). For not
(a) Wy. Pr. Rep. 254. (6) 1 Ves. 454.
(c) 1 Vern. 421. 1 Ch. Ca. 91. There is great obscurity attending the origin of sequestrations, as, notwithstanding these observations, there is an order of Lord Bacon's, which expressly states that no sequestration shall be granted but of lands, leases, or goods in question. Ord. 29. Beames, 16. There are, however, as shown by the learned editor, a great number of precedents prior to, and contemporaneous with, these orders, in which sequestrations were granted of other lands and goods. It is however clear that they were not introduced by Lord Keeper Coventry