General Mackenzie attributed the jealousy of the latter to French influence; Mr. Frere to the abrupt proceedings of Sir George Smith, and to fear, lest the Junta of Seville, who were continually on the watch to recover their ancient power, should represent the admission of the British troops as a treasonable proceeding on the part of the supreme government. It is, however, evident that the true cause was the false position in which the English ministers had originally placed themselves by inundating Spain with arms and money, without at the same time asserting a just influence, and making their assistance the price of good order and useful exertion.

CHAPTER III.

Weakness of the British army in Portugal-General Cameron marches to Lisbon -Sir R. Wilson remains near Ciudad Rodrigo-Sir J. Cradock prepares to take a defensive position at Passa d'Arcos-Double dealing of the Regency-The populace murder foreigners, and insult the British troops-Anarchy in Oporto -British government ready to abandon Portugal-Change their intentionMilitary system of Portugal-The Regency demand an English general-Beresford is sent to them-Sherbrooke's and Mackenzie's troops arrive at LisbonBeresford arrives there, and takes the command of the native force-Change in the aspect of affairs-Sir J. Cradock encamps at Lumiar-Relative positions of the allied and French armies-Marshal Beresford desires Sir J. Cradock to march against Soult-Cradock refuses-Various unwise projects broached by different persons.

THE effort made to secure Cadiz was an act of disinterested zeal on the part of Sir John Cradock. The absence of his best troops exposed him to the most galling peevishness from the Regency, and to the grossest insults from the populace; with his reduced force, he could not expect to hold even a contracted position at the extremity of the rock of Lisbon against the weakest army likely to invade Portugal; and as there was neither a native force nor a government to be depended upon, there remained for him only the prospect of a forced and, consequently, disgraceful embarkation, and the undeserved obloquy that never fails to follow disaster.

In this disagreeable situation, as Elvas and Almeida no longer contained British troops, his attention was necessarily fixed upon Lisbon and upon Oporto, which the violence of the gales had rendered a sealed port; meanwhile, the hospitals and magazines of Almeida, and even those of Salamanca, being sent to Lamego, had crowded that place with fifteen hundred sick men, besides escorts and hourly accumulating stores. The Douro had overflowed, the craft could not ply, one large boat attempting to descend was over

set, and eighty persons, soldiers and others, had perished. General Cameron also, hearing of this confusion, relinquished the idea of embarking at Oporto, and, recrossing the Douro, made for Lisbon, where he arrived the beginning of February, with two thousand men, who were worn with fatigue, having marched eight hundred miles under continued rains. Sir Robert Wilson had sent his guns to Abrantes, by the road of Idanha Nova; but partly from a spirit of adventure, partly from an erroneous idea that Sir John Cradock wished him to defend the frontier, he remained with his infantry in the neighborhood of Ciudad Rodrigo. His force had been increased by a Spanish detachment under Don Carlos d'España, and by some volunteers, but it was still weak, and his operations were necessarily confined to a few trifling skirmishes: yet, like many others, his imagination so far outstripped his judgment, that, when he had only felt the advanced post of a single division, he expressed his conviction that the French were going to abandon Spain altogether.

Sir John Cradock entertained no such false expectations. He was informed of the battle of Coruña and the death of Moore, and he knew too well the vigor and talent of that General to doubt that he had been oppressed by an overwhelming force; he knew also that Zaragoza had fallen, and that twenty-five thousand French troops were thus free to act in other quarters; he knew that Soult, with at least twenty thousand men, was on the Minho; that Romana was incapable of making any head; that Portugal was one wide scene of helpless confusion, and that a French army was again in the neighborhood of Merida, threatening Lisbon by the line of the Tagus; in fine, that his own embarrassments were hourly increasing, and that the moment was arrived when the safety of his troops was the chief consideration. The tenor of the few despatches he had received from England led him to suppose that the ministers designed to abandon Portugal; but, as their intentions on that head were never clearly explained, he resolved to abide by the literal interpretation of his first instructions, and to keep his hold of the country as long as it was possible to do so without risking the utter destruction of his army. To avoid that danger, he put every encumbrance at Lisbon on board the transports in the Tagus; proceeded to dismantle the batteries at the mouth of the river, and in concert with the Admiral, made preparations for carrying away or destroying the military and naval stores in the arsenal. At the same time, he renewed his efforts to embark the sick men and stores at Oporto; but the weather continued so unfavorable, that he was finally obliged to remove the invalids and stores by land, yet he could not procure carriages for the whole.

After the arrival of Cameron's detachment, the effective British force under arms, including convalescents and fifteen hundred stragglers from Sir John Moore's army, was about eight thousand men; yet when the security of the forts and magazines and the tranquillity of Lisbon were provided for, only five thousand men, and those not in the best order, could be brought into the field. As this force was infinitely too weak to cover such a town as Lisbon, the General judged that it would be unwise to take up a position in advance, whence he should be obliged to retreat through the midst of a turbulent and excited population, which had already given too many indications of ill-temper to leave any doubt of its hostility under such circumstances. He, therefore, came to the resolution of withdrawing from Saccavem and Lisbon, to concentrate his whole force on a position at Passa d'Arcos, near the mouth of the river, where he could embark with least danger, and where he had the best chance of defending himself, if necessary, against superior numbers.

This reasoning was sound, and Cradock's intention was, undoubtedly, not to quit Portugal, unless driven from it by force, or in pursuance of orders from England; his arrangements, however, seem to have carried more the appearance of alarm than was either politic or necessary; the position of Passa d'Arcos might have been prepared, and the means necessary for an embarkation secured, and yet the bulk of the troops kept in advance until the last moment. To display a bold and confident front in war is, of all things, the most essential, as well to impose upon friends as upon enemies; Sir John Cradock did not fail to experience the truth of this maxim. The population of Lisbon, alarmed by the reverses in Spain, yet, like all the people in the Peninsula, confident in their own prowess and resolution until the very moment of attack, became extremly exasperated; the Regency, partly from their natural folly and insincerity, but more from the dread of the lower orders, countenanced, if they did not instigate, the latter to commit excesses, and to interrupt the proceedings of the British naval and military authorities. The measures of precaution relative to the forts had originated with the Regency, yet they now formally protested against them, and, with a view to hamper the General, encouraged their subalterns to make many false and even ridiculous charges against the British executive officers; and it would appear that the remonstrances of the Admiral and Generals were but imperfectly supported by Mr. Villiers.

In this manner the people's violence was nourished until the city was filled with tumult; mobs, armed with English pikes and muskets, collected night and day in the streets and on the high-roads, and

under the pretext of seeking for and killing Frenchmen, attacked indiscriminately all foreigners, even those in the British service wearing the British uniform. The guards, who endeavored to protect the victims of this ferocity, were insulted; couriers, passing with despatches, were intercepted and deprived of their papers; English officers were outraged in the streets, and such was the audacity of the people that the artillery was placed in the squares, in expectation of an affray. The state of Lisbon was similar to what it had been at the period of Junot's convention, and if the British had abandoned the country at this time, they would have been assailed with as much obloquy by the Portuguese; for such has been, and will be, the fate of all unsuccessful auxiliaries,-a reflection that should render historians cautions of adopting accusations upon the authority of native writers on the like occasions.

This spirit was not confined to Lisbon. In Oporto the disposition to insult the British was more openly encouraged than in the capital; the government of the multitude was more decidedly pronounced. From the cities it spread to the villages. The people of the Alemtejo frontier were, indeed, remarkably apathetic; but, from the Minho to the Tagus, the country was in horrible confusion; the soldiers were scattered, without regard to military system, and, being unpaid, lived at free quarters; the peasantry of the country assembling in bands, and the populace of the towns in mobs, intercepted the communications, appointed or displaced the generals at their pleasure, and massacred all persons of whom they were suspicious; the ammunition which had been supplied from England was wasted by constant firing in token of insubordination, and, as if the very genius of confusion was abroad, some of the British troops, principally malingerers,* of Sir John Moore's army, added their quota of misconduct, to increase the general distress.

The leading instigator of the excesses at Oporto was one Raymundo, a coadjutor and creature of the Bishop's, a turbulent and cruel fellow, who, by taking a share in the first insurrection against the French, obtained a momentary influence, and has since been elevated, by a very credulous writer, into a patriotic hero. He was, however, a worthless coward, fitted for secret villany, and incapable of a noble action.

1

This state of affairs, productive of so much misery and danger, continuing without intermission, caused many of the upper classes to despair of their country's safety by war, and increased the number of those who, wishing to attach themselves to the fortune of France, were ready to accept of a foreign prince for their sovereign,

An appellation given among soldiers to men who, under pretence of sickness, shrink from the performance of their duties in the field.

if with him they could obtain tranquillity and an ameliorated constitution; and when, soon afterwards, the edge of the enemy's sword, falling upon the senseless multitude, filled the streets of Oporto with blood, there was a powerful French party in Portugal. The bulk of the people were, however, stanch in their country's cause; they were furious and disorderly, but imbued with hatred of the French, ready at the call of honor, and susceptible of discipline, without any loss of energy.

The turbulence of the citizens, the remonstrances of the Regency, and the representations of Mr. Villiers, who was in doubt for the personal safety of the British subjects residing in Lisbon, convinced Sir John Cradock that political circumspection and adroitness were as important as military arrangements to prevent a catastrophe at this critical period; hence, as, contrary to what might have been expected, the enemy had not yet made any actual movement across the frontier, he suspended his design of falling back to Passa d'Arcos. In this unsettled state affairs remained until March, when intelligence arrived that the French fleet was at sea, whereupon two of the line-of-battle ships in the Tagus were despatched to reinforce Sir Thomas Duckworth's squadron, and the batteries at the mouth of the river were again armed. Meanwhile, Soult was making progress in the north, the anarchy at Oporto was continually increasing, and the English government had certainly come to the resolution of abandoning Portugal if the enemy advanced; for, although Sir John Cradock was not informed of their views, an officer in England, well acquainted with Portuguese customs, actually received orders, and was embarking, to aid the execution of this measure, when suddenly the policy of the Cabinet once more changed, and it was resolved to reinforce the army. This resolution, which may be attributed partly to the Austrian war, partly to the failure at Cadiz, partly to the necessity of satisfying public opinion in England, was accompanied by a measure which laid the first solid basis on which to build a reasonable hope of success.

The Portuguese government, either spontaneously, or brought thereto by previous negotiation, had offered the command of their troops, with the title of Marshal, to an English general, and the British ministers accepted this offer, promised supplies of arms, ammunition, clothing, and a subsidy for the payment of a certain number of regular soldiers; thus obtaining a firm hold of the military resources of Portugal, and gaining for the first time a position in the Peninsula suitable to the dignity of England and the contest in which she was engaged. The Portuguese desired to have Sir Arthur Wellesley, but he refused the offer, and it is said that Sir John Murray, (he who afterwards failed at Tarragona,) Sir John Doyle,