to complete the picture of distracted councils, O'Neil refused to fall back upon Caparosa without the order of Palafox. Fortunately the latter arrived at the moment in Tudela, and a conference taking place between him and Castaños the same day, they agreed that the Aragonese army should cross the Ebro, and occupy the heights over Tudela, while the rest of the troops should stretch away in line as far as Taranzona; nevertheless, in defiance of all orders, entreaties, or reasoning, the obstinate O'Neil remained in an olive-wood on the right bank of the river during the night of the 22d, leaving the key of the position open to the enemy. A council of war was held, the discussion was turbulent, and the opinions discordant. Palafox insisted on the defence of Aragon, as the principal or rather the only object to be attended to;* and he wished the whole army to pass to the left bank of the Ebro, and confine its operations to the protection of Zaragoza on that side,— a proposal which alone was sufficient to demonstrate his total incapacity for military affairs. Castaños reasoned justly against this absurdity, but the important moments passed in useless disputation, and the generals came to no concluion. Meanwhile Marshal Lasnes, bringing with him Maurice Mathieu's division of the sixth corps, which had just arrived from France, concentrated above thirty thousand infantry, four or five thousand cavalry, and sixty pieces of artillery, and marching by Alfaro, appeared, at eight o'clock in the morning of the 23d, in front of the Spanish outposts, close to Tudela, just at the moment when the Aragonese were passing the bridge and ascending their position. BATTLE OF TUDELA. From forty to fifty guns were distributed along the front of the Spanish army, which, numbering about forty-five thousand fighting men, was extended on a range of easy hills from Tudela to Taranzona, a distance of more than ten miles. Two divisions of the army of the centre connected the Aragonese with the fourth division, which occupied Cascante, three divisions were in Taranzona, and there were no intermediate posts between these scattered bodies. The weakness attendant on such an arrangement being visible to the enemy at the first glance, Lasnes hastened to make his dispositions, and at nine o'clock General Morlot with one division attacked the heights above the town. Maurice Mathieu, supported by the cavalry of Lefebre Desnouettes, assailed the centre, and General Lagrange advanced against Cascante. The Aragonese resisted Morlot with vigor, and even pressed him in the plain at the foot of *Ibid, and his Vindication. + Mr. Stuart's Letters, MS. Lord W. Bentinck's ditto. the hills, but Maurice Mathieu having gained possession of an olivewood, and a small ridge which was connected with the centre of the Spanish position, after some sharp fighting pierced the line, and then Lefebre, breaking through the opening with his cavalry, wheeled up to the left, and threw the right wing into hopeless confusion. The defeated soldiers fled towards the bridge of Tudela, pursued by the victorious horsemen. In the mean time La Peña, descending from Cascante with the fourth division, drove in Lagrange's advanced guard of cavalry, yet he was soon encountered at a charging pace by the infantry, was beaten and fell back to Taranzona, where three divisions had remained during the whole of the action, which, strictly speaking, was confined to the heights above Tudela. Palafox was not in the battle, and O'Neil, with the right wing and the centre, fled to Zaragoza with such speed, that some of the fugitives are said to have arrived there the same evening. When La Peña was driven back upon Taranzona, the left wing had commenced an orderly retreat towards Borja, when some cavalry, detached by Ney from the side of Soria, coming in sight, caused great confusion; a magazine blew up, in the midst of the disorder cries of treason were heard, the columns dissolved in a few moments, and the road to Borja was covered with a disorganized multitude. This ended the celebrated battle of Tudela, in which forty thousand men were beaten and dispersed by an effort that, being in itself neither very vigorous nor well sustained, was nevertheless sufficient to demonstrate the incapacity of Spanish generals, and the want of steadiness in Spanish soldiers. Several thousand prisoners, thirty pieces of artillery, and all the ammunition and baggage, fell into the hands of the French, who rated the killed and wounded very high. The total loss may be estimated at eight or nine thousand men.* Fifteen thousand escaped to Zaragoza; a detachment of two thousand, under the Conde de Cartoajal and General Lilli, left in the mountains of Nalda, were cut off by the result of the action, and two divisions, whose numbers were increased by fugitives from the others, were rallied at Calatayud on the 25th, but they were half starved and mutinous. At Calatayud, Castaños received two despatches from the Central Junta, virtually restoring him to the command, for the first empowered him to unite the Aragonese army with his own, and the second desired him to co-operate with St. Juan in the Somosierra to protect the capital. The battle of Tudela disposed of the first despatch; the seconnd induced Castaños to march by Siguenza upon Madrid. *Eleventh Bullettin. Victoires et Conquêtes. + Castanos' Account of the Battle of Tudela, and Vindication. In the mean time, Napoleon, recalling the greatest part of his cavalry from the open country of Castile, and having left seven or eight thousand men in Burgos, had fixed his head-quarters at Aranda de Duero on the 23d; but from the difficulty of transmitting despatches through a country in a state ef insurrection, intelligence of the victory at Tudela only reached him on the 26th, and he was exceedingly discontented that Castaños should have escaped the hands of Ney.* That Marshal had been instructed to reach Soria by the 21st, to remain there until Lasnas should be in front of the Spaniards, and then to pass by Agreda, and intercept the retreat of the latter; and on the evening of the 21st, General Jomini and Colonel D'Esmenard, staff-officers of the sixth corps, arrived with an escort of eighty cavalry at Soria. This town is situated upon a rocky height, with a suburb below, and the Conde de Cartoajal, who was retiring from the mountains of Nalda, happening to be in the upper part, the magistrates endeavored to entrap the French officers. For this purpose, they were met at dusk by the municipality, and invited to enter the town with great appearance of cordiality; but their suspicions were excited, the plan failed, Cartoajal marched during the night, and the next day the sixth corps occupied the place. General Jomini, whose profound knowledge of the theory of war enabled him to judge accurately of the events that were likely to occur, urged Ney to continue his march upon Calatayud, without any rest; the Marshal, however, either offended with the heat of Jomini's manner, or from some other cause, resolved to follow the letter of his instructions, and remained at Soria the 23d and 24th, merely sending out some light cavalry on the side of Medina Celi and Agreda. On the 25th he marched to the latter town, and the 26th crossed the field of battle, passing through Cascante; the 27th, he arrived, with one division, at Mallan, a town between Tudela and Zaragoza, his advanced guard being at Arlazon on the Xalon.* To the erroneous direction and dilatory nature of these movements, Castaños owed the safety of the troops, which were re-assembled at Calatayud. Ney must have been acquainted with the result of the battle on the 25th, and it is remarkable that he should have continued on the road towards Agreda, when a single march by Medina Celi would have brought him upon the line of retreat from Calatayud to Siguenza. By some writers these errors have been attributed to Ney's jealousy of Marshal Lasnes; by others it has been asserted that the plunder of Soria detained him. The falsehood of the *S. Journal of Operations, MS. Eleventh Bulletin. + S. Journal of Operations, MS. latter charge is, however, evident from the fact, that with the exception of a requisition for some shoes and great-coats, no contribution was exacted from Soria, and no pillage took place at all; and with respect to the former accusation, a better explanation may be found in the peculiar disposition of this extraordinary man, who was notoriously indolent, and unlearned in the abstract science of war. It was necessary for him to see, in order to act, and his character seemed to be asleep until some imminent danger aroused all the marvellous energy and fortitude with which nature had endowed him. The success at Tudela fell short of what Napoleon had a right to expect from his previous dispositions, yet it sufficed to break the Spanish strength on that side, and to lay open Aragon, Navarre, and New Castile, as the northern part of Spain had before been opened by the victory of Espinosa. From the frontiers of France to those of Portugal, from the sea-coast to the Tagus, the country was now overwhelmed; Madrid, Zaragoza, and the British army, indeed, lifted their heads a little way above the rising waters, but the eye looked in vain for an efficient barrier against the flood, which still poured on with unabated fury. And as the divided, weak state of the English troops led the Emperor to conclude that Sir John Moore would instantly retire into Portugal, he ordered Lasnes to pursue Palafox-to seize the important position of Monte Torrero-to summon Zaragoza, and to offer a complete amnesty to all persons in the town, without reservation, thus bearing testimony to the gallantry of the first defence. His own attention was fixed on Madrid. That capital was the rallying point of all the broken Spanish, and of all his own pursuing divisions, and it was the centre of all interests; a commanding height from whence a beneficial stream of political benefits might descend to allay, or a driving storm of war pour down to extinguish the fire of insurrection.* * S. Journal of Operations, MS. CHAPTER II. Napoleon marches against the capital; forces the pass of the Somosierra-St. Juan murdered by his men-Tumults in Madrid-French army arrives there; the Retiro stormed-Town capitulates-Remains of Castaños' army driven across the Tagus; retire to Cuença-Napoleon explains his policy to the nobles, clergy, and tribunals of Madrid-His vast plans, enormous force-Defenceless state of Spain. THE French patrols sent towards the Somosierra ascertained, on the 21st, that above six thousand men were intrenching themselves in the gorge of the mountains; that a small camp at Sepulveda blocked the roads leading upon Segovia; and that General Heredia was preparing to secure the passes of the Guadarama. Napoleon having, however, resolvèd to force the Somosierra, and reach the capital before Castaños could arrive there, ordered Ney to pursue the army of the centre without intermission, and directed the fourth corps to continue its march from Carrion by Palencia, Valladolid, Olmedo, and Segovia. The movement of this corps is worthy of the attention of military men. We shall find it confusing the spies and the country people-overawing the flat country of Leon and Castile-protecting the right flank of the armymenacing Gallicia and Salamanca-keeping the heads of Moore's and Baird's columns from advancing, and rendering it dangerous for them to attempt a junction-threatening the line of Hope's march from the Tagus to the Guadarama-dispersing Heredia's corps, and finally turning the pass of Somosierra, without ever ceasing to belong to the concentric movement of the great army upon Madrid. But the time lost in transmitting intelligence of the victory at Tudela was productive of serious consequences." The officer despatched with these fresh instructions, found Ney and Moncey (Lasnes was sick at Tudela) each advanced two days' march in the wrong direction. The first, as we have seen, was at Mallen, preparing to attack Zaragoza; the second was at Almunio, near Calatayud, pursuing Castaños. They were consequently obliged to countermarch, and during the time thus lost, the people of Zaragoza, recovering from the consternation into which they were at first thrown by the appearance of the flying troops, made arrangements for a vigorous defence. Castaños also escaped to Siguenza, without any further loss than what was inflicted in a slight action at Burvieca, where General Maurice Mathieu's division came up with his rear-guard. * S. Journal of Operations, MS. |