regular and serious war, prudence did not permit three corps, the strongest of which was only eighteen thousand men, to separate to a greater distance than six days' march, in the midst of eleven millions of people in a state of hostility. But fifty thousand French could defend with success a line of sixty leagues, and could guard the two grand communications of Burgos and Tudela, against enemies who had not up to that period been able to carry to either point above twenty-five thousand men. In this mode fifteen thousand French could be united upon either of those roads."

Joseph was dissatisfied with Napoleon's plans, and preferred his own. The disposable troops at his command, exclusive of those at Bilbao, were fifty thousand, which he distributed as follows: The right wing occupied Burgos, Pancorbo, and Puente Lara. The centre was posted between Haro and Logroño. The left extended from Logroño to Tudela, and the latter town was not occupied. He contended that this arrangement, at once offensive and defensive, might be advantageously continued if the great army, directed upon Spain, arrived in September, since it tended to refit the army already there, and menaced the enemy; but that it could not be prolonged until November, because in three months the Spaniards must make a great progress, and would very soon be in a state to take the offensive, with grand organized corps obedient to a central administration, which would have time to form in Madrid. Everything announced, he said, that the month of October was one of those decisive epochs which gave, to the party who knew how to profit from it, the priority of movements and success, the progress of which it was difficult to calculate.

In this view of affairs, the merits of six projects were discussed by the King.

First project. To remain in the actual position. This was declared to be unsustainable, because the enemy could attack the left with forty thousand, the centre with forty thousand, the right with as many. Tudela and Navarre, as far as Logroño, required twentyfive thousand men to defend them. Burgos could not be defended but by an army in a state to resist the united forces of Blake and Cuesta, which would amount to eighty thousand men; it was doubtful if the twenty thousand bayonets which could be opposed to them, could completely beat them; if they did not, the French would be harassed by the insurgents of three provinces-Biscay, Navarre, and Guipuscoa would interpose between the left wing and France.

Second project. To carry the centre and reserve by Tudela, towards Zaragoza or Albazan. United with the left, they would amount to thirty thousand men, who might seek for, and, doubtless,

would defeat the enemy, if he was met with on that side. In the mean time, the right wing, leaving garrisons in the citadel of Burgos and the fort of Pancorbo, could occupy the enemy, and watch any movements in the Montaña Santander, or disembarkations that might take place at the ports. But this task was considered difficult, because Pancorbo was not the only defile accessible to artillery; three leagues from thence another road led upon Miranda, and there was a third passage over the point of the chain which stretched between Haro and Miranda.

Third project. To leave the defence of Navarre to the left wing, to carry the centre, the reserve, and the right wing to Burgos, and to beat the enemy before he could unite; an easy task, as the French would be thirty thousand strong. Meanwhile, Moncey would keep the Spaniards in check on the side of Tudela, or, if unable to do that, he was to march up the Ebro, by Logroño and Briviesca, and join the main body: the communication with France would be thus lost, but the army might maintain itself until the arrival of the Emperor. A modification of this project was, that Moncey, retiring to the intrenched camp of Pampeluna, should there await either the arrival of the Emperor, or the result of the operations towards Burgos.

Fourth project. To pass the Ebro in retreat, and to endeavor to tempt the enemy to fight in the plain between that river and Vittoria.

Fifth project. To retire, supporting the left upon Pampeluna, the right upon Montdragon.

Sixth project. To leave garrisons, with the means of six weeks' defence, in Pampeluna, St. Sebastian, Pancorbo, and Burgos. To unite the rest of the army, march against the enemy, attack him wherever he was found, and then wait, either near Madrid or in that country into which the pursuit of the Spaniards or the facility of living should draw the army. This plan relinquished the communications with France entirely, but it was said that the grand army could easily open them again; the troops, already in Spain, would be sufficiently strong to defy all the efforts of the enemy, to disconcert all his projects, and to wait in a noble attitude the general impulse which would be given by the arrival of the Emperor.

Of all these projects, the last was the favorite with the King, who strongly recommended it, and asserted that if it was followed, affairs would be more prosperous when the Emperor arrived than could be expected from any other plan. Marshal Ney and General Jourdan approved of it, but it would appear that Napoleon had other views, and too little confidence in his brother's military judgment to intrust so great a matter to his guidance.

OBSERVATIONS.

1. It is undoubted that there must always be some sympathy of genius in the man who is to execute another's conception in military affairs. Without that species of harmony between their minds, the thousand accidental occurrences and minor combinations which must happen contrary to expectation, will inevitably embarrass the executor to such a degree, that he will be unable to see the most obvious advantages; and in striving to unite the plan he has received with his own views, he will adopt neither, but steering an unsteady, reeling course between both, will fail of success. The reason of this appears to be, that a strong, and, if the term may be used, inveterate attention must be fixed upon certain great principles of action in war, to enable a general to disregard the minor events and inconveniences which cross his purpose: minor they are to the great object, but in themselves sufficient to break down the firmness and self-possession of any but extraordinary men.

2. The original memoir from which Joseph's projects have been extracted, is so blotted and interlined, that it would be unfair to consider it as a mature production. The great error which pervades it, is the conjectured data upon which he founds his plans, and the little real information which he appears to have had relative to the Spanish forces, views, or interior policy. His plans were based upon the notion that the Central Junta would be able and provident, the Spaniards united, the armies strong and well guided; none of which was true. Again, he estimated Cuesta and Blake's armies at eighty thousand, and considered them as one body; but they were never united at all, and if they had, they would scarcely have amounted to sixty thousand. The bold idea of throwing himself into the interior came too late; he should have thought of that before he quitted Madrid, or at least before the central government was established at that capital. His operations might have been successful against the miserable armies opposed to him, but against good and movable troops they would not, as the Emperor's admirable notes prove. The first project, wanting those offensive combinations discussed by Napoleon, was open to all his objections, as being timid and incomplete. The second was crude and ill-considered; for, according to the King's estimate of the Spanish force, thirty thousand men on each wing might oppose the heads of his columns, while sixty thousand could still have been united at Logroño. These might pass the Ebro, excite insurrection in Navarre, Guipuscoa, and Biscay, seize Tolosa and Miranda, and fall upon the rear of the French army, which, thus cut in two and its communications intercepted, would have been extremely embar

rassed. The third was not better judged. Burgos, as an offensive post, protecting the line of defence, was very valuable, and to unite a large force there was so far prudent; but if the Spaniards retired and refused battle with their left, while the centre and right operated by Logroño and Sanguessa, what would have been the result? The French right must, without any definite object, either have continued to advance, or remained stationary without communication, or returned to fight a battle for those very positions which they had just quitted. The fourth depended entirely upon accident, and is not worth argument. The fifth was an undisguised retreat. The sixth was not applicable to the actual situation of affairs; the King's force was no longer an independent body-it was become the advanced guard of the great army, marching under Napoleon. It was absurd, therefore, to contemplate a decisive movement, without having first matured a plan suitable to the whole mass that was to be engaged in the execution: in short, to permit an advanced guard to determine the operations of the main body, was to reverse the order of military affairs, and to trust to accident instead of design. It is curious, that while Joseph was proposing this irruption into Spain, the Spaniards and the military agents of Great Britain were trembling lest he should escape their power by a precipitate flight. "War is not a conjectural art!"

CHAPTER V.

Position and strength of the French and Spanish armies-Blake moves from Reynosa to the Upper Ebro; sends a division to Bilbao; French retire from that town-Ney quits his position near Logroño, and takes Bilbao-The armies of the centre and right approach the Ebro and the Aragon-Various evolutionsBlake attacks and takes Bilbao-Head of the grand French army arrives in Spain -The Castilians join the army of the centre-The Asturians join Blake-Apathy of the Central Junta-Castaños joins the army; holds a conference with Palafox; their dangerous position; arrange a plan of operations-The Spaniards cross the Ebro-The King orders a general attack-Skirmish at Sanguessa, at Logroño, and Lorim-The Spaniards driven back over the Ebro-Logroño taken-Colonel Cruz, with a Spanish battalion, surrenders at Lerim-Francisco Palafox, the military deputy, arrives at Alfaro; his exceeding folly and presumption; controls and insults Castaños-Force of the French army increases hourly; how composed and disposed-Blake ascends the valley of DurangoBattle of Zornosa-French retake Bilbao-Combat at Valmaceda-Observations.

THE Emperor overruled the offensive project of the King, and the latter was forced to distribute the centre and right wing in a manner more consonant to the spirit of Napoleon's instructions;