opinion, the British army was inferior to it in none of these points save the first, and in discipline it was superior, because a national army will always bear a sterner code than a mixed force will suffer. Amongst the latter, military crimes may be punished, but moral crimes can hardly be repressed; men will submit to death for a breach of great regulations which they know by experience to be useful, but the constant restraint of petty, though wholesome rules, they will escape from by desertion, or resist by mutiny, when the ties of custom and country are removed; for the disgrace of bad conduct attaches not to them, but to the nation under whose colors they serve. Great indeed is that genius that can keep men of different nations firm to their colors, and preserve a rigid discipline at the same time. Napoleon's military system was, from this cause, inferior to the British, which, if it be purely administered, combines the solidity of the Germans with the rapidity of the French, excluding the mechanical dulness of the one, and the dangerous vivacity of the other; yet, before the campaign of the Peninsula had proved its excellence in every branch of war, the English army was absurdly under-rated in foreign countries, and absolutely despised in its own. It was reasonable to suppose that it did not possess that facility of moving in large bodies which long practice had given to the French, but the individual soldier was most falsely stigmatized as deficient in intelligence and activity, the officers ridiculed, and the idea that a British could cope with a French army, even for a single campaign, considered chimerical.

The English are a people very subject to receive, and to cherish false impressions; proud of their credulity as if it were a virtue, the majority will adopt any fallacy, and cling to it with a tenacity proportioned to its grossness. Thus an ignorant contempt for the British soldiery had been long entertained, before the ill-success of the expeditions in 1794 and 1799 appeared to justify the general prejudice. The true cause of those failures was not traced, and the excellent discipline afterwards introduced and perfected by the Duke of York was despised. England, both at home and abroad, was in 1808 scorned as a military power, when she possessed, without a frontier to swallow up large armies in expensive fortresses, at least two hundred thousand of the best equipped and best disciplined soldiers in the universe,* together with an immense recruiting establishment; and, through the medium of the militia, the power of drawing upon the population without limit. It is true that of this number many were necessarily employed in the defence of the colonies, but enough remained to compose a disposable force greater than that with which Napoleon won the battle of

* See Abstract of the military force of Great Britain in 1808

Austerlitz, and double that with which he conquered Italy. In all the materials of war the superior ingenuity and skill of the English mechanics were visible, and that intellectual power which distinguishes Great Britain amongst the nations in science, arts, and literature, was not wanting to her generals in the hour of danger.

CHAPTER II.

Dissensions in the Spanish court-Secret treaty and convention of Fontainebleau -Junot's army enters Spain-Dupont's and Moncey's corps enter Spain-Duhesme's corps enters Catalonia-Insurrection of Aranjuez and Madrid-Charles the Fourth abdicates-Ferdinand proclaimed King-Murat marches to Madrid -Refuses to recognize Ferdinand as King-The sword of Francis the First delivered to the French General-Savary arrives at Madrid-Ferdinand goes to Bayonne-The fortresses of St. Sebastian, Figueras, Pampeluna, and Barcelona, treacherously seized by the French-Riot at Toledo 23d of April, Tumult_at Madrid 2d May-Charles the Fourth abdicates a second time in favor of Napoleon-Assembly of the Notables at Bayonne-Joseph Bonaparte declared King of Spain-Arrives at Madrid.

FOR many years antecedent to the French invasion, the royal family of Spain were distracted with domestic quarrels; the son's hand was against his mother, the father's against his son, and the court was a scene of continual broils, under cover of which artful men, as is usual in such cases, pushed their own interest forward, while they seemed to act only for the sake of the party whose cause they espoused. Charles IV. attributed this unhappy state of his house to the intrigues of his sister-in-law, the Queen of the Two Sicilies; he himself, a weak and inefficient old man, was governed by his wife, and she again by Don Manuel Godoy,† of whose person, it is said, she was enamored even to folly. From the rank of a simple gentleman of the royal guards, this person had been raised to the highest dignities, and the title of Prince of the Peace was conferred upon him whose name must be for ever connected with one of the bloodiest wars that fill the page of history.

Ferdinand, Prince of the Asturias, hated this favorite, and the miserable death of his young wife, his own youth, and apparently forlorn condition, created such an interest in his favor, that the people partook of his feelings; thus the disunion of the royal family, extending its effects beyond the precincts of the court, involved the nation in ruin. Those who know how Spaniards hate

*Nellerto. The Anagram of Llorente. + Vide Doblado's Letters.

E

will comprehend why Godoy, who, though sensual, was a mild, good-natured man, has been so overloaded with imprecations, as if he, and he alone, had been the cause of the disasters in Spain. It was not so. The canon, Escoiquiz, a subtle politician, who appears to have been the chief of Ferdinand's party,* finding the influence of the Prince of the Peace too strong, looked for support in a powerful quarter, and under his tuition, Ferdinand wrote upon the 11th of October, 1807, to the Emperor Napoleon. In this letter he complained of the influence which bad men had obtained over his father, prayed for the interference of the "hero destined by Providence," so ran the text, "to save Europe and to support thrones ;" asked an alliance by marriage with the Bonaparte family, and finally desired that his communication might be kept secret from his father, lest it should be taken as a proof of disrespect. He received no answer, and fresh matter of quarrel being found by his enemies at home, he was placed in arrest, and upon the 29th of October, Charles denounced him to the Emperor as guilty of treason, and of having projected the assassination of his own mother. Napoleon caught eagerly at this pretext for interfering in the domestic policy of Spain,-and thus the honor and independence of a great people were placed in jeopardy, by the squabbles of two of the most worthless persons.

Some short time before this, Godoy, either instigated by an ambition to found a dynasty, or fearing that the death of the King would expose him to the vengeance of Ferdinand, had made proposals to the French court to concert a plan for the conquest and division of Portugal, promising the assistance of Spain, on condition that a principality for himself should be set apart from the spoil. Such is the turn given by Napoleon to this affair. But the article which provided an indemnification for the King of Etruria, a minor, who had just been obliged to surrender his Italian dominions to France, renders it doubtful if the first offer came from Godoy, and Napoleon eagerly adopted the project if he did not propose it. The advantages were all on his side. Under the pretext of supporting his army in Portugal, he might fill Spain with his troops; the dispute between the father and the son, now referred to his arbitration, placed the golden apples within his reach, and he resolved to gather the fruit if he had not planted the tree.

A secret treaty was immediately concluded at Fontainebleau, between Marshal Duroc on the part of France, and Eugenio Izquerdo on the part of Spain. This treaty, together with a convention dependent on it, was signed the 27th, and ratified by Napoleon on *Napoleon in Las Casas.

+ Nellerto.

the 29th of October, the contracting parties agreeing on the following conditions:

The house of Braganza to be driven forth of Portugal, and that kingdom divided into three portions. The province of Entre Minho e Duero, including the town of Oporto, to be called the kingdom of North Lusitania, and given as an indemnification to the dispossessed sovereign of Etruria.

The Alemtejo and the Algarves to be erected into a principality for Godoy, who, taking the title of Prince of the Algarves, was still to be in some respects dependent upon the Spanish crown.

The central provinces of Estremadura, Beira, and the Tras os Montes, together with the town of Lisbon, to be held in deposit until a general peace, and then to be exchanged under certain conditions for English conquests.

The ultramarine dominions of the exiled family to be equally divided between the contracting parties, and in three years at the longest, the King of Spain to be gratified with the title of Emperor of the two Americas. Thus much for the treaty. The terms of the convention were:

France to employ 25,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry. Spain 24,000 infantry, 30 guns, and 3,000 cavalry.

The French contingent to be joined at Alcantara by the Spanish cavalry, artillery, and one third of the infantry, and from thence to march to Lisbon. Of the remaining Spanish infantry, 10,000 were to take possession of the Entre Minho e Duero and Oporto, and 6,000 were to invade Estremadura and the Algarves. In the mean time a reserve of 40,000 men was to be assembled at Bayonne, ready to take the field by the 20th of November, if England should interfere, or the Portuguese people resist.

If the King of Spain or any of his family joined the troops, the chief command to be vested in the person so joining, but, with that exception, the French general to be obeyed whenever the armies of the two nations came into contact, and during the march through Spain, the French soldiers were to be fed by that country, and paid by their own government.

The revenues of the conquered provinces to be administered by the general actually in possession, and for the benefit of the nation in whose name the province was held.

Although it is evident that this treaty and convention favored Napoleon's ulterior operations in Spain, by enabling him to mask his views, and introduce large bodies of men into that country without creating much suspicion, it does not follow, as some authors have asserted, that they were contrived by the Emperor for the sole purpose of rendering the Spanish roval family odious to the

P

world, and by this far-fetched expedient, to prevent other nations from taking an interest in their fate, when he should find it convenient to apply the same measure of injustice to his associate, that they had accorded to the family of Braganza. To say nothing of the weakness of such a policy, founded, as it must be, on the error that governments acknowledge the dictates of justice at the expense of their supposed interests, it must be observed that Portugal was intrinsically a great object. History does not speak of the time when the inhabitants of that country were deficient in spirit; the natural obstacles to an invasion had more than once frustrated the efforts of large armies, and the long line of communication between Bayonne and the Portuguese frontier, could only be supported by Spanish co-operation. Add to this, the facility with which England could, and the probability that she would, succor her ancient ally, and the reasonable conclusion is, that Napoleon's first intentions were in accordance with the literal meaning of the treaty of Fontainebleau, his subsequent proceedings being the result of new projects, conceived as the wondrous imbecility of the Spanish Bourbons became manifest.* Again, the convention provided for the organization of a large Spanish force, to be stationed in the north and south of Portugal, that is, in precisely the two places from whence they could most readily march to the assistance of their country, if it was invaded. In fact the division of the Marquis of Solano in the south, and that of General Taranco in the north of Portugal, did, when the Spanish insurrection broke out, (Nov. 1807,) form the strength of the Andalusian and Gallician armies, the former of which gained the victory at Baylen, while the latter contended for it, although ineffectually, at Rio Seco.

The French force, destined to invade Portugal, was already assembled at Bayonne, under the title of the "First army of the Garonne," and actually entered Spain before the treaty was signed. It was commanded by General Junot, a young man of a bold, ambitious disposition, but of greater reputation for military talent than he was able to support; and his soldiers, principally conscripts, were ill fitted to endure the hardships which awaited them. At first by easy marches, and in small divisions, he led his troops through Spain, but the inhabitants, either from a latent fear of what was to follow, or from a dislike of foreigners common to all secluded people, were not friendly.† When the head of the columns reached Salamanca, the General halted, intending to complete the organization of his troops in that rich country, and there to await the most favorable moment for penetrating the sterile frontier which guarded * Voice from St. Helena, vol. ii.