it must have succeeded, because Junot was entangled in the defiles of Torres Vedras from six o'clock in the evening of the 20th, until late in the morning of the 21st.* The two armies would thus have changed camps in the space of a few hours, without firing a shot; Junot would have lost Lisbon, and have been placed in the most ridiculous situation.

5. In the battle, the Duke of Abrantes showed great courage, but no talent. His army was inferior in numbers, yet he formed two separate attacks-an evident error, that enabled Sir Arthur to beat him in detail without difficulty. He was the less excusable because the comparatively easy nature of the ground over which the road from Torres Vedras to Lourinham led, and the manner in which the English army was heaped to the right when the position first opened to the view, plainly indicated the true line of attack. Junot should, with all his forces concentrated for one effort, have fallen in upon the left of his opponent's position; if victorious, the sea would have swallowed those who escaped his sword-if repulsed, his retreat was open, and his loss could not have been so great in a well-conducted single effort, as it was in the ill-digested, unconnected attacks that took place.

6. The rapidity with which the French soldiers rallied and recovered their order after such a severe check was admirable, but their habitual method of attacking in column cannot be praised; against the Austrians, Russians, and Prussians it may have been successful, but against the British it must always fail, because the English infantry is sufficiently firm, intelligent, and well disciplined to wait calmly in lines for the adverse masses, and sufficiently bold to close upon them with the bayonet. The column is undoubtedly excellent for all movements short of the actual charge, but as the Macedonian phalanx was unable to resist the open formation of the Roman legion, so will the close column be unequal to sustain the fire and charge of a good line, aided by artillery. The natural repugnance of men to trample on their own dead and wounded, the cries and groans of the latter, and the whistling of the cannon-shots as they tear open the ranks, produce the greatest disorder, especially in the centre of attacking columns, which, blinded by smoke, unsteadfast of footing, and bewildered by words of command coming from a multitude of officers crowded together, can neither see what is taking place, nor make any effort to advance or retreat without increasing the confusion; hence no example of courage can be useful, no moral effect can be produced by the spirit of individuals, except upon the head, which is often firm and even victorious at the moment when the rear is flying in terror. Never

* Thiebault.

theless, well-managed columns are the very soul of military operations; in them is the victory, and in them also is safety to be found after a defeat; the secret consists in knowing when and where to extend the front.

ARMISTICE.-CONVENTION.

1. It is surprising that Junot, having regained Torres Vedras, occupied Mafra, and obtained an armistice, did not profit by the terms of the latter to prepare for crossing the Tagus and establishing the war on the frontiers. Kellermann ascertained during his negotiation, that Sir John Moore was not arrived; it was clear that until he did arrive, the position of Montechique could neither be attacked nor turned, and there was nothing in the armistice itself, nor in the war in which it had been agreed to, which rendered it dishonorable to take such an advantage. The opening thus left for Junot to gain time was Sir Arthur Wellesley's principal objection to the preliminary treaty.

2. With regard to the convention, although some of its provisions were objectionable in point of form, and others imprudently worded, yet taken as a whole it was a transaction fraught with prudence and wisdom. Let it be examined upon fair military and political grounds, let it even be supposed for the sake of argument that Sir Arthur, unimpeded by Sir Harry Burrard, had pursued his own plan, and that Junot, cut off from Lisbon and the half of his forces, had been driven up the Tagus-he was still master of flying to Almeida or Elvas, the thousand men left in Santarem would have joined him in the Alemtejo or fallen down to the capital, and what then would have been the advantages that could render the convention undesirable? The British army, exclusive of Moore's division, had neither provisions, nor means of transporting provisions for more than ten days, and the fleet was the only resource when that supply should be exhausted; but a gale from any point between south and north-west would have driven the ships away or cast them on a lee-shore. It was therefore indispensable first to secure the mouth of the Tagus, for the safety of the fleet; and this could only be done by occupying Cascaes, Bugio, and St. Julian's, the last of which would alone have required ten days, open trenches, and a battering train, which must have been dragged by men over the mountains, for the artillery horses were scarcely able to draw the field guns, and no country animals were to be found. In the mean time, the French troops in Lisbon, upon the heights of Almada, and in the men-of-war, retiring tranquilly through the Alemtejo, would have united with Junot, or, if he had fallen back * Proceedings of the Court of Inquiry.

upon Almeida, they could have retired upon Elvas and La Lippe. In this argument the Russians have not been considered, but whatever his secret wishes might have been, Siniavin must have surrendered his squadron in a disgraceful manner, or joined the French with his six thousand men; and it may here be observed, that even after the arrival of Sir John Moore, only twenty-five thousand British infantry were fit for duty.

Let it now be supposed that the forts were taken, the English fleet in the river, the resources of Lisbon organized, the battering guns and ammunition necessary for the siege of Elvas transported to Abrantes by water; seventy miles of land remained to traverse, and then three months of arduous operations in the sickly season, and in the most pestilent of situations, would have been the certain consequences of any attempt to reduce that fortress. Did the difficulty end there? No! Almeida remained, and in the then state of the roads of Portugal, and taking into consideration only the certain and foreseen obstacles, it is not too much to say that six months more would have been wasted before the country would have been entirely freed from the invaders; but long before that period Napoleon's eagles would have soared over Lisbon again! The conclusion is inevitable: the convention was a great and solid advantage for the allies, a blunder on the part of the French.

With the momentary exception of Junot's threat to burn Lisbon if his terms were not complied with, we look in vain for any traces of that vigor which urged the march from Alcantara. We are astonished to perceive the man, who, in the teeth of an English fleet, in contempt of fourteen thousand Portuguese troops, and regardless of a population of three hundred thousand souls, dared, with a few hundred tired grenadiers, to seize upon Lisbon, so changed in half a year, so sunk in energy, that, with twenty-five thousand good soldiers, he declined a manly effort, and resorted to a convention to save an army which was really in very little danger. But such and so variable is the human mind, a momentary slave of every attraction, yet ultimately true to self-interest. When Junot entered Portugal, power, honors, fame, even a throne was within his view; when he proposed the convention, the gorgeous apparition was gone; toil and danger were at hand, fame flitted at a distance, and he easily persuaded himself that prudence and vigor could not be yoked together. A saying attributed to Napoleon perfectly describes the convention in a few words: "I was going to send Junot before a council of war, when, fortunately, the English tried their generals, and saved me the pain of punishing an old friend!"

BOOK

BOOK III.

CHAPTER I.

Comparison between the Portuguese and Spanish people-The general opinion of French weakness and Spanish strength and energy, fallacious-Contracted policy of the English Cabinet--Account of the civil and military agents employed-Many of them act without judgment-Mischievous effects thereofOperations of the Spanish armies, after the battle of Baylen-Murcian army arrives at Madrid-Valencian army marches to the relief of Zaragoza-General Verdier raises the siege-Castaños enters Madrid-Contumacious conduct of Galluzzo-Disputes between Blake and Cuesta-Dilatory conduct of the Spaniards-Sagacious observation of Napoleon-Insurrection at Bilboa; quelled by General Merlin-French corps approaches Zaragoza-Palafox alarmed, threatens the Council of Castile-Council of war held at Madrid-Plan of operations -Castaños unable to march from want of money-Bad conduct of the Junta of Seville-Vigorous conduct of Major Cox-Want of arms-Extravagant project to procure them.

THE Convention of Cintra, followed by the establishment of a regency at Lisbon, disconcerted the plans of the Bishop and Junta of Oporto, and Portugal was restored to a state of comparative tranquillity; for the Portuguese people, being of a simple character, when they found their country relieved from the presence of a French army, readily acknowledged the benefit derived from the convention, and refused to listen to the pernicious counsels of the factious prelate and his mischievous coadjutors. Thus terminated what may be called the convulsive struggle of the Peninsular war. Up to that period a remarkable similarity of feeling and mode of acting betrayed the common origin of the Spanish and Portuguese people; a wild impatience of foreign aggression, extravagant pride, vain boasting, and a passionate reckless resentment, were common to both; but there the likeness ceased, and the finer marks of national character which had been impressed upon them by their different positions in the political world, became distinctly visible.

Spain, holding, from time immemorial, a high rank among the great powers, and more often an oppressor than oppressed, haughtily rejected all advice. Unconscious of her actual weakness and ignorance, and remembering only her former dignity, she ridiculously assumed an attitude which would scarcely have suited her in the days of Charles V.; whereas Portugal, always fearing

the ambition of a powerful neighbor, and relying for safety as much upon her alliances as upon her own intrinsic strength, was from habit inclined to prudent calculation, and readily submitted to the direction of England. The turbulence of the first led to defeat and disaster; the docility and patience of the second were productive of the most beneficial results.

The difference between these nations was, however, not immediately perceptible. At the period of the convention the Portuguese were despised, while a splendid triumph was anticipated for the Spaniards. It was affirmed and believed, that from every quarter enthusiastic multitudes of the latter were pressing forward to complete the destruction of a baffled and dispirited enemy; the vigor, the courage, the unmatched spring of Spanish patriotism, was in every man's mouth; Napoleon's power and energy seemed weak in opposition. Few persons doubted the truth of such tales, and yet nothing could be more unsound, more eminently fallacious, than the generally entertained opinion of French weakness and of Spanish strength. The resources of the former were unbounded, almost untouched; those of the latter were too slender even to support the weight of victory; in Spain the whole structure of society was shaken to pieces by the violence of an effort which merely awakened the slumbering strength of France. Foresight, promptitude, arrangement, marked the proceedings of Napoleon, but with the Spaniards the counsels of prudence were punished as treason, and personal interests, everywhere springing up with incredible force, wrestled against the public good. At a distance the insurrection appeared of towering proportions and mighty strength, when, in truth, it was a fantastic object, stained with blood, and tottering from weakness. The helping hand of England alone was stretched forth for its support; all other assistance was denied, for the continental powers, although nourishing secret hopes of profit from the struggle, with calculating policy, turned coldly from the patriots' cause. The English Cabinet was indeed sanguine, and resolute to act, yet the ministers, while anticipating success in & preposterous manner, displayed little industry, and less judgment, in their preparations for the struggle; nor does it appear that the real freedom of the Peninsula was much considered in their councils. They contemplated this astonishing insurrection as a mere military opening through which Napoleon might be assailed, and they neglected, or rather feared, to look towards the great moral consequences of such a stupendous event-consequences which were, indeed, above their reach of policy: they were neither able nor willing to seize such a singularly propitious occasion for conferring a benefit upon mankind.