propofition true or falfe, these are of the fame nature in both; that is, they are fubject, predicate, and copula.

But that the reader may have a tafte of his clear style, and way of reafoning, I fhall for his fatisfaction tranfcribe Mr S.'s whole argument from the nature of the predicate. His words are thefe, P. 9. 10. II. 12. "Qur argument from the copula is particularly ftrength"ened from the nature of the predicate in the propofi"tions we speak of; I mean, in fuch speeches as affirm "fuch and fuch points of faith to be true. For true

means exiftent in propofitions which exprefs only the "An eft of a thing, as most points of faith do; which "speak abftractedly, and tell not wherein the nature of

the fubject it fpeaks of confifts, or the Quid eft. So "that most of the propofitions Chriftians are bound to "profefs, are fully expreffed thus: A Trinity is exift66 ent, &c. And the like may be faid of thofe points "which belong to a thing or action paft; as, Creation was, &c. For exiftent is the predicate in these two, "only affixed to another difference of time; and it is e"qually impoffible fuch fubjects fhould neither have been .66 nor not have been, or have been and have not been at once; as it is that a thing fhould neither be nor not "be at prefent, or both be and not be at present.

Re

garding then fedfaftly the nature of our predicate "[exiftent], we fhall find that it expreffes the utmost

actuality of a thing; and as taken in the posture it "bears in thefe propofitions, that actually exercifed, "that is, the utmost actuality in its moft actual state;

that is, as abfolutely excluding all manner or leaft "degree of potentiality, and confequently all poffibi"lity of being otherwife; which is radically deftroyed "when all potentiality is taken away. This difcourfe "holding, which in right to truth I fhall not fear to af"firm (unconcerned in the drollery of any oppofer) to "be more than mathematically demonftrative; it fol "lows inevitably, that whofo is bound to profeís a Tri"nity, incarnation, &c. is or was exiftent, is also bound "to profefs, that it is impoffible they fhould be not exiftent; or, which is all one, that it is impoffible those "points of faith fhould be falfe.

The fame appears out of the nature of diftinction or divifion, applied to our predicate exiftent, as found in thefe propofitions: for could that predicate bear a pertinent diftinction, expreffing this and the other refpect, or thus and thus, it might poffible be according to one of thefe refpects, or thus confidered, and not be "according to another; that is, another way confidered: but this evafion is here impoffible; for either "thofe diftinguifhing notions must be more potential or antecedent to the notion of exiftent; and then they "neither reach exiftent, nor fupervene to it as its de"terminations or actuations, which differences ought to "do; nor can any notion be more actual or determina"tive in the line of fubftance or being, than exiftent is; and fo fit to diftinguish it in that line: nor, lastly, can any determination in the line of accidents ferve "the turn; for thofe fuppofe exiftence already put, and

fo the whole truth of the propofition entire and com"plete antecedently to them. It is impoffible therefore, "that what is thus affirmed to be true, fhould in any regard be affirmed poffible to be falfe: the impoffibility of diftinguifhing the predicate pertinently exclu"ding here all poffibility of divers refpects.

"The fame is demonftrated from the impoffibility of "diftinguishing the fubjects of thofe faith-propofitions; "for thofe fubjects being propofitions themfelves, and "accepted for truths, as is fuppofed, they are inca

pable of diftinction, as fhall be particularly fhewn "hereafter. Befides, thofe fubjects being points of "faith, and fo ftanding in the abftract; that is, not defcending to fubfuming refpects; even in that regard "too they are freed from all pertinent diftinguishable

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nefs.

"The fame is demonftrated from the nature of truih, which confifts in an indivifible; whence there is nothing of truth bad, how great foever the conceived approaches towards it may be, till all may not-be's, or potentiality to be otherwife, be utterly excluded by the actuality of is, or exiftence; which put or difcovered, the light of truth breaks forth, and the dim "twilights of may not be's yanith and difappear."

I have here, reader, prefented thee with a difcourfe

which

which (if we may believe Mr S.) " is more than ma"thematically demonftrative." A rare fight indeed! And is not this a pleasant man, and of good affurance? I now find it true, which he fays elsewhere, (Letter of thanks, p. 1.) that " principles are of an inflexible genius, and felf-confident too; and that they love naturally to exprefs themselves with an affuredness.” But certainly the facred names of principles and demonfiration were never fo profaned by any man before. Might not any one write a book of fuch jargon, and call it demonftration? And would it not equally serve to prove or confute? If he intended this stuff for the fatisfaction of the people, he might as well have writ in the Coptic or Sclavonian language: yet I cannot deny, but that it is very fuitable to the principles of the Ro man church; for why fhould not their fcience, as well as their fervice, be in an unknown tongue; that the one may be as fit to improve their knowledge, as the other is to raise their devotion? But if he defigned this for the learned, nothing could be more improper; for they are far lefs apt to admire nonfenfe than the common people and I defire that no man (how learned foever he may think himfelf) would be over confident that this is fenfe. I do verily believe, that neither Harphius, nor Rofbrocius, nor the profcund mother Juliana, have any thing in their writings more fenfelefs and obfcure than this difcourfe of his, which he affirms to be more "than mathematically demonftrative." So that, if I were worthy to advife Mr S. he fhould give over his pretence to fcience; for, whatever he may think, his talent certainly does not lie,that way; but he feems to be as well made for a myftical divine, as any man I know; and methinks his fuperiors fhould be fenfible of this, and employ him to write about the deiform fund of the foul, the fuper effential life, the method of felf annihilation, and the paffive unions of nothing with nothing; thefe are profound Jubjects, and he bath a style peculiarly fitted for them. For even in this parcel of ftuff which I have now cited, there are five or fix words, such as may-notbe's, potentiality, actuality, actuation, determinative, fupervene, and fubfume, which (if they were but well mingled and difcreetly ordered), and brought in now and

then

then with a that is, to explain one another) would half fet up a man in that way, and enable him to write as myftical a difcourfe as a man could with. But enough of this. And I have trefpaffed not a little upon mine own difpofition in faying thus much, though out of a juft indignation at confident nonfenfe.

It is now time to draw towards a conclufion of this debate. I fhall only leave with the reader a few observations concerning this book of Mr S.'s, and his doctrine of infallibility.

1. That the main drift of his book being to prove,' that what is true is impoffible to be falfe, he opposes no body that I know of in this matter.

2. That in afferting infallibility to be neceffary to the' true nature of faith, he hath the generality of his own church his profeffed adverfaries. The church of Rome never arrogated to herfelf any other infallibility but what fhe pretends to be founded upon Chrift's promise to fecure his church always from error by a fupernatural' affiftance; which is widely different from Mr S.'s' rational infallibility of oral tradition. Mr S. furely cannot be ignorant, that the divines of their church (till Mr Rufhworth and Mr White found out this new way) did generally refolve faith into the infallible teftimony of the church: and the infallibility of their church,' into our Saviour's promife; and the evidence of the true church, into the marks of the church, or the motives of credibility; which motives are acknowledged to be only prudential, and not demonftrative. Bellarmine fays, (1. 4. De ecclef.) that the marks of the church do not make evidently true, which is the true church, but only evidently credible; " and that (fays he) is faid to

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evidently credible, which is neither feen in itself, nor "in its principles; but yet hath fo many and fo weighty "teftimonies, that every wife man hath reason to be"lieve it." Becanus (Sum. tom. 2. partic: de fide, 1.) to the fame purpofe; that "the motives of credibility are only the foundation of a prudent, but not "of an infallible affent." I know very well that Mr Knott, and fome others, would fain perfuade us, that an affent in fome fort infallible may be built upon prudential motives; which is as abfurd as it is poffible: but

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ifs

if it were true, yet Mr S. would not accept of this fort of infallibility; nothing lefs will ferve him than demonftrative motives, and fuch as are abfolutely conclufive of the thing. Stapleton (as Mr Crefly tells us) expressly fays, that fuch an infallible certitude of means is not now neceffary to the paftors of the church, as was neceffary to the apoftles, who were the first founders of the church. So that, according to these authors, there may be true faith, where neither the means nor the motives of it are fuch as to raise our affent to the degree of infallibility. And this is as much to the full as any Proteftant (that I know of) ever faid. Nay, even his friends. of the tradition, Mr Rufhworth, Mr White, and MrCreffy, are guilty of the fame damnable and fundamental error, as Mr S. calls it, (Letter to his anfwerer, p. 5.) For they grant lefs affurance than that which is infallible, to be fufficient to Christian faith, and that we are juftly condemned, if we refufe to believe upon fuch evidence as does ordinarily fatisfy prudent men in human affairs. And particularly Mr White makes a quetion, whether human nature be capable of infallibility? as I have fhewn at large, by clear and full testimonies out of each of thefe authors, in the Anfwer to Sure footing, [vol. 3. p. 309. et seqq.]. Of which teftimonies though Mr S. has not thought fit to take the least notice throughout his book, yet I cannot but think it a reasonable request, to defire him to vindicate the divines of his own church (efpecially thofe of his own way) from thefe things, before he charge us any farther with them.

3. That Mr S. by this principle, That infallibility is neceffary to the true nature of faith, makes every true believer infallible in matters of faith; which is such a paradox, as I doubt whether ever it entered into any other man's mind. But if it be true, what need then of any infallibility in Pope or council? And if this infallibility be grounded upon the nature of oral tradition,. what need of fupernatural affiftance? I doubt Mr S. would be loth to preach this doctrine at Rome? I have often heard, that there is an old tefty gentleman lives. there, who would take it very ill that any one befides him.elf fhould pretend to be infallible.."

4. That