will limit ourselves to a statement about which there can be no question, that the inhabitants of a district are much more competent, in the aggregate of cases, to select their officers to rule over them from among their number than a stranger can be who has to be directed by the representations of others. Now the Executive has either to rely, in the majority of instances, upon the representations of others, if he makes his selection from the district in which the duties are to be discharged, or he must adopt the infamous system of proconsularships and satrapies under which the victims of Roman and Persian tyranny were made to groan in elder days. But this latter practice need not be considered, for in our country it would never be tolerated in a second instance. Being obliged, then, to judge of a candidate from the letters and statements of friends and of foes, of parties and of partizans others rarely trouble themselves with applications for office-what security has the appointing power of making a righteous selection? How can he know all the various interests which depend upon the success or failure of a given suit-how can he fairly weigh the value of recommendations beset with motives of which he knows little or nothing, with certainty? The Executive patronage of the State of New York alone requires the appointment at the rate of from seven to ten officers every day for a whole year. How or when is a Governor to find time to make any adequate examination for these appointments alone, letting alone all other business? The thing is impossible.* But there is another difficulty in the way which prudent statesmen should provide against. We refer to the perpetual temptation to ask qualifications in candidates which the duties of their offices do not require, to give more consideration to their political availability than to their official competency. We shall not trifle with our readers by adducing proofs of this perversion of Executive patronage. It is not so long since the highest as well as the humblest political honors of the nation were openly offered as the price of political devotion-since the public press was subsidized with scarcely an affectation of concealment, and even the judiciary prostituted to the most scandalous nepotism-that we need bring proofs of the infamous uses to which official patronage may be put, when it falls by an act of God, or the blindness of his creatures into the hands of wicked and designing men. Nor is this perversion of official influence confined to those feeble and dishonest men whose elevation is the accident of an accident, but it has entered into and become a part of the very science of politics among us. The availability of a candidate is just as inevitable a condition of his appointment, to be discussed and established, as his constitutional qualifications. The number of votes he can control is as sure to be inquired about as his fulness of age or his citizenship. Neither is this perversion of the appointing power limited to the abusive disposition of offices already created. The strength and influence which they furnish form an appetite which grows by what it feeds on, and a temptation perpetually besets the government to *Pertinent to this view of our subject are the following remarks of De Tocque ville, who, independent of his profound insight into the philosophy of our government, possessed a practical acquaintance with the evils of excessive centralization which entitles his opinion to special respect. "The partizans of centralization in Europe maintain that Government directs the affairs of each locality better than the citizens could do it for themselves. This may be true when the central power is enlightened, and when the local districts are ignorant; when it is as alert as they are slow; when it is accustomed to act, and they to obey. Indeed it is evident that this double tendency must augment with the increase of centralization, and that the readiness of the one and the incapacity of the others must become more and more prominent. But I deny that such is the case when the people are as enlightened, as awake to their interests and as accustomed to reflect on them as the Ameri cans are. I am persuaded, on the contrary, that in this case the collective strength of the citizens will always conduce more efficaciously to the public welfare than the authority of the Government. It is difficult to point out with certainty the means of arousing a sleeping population and of giving it passions and knowledge which it does not possess; it is, I am well aware, an arduous task to pur suade men to busy themselves about their own affairs, and it would frequently be easier to interest them in the punctilios of court etiquette than in the repairs of their common dwelling. But when ever a central administration affects to supersede the persons most interested, I am inclined to suppose that it is either misled or desirous to mislead. However enlightened and however skilful a central power may be, it cannot of itself embrace all the details of the existence of a great nation. Such vigilance exceeds the powers of man. And when it attempts to create and set in motion so many complicated springs it must submit to a very imperfect result or consume itself in bootless efforts." multiply offices for the single purpose of rewarding and purchasing partisans. It was the great maxim of Bentham, which was never absent from his mind when speculating upon the science of government, neither to create or permit any "sinister interest" to bear upon the legislative power directly or indirectly. That the one we have last suggested belongs to that category we have unfortunately no occasion to make proof of. It has betrayed itself so frequently in the political history of our country that it need but be stated to revive in the minds of our readers sufficiently distinct impressions of the disgraceful consequences to which it may sometimes lead. We do not speak of these things to grumble that men will use their influence as abusing it, for we affect never to complain of what we esteem inevitable. It is always to be presumed in government that every man will consult his own interest without reference to any rights which the law has not provided protection for. The State always contains men enough willing to misuse discretionary powers and ready to use any means to possess them, to make this principle a canon of political science. The only protection which the people have is to limit those powers by law, and then the exercise of them cannot be abused. But of this we will speak presently. We wish to say a word first of the influence wrought upon the character of our public men as individuals and as a class by the exercise of this enormous power. The political patron differs very materially from the private benefactor. He has offices to confer, but the favor does not consist in giving an office but in preferring the appointee to every one else. The places or honors are his to give but not to withhold. He cannot if he would enter in and enjoy them himself. They must be filled by his fellow citizens, and he must choose to fill them. Every man, therefore, feels that he has a certain equitable interest or property in any vacant office exactly equal to his own opinion of his capacity for discharging its duties. If any other than himself be selected, and he a candidate, he feels that he has been defrauded to that extent, and the Executive is the offender. Now man has been defined a reasoning animal, but not, so far as we have read, a reasonable one. He is so constituted as to forgive an injury more easily than a neglect. He would sooner be misjudged than overlooked. In nine cases out of ten, therefore, the candidate will be just unreasonable enough to ascribe his failure, if such a fate attend his application, to the ignorance or dullness, and probably, also, to the corruption of the government which has passed him by. The chances then are that he will immediately become pregnant with prophecy about the impotence and insufficiency and folly of the administration. He will discover before any one else, by virtue of that superior sagacity which he offered to prevent it, that the destinies of the country are committed to dangerous hands, and that every man who is half a patriot will see the imminent necessity of rescuing her at once from their control. Most men when they have a strong conviction are not long in finding facts to sustain it; especially if it pertain to questions of personal character and capacity. Every act of the offending government is misrepresented, every motive is impeached, apparent virtues are attributed to artfulness, the friendly word of approbation which falls in their hearing is imputed to corruption. Everything they hear, everything they see emanating from that hateful source is distorted, before it has traversed the troubled medium of their wounded vanity and inconsiderate selfishness. The consequence is that a reputation which has been acquired by a life spent in the exercise of brilliant talents, an unreproachable moral purity, and the most devoted industry, may in the short space of six months be prostrated by an unsuccessful effort to dispense the patronage of our general or of State governments to the satisfaction of all whom it may concern. Whatever gratification human ambition may derive from the exercise of such powers, must be painfully neutralized by these unhappy consequences which it is so certain to entail. It will be the office of history to illustrate this view from the experience of the present generation. Thus much of the influence of patronage upon the individual character and repute of him who dispenses it. A word now of its influence upon his class upon the general character of those who are called through it to the public service. We take leave to remind our If they cannot have it from one man, readers again of the vast number of they will have it from another; and persons ever aspiring to official favors they'll ransack all the asylums of in our country. Some commit their wrecked and decayed politicians in the hopes to the chances of a municipal country until they discover one, as they election, some to a state election, some always can, fit for their uses. Actuated, to a national election, and some entirely then, by an interest more strong than to the success of some individual can- is felt by the more eligible class of didate. All that excess of zeal which political aspirants, and increasingly the office-seeker feels over the single- stronger than that of the ordinary citiminded citizen-voter, will be expended zens, they devote themselves to the for the success of some man or set of success of their man or men, with a demen from whom he has hope. Any votion and an unscrupulousness as discandidate whose preferences would in- proportioned as are their merits to those terfere with his success, he would, of of the other two classes. The interest course, oppose, directly or indirectly. in these labors becomes reciprocal. The He would likewise oppose any man candidate may have tried in vain for a whose opinions on any subject might fair nomination from the people; he lead to such an interference. His as- may lack some element of character sistance he must make a market of in which is fatal to his legitimate success; some wise. He will devote himself, he consorts by instinct with his kind; therefore, to such person or persons he promises everything that is necesonly as he can most securely rely upon sary to beget efficiency in his backers; in the day of accounting. Upon this he is chosen; and every office over principle of reciprocity of interest, it which he can exert any control is bilmay be assumed that a very considera- leted with some of his instruments. ble proportion of our professional poli- That this kind of success is practicable, ticians embark in speculations for of- nay, is common, no one with the expefice. Now it is not too much to say, in rience of however short a political life, general terms, that those who have can question. If it be practicable, it fewest claims for political rewards will must be profitable. If profitable, it be least likely to receive them, unless will be prosecuted by every officethey have thus contracted for them in waiter sufficiently easy in his morals to advance, either directly or by implica- use the means. But the number of tion. If the superior officer have no unscrupulous men equal to the compreinterests but those of the public to hension and the prosecution of such serve, he will select such men for the schemes, is infinitely greater than is public offices as will most redound to that of the offices to be provided for. his own dignity and that of the offices What is to be the consequence? Is it to be filled. Those who are least fitted not inevitable that the public must therefore for the places they aspire to, come to be served by less than firstwill be last thought of in such a case. rate officers?-by men who will conSensible of this, they will ally them- sent to compromise their moral standselves to the fortunes of some man ard in some degree, to compass ends upon whose gratitude they can depend which seem unattainable by fair means if he should be successful. But if the against such unfair competition. If so, candidate be a man who will submit to does it not follow that our standard of even an implied stipulation in favor of public men must depreciate rapidly? the men to whom such a stipulation is No one can fail to perceive this tendennecessary, he, in turn, must be wholly cy manifesting itself continually, both unworthy of the place to which he as- in the character of the applicants for pires. Nay, if he will consent to award official station and of those who are seto the less worthy applicants the offices lected to fill them. But upon this whose advowson he enjoys, even as a point we can hardly speak so briefly as reward for services voluntarily render- our limits require without incurring the ed, or for any cause other than through risk of being misapprehended. We his own ignorance, he is a bad man and have a word, however, to say some a dangerous public officer. But the day upon the subject, and shall avail less deserving, and also the more neces- ourselves of an early opportunity to sitous, will insist upon having such a explain ourselves. We have stated prospect secured to them in some form. enough for the present to give our read ers an idea of the kind of influence which patronage must ever work upon the character of the public service, by trusting it to men whose interests do not correspond with those of the masses. There is another consequence attending the maintenance of this vast army of office holders in the republic, of a kindred character, though perhaps paramount in importance, to any we have mentioned. We have alluded to their coherence which is maintained in spite of their very different political aspirations by the common interest in the success of the party on whose fate they all depend. This, as we have shown, leads to a merger of all local, or, as they are termed, secondary interests in the questions of common and universal party interest. Regular nominations and party union are at once the cry with which every menace of local divisions is converted or subdued into acquiescence. This species of party tyranny, with which our readers are perfectly familiar-and therefore we the less regret to have so very imperfectly stated its character-interferes in a frightful degree with that freedom of discussion and liberality of opinion which is the most reliable source of general good sense among the people, and the best security for their judging public measures with wisdom and fairness. As it is, they dare not debate a question which has become a party is sue. That would imply a doubt of its correctness, and might lead to disunion and defeat, and as multitudes of our citizens have not the means of resolving questions of public moment in their closet, and are debarred by the superior activity or sagacity of professional politicians from debating them before they are committed as a party for or against them. They are obliged either to incur the risk of being stigmatized as "unBound," or blindly to adopt opinions which they imperfectly understand or of which they disapprove. We wisely purpose in our law to guarantee the utmost freedom of opinion and of speech, but by the operation of our laws we manifestly limit both to a serious extent. By establishing in our midst a band of men whose common interest is the success of the party rather than of measures which would promote the public welfare, we expose society to the operation of an artificial public opinion more compulsory and inexorable than any law of itself could possibly be made. But it is idle to multiply objections to the prevailing systems of appointment to office. It will be sufficiently conclusive upon all who esteem the end of government to be the welfare of the governed, that centralizing power by patronage in the hands of executive officers tends, I. To interfere with and obstruct the fair representation of the public will. 1. By organizing and disposing an army of influential men about the country interested in perpetuating a particular governmental policy from other motives than the public good. 2. By aggregating the people into large parties upon a few questions of common interest, by which all minor and local interests are swallowed up, and in the name of party fidelity the citizen is sacrificed to the partisan. II. That it leads to the selection of incompetent and unsatisfactory public officers. 1. Because an Executive can have no adequate opportunity or means to investigate the claims of the various applicants, and 2. He is under a continual temptation to select available instruments to serv his own political ends rather than com petent officers to serve those of th public. III. That it creates a temptation o multiply offices for the purpose of creating or rewarding political or personal friends. IV. That it tends to bring into discredit the character and reputation of men who have fairly earned the confidence of the people by their purity and capacity as men and as statesmen, and also V. To lower the standard of the public service by creating an interest favorable to the selection of unscrupulous officers. VI. That it tends to interfere greviously with the liberty of opinion and of discussion by subjecting the political sentiments of all classes to the most unrelenting party tyranny. But few of our readers will not have already anticipated the only adequate remedy to these numerous and alarming defects of our constitutional system. We must rely upon that great principle of human government-the wisdom of be which it has been the peculiar office of history for the past three hundred years to teach, and of our own political institutions to establish-THE REPRESENTATIVE SYSTEM. Those for whose benefit, offices are created are alone competent to fill them wisely. If there any truth in the doctrine of popular sovreignty, any wisdom in the theory of political representation, then are our governments conducted in flagrant and constant violation of the truth and wisdom of both. If the people are wise enough to elect a Governor or a member of Congress, or the judges of the highest court of appeal in a State like New York, are they incompetent to select a postmaster or the clerks of their courts. If they can guide the legislature of the country by their instructions through the profound mysteries of the Tariff and the Sub-Treasury scheme, can't they be trusted with the selection of their revenue officers? To take the single case of postmasters and their deputies, of which there are about 28000, more or less, appointed by the General Government, can any one state anything purporting to be a reason for supposing the Postmaster General more competent to fill any single post-office in the land, than the inhabitants of the It will be observed by our readers, upon a slight examination, that the objections we have stated to the excessive patronage of our executive officers would, for the most part, be obviated by distributing it among the people. * Since writing the above we have been gratified to find our views ably defended in a series of essays just published "On human rights and their political guarranties," by E. P. Hurlbut, Esq., of New York city, from which we take leave to make the following extract, premising that a notice of Mr. Hurlbut's book will be found in a subsequent article in this number of the Review. "Admit the sovereignty of the people, and it necessarily follows that in every instance it is their right and duty to choose the officers of State; their right because of their supremacy, and their duty because of the immense moral interests which are staked upon the action of government. Herein the American constitutions depart from the true theory of rightful government, by providing for the appointment of very many important State officers by the agents of the people, instead of providing for the invariable choice of all officers by the people themselves. The worst corruptions nestle in the bosom of the executive department of State, and this branch of the government can never be purified without stripping it of patronage. Let the people resume the power of appointing to office, which they have improperly delegated to this department, and they will redeem it from temptation and corrupting influences-from the inportunity and bribes of office-seekers-the scandal of the disappointed, and the false eulogy of the gratified applicants for official station. Let the people have a direct vote upon the choice of every officer, from the President of the United States to the constable of a town-from a Secretary of State to a deputy postmaster-and no longer cheat the true sovereigns in a free State out of the best portion of their rightful authority by the trick of Executive appointment to office. As there can be no violation of the natural laws without consequent evil-so a Government based upon the principles of justice and equality cannot violate the law of its existence without incurring harm-and the American people are at present afflicted with the curse of Executive patronage, for their transgression of the fundamental principle of a free Government. This, together with many other evils flowing from the American Constitutions, has arisen from a want of harmony between the great principles lying at the foundation of democratic institutions, and the mode of procedure under them. The principle is sound; but it is not followed out in detail. The people are trusted a little way, and then a sudden fear chills all confidence, and they have masters appointed over them. They may elect a Governor directly, but must choose electors to elect a President. They may elect a County Treasurer, but not a State Treasurer-a Justice of the Peace but not a County Judge. They are permitted to choose a Congressman, but not a village Postmaster. This is worse than absurd-it corrupts the Executive power, and fills office with sycophants and unworthy incumbents. It produces that scramble for spoils, that rush to the Executive chamber, which shocks the moral sense of the community at every inauguration of a new President or Governor. As confidence in the democratic principle gains ground, this abuse will be gradually corrected and we shall get rid of those details which we have borrowed from the limited monarchy of Great Britain, and oddly enough blended with our institutions, without perceiving their unfitness. |